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ABSTRACT 
This research stems from the proposition that important 
qualitative changes are occurring within Western Society, and 
that these changes call for new forms of individual and 
organisational adaptation. 
Planning is a pre-eminently suitable way of adapting in an 
appropriate fashion to the complexities of change, rather than 
through ad hoc responses. 
Four tendencies appear to be prevalent and to persist within 
what may be termed these technologically advanced societ:ies; 
these are: 
high and accelerating rates of technological and social 
change; 
an unevenness in these rates of change, especially among 
different parts of the environment in which organisations 
operate; 
an increasing interconnectedness and interdependence among 
these environmental parts; and 
an increasing overall size and complexity of the environment 
and its consistuent organisations. 
System's theory, it is felt, will provide a particularly apt 
conceptual framework for the consideration of these problems, 
which will be made explicit and amplified primarily through an 
exploration of these concepts which are central to a theory of 
behavioural systems. 
It is argued that the conditions in which social activity occurs 
are, in many parts of the world, becoming subject to important 
qualitative changes which demand new responses and modes of 
adaptation of behaviour, which look to what may be termed a new 
'appreciative' outlook, in which a central element will be a 
recognition that units within ecological consideration nrust 
become the basis for achieving equitable outcomes. 
Chapters 7 and 8 discuss planning, the method which all social 
units at all levels use when attempting to regul;:i.te relations 
with others in order to continue functioning effectively. Here, 
the conceptual framework will be used to examine this problem of 
planning. Further, to refine the notion of planning, technical, 
natural, institutional, economic, conflict and social systems 
will be examined. In particular, urban planning will be looked 
at as of increasingly critical concern as the result of the 
world urbanisation process. 
A new paradigm for planning will be suggested which draws 
together the main elements of the thesis, in which the aims and 
techniques of enquiry will be from the making of explanations 
which derive from single purpose approaches to the furtherance 




This thesis is about social systems theory. It is my intention 
to develop a framework for analysis, and to illustrate the use 
to which this framework may be put by applying it to planning in 
general and to urban planning in particular. It is necessary, 
however, to "clear the ground" as it were, in order to establ.ish 
why I think systems theory may be used as a tool for analysis 
and development rather than (say) a Marxist theoretic or a set 
of functionalist empirical techniques. 
Firstly, I should state that I, like any other resear.2her, 
operate within a value set, that for me revolves around the 
notions of democracy, which has led me in my previous research 
to use the socio-technical systems approach, which in turn has 
been linked in the literature to industrial democracy at the 
shop floor level and the "Quality of Working Life" movement 
(Davis and Cherns: 1975). Between 1950 and the early 1970's the 
systems theory approach assumed increasing importance and 
considerable theoretical development took place. In my search 
of the systems theory literature, however, I found very little 
of theoretical importance had been written after 1972 although 
the socio-technical systems approach had continued in the 
industrial setting and indeed, some criticisms of the techniques 
used within this have appeared recently (Blackler and Brown: 
1980; Kelly and Clegg: 1982). 
It is difficult to account for the decline in the use of systems 
theory among researchers although two possible reasons suggest 
themselves. Firstly, there has been a reaction to the rather 
euphoric optimism of the 1960's, especially in terms of the 
decline in the world economic climate. It was felt, perhaps, 
that: the systems approach to research, at least, in terms of the 
ways in which systems theory was being used, was not adequate to 
deal with power relations within soci~ty, esp~cially when the 
changes which occurred seemed not to be forseen by the systems 
theorists. 
Secondly, social systems theory appeared to be "overtaken" by 
neo-Marxist structuralism in Eueope, which di<!_ examine the 
problems of power relations in Western Society and this more 
effectively than the Humanist Marxism of Marcuse which had not 
lived up to its promise after the May '68 student riots in 
Paris. 
Systems theory and Humanist Marxism had, paradoxically, 
something in common in that both took a somewhat subjective 
anti-positivist epistemological stance. Marxist str11cturalism, 
on the other hand, predicted that "truth" could be revealed 
through science, and the objective analysis of "deep 
structures". In America, there was a corresponding retreat by 
academic functionalists towards "hard" sociology; to statistics 
and empiricism, a move facilitated by the development of even 
more powerful, but cheaper computers. 
How then can systems theory be useful as a concept for the 
development of further theory? I wish to argue that systems 
theory has, in the main, been wrongly conceived and used by 
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theorists, so that the criticisms which have been levelled at 
systems theory should really be d.irected towards those who have 
not properly understood it. For the rest of this discussion, I 
will develop the concept of systems following von Bertalanffy, 
and show that his original framework, if followed, may lead to a 
better understanding of the problems which beset us in the realm 
of urban planning. 
The notion of "system" is an elusive one. Many books on systems 
theory do not offer a formal definition of the systems concept, 
and where a definition is attempted, it is usually one of 
considerable generality. For example, Angyal suggests that 
'there is a logical genus suitable to the treatment of wholes. 
We propose to call it system' (Angyal: 1941: 24.3). Again in the 
wotds of von Bertalanf fy, the founding father of general systems 
theory, 'these are correspondences in the principles which 
govern the behaviour of entities that are intrinsically widely 
different. This correspondence is due to the fact that they all 
can be considered, in certain aspects, as "systems", that is, 
complexes of elements standing in interaction' (von Bertalanffy: 
1956: 1-2). 
The notions of 'holism' and 'interaction' of parts are not 
exclusive to systems theory, and the skeletal definitions such 
as these have led many social scientists to the view that 
systems theory often represents little more than old 
conceptualisations dressed up i L1 new and needlessly complex 
jargon. 
The situation is, in fact, much more complex than this however. 
Von Bertalanffy wishes to use the notion of 'system' as a means 
for cutting through the substantive differences which exist 
between different academic disciplines. The subject matter of 
chemistry, physics, biology, sociology, etc., are linked in his 
view by the fact that they study 'complexes of elements standiag 
in interation', that is, 'systems'. The task of this general 
systems theory is to discover the principles of organisation 
which underlie such systems. One of hls general aims is to 
achieve a 'unity of science' based upon 'the isomorphy of laws 
in different fields' (von Bertalanffy: 1956: 3). 
In many respects von Bertalanffy's aim can he regarded as 
archetypical of the positivist perspective; it is based on upon 
epistemological assumptions dominated by a concern to search for 
and explain the underlying regularities and structural 
uniformities which characterise the world in general. However, 
his perspective differs from that of most positivists, in that 
he does not take his point of departure from the traditions of 
conventional science. Indeed, the contrary is true, and that is 
of major significance for this thesis. Von Bertalanf fy is 
firmly set against the reductionism which characterises most 
areas of scientific endeavour, with its emphasis upon modes of 
enquiry based upon the methods and principles of conventional 
physics. He views his general systems theory as providing an 
alternative to this; instead of reducing all phenomena of study 
to physical events, he advocates that we study them as systems. 
His positivism is thus of a non-traditional kind and is 
dominated by the metaphor of 'system' as an organising concept. 
v 
Von Bertalanffy makes much use of 'the limitations of 
conventional physics' as a means of advocating his general 
systems approach. In this the difference between 'closed' and 
'open' systems plays a very important part. Von Bertalanffy 
argues that conventional physics deals mainly with closed 
systems, that is, systems which are considered to be isolated 
from their environment. The method of the controlled 
experiment, in which the subject of study is taken out of its 
environment and subjected to various tests, provides a very good 
example of this. Such closed systems are characterised by 
equilibrium. As von Bertalanffy puts it, 'a closed system must, 
according to the second law of thermodynamics, eventually att;:iin 
a time independent equilibrium state, with maximum entrophy and 
minimum free energy, where the rat.lo between its phases remains 
constant' (von Bertalanffy: 1950). 
Open systems are quite different, in that they are characterised 
by an exchange with their environment. They engage in trans-
actions with their environment, 'importing' and 'exporting' and 
changing them in the process. A living organism prov.ides a good 
example of an open system, since it maintatns itself through a 
process of exchange with its environment, during the course of 
which there is a continuous building up and breaking down of 
component parts. The concept of an open system is thus 
essentially processual. Whilst a closed system must eventually 
obtain an equilibrium state, an open system may achieve a steady 
state, homeostasis, in which the system remains constant as a 
whole and in its phases, though there is a constant flow of the 
component materials. Such a steady state, however, it not a 
necessary condition of open systems. 
This is a point of the utmost importance, and it needs to be 
emphasised. An open system can take a wide variety of forms. 
There are no general laws that dictate that it must achieve a 
steady state, be goal directed, evolve, regress or disintegrate. 
In theory, anything can happen. One of the purposes of open 
systems theory is to study the patterns of relationships which 
characterise a system and its relationship to its environment in 
order to UNDERSTAND the way in 1-1hich it operates. The open 
systeins approach does not carry with it the implication that any 
one particular kind of analogy is appropriate for studying all 
systems, since it is possible to dtscern different tyJ?es of open 
system in practice. 
The above point has not been clearly stressed or articulated in 
the literature on system theory, at least not in the systems 
literature. As far As most social scientists are concerned, 
there are two types of system perspectives - open and closed. 
The fact that the former encompasses a whole range of 
possibilities is hardly every recognised. 
As a theoretical perspective in.social science, the notion of a 
closed system tends to be avoided. Von Bertalanffy's argument 
that closed systems are characterised by isolation from their 
environment has proved overwhelmingly successful in persuadtng 
social theorists that the closed systems approach is 
inappropriate as a guiding principle for the conceptualising of 
social phenomena. Indeed, it has become almost obliga,tory for 
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social system theorists to decry the inadequacies of closed 
systems theorising. In the field of organisation studies for 
example, an attack upon the closed system thinking implicit in 
Weber's model of bureaucracy or classical management theory 
provides a convenient springboard for lauding the praises of the 
contemporary perspective of open systems theory. 
Paradoxically, as a method of analysis the notion of a closed 
system is still dominant in many areas of social enqui.ry. The 
ust~ of cont rolled experiments and interview programmes, and the 
attempt to measure social phenomena through attitude 
questionnaires, all provide examples of closed system 
methodologies based upon the assumption that the environment 
generated by the investigation has no impact upon the subject of 
study. The paradox is often compounded by the fact that such 
closed system methodologies are often employed within the 
context of theoretical perspectives which emphasise the 
importance of an open systems approach. This phenomenon has 
been termed "abstracted empiricism", (C.Wright Mills: 1959). 
Abstracted empiricism describes the output of researchers who 
have allowed methodologies derived from the natural sciences to 
dominate their work. I use it here in a related hut more 
specific and limited sense. If social science is considered in 
terms of a subjective-objective continuum, abstracted empiricism 
represents a situation in which a highly nomothetic methodology 
is used to test a theory which is based upon ontology, an 
epistemology and a theory of human nature of a more su~jectivist 
kind. It is with regard to this incongruence that, for example, 
abstracted empiricism differs from behavi_ourism. 
Skinner and other behaviourists adopt a perfectly coherent and 
congruent perspective in relation to their objectve world view. 
Their engagement in the wholesale use of experimental and other 
research methods derived from the natural sciences is consistent 
with the nature of their theorising. Abstracted empidcism 
arises in situations where the methods used are inconsistent 
with the underlying theory. Within this thesis I have attempted 
to be ever mindful of this problem, and in discussing urban 
planning I attempt to maintain a methodology which does not 
retreat to nomothetic views. 
Despite the widely recognised deficiencies of the closed system 
as a theoretical construct in social science, the full 
implications of an open systems approach have not been pursued 
in any depth. The concept has been adopted in a very partial 
and often misleading way. For many theorists, the adoption of 
an open systems perspective has been a very limited venture, 
confined to recognising and emphasising the environment as an 
influence upon the subject of study and reformulating 
traditional models in terms of systems concepts. More than 
anything, the call to adopt an open systems approach has been 
interpreted as a call to take heed of the environment and often 
little else. As Buckley has noted, 'though there is a fair 
amount of superficial (and often incorrect) use of the newer 
terminology (it is almost de rigueur to mention "boundary 
maintenance", input-output, "cybernetic control" (sic), feedback 
and the like), the underlying conceptions sho1-1 littl.e advance 
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over the mechanical equilibrium model of earlier centuries' 
(Buckley: 1967: 7). 
The majority of systems mod~ls used in the social sciences tend 
to be based upon mechanical and biological analogies, throueh in 
recent years increasing attention has been paid to cybernetic 
models as a basis of analysis. The mechanical models have been 
derived directly from the physical sciences and tend to be 
underwritten by the assumption that the system has a tendency to 
achieve an equilibrium state. Since, as I have already noted, 
equilibrium is only possible in closed systems, does this imply 
that all theorists using mechanical models are working upon 
closed system principles? To the extent that most of these 
theorists recognise the influence of the environumnt, the answer 
is no. Though adhering to the underlying concept of equilibrium 
- albeit mistakenly in theoretical terms - they modify their 
analysis to allow for the fact that disequilibrium is a very 
common feature of the system; or that the situation is one of 
dynamic equilibrium, with the system moving from one equilibrium 
state to another; or that the system is characterised by 
homeostasis. All these three strategies can be understood as 
attempts to save the notion of equilibrium as an ongoing concept 
in open systems situations where it is fundamentally 
inappropriate. Homeostasis is an acceptable open systems 
concept, but it applies an organismic as opposed to a mechanical 
analogy as an organising principle. 
Mechanical models of open systems, therefore, tend to be 
characterised by a number of theoretical contradictions and are 
thus of very limited value as methods of an;:ilysis in situations 
where the environment of the subject of study is of any real 
significance. Environmental change is of principle significance 
as a source of disequilibrium. The possibility that 
environmental change may influence the very structure and 
essential nature of the system is negated to some extent by 
assumptions that equilbrium will eventually be resolved. The 
use of a mechanical equilibrium analogy thus severely constrains 
the openness of the system under investigation. 
Similar problems relate to the use of biological analogies in 
systems analysis. Since von Bertalanffy's advocacy of the 
merits of an open systems approach, the choice of a biological 
organism as a model for systems analysis has proved increasingly 
popular and has more or less replaced the older mechanical 
analogies. Indeed, the biological analogy of an organism - with 
its emphasis upon characteristic features such as energic input, 
throughput and output, homeostasis, negative entrophy, 
differentiation and equifinality - has often been equated with 
the open systems approach per se. Von Bertalanffy's enthusiasm 
for illustrating the open systems notion with analogies drawn 
from biology, his former discipline, has led many social systems 
theorists to confuse what was intended as an illustation with a 
point of principle. For many, the adoption of an open systems 
approach has been equated with the adoption of an organismic 
analogy as a basis for analysis. I wish to argue later that 
this represents but one of a number of possible open systems 
analogies. 
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Now of particular importance as far as the organismic ;,inalogy is 
concerned are those which imply that the system has 'needs'; 
that these are necessarily geared to survival or homeostasis; 
and that the subsystems contribute to the well-being of the 
systems as a whole. The notion that a system has needs \vhich 
must be fulfilled and the notion of functional unit both derive 
directly from the use of the analogy of the biological organism 
for the study of society. The notions of homeostasis and 
survival are characteristic of biological analogies at the level 
of both the organism and of the species. 
As in the case of the mechanical equilibrium systems model, the 
use of the organismic analogy constrains the m;:inner in 1vhich the 
system is viewed in relation to its environment. Firstly, the 
system, like an organism is cast in a respondlng role. Despite 
the fact that the relationship between system and environment i.s 
seen in theory as one of mutual influence, the organismic 
analogy encourages the view that it is the environmr:nt 1vhich 
influences and the system which responds. The emphasis is upon 
the environment acting upon the system rather than the other way 
around. Secondly, the organismic analogy tends to presume a 
relatively stable syste111 structure. The system responds through 
recognisable channels, the constituent elements of which have a 
function to perform within the context of the system as a whole. 
Thirdly, the general nature of the response is seen as being 
determined by the 'needs' of the system. These needs act as a 
reference point for interpreting the activities of the system as 
a whole. Full openness, however, requires that the system be 
allowed to act unfettered by such assumptions. 
Walter Buckley (1967) has provided a critique of the 
inadequacies of conventional models used in social science. He 
argues that in the realm of humdn activity it is the morphog13nic 
nature of social arrangements which is all important, and that 
systems models adequate for the task of analysing these 
processes need to be adopted. Buckley's morphogenic view of 
society takes him away from the majority of more conventional 
social systems theorists, in that he sees social structure as 
emerging from the process of social interaction. Thus his 
morphogenic view does not emphasise structure at the expense of 
process, nor is his scheme concerned to provide explanations of 
social affairs which are geared to providing explanations of the 
status quo. Buckley, following Radcliffe-Brown's view that 'the 
social structure as a whole can only be observed in its 
functioning' is not constrained by any adherence to the 
organismic analogy. His morphogenic system theory is thus 
subjectivist. 
Buckley's analysis opens up new horizons as far as systems 
theory in social science is concerned. It illustrates that 
systems analysis need not be confined to the use of a particuL:tr 
kind of well-worn analogy, such as that of the organism. Other 
choices offer themselves for consideration. Cybernetics models 
for example, seek to cut through the substantial differences 
which exist between machines and organisms, in an attempt to 
focus upon common organisational principles whi.ch define the 
nature of self-regulating systems. Such models offer a useful 
alternative to the traditional social system analogies in 
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situations where the study of social regulation or social 
engineering is a primary concern. Other analogies also of fer 
themselves as a basis for systems analysis. If the concern is 
to study situations in which conflictual relationships tend to 
predominate, then an analogy which emphasises that the system 
has a tendency to break up or d.ivide may be more appropriate. 
"Factorial' or 'catastrophic' systems models may provide a 
better explanation of the subject under study. One of the 
central problems facing the systems analyst is that of choosing 
an analogy which reflects the basic nature of the phenomena to 
be investigated. 
The emphasis of my discussion here has been placed upon the fact 
that systems theory is not linked to the use of any one 
particular analogy. The fact that more applications have been 
based upon the mechanical and organismic models, especially the 
latter, has often disguised the fact. The focus in my approach 
to systems theory, hopefully exhibited within these pages is 
upon the way in which a system is organised internally and in 
relation to its environment. This approach seeks to penetr.::tte 
beyond the substantive nature of the machine, organ.ism or 
whatever to reveal its principle of organisation. Systems 
theory i.s about organisation - the organisation of 'complexes of 
elements staading in interaction', to use von Be·rtalanffy's 
words (1956: 2). The automatic selection of one particular kind 
of analogy presumes a specific kind of structure and con-
commitant pattern of information process, exchange, behaviour 
and the like. The selection of a particular type of analogy to 
represent a system in advance of a detailed analysis ~f its 
structure and mode of operation is akin to prescription in 
advance of diagnosis. This has been the principal problem with 
systems analysis in soci.al science. Social theorists have 
generally reached for some simple mechan'ical organis:nic analogy 
in advance of any study of the system to whi.c.h it is applied. 
Nowhere has this problem been more evident than in the realm of 
urban planning, which I shall use to develop a contrary theme to 
tltat of the neo-Harxist structuralists who have beco1n,~ more 
dominant as the systems approach has been in retreat, (which is 
not to say that 1 shall be deaU.ng with Hacxist structuralism in 
my thesis). None-the-less, some mention should be made of this 
approach at this juncture. 
Briefly, within urban planning, the work of the Neo-Marx:ists 
structuralists has found its most forceful expression in the 
work of Castells, who takes his epistemology and his structure 
of analytical concepts from Althusser, and his political theory 
from Powlantzas. He has attempted to clear the way conceptually 
for the development of a scientific analysis of the urban 
question. Castells then takes a highly objectivist view to 
urban sociology. For example, he asserts that "a science either 
general or particular which has neither a specific theoretical 
object nor a specific real object d_oes not exist as a science" 
(Castells: 1976: 60). Now it is difficult to know what he means 
by this, but I take it to reflect his objectivity, particularly 
as he also maintained that the development of the city as a 
unit of collective consumption could not be explained in terms 
of the actions of individual subjects, as "transformations of 
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space must (thus) be analysed as specifications of trans-
formations in the social structure" (ibid: 78). For Castells, 
urban sociology, in failing to be either a specific theoretical 
object or a specific real object cannot be considered as a 
science but as an ideology. Needless to say, he finds both of 
these objects in his own work stating the "real object" to be 
the "city" as a spatial unit of collective consumption, and the 
"theoretical object" the "city" as a residential unit of 
"labour-power" (ibid: 48). 
Having thus defined both the "real object" and the "theoretical 
object" of a scientific urban sociology, Castells was in a 
position to develop a class analysis of urban problems (defined 
as problems of collective consumption involving the n~production 
of labour-power). Urban problems, he declared are "in advanced 
capitalism •••• the focal point for new forms of class struggle" 
(ibid: 147) and it is therefore necessary to understand urban 
politics scientifically. 
This semantic tax.onomy may be scientific but Castells becomes 
enmeshed in obtuse arguments and undefined term::> (Pickvance: 
1976; Saunders: 1981; Dunleavy: 1980; Elliott and acCrone: 
1982). This is not to dismiss Castells' contribution but this 
high degree of abstraction serves not to enlighten us as to how 
urban sociology in gener::il and urban planning in particular is 
to proceed. 
I deal, in some detail, with the objective functionalist flight 
to statistical techniques in the main body of the thesis, but 
suffice it to say at this stage, that this flight also involves 
abstraction and the removal of the urban planner from the domain 
of public debate to the realm of the expert. 
How then, may social systems theory bring urban pLrnni.ng hack to 
the public realm and within the democratic process? This is the 
problem for this thesis. In Chapter 1, I discuss the 
environment in terms of planning and social changi~. Chapters 2 
and 3 develop the concepts of systems and the systems/ 
environment interface. Chapter 4 deals with the problem of how 
systems adapt to their environment while Chapter 5 begins the 
discussion on planning. In Chapter 6, the planners' ex.panding 
horizons are considered and Chapters 7 and 8 take us a1.,1ay from 
strategic activity in the abstract and discuss urban planning as 
an example of an area where the not.ion of appreciative 
management may be applied. Finally, in Chapter 9 I put forward 
some recommendations and suggestions for their implementation. 
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PLANNING AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
2 
DIMENSIONS OF CHANGE 
This study is premised on the proposition that the social fields 
of advanced industrial societies, considered as the mi lieux for 
the purposive social behaviours of individuals, groups and 
organisations, are becoming subject to important qualitative 
changes in their structure and dynamics, changes \vhich will 
necessitate new forms of individual and organisational 
adaptation. These charges appear to be a function of four 
prevalent and very persistent tendencies operating within the 
advanced industrial societies: (1) high and accelerating rrites 
of technological and social change; (2) unevenness in the rates 
of change among the constituent parts of the f leld; (3) 
increasing interconnectedness and interdependence among these 
parts; and (4) increasing overall size and complexity of the 
social field. 
While these changes are a function of the transformation of 
industrial society, there is little consensus as to the form of 
society that is emerging. Of the designations that have been 
popularised, a number have given special emphasis to a limited 
facet of the developing societal structure. 'The affluent 
society' and 'the atomic age', now less fashionable than 'the 
service state' and 'the electronic age', are designations of 
this sort. 
Brzezin~ki's 'technetronic era', Boulding's 'post-civilised 
society', and Toffler's 'super-industrial society' are more 
encompassing terms, and analysis reveals a good deal of overlap 
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amongst them. Here, however, the term popularised by Daniel 
1 Bell, 'post-industrial' society, is preferred. Its advantage, 
as Trist (1972:157) has pointed out, lies in the implication of 
its metaphor: 
that we may not assume that the present 
social order will continue indefinitely; 
rather must we prepare ourselves to assist 
the emergence of a society radically 
different from the industrial societies 
which have evolved in the last two hundred 
years - whether these remain substantially 
capitalistic or have taken on either d mixed 
or a socialistic complexion. 
In other words industrial society was characterised as a 
manufacturing society, dominated by the production systems of 
secondary industry, the development of which is geared to the 
exploitation of natural resources and a system of trade 
considerably dependent upon international relations (Tof fler 
1980). It was a system in which most of the important roles are 
occupied by adult males - as workers, decision-makers, and 
'bread-winners'; and in which families, as a consequence, was 
'nucleated', In such a society, the state has three fundamental 
roles: to create and regulate the conditions under whieh 
production and productivity can be maintained; to provide for a 
comprehensive education system that was capable of meeting the 
necessary manpower requirements; and to provide for the 
casualties of industrialism - the poor, the sick, the aged, and 
so on. 
On the other hand the concept of post-industrialism challenges 
the prevailing unreflective assumptions of the relati.ve 
permanence and stability of these roles has implications for our 
personal worlds. But particularly it challenges the concepts of 
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planning that have been developed and applied in industrial 
society, for planning has a special concern with trying to 
anticipate the shape of the future. If, as we believe, 
industrial society is undel'.'going a radical tnrnsformation, then 
it is certain that our att"itudes towards planning and methods of 
undertaking it are going to require revision. In fact, as will 
be discussed, such a 're-think' has already begun. 
The first part of my argument is applied to describing the 
transformation that is taking place and putting forward an 
inter.pret.i.ve framework. The second part applies this framework 
to planning activity and tries to formulate a new concept of 
plannlng that is appropriate to the conditions that are emerging 
in society. 
In discussing the nature and the dimensions of the changes that 
are taking place (in particular, those changes which have 
significant consequences for a social system's efforts to plan 
its future), the concept of social field has been adopted in 
prefel'.'ence to the concepts of society or social structure, 
although of course these terms are used. The field concept 
conforms to the 'world hypothesis' of contextualism, for which 
the 'root metaphor' is the hlstorical event or act (Pepper: 
1942). Contextualism's basic categories are contexts or 
complexes, whi(:h, as explicans, are taken into consideration 
from whatever source they come and are interpreted one by one, 
as they occur. The 'world hypothesis' to which the field 
concept conforms is synthetic and dispersive, standing in direct 
contrast with the mechanistic world hypothesis, which is 
5 
analytic and integrative, but differing also from the organici::;t 
and formistic hypotheses (Pepper's four 'world hypotheses' are 
also discussed below). 
The essential reference of the field concept is topological, and 
it leads to the interpretation of events and processes in terms 
of such genotypical properties as position, force, direction, 
velocity, mass, barrier, and so on - properties that ilre 
descriptive of the structure and dynamics of the field. The 
concepts of society and social structure that have developed in 
soc.iology and anthropology do not tend to lead to 
interpretations of this sort, but promote instead a mode of 
interpretation that i.s constrained by 'classificatory' thinking 
and order; to entities rather than events as the basis data. 
This is especially true of both mechanical and organic models of 
society, which, when taken at all literally, tend to exclude any 
means of interpreting and articulating the processes of 
mediation between the main structural components the entities -
and the parts of which they are constituted; between the social 
group and the psychological individual (Burrel, G. and Horgan, 
G. 1978). The undoubted success of such models in understanding 
machines and organic life is no guarantee at all of thei.r 
utility in understanding social systems, whose constituent parts 
are not only dynamic and animate, but are, in themselves, 
purposeful. 
Certain widely accepted sociological concepts are readily 
assimilable to the field:..theoretic approach - the in-group 
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versus out-group distinction made by Sumner, Cooley's 
distinction between primary and secondary groups, and the more 
recent concepts of reference group and relative deprivation, for 
example. Many others are not readily assimilated - the 
categories of upper, middle and lower class used i.n 
stratification studies (Marx's bourgeoisie and proletariat are, 
by contrast, dynamic concepts), the church-sect typology; the 
distinction between formal and informal organisation theory for 
example. Where possible, field-theoretic terms will be used 
throughout, in preference to 'Aristotelean', class-theoretic 
terms. 
Although the basic analogue for a field theory of social 
behaviour may have been mechanistic in origin (the gravitational 
and electro-magnetic field of physics), its fullest development 
in the behavioural sciences, in the work of Lewin (1935, 1936) 
and Brown (1936) is wholeheartedly contextual ist in character 
(Capra: 1978). Lewi n's topological psychology and his concept 
of life-space presented the psychological field as a spatial 
construct, a region, to which my descriptions of psychological 
behaviour can be ordered. The social field is a methodo-
logically equivalent construct for ordering sociological and 
socio-psychological behaviour. 
The social field precedes and endures beyond the individual 
life-time, coming into existence for the individual with 
socialisation or with confrontation. The individual is a 
carrier of the field in the collectives of which he becomes part 
- family, community, formal organisation, nation and so on, but 
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membership of these collectives alters the field for hi.m and for 
the other members. The strength of an organisational 
'philosophy' of class consciousness or group cohesion is, thus, 
to an extent a measure of the degree to which the social field 
is unified for a collection of individuals, the extent to which 
a given social field is shared. The so~ial field exists only in 
and through individuals, but because of its pervasiveness and 
persistence (its spatio-temporal expanse and its historical 
duration) it achieves a phenomenological independence as the 
'ground' on which social life is sustained, a relatively stable 
domain within which the effects of action and interaction are 
calculable to a degree that permits the maintenance of social 
order. 
The social field is not to he thought of as simply a passive 
medium however, a backcloth against which social behaviour is 
acted out. It is a region in which all the points have 
positional value of direction and magnitude, and in which the 
total distribution of forces determines the value of positions 
within it. Behaviours available to the organism, individual, or 
group, are not, therefore, freely variable, but are contained by 
the properties of the field as a whole. The goals to which 
activity is directed, and the strength and persistence with 
which goals are sought, are not determined solely by the actor, 
but are jointly determined by the actor and the structure and 
energy distribution of the field. Global characteristics of the 
relevant field, such as its degree of stability or instability, 
homogeneity or heterogeneity, its overall size and complexity, 
and the degree of interdependence between its parts, (as well as 
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the more localised texture of the immediate action situation), 
influence the choice, structure, and success of behaviours. 
Nor is the social field not simply a spatio-temporal 
distribution of persons and objects, but is a region of social 
and psychological forces which direct and constrain the striving 
and avoidance behaviours of individuals and collectivities. 
Individuals and social collectives may, therefore, be implicated 
in fields from which they are geographically distant. Both love 
and emnity between persons can endure across oceans and across 
decades. The espionage agent in a foreign land, the infantry 
patrol behind the enemy lines, the commer.~ial salesman out of 
his territory - each of these is responsive to field forces 
which emanate from the distant 'base', as well as from the 
immediate situation that is confronted. The full power of 
forces such as these is most completely experienced by those who 
try to escape them - the political defector, the deserter and 
the escaped convict. 
Equally, the field may be reduced to insignificance, or even go 
out of existence for actors _physically present in its midst. 
Thus, total institutions, such as monasteries and mental 
hospitals, can erase the extended social field outside the 
institutional boundaries and localise the experiential world of 
their inmates almost entirely within their confines. For 
individuals, the experience of immense loneliness within a large 
and busy city is a classic example. 
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The field concept is radically a-historical, and, in this 
respect, represents a starting point quite different from the 
concept of society. Only those forces actually operating on the 
person or the group in the present are held to be capable of 
having effects. The social field, like the life-space, does, 
however, have a forward and a backward reference; so that events 
which have happened and events which are yet to occur or are 
anticipated may have effects in the present. .Just ::ls past 
traumas and cherished ambitions operate as contemporaneous 
forces in the life-space of the individual, so too do past 
experiences which have been shared by many people, (through 
world wars and economic depressions) and shared anti.ci.pations 
about an outcome (for example, of a general election) enrich the 
quality of social fields, by incorporating t~ lements of the past 
and the future. 
In general, the extension of the social field cannot be 
represented categorically; it can only be represented 
relationally. It is a function of the way in which the 
constituent parts are interconnected with other parts - their 
comprehension of their own dependence upon the behavioul'.'s of 
other pal'.'ts and of the ways in which their own behaviours 
influence the behaviours of other parts. In some instances, 
therefore, the social field may transcend national boundaries; 
in other instances it is included within th~n. Jet-set connotes 
at least an embryonic social field that is supra-national, and 
aspects of social fields that are conditioned by world religions 
similarly extend across societal boundaries. The main 
intra-societal differentiation in modern society tends to be 
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between urban and rural fields, but many other regional, 
functional and cultural differentiations exist. 
Transformation of the social field thus refers to changes in the 
stn1cture and the dynamics of the social and psychological 
environments in which the behaviour of groups and individuals 
takes place. Just as with gravitational and magnetic fields, 
the global properties of the social field - the overall 
distribution of forces - influences all activities within the 
field. My main purpose in attempting to understand the current 
transformation of social fields in highly industrialised 
societies is to investigate the implications of this 
transformation for, in particular, planning activity. 
I now return to a discussion of the four main dimensions of the 
transformation that I identified at the beginning. 
1. Acceleration of change 
Large-scale and continuing technological change has become 
ubi~uitous within western societies. The internal logic of 
machine-based production systems geared to an expanding free 
enterprise market, has entailed a heavy and rising investment in 
technological innovation as a means for the survival and 
expansion of economic enterprises in the face of constant 
competitive challenge. We have long since learned to live with 
change. The essent.ial novelty that we now have to come to terms 
1vit:h is the accelerating rate of social change, in a number of 
key areas of contemporary social systems. As David Loeks has 
put it: 
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There is an increasing awareness that man 
now stands well past the threshold of a 
universally urbanised, industrialised, 
technologically sophisticated world. The 
nature of his response to these 
circumstances is and will be dominated by 
the overweening fact of accelerated change: 
unprecedented, explosive, and for the 
forseeable future at least, continuing. 
(Leeks: 1967:347) 
Statistics relating to per capita consumption of energy, car 
ownership, computer speeds and capacities, average standards of 
living, productivity of labour, proportions of a society in the 
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'learning'force' - all these, and thousands of otht:r di.mensions, 
combine to suggest that the industrialised societies are not 
merely climbing a gradient, b1t are mounting a steep· and sharply 
rising curve, with respect to the material means of life. 
The twentieth century marks the middl1~ 
period of a great transition in the state of 
the human race. It may properly be cal led 
the second great transition in the history 
of mankind. The first transition was that 
from precivilised to civilised society which 
began to take place about five thousand 
years ago .•• (The second) may be called the 
transition from civili.sed to post-civilised 
society. 
Part of the evidence is that: 
•.. as far as many statistical series related 
to activities of mankind are concerned, the 
date that divides hwuan history into two 
equal parts is well within living memory. 
(Boulding: 1964:1-2) 
Individually apprehended, trends such as these do not unduly 
impress or disturb. In combination however, they are both 
reflected in, and are a determining factor behind, some of the 
massive structural shifts that are currently threatening to 
engulf our major social planning institutions. The emergence of 
government as the biggest capitalist of all, a massive employer 
and the main dispenser of social welfare, has created 
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fundamental problems concerning the relations to be developed 
between government and industry, the political system and the 
economic; and is thrusting a ne\,r responsibility upon the 
administrative arm of governments, commensurate with increasing 
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governmental power. Deeply ingrained assumptions hearing upon 
the 'natural' life eye le of family dependency, education, 
marriage, employment and eventual retirement requi.re 
modification as mass secondary education and the advent of 
'continuing' education shift the balance of numbers between the 
labour force and the learning force in favour of the latter; as 
the service sector takes over froin manufacturing as the 
predominant employer of labour; the bal:rnce of work to leisure 
time alters; as 'non-linearity' of educational and career lines 
becomes possible with the expansion and diversification of 
education, the general attainment of higher levels of basic 
education, and the greater ease of geographi.cal an.I occupational 
mobility. 
Finally, and perhaps most dramatically, the accelerating pace 
and scale of urbanisation, crystallised in the unprecedented 
growth of the world's cities, epitomises, in material form, the 
dominance of man over nature in which all technology plays a 
part. Here, as in many other areas, the obsolescence of 
concepts is testimony to the pace of change. 'Town and country 
planning' may have been a brash and imaginative designation in 
its day, but as a conceptual tool for approaching the 
contemporary tumult of London or Chicago it appears quaint. 
City has been supplanted by connurbation and, subsequently, by 
megalopolis in order that we may conceptually encompass the new 
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dimensions of the urban phenomenon: more recently still, the 
notions of ecumenopolis and urban field encourage an even wider 
view of the urbanisation of the world. 
Alvin Toffl~r has coined the term 'future shock' to refer to the 
psychological bewilderment and disorientation that may affect 
individuals, groups and entire cultures when the rate of change 
in their environments outstrips their adaptive capaci.ties: 
Future shock is a time phenomenon, a product 
of the greatly accelerated rate of change in 
society. It arises from the superimposition 
of a new culture, on an old one. It is 
culture shock in ones 0111n society. 
The concept of future shock •... suggests that 
there must be balance, not merely between 
the rates of change in different sectors, 
but between the pace of environmental change 
and the limited pace of human response. For 
future shock grows out of the increasing lag 
between the two. 
(Toffler: 1970:13,5) 
In associating his concept with the parallel term, 'culture 
shock', he argues that the culture of the future is likely to be 
so radically different from the present (and, at the same time, 
will invade the present so rapidly) that the effect on 
individuals and groups will be directly analogous to that of a 
lateral shift between two existing, but quite dissimilar, 
cultures. His concepts and his intuitions correspond 
encouragingly with the concept of 'turbulence', which has been 
subject to a quite separate development during the last decade, 
and particularly in the identification of accelerating rates of 
change as a major contributory factor in the emergence of novel 
social environments. 
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2. Unevenness of change 
The second contributory factor augments in a significant way the 
impact of accelerating change per se. The unevenness of change 
rates across the manifold segments and dimensions of extended 
social fields widens the range of opportunities between 
differently situated groups, thereby supporting tendencies 
towards social segmentation and creating wider possibilities for 
sentiments of 'relative deprivation', as more groups perceive 
themselves as disadvantaged compared with the standards of 
welfare of the more rapidly advancing parts of the system. 
It is useful to distinguish two component effects of 
differential change rates among the parts of a complex an<l 
dynamic system.· One result is the structural effect of 
differentiation per se, revealed as an increasing heterogeneity 
of the system as a whole. Thus freshmen classes and recruit 
intakes at a military .induction centre begin as relatively 
homogeneous groups, which subsequently differi:ntiate over time 
with respect to criteria of educational att;iinment and 
leadership ability. The second component is the processual 
effect of 'friction', which can be expected to occur wherever 
contiguous parts of a system move at differentL~l speeds or in 
different directions. Differentiation engenders segmentation, 
and creates problems of the co-ordination and regulation of 
parts; 'friction' engenders conflict, tension and resistances 
creating problems of confU.ct resolution and tension reduction -
i.e. social and organisational 'lubrication'. 
The manifestations and consequences of uneven change rates among 
the parts of societies have become the daily fare of the mass 
/ 
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media, though they naturally favour reporting the conflicts and 
the abrasiveness which arise from differential change, and are 
inclined to leave the -mapping- of social segmentation to the 
statistical bureaus and the academic world. 
The reality of a widening generation gap has become more and 
more conspicuous since the Second World War, to the extent that 
a generational -bi-culturalism- can be discerned in the 
technically advanced societies. Dominant societal issues in the 
United States, such as integration and civil rights, the draft, 
and the role of the universities, have reverberated throughout 
the western world and have become the catalysts of a bro::i.d age 
polarisation. And, it is in the moral area, of individual and 
social values, where the cleavage is most directly experienced 
in the contemporary world. The phenomenon castigated as 
-permissiveness- by older people i.s embraced as 
-self-actualisation- by the young. The life ex:periences, values 
and expectations of the young and the old are geared to 
different futures. The dimensions of the divide as well as some 
of its consequences, are being recorded for posterity by the 
judiciary, for, in the transcripts of trials hearing charges 
against anti-war protestors, draft resistors and the publishers 
of underground newspapers one finds encapsulated the clash of 
radically different, generation-based value systeins. 
Uneven change rates are discernible, too, between the 
-permanently disadvantaged- poor and the affluent masses, 
between the whites and the blacks in America; between the 
developed and the developing nations. As far as their means of 
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existence are concerned the populations of outlying rural 
districts are vulnerable to becoming 'trapped' in the same 
manner as the disadvantaged, 'ghettoised' minorities in the 
cities, and welfare agencies have found the problems of both 
groups difficult to meet in an effective way. The recent 
'insurrection' of French agricultural workers and the conflict 
in Northern Ireland (which has attained the proportions of civil 
war), are each symptoms of friction between groups 1vhi.ch are 
advancing materially at different rates - farmers and 
industrialists, Catholics and Protestants. 
Much has been written about the structural handicaps of 
pre-industrial societies attempting to accumulate sufficient 
surplus resources for the investment necessary for economic 
'take-off'. A few, such as Mexico and Israel, seem to have got 
over the 'hump', with the assistance of heavy foreign aid, but 
there are dozens of other societies still struggling to provide 
a basic subsistence for their expanding populations (e.g. 
India), or stalled at the point where they can produce enough to 
keep pace with population growth but not enough to be able to 
tool up for industrialisation (e.g. Indonesia).
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The crises 
latent in this state of affairs are described by Horowitz: 
Destitution, malnutrition and distressingly 
low standards of liv:ing are aggravated by 
sociological and psychological conditions. 
The 'demonstration effect' of modern 
civilisation and of standards of living 
superior to those of the overwhelming 
majority of the people in underdeveloped 
countries is conveyed to the latter by the 
media of mass communication - radio, motion 
pictures, etc. The socio-political 
repercussions of the gap between the two 
major areas of the world, that is to say, 
between the in~1strialised and the 
underdeveloped areas; are thus magnified. 
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The industrialised sector now faces the 
urgent challenge of either mitigating those 
politically explosive frictions and 
antagonisms, or of taking the consequences, 
which may be serious. A new approach to the 
interrelationship between the developed and 
the underdeveloped parts of the world has 
become inevitable. The affluent sector of 
the 1vorld cannot remain a quiet island in 
the midst of a stormy ocean, an oasis of 
prosperity in a desert of desperate poverty. 
(Horowitz: 1966:5) 
There is one dimension of societa 1 development imbalances whi.::.h 
seems, in a significant way, to lie behind the mora specific 
manifestations. It is located in the apparent paradox t11att 
while scientific advancement, ~nd its translation into 
technology, has created the potential for a 1vorld of plenty, and 
has put the natural order at our feet, the welfare (and even the 
survival) of a vast proportion of tht~ world's popul::ition is as 
seriously threatened as at any other period in history. Elting 
Morison has put it this way: 
•••• we may be caught in the irony that ctt 
the very rnoinent when by our wit we have 
developed the means to give us considerable 
control over our resistant natural 
environment, we find we have produced in the 
means themselves an artificial en vi ronme.nt 
of such complication that we cannot control 
it. 
(Morison: 1966:209) 
Basically the fault seems to be that our _kno1-1ledge grows faster 
than our ability to use it; our decision-making institutions 
have been outdated by the growing complexity and 
unpredictability of the phenomena about which decisions have to 
be made: 
For many years our technological knmvledge 
has been rapidly outpacing our 
decision-making institutions •.• Until the 
19th century, society usually shm.;red great 
capacity for assimilating new scientific and 
technological information and putting it to 
rather wide use. Among the novel social 
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adjustments to new knowledge were, for 
example, the limited-liability corporation, 
central planning units, the mass-democratic 
state, independent regulatory commissions, 
and professional managers. However, the 
technologies and theories of most of the 
older scientific knowledge did not deal 
directly with the central institutions and 
values of society •••• It is modern science 
that has made the relationship between 
knowledge and social action a radical 
problem •.• 
I can see only a continuously accelerating 
rate of innovation in most branches of 
science. The knowledge these innovations 
will create will be able either to destroy 
mankind physically and socially or, if USl~d 
to our best advantage, to lift mankind to 
new heights of individual and soci.al 
existence. The problem of integrating 
knowledge and social action is there fore 
becoming both more difficult and more 
critical. 
(Dror: 1968:3-5) 
It is perhaps not too immodest to suggest (as does Wiener: 
1978:Ch.l) that social science understandings are now urgently 
required to redress the balance between our technical capacitity 
and our social, political and economic wisdorn.
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Again the United States offers the most poignant examples, but 
they are descriptive of a general characteristic of advanced 
industrial societies. The nation that has a'-1ed the -.-1orld with 
the technical triumphs of the Apollo moon Lnissions, pioneered 
the revolutionary "Planning-Programming-Budgeting-Scheduling" 
system in government administration, and successfully devastated 
vast tracts of the Vietnamese landscape with its 11L3hly 
sophisticated armaments and 'delivery systeins', has not been 
able to develop the social and institutional controls needed to 
handle the problems of waste and pollution and restore sanity to 
the problems of movement in the cities. There is no longer even 
a clear conception of 'victory' to guide the 1-1ar machine. 
~~--------------------............ ..-
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Insofar as the 'lag' involved here is in the maturity of our 
institutional arrangements for decision-making, policy-making 
and planning, then we need some kind of organisational 
revolution in order to overcome traditional bureaucratic 
thought-modes, the legacy of early forms of mass production and 
professional civil service and the influences of Taylor and 
Weber. If our understanding and control of nuclear fission can 
be replicated for planning and policy-making, then this basic 
component of unevenness of growth will have been substantially 
removed. 
My use of the concept of 'lag' dravrn attention to a much earlier 
appreciation of the significance of uneven development. William 
Ogburn first used the concept of 'cultural lag' in 1.914, 
developed the idea :into a theory in the following year, and 
published it in his Social Change in 1922. In that work he 
writes: 
The thesis is that the various parts of 
modern culture are not changing at the same 
rate, some parts are changing much more 
rapidly than others; and that since ther:-2 is 
a correlation and interdependence of parts, 
a rapid change in one part of our eulture 
requires readjustments through changes in 
the various correlated parts of cult1Jl"e, 
(Ogburn: 1950: 200-201) 
Commenting 1m1ch later on his early work, he further explains 
that: 
A cultural lag is i.ndependent of the nature 
of the initiating part or of the lagging 
part, provided that they are interconnected. 
The independent variable may be 
technological, economic, political, 
ideological, or anything else. 
(Ogburn: 1964:91) 
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The appearance of technological determinism in his earHer 
writing he ascribes to the fact that: "In our times in the 
western world, technology and science are the great prime movers 
of social change. That this is so is an almost universal 
observation." (Ogburn: 1964: 91) 
I have noted above that unevenness of growth must be viewed as 
augmenting the effects of rapid change itself. Mor:e than 30 
years after he first developed his theory, Og~1rn writes: 
The application of the theory to modern 
times suggests a possible appendix to the 
theory which nms like this: the number of 
patents, discoveries in applied science, and 
inventions has been increasing in something 
Li.ke an exponential curve. Most of these 
are minor; but important ones have been 
coming very rapidly ••• As these discoveries 
and inventions are adopted, we must adjust 
to them; we must adapt ourselves to this 
changing environment, but •,ye do it with a 
certain amount of lag. So an arld1~ndum to 
the theory of cultural lags is that lags 
accumulate because of the great rapidity and 
volume of technological ehange. 
(Ogburn: 1964:92) 
We should perhaps note that Marx""s dialectical materialism 
already contained the core ideas of structural lag and H:s 
consequences for a social system. In fact, the thesis occurs in 
Marx in its most exaggerated form. His radical dichotomisation 
of ""the parts of culture"" and emphasis of the fundamental 
connection between them (that of their relations to the means of 
production) distils the essential idea of the consequences of 
differential growth rates. The material advance of the 
bourgeoisie, and its exploitation of the proletariat, 
culminating in the working-class revolution, is a model of the 
ideas with which I have been concerned. 
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3. Increasing interdependence 
A third aspect of the current transformation of social fields is 
the increasing ecological interdependenc<~ among the parts of the 
field, which seems to be primarily due to the related processes 
of increasing functional specialisation of the parts, and 
dramatic extensions in the scope and rapidity of inter-species 
communication. A rev.italisation of interest in human or soci.al 
ecology and the development tov;rard 1naturity of ecological 
psychology reflect an atvareness of this transformation and 
.d f h . l f . ' . 5 pr0v1 e some o t e essentia concepts ·or its comprenens1on.-
While giving more and more attention to ecological prohle~s, it 
may be as well to emphasise the disti.nctiveness of social 
ecologies. 
Han, as the species Ilornosapiens, is comprehended in the 
ecosystem problems of the biologists, but the behavioural 
sciences need to take into account the unique role of 
cultural-symbolic phenomena in the evolution of social fields, 
which distinguishes man from plant and animal populations. 
Social ecology encompasses the organisation of populations and 
their modes of adaptation to the environment, but has to 
appreciate the special significance of man's capacity for 
symbolic intercommunication and the d.istinctive ways in which 
such communications may be amplified, attenuated, or distorted, 
through a multitude of psychological and social mechani.sms. 
In any ecologically connected system, increases in 
interdependence have the consequence that the activity of a 
discrete part, or perturbat.ions in a remote sector, are likely 
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to affect the functioning of the whole system. For social 
systems, industrialisation is inevitably accompanied by 
differentiation of its structure into more and more specialised 
parts, so that the completion of any major task is likely to 
require the involvement and the co-ordination of greater numbers 
of relatively independent sub-systems, and interconnectedness 
across extended social fields and is now being most rapidly 
increased by the elaboration of service and maintenance 
functions, which become equally indispensable to the operation 
of households and giant corporations. 
Specialisation in other institut.ionali.sed domains hal> beea no 
less profound. In science, government and administr.:ttion, 
professional roles, occupations and organisational units have 
beeil multiplied. In response to the failure of laissez-faire 
economics to ass:ist those who are disadvantaged i.n the 
marketplace, and to the need for massiile investment progra111mes 
in such areas as defence, education, housing, urban 
rehabilitation and rural reconstruction, government has extended 
its influence and control into wider and more diverse areas, and 
in doing so has greatly increased the 'organic' 
interconnectedness of industrial societies. 
Differentiation into a larger number. of parts does not, of 
itself, guarantee the amplification of co1nmunieations netwo1·ks 
and the absorption of new parts into a wider set of 
interrelations. This has been (notoriously) the eKperience of 
such multi-centred institutions as metropolitan administrations 
and civil services. 6 In~1strialisation has increased the 
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requirements for intercommunication between specialised parts, 
but has also produced the means for expanding communication 
capacities. While science and technology, in general, have 
become prime movers of an accelerating rate of change, it is 
specifically in the technologies of transport and com®1nications 
that the greatest impact has been made on the interrelau~dness 
of system parts. The point has been well made by Emery: 
Telegraph, telephone, radio, radar, tele-
vision, gramophone, typewriter, linotype, 
camera, duplicator, Xerox, calculator, 
Hollerith, computer: these names register .'l 
century of change that continues in an 
explosive fashion. Parallel with these have 
been a very great increase in sp~~ed and ease 
of travel, so that recorded communications 
flow in greater bulk at greater spet::d, and 
even the recording of communications becom.~s 
short-circuited as it becomes easier for 
managers, scientists and politicians, etc. 
to fly together than to correspond. 
( Emery : l 9 6 7 : 2 2 4 ) 
Improvements in man's capacity for moving himself and for 
transmitting information have the character of both a 
precondition and a symptom of higher levels of interdependency. 
They have made possible the emerge11ce of national and 
multinational associations in which the member groups can react 
to one another in 'real time'; increasing functional 
specialisation and geographical diversification of production, 
distribution and administrative systems have created pressures 
for innovations and further refinements to improve the speed and 
reliability of communications. 
As I indicated in discussi~g the concept of social field, the 
parts of such fields may be related retrospectively (developing 
from common initial conditions), contemporaneously (actually in 
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interaction), and prospectively (having overlapping futures). 
The higher development of the hwnan brain and central nervous 
system, and man's ability to communicate symbolically, impart to 
social fields a temporal dimension, as well as a spatial 
dimension, which is characterised by a greater or lesser 
connectivity of time-slices: 
The scope and amplificatory po1.;er of communication channels have 
some interesting and unexpected consequences in the adoption and 
imitation, in remote sectors, of events and experiences 
occurring at some particular point. Fads and fashions can skip 
continents as a result of timely exposure in a prominent part of 
the mass media. There is some evidence for example, that the 
public self-immolation of a Buddhist monk i.n Saizon, and the 
equally dramatic suicide of a Czech student, .Jan Tilach, during 
the Russian occupation of Prague, became, via the media, the 
'starting condition' for imitative behaviours across the gl,1be. 
The spate of aircraft hijackings is another instance, and there 
is now considerable agreement that campus riots in London, Ne1v 
York, Tokyo, Paris and many other university centres towards the 
end of the sixties, had a common 'ignition' in the events at 
Berkeley in 1963. The mass media proillote contagion, and make it 
more probable that similar but isolated occurrences in remote 
parts of the world can be traced back to a single, localised 
event. 
The 'contemporary' interrelations through which the nei~:is and 
ambitions of individuals and social systems are met are, 
perhaps, the more widely recognised and best understood. 
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Specialisation implies that no one part can accomplish a complex 
task by itself, so that interactive relations with other parts 
are essential as a means for the attainment of such ends. The 
momentary interrelations which make an existing division of 
responsibilities work are the most accessible to observation and 
intervention, and, typically, high proportions of institutional 
energy and resources are expended in improving their efficiency 
and in correcting their relatively apparent deficiencies. 
The most challenging interdependencies that are characteristic 
of social fields are those we have called prospective, and 1-lhich 
tend to be more latent than mani.fest in the existing state of 
affairs. For example, the economy of all societal resources is 
such that the outcomes sought by its multitude of actors 
invariably compete with one another. This can often be 
anticipated and taken into account in the definition 1)f roles 
and areas of responsibility, the formulation of laws and 
regulations and effot·ts to secure agreement over basic aims and 
values. 
The ubiquity and rapidity of change make it more and mocc 
important to try to appreciate in advance, the mutual 
interferences of separate courses of action. The unevenness of 
change and greater degrees of interdependence across the social 
field make it increasingly difficult to do so. It can, of 
course, happen that activities directed to a partic111..'lr end have 
benign consequences in another sphere which were not eKpected. 
The introduction of the motor car led to dramatic reductions in 
the incidence of diphtheria and other diseases that scarred 
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urban living during the 19th century. The replacement of the 
horse as a source of motive power reduced the available breeding 
ground for the flies that carried many such diseases. On the 
other hand, the building of in-city freeways to relieve traffic 
congestion has had the opposite and deleterious effect of 
increasing congestion. Enhanced ecological interdependencies 
increase the probability that the consequenct~s of present 
actions will prove to be related in quite unexpected ways. 
Du~kheim's Division of Labour in Society, which was first 
published in 1893, significantly predates a number of the 
concepts and insights I have been <liscussi?g· His thesis is 
that while all societies are characterised by soine form of 
'solidarity' (broadly, social cohesion), the progress of the 
division of labour is accompanied by a shift from mechanical to 
organic forms, from cohesion based on similarities to cohesion 
based on interdependence of differences. The division of labour 
itself is advanced by increases in both 'social volume' (the 
sheer size of a society) and 'moral density' (the degree to 
which 'individuals are sufficiently in contact to be able to act 
and react upon one another'). 
Three causes of increases in moral density are outlined; 
firstly, the 'progressive condensation' of social life is a 
natural concomitant of the progress of civilization - the 
transition from nomadic and hunting societies to agricultural, 
and, finally, to industrial societies, results in an increasing 
concentration of the population; secondly, the formation and 
development of cities, resulting from the need of individuals 
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'to put themselves in very intimate contact with others', 
creates 'so many points where the social mass is contracted more 
strongly than elsewhere'; and :finally, 'there are the number and 
rapidity of ways of communication and transportation. By 
suppressing or diminishing the gaps separating sncial segments, 
they increase the density of society' (Durkheim: 1963: 2 59-60). 
The density of society and the division of labour react upon one 
another: 'If society, in concentrating, determines the 
development of the division of labour, the latter, in its turn, 
increases the concentration of society' (Durkheim: 1963:260). 
The progress of societal differentiation is normally accompanied 
by ne1v 'organic' forms of social cohesion as the relati.onshi.ps 
among the specialised parts become routinised and embodied in 
contracts and other laws, customs and norms. 
Of further interest to my concern is his analysis of a 
pathological form of the process - the 'anrnnic division of 
labour'. After drawing attention to certain phenomena 
manifesting a lack of social cohesion - industrial and 
commercial crises, labour-management conflictsj and the 
specialisation of science - Durkheim argues as follows: 
If the division of labour does not produce 
solidarity in all these cases, it is because 
the relations of the organs are not 
regulated, because they are in a state of 
aho;nie.... The state of anomy is impossible 
wherever solitary organs are sufficiently in 
contact of sufficiently prolonged. In 
effect, being contiguous, they are quickly 
warned, in each circumstance, of the need 
which they have of one another, and, 
consequently, they have a lively and 
continuous sentiment of their mutual 
dependence •.•• But, on the contrary, if 
some opaque envi romnent is inteqJosed, then 
only stimuli of a certain intensity ca11 be 
communicated from one organ to another. 
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Relations, being rare (or, we might add, 
entirely novel) are not repeated enough to 
be determined: each time there ensues new 
groping. The lines of passage taken by the 
streams of movement cannot deepen because 
the streams themselves are too 
intermittent ••• the case will be the same if 
the contiguity, though sufficient, is too 
recent or has not endured long enough. 
(Durkheim: 1963:368-9) 
Regarding the particular case of labour-management conflicts, 
he offers the following explanati.on: 
Machines replace men; manufacturing r2-places 
hand-work. The worker is regimented, 
separated from his family throughout the 
day. He always lives apart from his 
employer, etc. These new conditions of 
industrial life naturally demand a new 
organisation, but as these changes ha11e been 
accomplished with extreme rapidity, the 
interests in conflict have not yet had the 
time to be equilibrated. 
(Durkheim: 1963:370) 
In these two passages I find support for the conclusion that the 
degree of connectivity among the parts of the social field is 
threatened by the appearance of novelty ( •.. 'conti.guity is too 
recent' •.• ) and by the rapidity of change. 
As the part processes of the organism are regulated by the 
blochemical exchanges of homeostasis, and organic ecologies are 
regulated by processes of phylogenetic adaptation, so cnltural 
systems play an essential part in the regulati.on of social 
ecologies. To the extent that the cultural system integrates 
the basic values, beliefs, norms, expectations, it provides a 
constant referent, or set of ground rules, for the regulation of 
newly formed interdependencies. When change comes too rapidly, 
and is spread unevenly across the social field, the cultural 
system itself tends to become disintegrated, and new 
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interrelationships can no longer be referred to its basic 
axioms, but have to be worked out independently. 
4. Increasing size and complexity 
The extensiveness of the social field, the area within which 
individuals and associations perceive themselves to share some 
common conditions of life, and within whith their behaviours 
form part of the relevant environment for the others, is most 
strongly influenced by personal mohili ty (geographical and 
social) and the power of communications. In making possible 
higher degrees of interdependence within the field, these 
factors also have the effect of extending its boundaries. 
Satellite television, telex links, faster and larger jet 
aircraft; these and other refinements of communications are 
currently 'shrinking the globe', in the same way that the 
railway era had the effect of shrinking countries. Greater 
fluidity of stratification systems and more opportunities for 
travel permit individuals to experience and share in a far wider 
sphere of life experiences than is possible i.n less mo bi le 
societies. 
The popularity of McLuhan's term 'global village' is no doubt 
due in part to the accuracy of his perception. Commenting in an 
article on Boulding's recognition of a 'second great trans-
ition', Wooton writes: 
Post-civilised society is a global society, 
and, just as civilised man had to adjust to 
one type of environment, post-civilised man 
will have to adjust to a new type of 
environment. It is important to understand 
the global dimensions of this post-civilized 
environment since we cannot adequately 
formulate policies concerning the process of 
30 
development unless we first of all have a 
correct understanding of the historical 
period in which we live. 
(Wooton: 1971:5) 
One of the portents of this new supranational environment is the 
rise in importance of a new form of enterprise: 
The multinational corporation is perhaps the 
best example of an institution operating 
within the constraints of the present while 
at the same time developing the 
institut.ional framework for the emerging 
global society. 
(Wooton: 1971:6) 
Perlmutter has coined the term 'global industrial estate' to 
draw attention to the pervasiveness of modern industrial 
technology and the transnational economies of scale that it 
makes possible, while Stainer and Cannon, in their study of 
'multi-national corporate planning' note that 
rapidly accelerating foreign activities of 
business enterprises is an impressive 
development of the past ten years, and 
continued growth of international business 
is readily predictable for the future. 
(Steiner and Cannon: 1966:vii) 
As a corollary, the Marxian dream of workers of the world united 
moves closer to some sort of fulfilment, as international labour 
organisations seek ways in which to combat the ne\v degree's of 
manoeuverab.ility in negotiation, and fleKihility in production, 
that are acquired by the international corporations. 
Other economic and mi li_tary developments contribute to the same 
tendency. The development of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles has reduced the whole world to a single theatre of war, 
whereas a few fields at the most were used at Agincourt. The 
complexities of the international cu-crency system are well 
beyond the comprehension of the average world c-Ltizen but there 
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are occasions, such as the devaluation of sterling some Y•~ars 
ago and the contemporary crisis of the American dollar, in which 
the extensiveness and apparent precariousness of international 
monetary relations is made evident, testifying again to the 
extent of our global interdependencies. 
Within national boundaries, similar trends towards the e~pans.ion 
of the field relevant to particular activities can bP 
identi.fied. The farmer must recognise the city as a 1nore and 
more important part of his world, as agriculture becomes 
'industrialised' and its success more directly dependent upon 
the city's mass markets, finance, and export facilities. The 
indications are that those sectors of the rural economy which 
fail, for whatever reason, to move into the ambit of 
metropolitan influences, becomes 'dissociated' segments within 
the wider system, requiring active intervention merely for them 
to survive. 
National and regional planning and development activities have 
been given an increasing runount of attention, and they typically 
have the effect of forging new links between previously 
segregated (or only loosely connected) areas. River basin 
development schemes, for instance, of which the work of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority is a classic example, often have the 
side-effect of uniting the occupants of the basin within a 
larger system. Co-ordinated regional cievelopment and management 
of employment, education, transport. and the like, again widens 
the system of interdependencies and extends the horizons of the 
field for its participants. In general, the extensiveness of 
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these interdependencies is most clearly revealed during labour 
strikes affecting key distribution, maintenance, or 
communication systems. 
For the individual and the family, no less than for the business 
enterprise, the relevant social world has become larger, more 
complex and more variegated. As progressively fewer of the needs 
of individuals are directly provided for by the home and the 
family, so their dependence upon other outside agents increases 
(Braverman: 1974). The expansion of urban areas and of the 
proportions of the population living in them, advances 
'cosmopolitanism' at the expense of 'localism'. As television 
is defined as a necessity rather than a luxury, it assumes a 
major role in extending people's vision into other worlds, and 
becomes a dominant source of shared experiences. 
The overall complexity of the social world increases for all its 
participants, as they become increasingly interdependent. Their 
inter-relations become less and less predictable under the 
impact of the field's rapid, but uneven, transformation. 
Symptoms of Turbulence 
These four dimensions of the transformation of industrial 
society are, of course, abstractions from the concrete 
situation, of which they are different facets, rather than 
separate components. In real:lty, they overlap and support one 
another in their effects on social worlds. As I have tried to 
suggest, the transformation has an impact upon all social units 
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within the field - individual, family, community, formal 
organisations, the state itself; environments characterised by 
accelerating, but uneven, rates of change, by ever-increasing 
size and complexity, and higher degrees of interdependence among 
the constituent parts, make very different demands upon 
individual group and organisational adaptive capabilities than 
do the more easily regulated environments of both pre-industrial 
and industrial society. 
Emery and Trist have described environments of this sort as 
turbulent, in contrast to other simpler types of environment 
which are 'placid' or 'reactive'. While in these less complex 
and less dynamic environments, significant sources of variance 
for the actor originate only from other behaving systems, 
turbulence implies that the field itself has become dynamic, and 
that important sources of variance for the individual or the 
organisation can emerge from practically any point in the field. 
Thus, organisations caught up in these transformation processes 
are likely to be subject to a radical increase in their area of 
'relevant uncertainty': 
The consequences which flow from their 
actions lead off in ways that become 
increasingly unpredictable; they do not 
necessarily fall off with distance, but may 
at any point be amplified beyond all 
expectations; similarly, lines of action 
that are strongly pursued may find 
themselves attenuated by emergent field 
forces. 
(Emery and Trist: 1965:26) 
The critical consequence from the point of view of purposive 
human activities in general is that the degree of uncertainty 
and unpredictability associated with all future-oriented 
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activity increases. The relevant environment of the actor 
becomes so complex and so dynamic that the rainifications of any 
of his possible behaviours cannot be adequately anticipated 
beforehand. The acceleration and the uneveness of change mean 
that the future cannot be safely extrapolated from the past, and 
these forces, together with the increasing overall size and 
complexity of the set of interconnections relevant to the 
attainment of a particular outcome, render 'comprehensiveness' 
in the analysis of choice situations, and in decision-making, 
impossible (Cooper: 1976). 
Tris t wr .it es: 
turbulence grossly increases the area of 
relevant uncertainty for individuals and 
organisations alike. It raises far-reaching 
problems concerning the limits of hurnan 
adaptation. Forms of adaptation, both 
personal and organisational, developed to 
meet a simpler type of environment no longer 
suffice to meet the higher levels of 
complexity now coming into existence. 
(Trist: 1970:5) 
Transition from industrial to post-industrial society has 
proceeded furthest in urban North America, but ther(:! are signs 
of stress within the industrialised societies nf Europe that are 
indicative of a similar transition. Unless we can learn to 
control and guide the transformation process, it seems likely 
that the social field for purposive human behaviours in these 
societies will be thrown into a state of turbulence. 
The turbulent social field becomes prone to the fragmentation of 
the social fabric, and the breakdown of co-ordination and 
regulation among the subsystems. It experiences widespread lags 
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and breakdO\ms in the forrna ti on of the cultural and other 
symbolic apparatus which stabilise interpretations of new 
realities into theories and concepts, values and understandings, 
by means of which men can adjust to change. It is characterised 
by increasing vulnerability of the ecology of man-nature 
relations, and by increasing susceptibility to outbursts of 
violence and conflict between groups experiencing different 
rates and kinds of change. It is a domain in which the 
increasing size, transience, novelty and unpredictability of his 
primary social world is more and more likely t0 result in the 
individual becoming alienated. 
This, at least, is the pessimistic scenario - a projection of 
the impact of turbulence which assumes that our abilities to 
understand and to act appropriately within such highly complex 
and dynamic environments will not have been subject to radical 
improvements; that our institutional arrangeml~nts for 
decision-making, policy-making and planning will not have caught 
up with our technological prowess. 
Iri this study I aim to develop a framework for analysis using a 
holistic approach and to contribute to research currently being 
undertaken towards finding a solution to the problem of hO\v man 
and his institutions can best adapt to the conditions of a 
turbulent environment. 
Let us look at some of the symptoms of the drift into 
post-industrialism that have already been identified. 
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1. Future shock 
The predominant feature of the four dimensions of turbulence 
that I have described - the one about which there is most 
agreement in the literature, and the one with the most vigorous 
effects upon all of the others, is the acceleration of change, 
innovation and diffusion, dominated itself by the rapid grm.;rth 
of science and technology during the last 200 years. 
Commentators on the phenomenon, with their prognostications, 
7 gloomy and utopian, are abundant. Toffler is one of the most 
dramatic. H~s study explores: 
•.•• the roaring current of change, a current 
so powerful today that it overturns 
institutions, shifts our values and shrivels 
our roots. Change is the process by whid1 
the future invades our lives, and it is 
important to look at it closely, not merely 
from the grand perspectives of history, but 
also from the vantage point of the living, 
breathing individuals who experience it. The 
acceleration of change in our time is, 
itself, an elemental force. This 
accelerative thrust has personal and 
psychological, as well as sociological 
consequences •••• unless man quickly learns to 
control the rate of change in his personal 
affairs as well as in society at large, we 
are doomed to a massive adaptational 
breakdown. 
(Toffler: 1970:4) 
Human life is characterised as a constant flow of 'situations', 
and si'tuations can be broken down into six components: 
••••• while the boundary lines between 
situations may be indistinct, every 
situation has a certain 'wholeness' about 
it, a certain integration. Every situation 
also has certain identifiable components. 
These include 'things' a physical setting of 
natural and man-made objects. Every 
situation occurs in a 'place' - a location 
or arena within which the action occurs. 
Every situation also has, by definition, a 
cast of characters - people. Situations also 
involve a location in the organisational 
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network of society and a context of ideas or 
information ••• situations also involve a 
separate dimension which, because it cuts 
across all the others, is frequently 
overlooked. This is duration - the span of 
time over which the situation occurs. 
(Toffler: 1970:32) 
It is instructive to note the similarities between this concept 
of the situation and the more systematically defined concept of 
behaviour setting formulated by Barker and Wright in their. 
development of a naturalistic psychology (1955: see also Barker: 
1968). 
A behaviour setting is a standing behaviour 
pattern together with the context of this 
behaviour, including the part of the milieu 
to which the behaviour is attached •..• 
(Barker and Wright: 1955:9) 
They have used this concept to order the naturally occurring 
behaviours observed in an English and an American town, and to 
try to understand indi vi.dual psychological acts in ter:us of the 
physical and social settings in which they occur. 
Toffler's thesis is that the acceleration of change has the 
result that the stream of situations we experience in our 
everyday lives, become increasingly characterised by transience 
(high rates of 'turnover', temporariness, imp1~r:nanence), 
novelty, (the non-routine, unpredicted, surprising), and 
diversity (situations of 'overchoice'), and it is the inability 
to adapt to these phenomena which gives rise to 'future shock'. 
Relationships with the six components of human situations may be 
equally affected by transience, novelty and diversity: man-thing 
relations, man-place relations, social relations, rnan's 
relations with the social organisation - the 'organisational 
nexus' the context of ideas and information, and man's relations 
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with time, each may become more impermanent, more unpredictable, 
and more variable: 
It is precisely these relationships that, as 
accelerat.lon occurs in society, become 
foreshortened, telescoped in time. 
Relationships that once endured for long 
spans of time now have shorter life 
expectancies. It is this abbreviation, this 
compression, that gives rise to the amost 
tangible feeling that we live; rootless and 
uncertain, among shifting dunes. 
(Barker & Wright: 1955:43) 
Elsewhere he writes: 
We may define future shock as the distress, 
both physical and psychological, that arises 
from an overload of the human organism's 
physical adaptive systems and its 
decision-making processes. Put more simply, 
future shock is the human response to 
overstimulation •.• Caught in the_ turbulent 
flow of change, called upon to make 
significant, rapid-fire life decisions, (the 
victim of future shock) feels not simply 
intellectual bewilderment, but 
disorientation at the level of personal 
values. 
(Barkes & Wright: 1955:290,322: emphasis 
added) 
The new form of society latent in these developments, Toffler 
refers to as 'super-industrial society'. This he intends to 
connote: " ••• a complex, fast-paced society dependent upon 
extremely advanced technology and a post-materialist value 
system" (Toffler: 1970:434). What happens when the changes 
confront an unprepared populat~on at too great a pace is 
revealed in America's experience: 
••• the United States is a nation in which 
tens of thousands of young people flee 
reality by opting for drug-induced 
lassitude; a nation in which missions of 
their parents retreat into video-induced 
stupor or alcoholic haze: a nation in which 
legions of elderly folk vegetate and die in 
loneliness; in which the flight from family 
and occupational responsibility has become 
an exodus; in which masses tame their raging 
anxieties with Miltown or Librium, or 
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Quinal, or a score of other tranquilisers 
and psychic pacifiers. Such a nation, 
whether it knO\vs it or not is suffering frorll 
future shock. 
(Toffler: 1970:325) 
Other authors have been particularly concerned with the strain 
placed upon cultural adaptations by the pace of sd.enti fie and 
technological advance. The greater the rate and the dimensions 
of inno1Jation, the greater the problems of refashioning concepts 
and value systems to cope with the changes. Thus, Ozbekhan 
makes the following judgement: 
The prime reason for the failure of the 
rules and values on which our rationality 
rests can, as I and many others believe, be 
found in the massive changes and the rapid 
rates of change that more Western societies 
are undergoing. The phenomena generated by 
change are not only stressful, they are not 
only disquieting - but they put to question 
the validity of many general concepts that, 
for a long time, have provided muscle to our 
world view. it is admittedly difficult to 
maintain a world 1Jiew predicated on a 
particular definition of facts when we are 
no longer sure what a fact is, or, on 
scarcity when we, in the industrially 
advanced West, are experiencing the birth 
pains of ab1ndance; or, on the sanctity of 
toil when the possibility of a leisure 
society has already raised questions of 
social organisation so fundamental as to be 
frightening, and so alien to our traditional 
modes of thinking as to be unanswerable ••• 
(Ozbekhan: 1968:50) 
Health ser1Jices are one particular area in which western 
societies are currently facing a set oE se1Jere moral and ethical 
problems, as a result of the revolutionary progress being made . 
in the biological sciences. Results already achieved in 
spare-part surgery, contraception and genetic control pose an 
immense challenge to widely held belief systeins and values. 
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There are signs that within science itself, the rapidity with 
which new disciplines, concepts and methods are bei:i.g developed 
is forcing changes on the traditional structure of 
subject-matter that will encourage synthesis as well as 
specialisation. Nevertheless, the problems of methodological 
esoterica and scientific jargon are still a huge handicap in the 
crossing of disciplinary boundaries. 
The characteristic of turbulent society that I am talking about 
is known and experienced by rriillions of people as the 'rat 
race'. Further evidence of the existence of the phenomenon is 
that it begats its negation - in groups of people known as 
drop-outs and hippies, in institutions such as "free" 
universities, and in social relationships of contrived 
spontaneity - 'encounter groups', 'T-groups', and sensitivity 
training. 
2. Fragmentation 
The 'accelerative thrust' of science and technology results in 
greater transience, novelty and diversity in the life situations 
of individuals, and creates pressures towards the constant 
readjustment of concepts, beliefs, attitudes and values, as 
reality is revolutionised. The history of even the first part 
of this century shows that changes occur in both the material 
means of existence and in value systems. The argument as to 
which is the cause of the other is no longer a very fruitful one 
and it is widely accepted that the phenomena are mutually 
interactive in their effects. There is some evidence hrnvever, 
that at different historcal times, either ideations or 
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production systems may be subject to the more rapid or more 
fundamental changes, and thus became the leading part of the 
system. 
The bias in interpretations of the industrialisation of wes~ern 
society is very much towards giving technology and the 
organisation of production the role of prime mover. 
Jantsch comments: 
The decisive factor in the current 
development ••. is the rapid and almost 
independent growth of the "'technology 
engineering"' area per se, and its one-sided 
influence on the other engineering areas, 
primarily on the slowly developing areci of 
social engineering, which is frequently 
disregarded in planning. Technology 
enginering is affecting the lnsuf ficiently 
known area of human engineering in an 
unkno,vn, but certainly important \vay. The 
uncontrolled growth of this one element in 
our overall system, technology, is no1v about 
to assume the characteristics of cancerous 
growth, disturbing and repressing the 




The second facet of turbulent society that I wish to look at is 
fragmentation, or "'fracture' (Thom: 1975). Fragmentation 
results from the unevenness of change among different groups 
within society, and the tendency for other groups to put 
themselves outside society. Not all parts of a complex and 
dynamic system such as society are likely to be subject to 
changes at the same rates and in the same directions. 
Fracturing, in constrast to the division of labour (functional 
specialisation), implies a reduction of cohesion and lo•'7er 
degrees of articulation among the segments that become 
separated. With fast and uneven rates of change, some segments 
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are l.ikely to get left behind, others are likely to be thrust 
out ahead, and it seems, others are likely to opt out 
altogether. 
In relation to material advance it is the urban and the rural 
poor that get left behind, these groups often being co-extensive 
with ethnic or religious minorities. Referring to a segment of 
the society being left behind in this respect implies that the 
disadvantaged are not merely a statistical aggregate of 
unfortunate individuals, but that they share other 
characteristics which relate their situation to the social 
structure, rather than simply to their personality 
configurations. Thus for the urban poor, the high costs of 
housing (often accentuated rather than alleviated by 'urban 
renewal' - slum redevelopment into middle-class accommodation), 
the size of families, barriers to education, and unemployment, 
help to account for a cycle of poverty in which the atta"i.nment 
of 'escape velocity' is beyond the means of the majority. 
Middle-class administered welfare schemes alleviate the symptoms 
- there has been a constant upward revision of the poverty level 
but it is found difficult to produce any preventive policy. 
The aged, too, are likely to become ih~g.lected by virtue of their 
structural position in changing world. l.Jith the steady 
contraction of kinship into nuclear families, 'the pensioners' 
become a structurally defined group, and one which, for want of 
political power, is likely to be left behind in the advance 
towards mass affluence. 
43 
Other groups advance materially much faster than the mean, and 
give rise to pockets of opulence, equally fractured from the 
total structure. The break is clearest with those persons who 
become sufficiently affluent for further income to be irrelevant 
as far as the satisfaction of their material needs is concerned. 
Many top entertainers, sportsmen and executives fall into this 
category. One suspects that the clannishness 6f professional 
golfers and the top car-race drivers derives not only from their 
shared experiences on the circuit, but also from the common 
life-styles made possible by their success. Other groups may 
still depend upon a continuing income, but have incomes high 
enough to support life styles which divide them from the mass of 
people. The "'noveaux riches"', the "'jet set"', the "'stock-broker 
belt"' - these terms designate groups which are as insulated from 
average life experiences as the "'hillbillies"', the "'Oki es"' and 
the urban poor. 
In the cultural-valuational dimension, other segmentations 
occur. Here the van is represented by creative artists, "'meciia 
men"', youth sub-cultures, and the like; groups that are closely 
related to the information-communication system, or for whom 
most significance lies in the future rather than the past. 
Other groups do not change their values and beliefs as fast as 
the world around them is changing, and, indeed, are inclined to 
maintain that there is a special virtue in the maintenance of 
the traditional and the orthodox, at a time when nothing else 
seems very permanent at all. Institutions which embody and 
purvey patriotism, religious orthodoxy and privilege, tend to 
react defensively when attacked, with the effect of solidifying 
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their existing positions, and widening the gulf between 
themselves and the van (Stanworth & Giddens: 1974). 
Intuitively, one suspects that the burning of national flags and 
draft cards and the baring of private parts, have become such 
popular spofts largely because of the certainty with which they 
evoke sentiments of moral outrage from the morally orthodox 
groups. 
Fracturing of the social structure is likely to be a significant 
feature of turbulent society to the extent that r;ites of change 
in the value systems and in material welfare ;;1re significantly 
different for different parts of the society. Conversely, we 
expect to find in relatively placid and homogeneous societies 
(not subject to constant change), that splinteriag and 
segmentation of the social structure i.s much less likely to 
occur. 
A different order of fracturing occurs (we may think of it as 
active rather than passive) when a group wilfully disengages 
itself from the rest of society, either to create its mvn world, 
or to undermine and destroy the existing social structure. 
Contemporary examples suggest that this is more 11.kely to be a 
response to the rapidity and direction of change, than to its 
unevenness, although it could be expected that groups 11hich are 
neglected beyond a certain tolerance level (groups that are left 
so far behind perhaps, as to make their situation quite 
hopeless), will be inclined to break altogether witl1 the system. 
It may be that the proponents of Black Power and the followers 
of Martin Luther King differed in their perceptions of how far 
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the blacks in America had been left behind. It is interesting 
to note that a number of the 'seceding' groups have adopted 
designations which emphasise their removal from the main-stream. 
Drop out, underground press, and free university are, in part, 
relational concepts, drawing attention to the realms from which 
they are disengaged. 
3. Ecological Traps 
The thi.rd facet of turbulent society has been described by 
Vickers as 'the end of free fall', and it will be useful to 
quote from him at some length: 
Within six generations or so, we in Britaln 
- and others elsetvhere even ;nore quickly -
have blown ourselves out of the agricultural 
into the lndustrial epoch, out of a a rural 
into an urban way of life, and out of a 
nat11ral into a man-ma'de environment •••• The 
explosion released several critical rates of 
change. Populations began to multiply 
faster; individuals began to produce and 
conswne more, to travel and communicate 
more, to expect and deinand more. As a 
result they began to depend more on each 
other and, soon, to get more and more i.n 
each others ways; but these c0nst~qu2nces 
were noticed only later, because the 
explosion began in a \vorld so under-occupied 
and under-developed that for a time each 
change could excite itself and the others 
without breeding limitations. This is what 
I call the time of free fall. It grows 
clearer every day that the time of free fall 
is coming to an end. For the man-made 
environment in which the industrial epoch is 
closing.us - created as it now is by the 
unintended results of what everyone does 
is becoming too unpredictable to live in and 
may soon become too unacceptable to live 
with... We shall have to live in a much 
denser political medium. We ruust take 
account of the increasing mutual demands and 
expectations of people and societies who are 
growing more numerous, more crowded, more 
mutually dependent - but also, at present, 
more di verse and more mutually intolerant. 
(Vickers: 1968:52) 
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Modes of behaviour that were felt to be appropriate during the 
time of 'free fall' are exemplified in the widespread practice 
in earlier days of what has been called 'exploitative' 
lumbering. Ogburn has described how the plentiful forests of 
the Appalachian, Great Lakes and Gulf regions of the United 
States were indiscriminantly cut and burnt, for timber and for 
agricultural land. 
Then rather suddenly, it began to he 
realised in certain cen~res of thought that 
if the policy of cutting timber continued in 
the same rate and in the same manner the 
forests would in a short qme he gone and 
very soon indeed they would be inadequate to 
supply the needs of the population. 
(Ogburn: 1950: 2 50) 
It is now generally understood that the overcropping of nat1n-al 
resources of plant or animal life can lead to disastrous and 
irreversible ecological consequences; this understanding came 
about with the development of a biological concept of ecology. 
The current concern with the problems of pollution arid 
conservation and better management of the envi ronme.nt in general 
expresses a new level of ecological awareness, one i.n which man 
himself, and the man-made environment, become intrinsic ele:nents 
of an extended ecosystem. The re-appearance of concepts of 
social and human ecology reveal a sensitivity to a wider syste1n 
of interdependencies. 
Free fall nu st come to an end when the recognition i.s forced 
upon us that to continue to allow the activities of individuals 
and organisations to be guided by self-interest will lead us 
into 'traps' as consequential for our urban civilisation as the 
dust bowls of the Prairies, and the thickening pollution of the 
Great takes have been for plant and animal king<loms. 
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The trap in its basic nature is the same in 
every case. Whether we focus attention on 
the individual or on any larger hwnan 
association up to the 1vhole population of 
the planet, we find that its relations with 
its environment are changing and that these 
changes threaten it in three main ways. 
Sometimes they threaten the physical basis 
of its existence, such as food supply, 
living space, or even breathable air. Often 
they threaten the institutional basis for 
its existence, by posing tiisks whid1 its 
institutions, political, ecoriomic or social, 
cannot be adapted to. Always they threaten 
what I will call the appreciative basis for 
its existence (the word 'cultural' would he 
too narrow) by requiring it to revise and 
revalue, more radJcally than time pernii ts, 
its understanding of the world it lives in 
and of whatever in that world it lives for. 
(Vi ck er s : 1 9 7 0 : 2 9) 
This third facet of turbulent society, results partleularly from 
the increased overall connectedness among human activities and 
the environment that they act upon, which increases the 
ecological density and makes .it less and less possible for 
actors to adapt to the environment by themselves; joint 
strategies are demanded for successful adaptation. Trist has 
argued that one of the key consequences of post-industrialism is 
that welfare and development of the system as .1 1vhole become 
interdependent, a situation which contr.:rnts with simpler level:3 
of environmental complexity. "'Welfare' (well-being; contJnuing 
to function well; maintenance of the steady state) and 
'development' (progression; continuing to advance; attai.nment of 
higher order steady states) refer to the static and the dynamic 
aspects of the socio-cultural system's adaptation. The 
relatively placid environments of pre-industrial societies are 
characterised by 'auto-regulative' welfare processes, embodied 
in extended kinship systems, while development processes require 
an active intervention, and are called into being when, for some 
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reason, the maintenance of welfare through kinship breaks down. 
Development is a function of welfare. In the mor-e complex and 
dynamic environments of industrial societies, development is 
maintained by auto-regulative processes which are embodied in 
the market system, and reflected in the replacement of kinship 
groups by enterprises as the leading part. Under industrial 
conditions, welfare increasingly requires active intervention, 
as kinship systems are no longer able to cope. Welfare is a 
function of development. 
In the turbulent environments which correspond to post-
industrial society, welfare and development become 
interdependent functions. "The meta-problems cr-eated in this 
situation pass the limit within which auto-regulative processes 
can adaptively operate with repect to either welfare or 
deveiopment, so that an active role becomes generally required." 
(Emery and Trist: 1972:130). In particular., accelerating rates 
of change means that development becomes a pre-requisite for the 
welfare of sub-systems - otherwise they are left behind and 
rendered obsolescent, falling into states of 'ill-fare'. In 
addition, the increasing interdependence arnong sub-systems means 
that the i 11-fare of relatively few sub-systems, especially if 
they occupy strategic positions, can be critical for the larger 
system. The increased interdependence of the fates of 
sub-systems, expressed in terms of their development and their 
welfare, leads to the point at which 'adaptation nmv depends on 
the ecological regulation of the interdependencies in all their 
dimensions of the innumerable sub-systems Hhich characterise 
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large societies undergoing rapid but uneven chang(~" (Emery & 
Trist: 1972:129). Kinship systems and enterprises are 
supplanted by ecological systems as the critical unit for 
adaptation. 
To the extent that the well-being and progress of all the 
sub-systems become more and more strongly inter-related, the 
dem;:i.nds for regulation, co-ordination, and institutionalisation 
of relationships can be eKpected to increase also, but so far we 
have had relatively little success in this respect. Even wher2 
the problem can be fairly simply identified, responsibilities 
and authorities tend to be divided and confused. Responses to 
the increasingly ecological character of the 
man-technology-nature nexus lag behind the realities of 
increased environmental uncertainty and give rise to the· 
familiar pathologies of admini.stratlve tardiness, organisational 
conflicts, retreat into routinisation and abdication of 
responsibilities. 
Thus, for example, there is a sense ln which pollution unites us 
all. The well-being and adaptivity of all parts of 
industrialized societies are subject to the reversibility of the 
rates at which some of our crucial resources are used or fouled. 
The ecological problems of pollution, waste disposal and 
resource management urgently demand a new coming to terras 
between industry and society, between the co(poration and the 
city, between private gain and ~ublic good, in which the parties 
will engage in a joint search for a solution and jointly take 
responsibility for adhering to it. Already, we are witness.ing 
, 
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some· new forms of relationship between the political and 
productive systems in the metering of pollutants, imposition of 
penalties for excessive emissions, the application of subsidies 
and other fiscal preferences for 'cleanness' or process or 
recycling, and the relocation of large users of fuel. 
To the turbulent society's problems of coping with future shock, 
fracturing and friction can be added the difficulties of 
steering around the dangers of becoming 'ecologically trapped'. 
If the connectedness· of outcomes is recognised too late, or not 
at all; if the mutual independence of \velfare and development is 
not appreciated by decision-makers, then we can dnticipate the 
setting off of some disastrous ecological processes for society 
as a whole, which, if they are reversible, will require huge 
applications of will and resource to reverse them. 
4. Alienation 
Alienation may be· related in particular to the overwhelming size 
and complexity of the social field which industrial man has to 
confront, but it also seems to be related to the rapidity of 
change and the lags in our institutional and value systems for 
which this is responsible. Friedmann, for example, makes this 
connection quite explicitly: 
We seem to be faced with rising disorders 
because of our collective inability to bring 
environmental 'turbulence' under control. 
Societal actions lead to unpredicted, 
negative consequences on such a scale that 
they tend to deny the effectiveness of 
individu~l effort. One result of this is 
that more and more people become alienated 
from the society. 
(Friedmann: 1969:316) 
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For a social system undergoing a transition of the kind we have 
been discussing, it is not only the sheer extensiveness and 
seeming immutability of the social realties that people have to 
meet in their lives that creates pressures towards the 
attenuation of their links with the social field, but also the 
increased instability and unpredictability of the field itself. 
Faunce makes the following cogent evaluation: 
The most persistent indictment of industrial 
society is that it has resulted in the 
alienation of industrial man. Loneliness in 
the midst of urban agglomeration; loss of 
social anchorage in mass society; the 
absence of a predictable life trajectory in 
an era of unprecedented social change; and 
the powerlessness of man within the complex 
social ~conomic and political systems he has 
created are common themes in the social 
criticism of the industrial way of li.fe ••• 
The pervasiveness of alienation in 
industrial societies results fr01a .its 
relationship to characteristics inherent in 
the social structure of these societies ••• 
Rapid social change, increased structural 
differentiation, decreased structural 
integration, and rationalisation of social 
organisation have produced widespread 
feelings of powerlessness, normlessness, or 
meaninglessness; this pattern of social 
experience reduces the correspondence 
between the cr-iteria used in maintaining 
self-esteem and those used in assigning 
social status, which results in loneliness, 
apathy, or overconformity. 
(Faunce: 1968:84:102) 
Unlike the other syrup toms of turbulence that I have discussed, 
alienation is specifically an individual (or more correctly, a 
socio-psychological) phenomenon, having to do with the web of 
affiliations that, link the psychological individual to the 
social field. Alienation refers to the attenuation of the 
causal strands that connect the psyche to the social field, 
whereby the wholeness of man's experiences and activity becomes 
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fragmented. This formulation encompasses the distinction that 
is usually made between al.ienatlon from the social units with 
which the individual is connected, and allenation from the self, 
or self-estrangement. 
This is so, because the self from which the lnd:ividual bec1)mes 
alienated is a social phenomenon; it is the 'look:ing-glass 
self', which is presented to us in interaction 1vith si;snificant 
others - an assimilation of others' perceptions of ourselves. 
The building up and maintenance of a reasonable, stable and 
consonant self-concept is, therefore, largely a funet ion of the 
individual's meaningful involvement in systems of social action 
that endures sufficiently long for the individual to be able to 
'locate' himself, and achieve a degree of commitment and 
identification with respect to the social behaviours in ~lich he 
is implicated. 
The generation of commitment and identification of this sort is 
threatened by the gathering momentwn of industrial society. The 
weakening of kinship bonds, increments in personal mobility, 
greater specialisation of occupations and so on, tend to reduce 
the possibilities for stabilising a positive personal identity. 
Again, Faunce writes: 
Difficulty in affirming a positive image of 
self is pervasive in industrial societies. 
Industrial man frequently participates in 
activities in which he has invested little 
of his self and in which he is consequently 
self-estranged in the classic sense of this 
term as developed by Marx and Fromm. "Freed 
from the bonds of small-grc?UP pre-industrial 
society, the individual is confronted with 
the problem of maintaining self·-esteem in an 




When the stream of situations in which industrial m;:in becomes 
involved grow more ephemeral and transient, less uniform and 
less predictable, it is harder for him to cement his i1nage or 
self into his social context. He becomes self-estranged. The 
pervasiveness of such self-estrangement in advanced industrial 
society may help to account for the appeal of the 
concept of 'self-actualisation' that has been popularised by 
Argyris, particularly in the contex:t of organisational 
behaviour, for self-actualisation represents the antithesis of 
self-estrangement - the maturing of the self rather than its 
vapourisation (see Argyris: 1957 and 1973). 9 
Estrangement from the social group can take the form of 
powerlessness, meaninglessness, or isolation (See Seeman: 1959, 
and Blauner: 1964 for discussion of the concept of alienation). 
The pervasiveness of the sense of powerlessness of the 
individual and his inability to influence, let alone control, 
some of the important conditions of his existence, appears to be 
a universal concomitant of industrialisation. The debate 
concern.ing the implicat.ions of the b1H"eaucratisation of society 
for the maintenance of democratic control revolves around the 
question of the extent to which bureaucracy depr.i11es the 
ind.ividual of his power to exert an influence over important 
decisions affecting his own and other's lives. Isolation refers 
to the more general separation of the ind:i11idual from the social 
field that I have discussed earlier in talking of the field 
'going out of existence' for him. Loneliness is, perhaps, the 
most common consequence of isolation (Slater: 1975). 
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Of meaninglessness, Faunce has this to say: 
Various writers have noted the increasing 
difficulty in rapidly changing segmented 
societies in finding appropriAte standards 
for judgement regarding courses of action or 
patterns of belief. Meaninglessness refers, 
more specifically, to the difficulty in 
making accurate predictions about the 
behaviour of others or about the outcome of 
our own actions. Situations have meaning to 
us to the extent that we are able to 
anticipate their outcome. Industrialism has 
increased the incidence of social situations 
that are meaningless in this sense. 
(Faunce: 1968:89) 
Meaninglessness, in particular, is a consequence of the modes of 
production fostered by industrialism, whereby jobs and 
occupations have become ever more specialised, to the point at 
which the individual becomes incapable of understanding the 
relation of his own part-function to the completed product, and 
disinclined to take any pride in or responsibility for that 
product. The job itself becomes meaningless 1vhen it allows no 
possibility for the worker to grow as a person and eirpr..-~ss 
himself in some creative way. 
In what does the alienation of labour 
consist? First, that the work is external 
to the worker, that it is not a part of his 
nature, that consequently he does not fulfil 
hi.ms elf in his work but denies himself, has 
a feeling of misery, not of well bei.ng, does 
not develop freely a physical and ment.::il 
energy, but is physically exhausted and 
mentally debased. The worker therefore 
feels himself at home only during his 
leisure, whereas at work he feels himself 
homeless. His work is not voluntary but 
imposed, forced labour. It is not the 
satisfaction of a need, but only a means for 
satisfying other needs. 
(Bottomore and Rubel: 1963:177-8) 
Marx's statement from the middle of last century has :1 
surprising aura of moderni°ty. 
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Self-estrangement, powerlessness, isolation, and meaninglessness 
are the social psychological correlates of the drift into 
post-industrialism. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER I 
1 Brzezinski (1968), Boulding (1964), Toffler (1970), Bell 
(1967). See Kumar (1979) for criticism of post 
industralism. 
2 See Shonfield (1969) for an analysis of, and speculation 
about, the changing roles and relations of the corporation 
and the state in modern society. 
3 The United Nations and the OECD definitions of a 'developing 
country' are given in Moyes and Hayter (1964). They list a 
total of 153 societies of which approximately 34 are 
'industrialized' according to OECO criteria. 
4 Some imbalances of this sort, between goverrnm~nt) 
technology, and social problems, are discussed by Sayre 
Smith (1969) in terms of the relative degrees of political 
and technological 'readiness' for particular societal 
innovations. 
5 See, in particular, Emery and Trist (1972) Barker 
(1968,1969), and the earlier work of Hawley (1950). 
6 John Lindsay documents some gross examples of 
maladministration and agency inco-ordination in describing 
recounting his first term as Mayor of New York, (Lindsay: 
1969). 
7 A different view can be found in Horowitz (1969), who 
questions the thesis that innovat.ion is accelerating, and 
argues that significant discoveries are in fact decreasing. 
8 For some evidence concerning the relation between the 
occurrence of significant life changes and the onset of 
psychiatric illness, see Rahe, McKean and Arthur (196 7) and 
Brown and Birley (1968). 
9 Blackler and Brown have recently criticised the concept of 
self-actualisation as being exploitative of the environment 





SYSTEMS THEORY AS A FRAMEWORK 
This account of the transformation of social fields related to 
the advent of post-industrialism, and of the kinds of problems 
that this transformation is likely to create for the government 
(in the widest sense of control or management) of social 
systems, has been largely descriptive and partly speculative. 
In order to be able to respond effectively in the midst of 
massive upheaval and dislocation of the social world, we need, 
both as management scientists and as centres of action within 
the social field, a system of concepts and understandings that 
is sensitive to the problems of organised, dynamic complexity, 
and that has sufficient theoretical significance to act as a 
guide in the selection of behaviours that are most likely to 
serve particularised ends and interests without threatening the 
survival of the fields as a whole. 
Notwi thstandi.ng the generally descriptive character of my 
preceding discussion, it has been guided by a particular 
conceptual framework, that of systems theory. Thi.s conceptual 
framework I will now make explicit and amplify, primarily 
through an exploration of three concepts that are central to a 
theory of behavioural ~ystems: purposiveness (or purposeful 
behaviour); the causal texture of the environment; and 
adaptation. In the present chapter I sketch an outline of 
systems theory and its development, and discusses the concept of 
a purposeful system. The two succeeding chapters present 
concepts of the environment and of adaptation. 
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It is now over 30 years since von Bertalanffy gave general 
currency to the concept of system, and presented the fundamantal 
distinction between open and closed systems that has become 
basic to the systems approach to behavioural phenomena 
(Bertalanffy: 1950). There is available in the literature a 
considerable collection of articles,, anthologies and monographs 
which surveys the field of systems theory and I do not proposed 
to duplicate these efforts. 1 
Some introductory remarks are needed however, in view of the 
fact that the systems concept has tended to become, over the 
last decade or so, all things to all men. It has become 
fashionable to use a systems vocabulary, with the consequence 
that a wide diversity of points of view and methodology can 
become obscured beneath a veneer of terminological similarity. 
Most conceptions of the systems approach, however, appreciate 
that its distinctive competence rests in i.ts capability for 
handling problems of organisation in a holistic manner - of 
interpreting dynamic complexes of interacting parts as wholes, 
and understanding them on this level. 2 Systems theory is, 
therefore, of particular r~levance to the investigation of 
biological, psychological and social phenomena, as most of the 
critical problems of these areas are problems of organisation. 
They are problems to do with the ways in which an entity can 
endure and maintain its essential form over time, while its 
parts are in complex and dynamic interaction, and constantly 
being r~generated. These 'organisational' problems require the 
simultaneous appreciation of structure and process, for in 
l_ 
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living systems these two dimensions are inseparable. (Cooper, 
1976). In outlining the quest for a general system theory, 
Bertalanffy writes: 
If we survey the evolution of modern 
science, as compared to science in a few 
decades, we are impressed by the fact that 
similar general viewpoints and conceptions 
have appeared in very diverse fields. 
Problems of organisation, of wholeness, of 
dynam'ic interaction, are urgent in modern 
physics, chemistry, physical chemistry and 
technology. In biology, problems of an 
organismic sort are everywhere encountered: 
it is necessary not only to study isolated 
parts and processes, but the essential 
problems are the organising relations that 
result from dynamic interaction and make the 
behaviour of parts different when studied in 
isolation or within the whole. The same 
trend is manifest in gestalt theory and 
other movements as opposed to classical 
psychology, as well as in modern conceptions 
of the social sciences. 
(Bertalanffy: 1956:1) 
Systems theory is a reaction to the mechanistic and atomi.stic 
thought-modes of the natural sciences that dominated science for 
most of the 19th century. Systems theory may be thought of as 
a scientific revolution, in Kuhn's terms, that became 
unavoidable as it was realised that mechanism fat.led to offer 
the life sciences a concept of life that would distinguish 
scientifically between living and non-living systems and a 
concept of behaviour that would distinguish between the 
behaviour of men and the behaviour of machines. The breaks 
appeared on a number of fronts and soon began reinforcing one 
another. 
In psychology, the atomistic approach was first challenged by 
the gestaltists, Wertheimer, Kaffka and Kohler, who came to take 
as their standpoint the evidence in perception of experienced 
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wholes, and who replaced behaviourism with a phenomenological 
methodology. In biology, the strain on such ad hoc hypotheses 
as the existence of 'entelechies' and 'elans vitau' reached 
breaking point in the early decades of this century, and the 
mechanism - vitalism dispute was defused by the development of 
an organismic approach in the work of, for example, Woodger, 
Jennings, Hendersen and Cann6n. In social psychology, the 
concept of the group mind, which had dominated attempts to 
understand the interdependence of the group and the individual, 
was similarly exposed as a vitalistic idea and succumbed to the 
moce rational approaches of Lewin, Brown and Mead. 
The character of this revolution has been further elucidated by 
Ashby: 
Science has, of course, long been interested 
in the living organism; but for 200 years 
it has tried primar.ily to find, within the 
organism, whatever is simple ••• 
The same strategy - of looking for the 
simple part - has been used incessantly in 
physics and chemistry. Their triumphs have 
been chiefly thos~ of identifying the units 
out of which the complex structures are--
made. The triumph has been in analysis, 
not in synthesis. Thus today the 
biochemist knows more about the amino acids 
of which egg-protein is composed than he 
does about the white of egg from which they 
have been obtained. And the physiologist. 
knowns more about the individual nerve cell 
in the brain than he does about the action 
of the great mass of them in interaction. 
Thus until recently the strategy of the 
sciences has been largely that of analysis. 
The units have been found, their properties 
studied, and then, somewhat as an 
after-thought, some attempt has been made to 
study them in combined action. But this 
study of synthesis has often made little 
progress and does not usually occupy a 
prominent place in scientific knowledge ••• 
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•.. whereas physics and chemistry, given a 
system, promptly breaks it to pieces in 
order to study the parts, there is arising a 
new discipline that studies the system 
without breaking it to pieces. 
The internal interactions are left intact, 
and the system is, in the well-known words, 
studied as a whole. 
(Ashby: 1958:1) 
The distinction between open and closed systems was of very 
great importance in the application of systems concepts to the 
understanding of behavioural systems (Bertalanffy: 1950). An 
open ,system engages in exchanges with its environment, importing 
from the environment certain sorts of material, transforming 
this in characteristic ways and exporting a ne1v configuration of 
the materials back into the environment. Processes such as 
photosynthesis, respiration, and manufacturing may thus be 
regarded as conversion processes of open systems. The ability 
to incorporate free energy from the environment ineans that open 
systems are capable of adaptive evolution, moving towards higher 
degrees of complexity and organisation and that they ~an 
maintain themselves in a time-independent steady state, avoiding 
increases in entropy. Closed systems, on the other hand, are 
subject to the second law of thermodynamics and they tend always 
to be moving towards an equilibrium point at which no more work 
can be done. Being unable to import energy from the 
environment, they are not capable of differentiation and growth; 
once the initial state of the system is determined, all 
subsequent states of the system can, in principle, also be 
known. According to Bertalanffy: 
Every living organism is essentially an open 
system. It maintains itself in a 
continuous inflow and outflow, building up 
and breaking down of components, never 
being, so long as it is alive, in a state of 
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chemical and thermodynamic equi.librium but 
maintained in a so-called steady state which 
is distinct from the latter. This is the 
very essence of that fundamental phenomenon 
.of life which is called metabolism, the 
chemical process within living cells. 
(Bertalanffy: 1950:3) 
This distinction was, in itself, of the greatest significance to 
the understanding of organisms and behavioural systems, and of 
the ways in which they differ essentially from inanimate objects 
and machines. The assimilation of the concept of open systems 
into the behavioural sciences has had as one consequence far 
more systematic attention to the environment of individual and 
social action, and the part that it plays in behaviour. As 
Emery and Trist have commented: 
••• though von Bertalanffy's formulation 
enables exchange processes between the 
organism, or organisations, and elements in 
its environment to be dealt with in a new 
perspective, it does not deal at all with 
these processes in the environment itself 
which are among the determining cond1tions 
of the exchanges. 
(Emery and Trist: 1965:22) 
A concept of' the envi rornnent as a causal te}~ture that 
'co-produces' the outcomes of the purposive behaviours of 
individuals and groups I will discuss in the following chapter. 
A further source of insight and inspiration in the development 
of a theory of behavioural systems was the dramatic progress 
made in systems engineering during and after the Second World 
War. The funds available for research on weapons and defence 
systems, and the bringing together of the first operations 
research teams to work on problems of integrated men-machine 
complexes that the new weapons technology created, compounded 
interest and progress in understanding thesystem problems of 
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control and communication in complex organisations. The 
development and refinement of radar-controlled gunnery, of 
target-seeking missiles such as the torpedo, and of 
servo-mechanisms for controlling the courses of ships and 
aircraft had a valuable spin-off for the social sciences by 
providing insights for the comprehension of goal-directed and 
purposeful behaviour of social systems. 3 
In particular developments in information and communication 
theory and cybernetics gave rise to a powerful 
cross-fertilisation, with developments in the understanding of 
purposive hwnan behaviour, that can be traced back to Slnt1~r 
(1924) and Tolman (1932). It 110\v appears that the development 
of the ability to build a machine that could regulate its mvn 
behaviour by means of feedback signals, led to an 
over-enthusiastic extension of cybernetics principles to 
problems of social life that still continues. An important 
corrective drawing attention to the limitations of the 
applicability of cybernetics to purposive behaviour, was 
published by Churchman and Acko ff (1950) and the subsequent 
collaboration of Ackoff and Emery (1972) has gone an important 
step beyond this in identifying the properties of purposeful 
systems and showing in what ways they differ from goal-seeking 
systems. 
This much, at least, can in general be said about the background 
and temperament of systems thinking. ln order to appreciate 
some of the variation that is possible within this general 
f raine, l turn to Pepper's analysis of 'world hypo theses' 
(Pepper: 1942). 
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Pepper identifies four 'relatively adequate' world hypotheses: 
formism, mechanism, contextualism and organicism. The means he 
uses in isolating these four is the 'root metaphor theory', 
which, he says: "is simply a recognition of the fact that there 
are schools of philosophy, and an attempt to get at the roots of 
these schools." (Pepper: 1942:328). 
The four world hypotheses amount to competing interpretations of 
the universe, each of \-Jhich has its own conception of what the 
basic uni ts are and its own mode of interpreting tht'm. They are 
"hypotheses of unrestricted scope, which exclude no evidence as 
irrelevant on the grounds of being outside the field under 
discussion." (Pepper: 1942:326). [nsofar as they each claim to 
encompass all phenomena in the universe (and none of them has 
the power to conclusively adjud.i.c11te over the adequacy of the 
others), it is open for different thinkers to adopt the 
hypothesis that they think or feel to be most appropdate to the 
problems they have to confront. If Pepper's claim is correct 
(that each of these four is a relatively adequate world 
hypothesis), then in particular instances an investigator's 
choice of a particular strategem may, without ser.Lous da1nage, be 
guided as much by his personal characteristics as by any 
objective criterion demonstrating its advantages over others. 
There is some evidence that systems thinkers, while each 
adhering to the basic conception of the system (a set of objects 
and the relations bet1veen them) have connected the basic systems 
vocabulary to a number of different world hypotheses. 
The four hypotheses are outlined by Pepper as follows: 
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Formism is often called 'realism' or 
'platonic idealism'. It is associated with 
Plato, Aristotle, and scholastics, 
neoscholastics, neorealists, modern 
Cambridge realists. Mechanism is ofi:.en 
called 'naturalism' or 'materialism' and by 
srnne, 'realism'. It is associated with 
Democritus, Lucretius, Galileo, Descartes, 
Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, ReJchenbach. 
Contextualism is commonly called 
'pragmatism'. It is associated with Peirce, 
.James, Bergson, Dewey, Mead. There may be a 
trace of it in the Greek, Protagoras. 
Organicism is commonly called 'absolute (or 
objective) idealism'. It is associated with 
Schelling, Green, Bradley, Bosanquet, Royce. 
(Pepper: 1942:141-2) 
The root metaphor of formism is similarity, the ex:perience of 
identity and sameness in the world around us; of mechanism, it 
is the machine, such as a watch or a dynamo; contextualism's 
root metaphor is the historic event or act; that of organ:icism 
is the organism and integration. It has to be appreciated, of 
course, that world hypotheses are not always made explicit, even 
by philosophers, and that eclecticism is, perhaps, more common 
than the consistent exploration of a single hypothesis. 
The hypotheses are arranged in four different pair 
relationships. Formism and mechanism are analytic, and 
contextualism and organicism are synthetic. "Not lhat the 
analytical theories do not recognise and interpret syntheses, 
and the synthetic theories analysis; but the basic facts or data 
of the analytical theories are mainly in the nature of elements 
or factors, so that synthesis becomes a derivative and not a 
basic fact, while the basic facts or data of the synthetic 
theories are complexes or contexts, so that analysis becomes 
derivative." (Pepper: 1942:142). 
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In the second polarity, formism and contextualism are linked as 
dispersive theories, mechanism and organicism as integrative. 
For the dispersive theories, the universe is a rather chaotic 
scattering of facts, lacking any overriding determination or 
order. 
Facts are, therefore, taken one at a time as they arise, 
understood in the contexts in which they occur and left. For 
the integrative theories, on the other hand, the cosmos is 
highly systematic and facts occur in a determinative order, so 
that if enough could be known they could be described, and 
perhaps, predicted, down to the minutest detail. The dispersive 
theories are more extensive in scope than the integrative 
theories, but are lacking in precision. More information about 
its 'facts' increases the determinateness of a dispersive theory 
by spreading its structural corroboration into a wider context 
(Structural corroboration is contrasted with multiplicative 
corroboration; the former consists in 'the convergence of 
qualitatively different items of evidence in support of a single 
item', e.g., 'circumstantial evidence'; multiplicative 
corroboration is achieved in the repetition of an 'identical' 
item of evidence in many different instances.) The integrative 
theories on the other hand, straining to put all facts in a 
determinative order, are more precise, but suffer from 
inadequacy of scope. They are most likely to be threatened by 
the appearance of new information than are the dispersive 
theories. Putting the two pairs together reveals that analysis 
is treated dispersively by formism and integratively by 
mechanism, while synthesis is treated integratively by 
organicism and dispersively by contextualism. 
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Contextualism 
In this present work I respond (for reasons which become clearer 
in Chapter 3) to the contextualist root metaphor; the historic 
event, or act: 
••• But it is not an act conceived of as 
alone or cut off that VJe rnean; it ls an act 
in and with its setting, an act in i.t8 
context. 
(Pepper: 1942:232) 
The contextualist's world is a world of incidents, events and 
acts that can be described least arnbiguously by the us'~ of verbs 
alone - 'running, loving, exploring, working, sufferi.1g and so 
on. Its fundamental categories are change and novelty - an 
explicit denial of inherent orderltness in the universe • 
• .• disorder is a categorical feature of 
contextualism, and so radically so that it 
must not even exclude order... Change ia 
this radical sense is denied by all other. 
world theories. If such radical change i:; 
not a feature of the world, if there .:1r.e 
unchangeable structures in nature like the 
forms of formi.sm and the space-ti1ne 
structure of mechanism, then contex:tualism 
is false. 
(Pepper: 1942:234) 
The degree of uniformity and structure that nevertheless 
persists is apprehended in the concepts of quality and texture, 
whose sub-categories provide the framework for the 
interpretation of actual events and acts. The quality of an 
event is constituted of its spread (its 'so-called specious 
present'), its change and its degree of iusion; and texture c;in 
be decomposed into its strands, its contexts and its refe:__~. 
The quality of a melody for example, is in its experient.ial 
wholeness or gestalt - 'its total meaning'; its textur.e refers 
to the notes and the tonic relations of which it is constructed. 
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In general, " ••• the quality of a given event is its intuited 
wholeness or total character; tl1e texture ls the details and the 
relation which make up that character or quality." (Pepper: 
1942:238) 
For the contextuali.st, the investigation of a Ct1l1tf~xt or complex 
is not usually undertaken for its own sake, but is end-oriented, 
or pragmatic. Correspondingly, it appeals to an operational 
theory of truth - "truth in terms of action, of actual evf~nts 
having references which lead to satisfactions in other actual 
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(adapted frorn Pepper., 1942: p. 1·~6) 
Basic facts are elements or factors 
Basic facts are contexts or. complexes 
Facts occur in a determinative order, 
and if enol1gh is known they are, in 
principle, predictable. Characterised 
by inadequacy of scope. 
Facts taken one by one and interpreted 
as they come. The cosmos is 
unsystematic. Characterised by 
i na.dequacy of precision. 
For the contextualist moreover, analysis is never finished, hut 
spreads out into ever more inclusive context, so that the point 
at which investigation begins and ends is, finally, a rather 
arbitrary manner. For systems theory, the co1nplete acceptance 
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of the idea that phenomena in the world may be ordered to an 
hierarchical array of systems and sub-systems (each system 
included in a larger system of which it is a part and itself 
being constituted of parts which are systems in themselves), 
means precisely that interpretation can proceed outwards into 
ever more inclusive contexts and inwards into an ever finer 
texture. 
This cursory account of Pepper's ideas is, unfortunately, no 
more than an introduction and an appreciation of the world 
hypotheses of formism, mechanism and organitism in particular 
will require an exami.nation of the original wo1·k. The 
contextualist hypothesis, to which the systems thinking of this 
study is oriented, is to be further outlined in the 
investigation of the development in psychology of a 
contextualistic concept of the environment and its role in 
behaviour. Pepper himself has shown th.e way in which the 
categories of contextualisrn may be fruitful in the study of 
behaviour, in his critical review of Tolman"'s study of 
"Purposive behaviour in animals and men" (Pepper: 1934). 
Other Approaches to Systems Thinking 
With regard to other varieties of systems thinking, it is _ 
apparent that the machine metaphor of mechanism has a dominant 
place in the interpretive schemes of many who identify 
themselves with systems engineering, systems management and 
systems analysis. Whenever the workings of complex men-machine 
systems are investigated from a methodological viewpoint, that 
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takes no account of the unique properties of a man, but is 
interested in him as a physical force, or calculator, or 
communicator, the investigation may usually be traced hack to 
the categories of mechanism. The mechanistic root metaphor may 
well be the most appropriate for analysing inanimate system~ in 
the natural world, but its application to the social world 
invariably strains the interpretation of purposive human 
activity. Thus, for example, essays on "The mechanics of 
bureaucracy" (Reiger: 1966), and on the "Cybernetics analysis of 
change in complex social organisations" (Cadwallader: 1959) and 
the theo'ty of 'systemic planning', laboriously constructed by 
Catanese and Steiss (1970), spell out some parallels between 
mechanical and social systems, but fail to enrich our 
understanding of man and his socio-cultural world. Many 
attempts to apply systems analysis to management problems suffer 
from similar shortcomings (Optner: 1968, Blackler ;rncV Brown: 
1978). 
Functionalism and Systems Theory 
The confusion that has sometimes arisen between systems theory 
and structural functionalism (or siniply functionalism) in 
management is clarified if it is appreciated that functionalism 
is a kind of systems theory, that has been rather heavily 
dependent upon the organicist hypotpesis. The equilibriwn model 
is functionalism, developed in the work of Malinowski and 
Radcliffe-Brown; it reflects a synthetic bias, because its datum 
is a set of interrelated parts, and an integrative disposition, 
in its insistence on the harmony or balance of these parts. 
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Thus, a great deal that is understood as systems thinking in 
sociology relates back to the organicist root metaphor, 
including, of course, the more specific organicism of Spencer, 
Ward and others. As Pepper's analysis suggests, the strains 
that have been experienced in the consistent application of 
organic models of society have to do mainly with the inadequacy 
of their scope and particularly their capacity to incorporate 
notions of conflict, change and novelty. There has thus been a 
tendency toward incorporating elements of other world 
hypotheses, and, in particular contextualism, that will help to 
overcome such limitations. The incorporation of concepts of 
dysfunction (Merton: 1949) and of reciprocity and autonomy in 
functional theory (Gouldner: 1959), may have rendered it more 
flexible, but Nagel's excellent critique (1956) has not 'yet been 
satisfactorily answered, and Dahrendorf's more polemi.cal 
evaluation of structural-functionalism (1958) has won many 
minds. 
Formism 
Finally, the influence of formism is also to be found i.n certain 
types of systems thinking. In Pepper's view, formism is the 
weakest of the four hypotheses and its full expression within a 
particular theoretical framework is, therefore, not to be 
expected. Its strength lies in the feeling of certainty that 
adheres to its root metaphor, the intuition of similarity, and 
its expression in particular disciplines is typically made 
manifest in class-theoretic concepts and ideas. Our f eeli.ng is 
that the programme of general systems theory that was launched 
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by Bertalanffy and Rappaport in 1956 can be related to this 
formistic hypothesis. 
Bertalanf fy commented at that time that in view of the 
correspondences emerging in a number of previously unrelated 
parts of science: 
It seems legitimate to ask for a theory, not 
of systems of a more or less special kind, 
but of universal principles applying to 
systems in general. In this way we come to 
postulate a new discipline, called General 
System Theory. Its subject manner is the 
formulation and derivation of those 
principles which are valid for 'systems' in 
general. 
A first consequence of the existence of 
general system properties is the appearance 
of structural similarities or isomorphies in 
different fields. There are correspondences 
in the principles which govern the behaviour 
of entities that are intrinsically, widely 
different ••• 
In fact, similar concepts, models and laws 
have often appeared in widely different 
fields ••• 
It seems, therefore, that a general theory 
of systems would be a useful tool providing, 
on the one hand, models that can be used in 
and transferred to, different fields, and 
safeguarding, on the other hand, from vague 
analogies which often have marred the 
progress in these fields. 
(Bertalanffy: 1956:1-2) 
Boulding, at the same time, advocated an approach to the 
organisation of general systems theory that would proceed by 
arranging the empirical fields in a hierarchy of complexity of 
organisation and try to develop a level of abstraction 
appropriate to each. He identified eight such levels: 
frameworks, clockworks, thermostat, cell, plant, animal, human, 
and social (Boulding: 1956). Although this classificatory 
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scheme of systems (and others like it) have been taken up in the 
systems literature, they have not shown great promise of 
stimulating new developments, but are limited in their utility 
to a clarificatory role. 4 
Systems Theory and the Concept of Purpose 
The development of a non-mechanistic systems theory that is able 
to take account of such unique properties of humans and their 
behaviour as will and personality has, for a long while, been 
. --[ 
baulked by the problem of differentiating objectively between 
goal-seeking behaviour (of which machines as well as men are 
capable) and purposeful behaviour, which represents the 
distinctive capability of human and social systems; of 
demonstrating the uniqueness of human behaviour as well as its 
similarities with cybernetic machines. The work by Ackoff and 
Emery, 'On purposeful systems' (1972) puts forward a solution to 
these difficult problems and it is the basis of this discussion 
of the concept of purpose. 1 They adopt the following definition 
of the system: 
A set of inter-related parts each of which 
is related directly or indirectly to every 
other element and no subset of which is 
unrelated to any other subset. 
(Ackoff and Emery: 1972:18) 
Given the interdependence and interpenetration between systems 
which are 'open', and their environments, it follows that an 
adequate understanding of living systems (all of which are open) 
requires an appreciation not only of the internal 
characteristics of the system, but also of the characteristics 
of the environment in which it exists, and of the nature of the 
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two-way exchange between system and environment. Following 
Emery and Trist (1965), if we use (L) to indicate some 
potentially lawful relation, and the suffixes (1) to refer to 
the system and (2) to the environment, we can say that a 
comprehensive understanding of such systems requires some 
knowledge of each member of the following set: 




system-environment interdependancies and transactions, and L
22 
to the processes by which parts of the environment become 
interrelated - 'the area of interdependencies that belong within 
the environment itself.' Ackoff and Emery have defined the 
environment of a system as: 
a set of elements and their relevant 
properties, which elements are not part of 
the system but a change in any of which can 
cause or produce a change in·the state of 
the system, 
(Ackoff & Emery: 1972:19) 
Whereas, as I bave pointed out, the contextualist's framework 
implies that the environment of an open system may logically be 
extended outwards to include the entire universe, the above 
definition restricts it pragmatically to those parts of the 
environment which make a difference to the state of the system. 
The relationship of producer-product which occurs in this 
definition is distinguished from the relationship of 
cause-effect, in the following way. An object (A) in a 
particular environment is said to be the producer of another 
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object (B) at a later time, if A is a necessaary but 
insufficlent condition for the occurrence of (B). In other 
words, there are other necessary and insufficient conditions 
which must occur in conjunction with (A) in order for (B) to be 
produced. The relationship between an acorn and an oak tree 
exemplifies the producer-product relation; the acorn is 
certainly necessary for the occurrence of an oak, but is not by 
itself sufficient; other conditions, soil and climate, for 
example, also being necessary. 
The relationship of cause and effect, on the other hand, occurs 
when a set "of circwnstances at a particular point of time is 
both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the occurrence 
of another set of circumstances: 
Producer-product is thus a special case of 
cause-effect. It applies when we consider 
the relationship between parts of 
time-slices (a time-slice is a 'bounded 
volume of space at a moment of time ••• that 
part of the natural world in which an 
investigator is interested') rather than 
time-slices as a whole. 
(Ackoff & Emery: 1972:22) 
Thus, when the time-slice that is the object of investigation is 
constituted of a system and its environment (and this is the way 
of looking at behavioural phenomena that is characteristic of 
the systems approach), then we can expect to find that a number 
of the 'products' (or 'outcomes') that we are interested in 
understanding are jointly produced by the system and its 
environment, there being at least one element or relationship in 
each that is necessary, but insufficient, for the outcome or 
product in question. 
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The term 'co-producer' is used to refer to "two or more objects, 
properties, and/or environments which are producers of the same 
product", with the observation added that "since no producer is 
ever sufficient for its product, every producer has at least one 
co-producer." (Ackoff & Emery: 1972:23). I shall show later 
that the relationship of producer-product is basic to the 
concept of adaptation; the adaptability of a behaving system is 
a function of its availability to select and use certain parts 
of its environment as co-producers of its outcomes. 
Open Systems 
It is clear that the class of open systems includes a very wide 
range of phenomena. Plants, meters, servo-mechanisms, 
target-seeking missiles, organisms, individuals, groups, 
organisations - all of these are open systems. It is clear also 
that there are some important differences in the characteristics 
and capabilities of these different systems. Open systems may 
be differentiated along two dimensions: the range of actions of 
which they are capable and the range of outcomes that they can 
produce. 
A thermostat attached to the heating system of a house, for 
example, is capable of only three actions - doing nothing, 
turning the furnace off and turning the furnace on; and as long 
as it is in action, it is capable of producing only one outcome 
- the maintenance of the air temperature within a given range. A 
human being, by comparison, is capable of an infinite variety of 
different actions and of producing an equally wide range of 
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different outcomes. The critical differences lie in whether or 
not the system is capable of choosing the actions that it will 
take and the outcomes that it will produce. 
Three classes of system can be distinguished. Firstly, there is 
a group of functional systems, which are not capahle of choice 
at all, but which merely act and react in certain prestructured 
ways. Both their actions and their outcomes are predetermined, 
by their internal properties and by the environment. The second 
group, of goal-seeking systems, are those which are capable of 
choosing their actions, but whose outcomes are determined by the 
environment. Finally, there is a class of purposeful systems -
those which are capable of choice with regard both to their 
actions and to the outcomes that they produce. The fourth 
possible class - of systems that are capable of choosing their 
outcomes, but whose actions are determined - is meaningless. 
Systems whose actions in a particular state of the environment 
are determined clearly cannot exercise choice over the outcomes 
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Typology of Systems - Ackoff and Emery 
Functional system: In any one state of its environment, a 
functional system has only one action (set of actions) and can 
produce only one outcome (set of outcomes). Thus, the changes 
registered by barometers and thermometers, for example, 
invariably correspond to states of the environment by which they 
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are determined. Other functional systems are more complex and 
are able to display structurally different actions in 
structurally different environments, though never structurally 
different actions in the same environment. Servo-mechanisms and 
state-maintaining systems are generally of this type - they 
react differently to different states of the environment, but 
always so as to produce a predetermJned set of outcomes - to 
perform the same function. A third class of functional systems 
is capable, in addition, of performing different functions in 
some different environments - an air-conditioning system that 
maintains a desired temperature and humidity is an example. 
There is, finally, a rather marginal group of functional systems 
- those which have only one action for all states of the 
env.irornnent, but which, as a result of changes in the state of 
the environment, can produce some different outcomes. Ackoff 
and Emery give the example of waste emitters, such as a factory 
chimney, which, under certaln environmental conditions (but not 
others), produces pollution of the lower atmosphere. 
functions of outcomes 
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Classes of Functional Systems from Ackoff and Emery: 1972:p.29 
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Goal-seeking systems: The basic distinction between functional 
and goal-seeking systems is that goal-seeking systems are able 
to select structurally different actions for doing the same 
thing in one environment. They are systems: 
r 
that can respond in structurally different 
ways to one or more structurally different 
(internal or external) events and all their 
responses have the function of producing a 
particular outcome, which is its goal. •• a 
goal-seeking individual or system is 
responsive, not reactive, because it has a 
choice of responses ••• Such an individual 
or system may accomplish the same thing in 
different ways. 
(Ackoff & Emery: 1972:30) 
A chess-playing computer, a radar--control led gun and an 
electronic maze-solving rat are examples of goal-seeking 
systems. It must be noted that when such systems have memory, 
then they are capable of learning and improving their efficiency 
in goal-attainment over time. There is a class of 
multi-goal-seeking systems, which seek different goals in 
different environments, but which still do not determine the 
goal to be pursued. Most plants have the properties of 
multi-goal-seeking systems. Goal-seeking systems choose the 
means by which to pursue their goals, but the gorils to bt~ 
pursued are determined by the environment and not hy the system 
itself. The computer and the rat have to be programmed by an 
agent from the environment. 
Purposeful system: The basic distinguishing characteristic in 
this case is that purposeful systems can choose their goals, as 
well as the means by which they attempt to iittain them. A 
purposeful system is "one which can produce (1) the same 
functional type of outcome in different ways in the same 
81 
structural environment, and (2) can produce functionally 
different outcomes in the same and different structural 
environments ••• Thus a purpo·seful system is one that can change 
its goals under constant environmental conditions; it selects 
goals as well as the means by which to pursue them. It thus 
displays will. Human beings are the most familiar examples of 
such systems." (Ackoff & Emery: 1972:31). 
Hence, purposeful systems are, in an important 1vay, 
environmentally independent - neither their courses of action 
nor the purposes that they pursue are determined by the 
properties of the environment that they are Jn. lf for example, 
a mature human being was substituted for the thermostat of my 
earlier example and given control over the supply of warm air· to 
a b~ilding, his possible range of actions and the range of 
outcomes that he could potentially produce would be far 3reater 
than that of the thermostat (a reactive functional system), and 
would be quite independent of any environmental state. If it 
were too hot, he could make the building hotter; if it were too 
cold, he could make it colder. If he became bored) he might 
simply quit performing his function. To be purposive is more 
than simply to react or to respond. 
Animals and men have memories, and their ability to engage in 
choice of actions and outcomes under constant and varying 
environmental conditions means that they are capable of learning 
- specifically they can improve their knowledge of the relative 
. . 
efficiency of differing courses of action and they can alter the 
relative values of the outcomes that they can produce. In other 
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words, through experience they can find better ways of doing 
things and they can change the ranking of the goals that they 
seek. Given the additional capacity of communication, they can 
also systematically improve their knowledge of the courses of 
action that are available to them in particular environmental 
contexts. Such improvements can be made without communication, 
but they would then be dependent upon trial-and-error behaviour. 
The effectivE!ness of inter-species communication is naturally a 
decisive factor in determining the amount and effectiveness of 
learning that can take place. 
It is evident that the capacities of purposive systems are not 
only much greater than, but also that they include, the 
capacities which are characteristic of functional and 
goal-seeking systems. This is so simply because the choices 
upon the purposive systems include the choice to deliberately 
suppress their freedom in selecting actions and outcomes - at 
least, this is true of humans. There are, in addition, abundant 
instances in which the potential complexity of human behaviour 
is downgraded to purely functional or goal-seeking activity, 
though they may more often be due to coercion than to voluntary 
choice. Part of the legacy of the industrial revolution - the 
'rationalisation' of production - has been the deliberate 
downgrading of,the tasks to be performed by human beings, so 
that as Marx observed, they become' 'mere adjuncts of a machine". 
Systems as ·Instruments 
This is but one example of a widespread phenomenon - the· use by 
certain systems of other systems as instruments for the 
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production of certain outcomes. An instrument is defined as 'an 
object which co-produces the outcome of an individuals or 
system's action, which co-production is itself produced by the 
individual or system' (Ackoff & Emery: 1972:31). Hammers and 
spanners, washing machines and refrigerators, calculating 
machines and computers are some examples of dev.ices that a re 
used by individuals as instruments. It can be said, i.n general, 
that the class of functional systems and the different types 
included within that class, have significance almost exclusively 
as instruments that have been created by men to extend their 
inherent capacities. They do not occur naturally in the 
processes of biological evolution, but are artifacts. 
An important general observation with regard to the use of 
instruments is that any device that is used as an instrument hy 
an individual or system is always at a lower system level than 
that of the system or individual that uses it. It is this fact, 
perhaps, that allows us to stay calm in the face of the prophecy 
that computers or robots are going to take over the world. 
Conversely, when one ind.ividual or group wants to use another 
individual or group as an instrument, this can only be achieved 
through restricting the choices of the 'used' individual and 
curtailing his purposive behaviours. The actual builders of the 
Pyramids were the instruments of the pharoahs and they could be 
used as such only as long as their behaviours were those of 
function or goal-seeking systems. 
• 84 
Collectivities 
It should be made clear that these concepts referring to 
different levels of systems are quite consistent with the 
concept of social collectivi·ties as systems. Although the basic 
analogue for the purposeful system is the psychological 
individual, groups, organisations, communities, even societies, 
may be treated in terms of the same distinctions. Insofar as 
the members of any social collectivity can be said to jointly 
produce a particular outcome or outcomes (and the group as a 
whole can be said to act in certain ways that enahle its 
behaviour to be dist:inguished from that of other groups, and 
from its own behaviours at different times), then the group can 
be said to have an individuality and can, for some purposes, be 
treated as a unified entity - a system. Thus, for example, 
winning and losing are outcomes for a football team whl.ch are, 
to an ex~ent, determined by each member's participation, and, as 
is well known to fans, different teams adopt very different 
styles of play. 
A 'social individual' is defined by Ackoff and Emery as 'any 
collection of psychological individuals that is itself treated 
as an individual' (Ackoff & Emery: 1972:212). Thus, social 
scientists have differentiated among social collectivities, 
according to such properties and characteri5tics as their size, 
rates of growth and membership turnover, their degree of 
cohesion and type of leadership, their propensity to fragment or 
to endure, and so on. Families are characte·rised by their 
socio-economic status and the 'emotional climate' of the home, 
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communities by their relative stability or instability and by 
the amount of social pathology within them, organisations by 
changes in their efficiency, their degree of centralisation, and 
their style of leadership. The uniqueness of social 
collectivities can be expressed in terms of their culture, which 
corresponds to the personality of the psychological individual. 
(Ackoff & Emery: 1972:229). 
These systems concepts of behaviour may be linked to the concept 
of the social field if we now think of the field as a connected 
network of open social systems, the relevant environments of 
which are, to a degree, overlapping, so that each system's 
environment iricludes some of the other systems in it. We can, 
for convenience, dichotomise the field into system and 
environment, corresponding to the gestaltist's more abstract 
distinction between 'figure' and 'ground', in which case the 
component systems are such entities as individuals, groups, 
communities, and organisations. Some further definitions from 
Ackoff and Emery may help to clarify this conceptual link: 
Social system: a system whose elements are 
purposeful individuals. 
Social group: a purposeful system whose 
members are purposeful 
individuals and who are 
intentionally co-producers of 
a common objective. 
Organisation: a social group with a 
functional division of labour 
relative to its common 
objective(s). 
Community: A social group which provides 
its members with, or provides 
them with access to, 
instruments for the 
satisfaction of some of their 
analogous objectives, 
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instruments which some of its 
members are responsible 
either for producing and 
maintaining or for providing 
the group with the means for 
acquiring and maintaining 
them, and which all its 
members are responsible for 
using in a way which does not 
reduce the access of any 
others in the group to them. 
Definitions 13.4, 13.2, 13.9 and 13.5, 
Ackoff and Emery. 
Conceptualising social groups as systems does, however, raise 
some problems concerning the relations betYleen such systems and 
the parts of which they are constituted, between the behaviour 
of the system regarded as an individual and the behaviour of its 
members, taking them as individuals. It would seem that the 
individual members may either be used by the group for the 
attainment of the group's ends, or they may use the group as an 
I 
instrument for the attainment of their individual ends. 
Although in practice there may be some tension towards the 
balancing· of rewards. and contributions - the needs df the 
individual that are satisfied and the amount of his 
individuality that has to be surrendered - there ls a meaningful 
polarity in the possible relations between the individual and 
the group. Ackoff has formalised this polarity in the following 
way: 
Furthermore there are two types of 
organisation ••• one type, the homogeneous 
organisation, consists of members whose 
relevant function is to serve their 
organisation's objective. A business 
corporation is such an organisation. The 
other type the heterogeneous organisation, 
consists of members whose objectives it is 
the function of the organisation to serve. 
A community is such an organisation. 
(Ackoff: 1970b:24) 
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The significance of this in planning for different types of 
system is to be discussed later on. 
I have shown then, that the concept of purposiveness refers to a 
characteristic of an open system that is defined in terms of the 
relationship between the system and its environment. A system 
is purposive in a particular environment if it can choose its 
goals and the means for achieving them. In what follows I will 
be mainly concerned with the purposive behaviour of individuals, 
groups, and organisations and with the specific question of how 
they can adapt successfully as the environments for action 
become increasingly dynamic and unpredictable. 
Before turning my attention to the concept of the causal texture 
of the environment, 1 should note that Ackoff and Emery identify 
a fourth class of systems, which they call ideal-seeking 
systems. An ideal is an objective that cannot be obtained in 
any time period, but which can be approached without limit. A 
perfectly frictionless machine, error-free observations, the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number, perfect competition; 
these are examples of ideals. "Only those purposeful systems 
can be ideal-seeking that can choose between objectives; that 
are able to maintain progress toward an ideal by choosing 
another objective when one is achieved or the effort to achieve 
it has failed, and that consistently sacrifice objectives for 
the sake of ideals ••• a purposeful system or individual is 
ideal-seeking if, on the attainment of any of its objectives, it 
chooses another objective which more closely approximates its 
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ideal." (Ackoff: 1970b:241) •.• I will return to the discussion 
of ideal-seeking systems in considering ways of adapting 
. 5 
successfully to turbulent environments. 
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NOTES ON CHAPTER II 
1 See Buckley (1967,1968), and Churchman (1968a) and Emery 
(1969) for a way into the systems literature. The 
foundations, development and applications of general system 
theory are described in Bertalanffy (1968). Hall and Pegen 
(1956) is frequently referred to for the definition of 
system, and the journal General Systems in which their 
articles appear is a useful general source. The relevance of 
system theory to organisations is explored in Katz and Kahn 
(1966), Litterer (1969) and Maurer (1971). 
2 An early paper by Angyal (1939) proposing a new 'logic of 
systems' as a counterpart to the conventional 'logic of 
relations', and distinguishing between understanding and 
explanation as two corresponding ways of knowing, is still 
germane to the methodology of systems theory. 
3 Some of the more stimulating work in this area came from 
Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow. See Rosenblueth, Weiner and 
Bigelow (1943), Rosenblueth and Wiener (1950) and Wiener 
(1948). 
4 A general discussi'bn of mechanical, organic and process 
models of social systems, together with a review of general 
systems theory, can be found in Buckley (1967). For some of 
the shortcomings of general systems theory see Hempel (1951). 
5 An earlier discussion of the nature of ideals can be found in 
Churchman and Ackoff (1949). 
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CHAPTER III 
ENVIRONMENT AND SYSTEM BEHAVIOUR 
. ·I .· 
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In this chapter, I shall explore the relationship between the 
way people behave and their environment, in particular the 
organisation as a behavioural constraint. An open systems 
approach to action will be contrasted with that of the closed 
system, which emphasises the importance of environmental 
considerations for purposive action. 
ENVIRONMENT AND BEHAVIOUR 
It is a fundamental fact that the environments of open systems 
do make a difference to their ability to maintain themselves (to 
survive) and to the efficiency with which they perform their 
functions. For example, many machines only operate effectively 
within a given temperature range, the efficiency of ships, as 
means of transport, is impaired by gales, and the efficiency of 
a windmill is directly dependent upon the availability of wind. 
An the level of purposeful systems, we know that the success of 
a rat in solving a maze and finding food is a function of the 
complexity of that maze, and that the attainment of desired 
educational outcomes depends, to some extent, upon the 
maintenance of a classroom environment that is conducive to 
learning. We may not always know which kind of environment is 
most supportive for the attainment of particular purposes, as is 
evidenced, for example, by the debate over the desirability of a 
therapeutic or a punitive milieu for corrective institutions and 
prisons. Such debates, however, confirm the importance of the 
environmental dimensions in purposive behaviour. 
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At the organisational level, economists have made some 
distinctions among the kinds of environments that are relevant 
for the operations of business firms. The models of perfect, 
imperfect, oligopolistic, and monopolistic market situations are 
a characterisation of limited (though crucial) parts of 
'business' environments. Clark (1965) and Rosengren (1964) have 
discussed the changing environments of the education system and 
the mental hospital in the United States to help account for 
goal-redefinition in these systems. 1 At the level of 
international affairs a good deal has been written about the 
distinctive way in which the 'cold war' conditioned the 
relationships between nations, and, on the grand view, diplomacy 
is the attempt by nations to formulate and maintain a state of 
affairs in the global environment that is supportive for the 
purposes of all nations (this objective has the quality of an 
'ideal'). 
It is important to recognise that insofar as machines, as well 
as men, are producers (i.e. a machine by itself, such as a pump 
or a motorcar, is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition in 
a particular environment for raising water or getting from one 
point to another), we need knowledge of their environments in 
order to be able to understand their behaviour. The behaviours 
that I am principally interested in are the purposive behaviours 
of men and their organised groupings and it is, therefore, the 
characteristics of psychological and social environments that 
are to be specifically considered. Subsequent discussion may be 
made easier by the presentation of an extended example of the 
kinds of significance that attach to the environments of 
purposive systems - in this case an organisation. 
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An infantry platoon in a war zone has the task of capturing a 
particular enemy position and this objective is to be achieved· 
within a given time period with the minimum possible number of 
casualties. Assuming that we know all that can be considered 
relevant about the 'internal' characteristics of the platoon 
itself (its organisation and its capabilities in terms of 
firepower, intercommunication and the like), we could not make 
any worthwhile forecast of the probable effectiveness of the 
operation, or of the chances of the platoon being wiped out, 
without a great deal of additional information about the nature 
of the battlefield - i.e. the characteristics of the platoon's 
environment. In assessing the viability of such an operation, a 
commander would want information concerning the distribution and 
strength of the enemy, the nature of the terrain (the 
distribution of 'dead ground'; its traversibility) the 
distribution of support facilities (food, medical aid, 
ammunition supplies) and atmospheric conditions (the weather, 
distribution of hours of darkness and daylight). 
Except where such properties of the environment are determinable 
by the purposive behaviour of the platoon (as may be the case, 
for example, with the distribution of support facilities, when 
these are at the disposal of a more inclusive system, of which 
the platoon is a part), they are sui generis, having an 
independent existence and independent effects vis-a-vis the 
organisation. They belong to the (121 ) and (122 ) classes of 
relationship. In order for the platoon to carry out its task, 
some coming to terms between it and the environment is clearly 
\, 
necessary. This mediation occurs through observation and 
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through the platoon acting in, and on, the environment in such a 
way as to change the state of system-environment relations. 
Perception 
The faculty of perception allows the accumulation of 
information. Unsystemised viewing of the landscape by the rank 
a.nd file members, together with the more deliberative acts of 
environmental scanning which constitute reconnaissance, have the 
effect of incorporating into the organisation some elementary 
'mapping' of the relevant threats and supports, obstacles and 
aids. The environment thus transposed into information and 
communicated amongst the members, becomes 'intelligence' (an 
internal characteristic of the platoon) and we can talk about 
its quality, quantity and distribution and the influence these 
have on performance and survival. 2 This type of mediation 
c6rresponds to (121 ) relations; perception is dependent upon 
causal strands originating within the environment. The most 
significant outcome for purposeful systems of this type of 
mediation is learning - the process by which the environment 
becomes known in such a way as to make possible increases in the 
efficiency of purposive behaviour (Argyris & Schon: 1978). 
The other type of mediation I have referred to corresponds to 
(1
12
) relations. In order to achieve its purpose the platoon 
will most obviously have to ~, thereby changing its position 
relative to the enemy and all the other environmental 
relevancies. There are, in addition, a number of ways in which 
the platoon can act to change its environment in order to make 
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it an easier environment in which to operate. In battlefield 
situations, illumination may be manipulated through the 
imposition of a blackout and through the use of flares and 
smokescreens; roads and bridges can be constructed and those of 
the enemy destroyed; the field may be fragmented by the erection 
of barbed wire or the construction of ditches. Military 
theorists have employed the terms tactics, strategy and 
operations to refer to the various configurations of behaviours 
that are available to a military unit, differentiated 
principally in terms of the scope and duration of particular 
sequences of action. 
I note here, too, that because the effectiveness of the enemy's 
activities is known to be a function of his knowledge of the 
same environment, some amount of energy and resources may be 
expended in making the environment appear different to what it 
really is. The use of camouflage, decoys and booby traps, the 
destruction of existing signs and the erection of false ones -
the manipulation of the environment in order to plant misleading 
cues for the adversary - may be a significant factor in the 
effectiveness of the mission. 
Limits on Activity 
My general proposition which emerges from this and the earlier 
examples is that the environments of purposeful systems have a 
significant determining influence over the kinds of objectives 
that can be pursued and the means (courses of action) by which 
they can be pursued. On the face of it, this is a somewhat 
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naive proposition, for anyone who is conscious of engaging in 
purposive behaviour, in pursuit either of his own ends or those 
of an organisation of which he is a member, will" become aware of 
certain ways in which the environment he is acting in limits, 
channels, or supports the pursuit of certain ends and the 
adoption of particular courses of action. An individual 
striving to become a politician, or to represent his country in 
some field of sport; a rural family battling to stay on the land 
in the face of a rural recession, or an organisation trying to 
maximize its share of the market; a welfare department trying to 
abolish poverty; or a planning authority trying to redevelop a. 
central business district; in all of these cases, the system 
must, if it is to succeed, come to terms with an environment in 
which the distribution of rewards and frustrations is complex 
and often unpredictable; in which the means available change 
their character and their position over time and in which other 
systems are often working toward competing ends. 
It is surprising, therefore, that until relatively recently, 
social scientists have devoted very little attention to 
environments as objects worthy of study in their own right. In 
1954 Chein wrote: 
Perhaps one of the outstanding weaknesses of 
contemporary psychological theory is the 
relative neglect of the environment by many 
of the most influential theoretical 
viewpoints. Stimulus-response psychology, 
for instance, tends to assimilate the entire 
environment, insofar as it is relevant to 
behaviour, into the term 'stimulus' and, 
perhaps, also, as in the case of 
reinforcement theory, 'goal objects'; for 
the most part many environmental features 
tend simply to be taken for granted ••• If, 
as I believe, a proper appreciation of the 
role of environmental factors is important 
·. 
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to rat psychology, it is ever so much more 
so in a humanistic psychology... Not only 
are human environments more complex, but the 
behaviours with which the rat psychologists 
are most concerned take place in the 
controlled environments of the laboratory, 
whereas the behaviours of greatest concern 
to the humanistic psychologist take place in 
freely variable (from the point of view of 
the psychologist) environments. With the 
greatest complexity of human environments 
they have perhaps more of a role to play, 
and with their free variability they have, 
so to speak, a more active role. 
(Chein: 1954:115) 
In a similar vein, Barker more recently writes: 
Scientific psychology knows nothing, and can 
know nothing, about the real-life settings 
in which people live-in ghettos and 
suburbs, in large and small schools, in 
regions of poverty and affluence. One might 
think that in the course of its necessary 
concern with stimuli, psychology would have 
become informed about the human environment. 
But this is not the case. Psychology has 
necessarily attended to those elements of 
the environment that are useful in pr·obing 
its focal phenomena, namely the 
behaviour-relevant circuitry within the 
skins of its subjects, within psychology's 
black box. Psychology knows much about the 
physical proportions and dimensions of the 
environme·ntal probes it uses - of distal 
objects of perception, for example, and of 
energy changes at receptor surfaces. But 
the problem is that, in the course of its 
investigations, it has excised these 
environmental elements from the contexts in 
which they normally occur; mealtimes, 
offices, airplanes, arithmetic classes, 
streets and sidewalks. In view of 
psychology's concern with such dismantled 
fragments of the environment, it is not 
surprising that general conceptions of the 
environment• occupy a minor place in the 
science ••• the most common notion, which can 
hardly be called a theory, is that the 
non-behavioural, ecological environment of 
man is an unstructured probabilistic, and 
largely passive area within which man 
behaves according to the programming he 
carries about inside him. 
(Barker: 1969il3-2) 
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The situation is curiously similar in the case of the study of 
organisations. Evan comments: 
Social science research on organisations has 
been concerned principally with 
intraorganisational phenomena ••• with 
relatively few exceptions, social scientists 
engaged in organisational research have not 
taken the organisation in its environment as 
a unit of observation and analysis ••• the 
relative neglect of inter-organisation 
relations is all the more surprising in view 
of the fact that all formal organisations 
are embedded in an environment of other 
organisations, as well as in a complex of 
norms, values and collectivities in the 
society at large. 
(Evan: 1966: 175) 
In support of this judgement, Dill has written: 
Administrative science needs propositions 
about the ways in which environmental 
factors constrain the structure of 
organisations and the behaviour of 
organisational participants. 
(Dill: 1959:409) 
Blau makes the point quite categorically: 
The complaint often heard that we know 
virtually nothing about the impact of the 
social setting on organisations is quite 
justified 
(Blau: 1964) 
Organisation theory has, for a long time, been constrained in 
its development by the use of closed system models, which 
predispose the researcher to look for explanations and 
understandings of what the organisation is and what it does 
solely in terms of its internal characteristics. The tendency 
to investigate the organisation as though it were an entity, 
more or less closed to its social and technical milieu has 
simplified the problems of research a good deal and has 
facilitated the accumulation of a considerable amount of 
information concerning the internal structures and processes of 
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organisations. Studies of supervision techniques, incentive 
schemes, communications and control, for example, have reached 
quite a high level of sophistication and we have a small, but 
growing, collection of generalisable propositions concerning.the 
relations amongst them. It is evident, however, that even if 
our understanding of these internal dimensions and our ability 
to measure them were vastly more advanced than it is now, we 
would still need to know a good deal more before we could fully 
understand even such gross phenomena as organisational survival 
or demise, growth or recession. A crucial part of what we need 
to know concerns the character of the environment within which 
the functions of the organisation have to be performed. 
There seems generally to be a significant consensus on the 
judgment that one of the most significant weakenesses of 
contemporary organisation theory, as in psychology, is its 
failure to develop the means whereby systematic account can be 
taken of the interdependancies between an organisation or 
organism and its environment. While it has been usual to pay 
lipservice to the importance of 'taking the environment into 
account', it typically happens that the environment remains an 
mamorphous, residual category, having no definition other than 
h . . .. . t" .. 3 t at it is non-organisa ion • Schein may be understating. the 
case in saying: "The relationships between organisations and 
their environments are complex, and as yet not well 
conceptualised (Schein: 1965, 89). 
This neglect of the environment in two areas of intellectual 
enquiry whose paramount concern is with the comprehension of 
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purposive behaviour (humanistic psychology and organisation 
theory), is, perhaps, not so surprising when we consider that an 
adequate understanding of the part played by the environment is 
purposeful activity has been dependent upon the conjunction of 
two very important intellectual developments which have come to 
fruition in this century. The implications of these have not, 
however, been fully assimilated into empirical social science. 
Mechanism and Vitalism 
The first of these was the reconciliation of mechanism and 
vitalism (or teleology) that made it possible to show that the 
purposeful behaviour of living individuals, which is 
characterised by a certain freedom of choice, is compatible with 
a mechanical interpretation of the world. To a considerable 
extent this appears to have been the accomplishment of Edgar A. 
Singer. His analysis of the inadequacies of the solution to the 
mechanism-vitalism dilemma proposed by Kant, supported by his 
own proposal of a 'naturalistic' conception of purposive 
behaviour made possible by the identification and elaboration of 
the producer-product relationship, broke new ground in providing 
a respectable technology. In his own judgement: 
For the naturalist, it is possible to 
accomplish what all history has shown to be 
desirable, but almost all past history has 
taken to be impossible: to see nature as an 
unbroken, determinate mechanism, the host 
and embodiment of a bio-centric world, 
populated by a vast variety of functional 
(not to say purposeful) beings, enjoying 




It was Singer's work which provided the basis for the subsequent 
elaboration by Churchman, Ackoff, Emery and others of a 
consistent theoretical approach to the understanding of 
purposeful systems. Nearly forty years after Singer's 
fundamental clarification of the concept of purposiveness, the 
naive incorporation of the determinative concept into 
explanations of purposeful behaviour from the field of 
cybernetics continues on quite a massive scale, testifying to 
the durability of outdated thought-modes. 
The Importance of Context 
The second development I have already referred to: the 
elaboration of a pragmatist or contextualist interpretive 
scheme, distinguished in its synthetic and dispersive mode of 
interpretation. While the development of a naturalistic concept 
of purpose may have been the more important condition, it seems 
unlikely that an appreciation of the environmental domain which 
is conceptually systematic, and at the same time theoretically 
relevant to the understanding of adaptive behaviour, could have 
emerged from the interpretive scheme of any of the other root 
metaphors - formism, mechanism, or organicism. The two 
analytical types - formism and mechanism - simply do not 
encourage any investigation of the contexts in which the units 
of study occur. The analysis of wholes entails reducing them to 
their constituent elements, the properties and relations of 
which are then investigated. Comprehension of the whole is the 
product of the mental process of 'reconstructing' the whole. 
!.._ __________________________________________ _ 
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Contextualism, on the other hand, encourages the open system 
perspective, and searches for an understanding of wholes which 
takes account of their contexts. 
A part, then, can.never be described in 
isolation. A whole composed of isolable 
parts is an illusion. Element analysis in 
the sense of breaking a thing down to 
isolated elements, is consequently 
impossible. What then do we do, when we 
think we analyse a whole? ••• What we 
actually do is to trace the strands of the 
given texture into some other texture or set 
of textures which have proved to be 
convenient instruments of control. 
(Pepper: 1934:112) 
Thus the musical scale provides the 'instrument of control' for 
analysing a melody. Organicism, like mechanism, has an 
integrative bias that directs attention to the appearances of 
integration in the universe, which, in exag&erated forms, is. 
regarded almost as a time-independent phenomenom. 
Contextualism, on the other hand, takes cognisance of the 
duration and spread of events, acts and processes as a basic 
rather than a secondary factor - it is dispersive. 
Contextualism is accordingly sometimes said 
to have a horizontal cosmology, in contrast 
to other views, which have a vertical 
cosmology. There is no top nor bottom to 
the contextualist's world. The formism or 
organicism one has only to analyse in 
certain specified ways and one is bound, so 
it is believed, ultimately to get to the 
bottom of things or to the top of things. 
Contextualism justifies no such faith. 
(Pepper: 1934:251) 
For these reasons, contextualism seems to be the most 
appropriate world hypothesis to employ in conjunction with a 
naturalistic teleology, when the task is to understand sequences 
of purposive behaviour in environments which are usually complex 
·and dynamic. 
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The Causal Texture of the Environment 
A major exception to the general neglect of the environment 
dimension on the part of behavioural scientists is a line of 
theoretical development in psychology that has its origins in 
the 'gestalt' psychology that arose in Germany during the first 
decades of this century. The concepts of gestalt psychology 
developed by Wertheimer, Kohler and Kaffka are clearly 
contextualist in nature, being a direct reaction against the 
'atomistic' psychology of the previous century. 4 The 
development of a conceptual scheme for treating the 
'ecological' (environmental) phases of behaviour as a 
quasi-independent realm can be traced from the early gestalists, 
through the molar behaviourism of Tolman and Brunswick and the 
work of Lewin and others at the Psychological Institute of 
Berlin, to the contemporary development of 'ecological 
psychology' by Barker and the incorporation of the essential 
u 
parts of this earlier theorising into systems thinking by Emery 
and Trist. 
In explicating the concept of environment to be used in this 
study, it will be helpful to consider briefly some of the more 
important contributions to this line of theoretical development. 
It will also help us to see the way in which contextualist 
thinking and a naturalistic teleology have combined to provide 
the orientation and concepts essential to an appreciation of the 
environment as a 'causal texture'. 
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Reider's seminal paper, 'Thing and Medium'> although only fairly 
recently brought to light, was originally published in 1926, and 
constitutes an important milestone in the investigation of the 
extra-personal dimensions of psychological events (Heider: 
1959). Whereas previous psychology had been preoccupied with 
processes going on at the receptor surfaces of organisms> as far 
as the problems of perception and stimuli were concerned> Heider 
drew a distinction between the physical characteristics of the 
objects of perception and the characteristic processes that 
mediate between them and the perceiving organism - between 
'things' and 'media'. He thus widened the traditional unit of 
perception by extending it out into the environment and drawing 
attention to the fact that distal objects at the origin of the 
perceptual unit (such as a stone) have quite different physical 
properties from the medium that intervenes between these objects 
and the proximal stimulus on the receptor surface (a pattern of 
light rays reflected from a stone). Media have the necessary 
and important quality that their parts are independent - it is 
this quality that allows them to 'transmit' the characteristics 
of things. The quality of a medium is thus dependent on the 
number of its parts and their 'docility' - the relative ease 
with which they can be externally constrained by things. The 
complexity of the textures that can pass through .the medium is a 
function of its variability and the resistance it offers. 
Differential qualities of media are represented in the 
differences, for example, between coarse and fine grain 
photography, and between languages with relatively larger or 
smaller vocabularies. Writing an introduction to his paper for 
its publication, Heider says: 
105 
••• it deals with the process that starts at 
the perceived object (the distal stimulus) 
and which ends with the stimuli impinging on 
the sense organs (the proximal stimuli). 
This process lies entirely in the 
environment and goes on whether or not there 
is an organism affected by the proximal 
stimuli. It belongs to what Brunswick has 
called the ecological phase of the causal 
sequence. It precedes the phase which 
occurs within the organism and which so far 
has been the focus of attention in most 
studies of perception. Since perception is 
adapted to the environment, it is obvious 
that we must be familiar with the 
environmental structures to which it is 
adapted if we are to get a comprehensive 
understanding of it. 
(Heider: 1959,:ix) 
Klein's 'note to the reader' in the same volume points out that: 
A unique feature of Reider's approach is his 
attempt to fathom environmental structure 
not from the response side - from the inside 
outward, as it were, as is common in 
psychological theories - but from the 
outside inward, that is, by specifying the 
architectural rules of the extrapersonal 
world of physical object and event units. 
(Heider: 1959:vii) 
Although there is little evidence that the insights of 'Thing 
and Medium' were widely recognised at that time, Reider's work 
did have an influence on, among others, Koffka, Lewin, Brunswick 
and Barker, all of whom have referred to his work in formulating 
their own important contributions. His discrimination of 
environments into things and media and the recognition of 
significant processes which occur in the environmental sector 
quite independently of the organism are of fundamental 
importance to the comprehension of interactions between 
purposeful systems and their environments. 5 
Tolman was not one of those who took up Reider's work, but his 
development of a 'purposive behaviourism' was, perhaps, the 
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first major theoretical work to bring together gestalt 
psychology and the problems of purposive behaviour. (Tolman: 
1932). Behaviour, for Tolman, is a molar phenomenon, standing 
in contrast to the molecular behaviourism of Watson. Behaviour 
acts are not reducible to the underlying molecular facts of 
physiology and physics, but have 'certain emergent properties of 
their own'. In his analysis, the two identifying properties of 
behaviour are its initiating causes (which can be either 
environmental stimuli or initiating physiological states), and 
the behaviour determinants. As Pepper has shown (Pepper: 1934), 
the two most significant of the behaviour determinants are the 
state of purpose of the organism and the cognitive immi~ · 
determinants. The state of purpose is an innate or acquired 
urge for the attainment of, or escape from, some sort of 
environmental object or physiological state, while the cognitive 
determinants of a behaviour act encompass the character.of the 
goal object (meaning either that which is to be sought or that 
which is to be avoided), its 'location' relative to actual and 
possible means-objects, and the character of the means-objects 
themselves. These three cognitive determinants fuse into a 
sign-gestalt, which, in turn, fuses with the purposive behaviour 
determinant in the carrying through of a behaviour act. 
Tolman's book is widely regarded as a landmark in theoretical 
psychology. Perhaps its most significant contribution, frommy 
point of view, is the elaboration of a molar (or gestalt) 
conception of the behaviour act as a causal sequence, which both 
begins and ends in the environment, being mediated through the 
acting organism: 
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(Our system) conceives mental processes as 
functional varieties intervening between 
stimuli, initiating physiological status, 
and the general.heredity and past training 
of the organism, on the one hand and final 
resulting responses on the other. 
(Tolman: 1932:414) 
His characterisation of the environment itself in terms of 
goal-objects and means, their properties and the relations 
between them, is suggestive but relatively rudimentary. 
Tolman's subsequent collaboration with Brunswick had the 
benefits both of Pepper's insightful analysis of the c-0nceptual 
framework of 'Purposive Behaviour in Animals and Men', and of 
Brunswick's familiarity with Reider's work. Their joint 
article, "The Organism and the Causal Texture of the 
Environment', (Tolman and Brunswick: 1935) deals most explicitly 
with the composition of the environment as such and the 
implications in environmental variance for adaptive behaviours. 
Their initial proposition is that psychology is primarily 
concerned with the methods of response of the organism to two 
characteristic features of the environment. Firstly, because 
the environment is a causal texture, in which events are 
regularly dependent upon one another, organisms come to accept 
some events as 'local representatives' of other events. In 
distance perception for example, a particular manifold of light 
rays is accepted as a local representative of the distant 
object. Secondly, these causal couplings between distal and 
proximal stimuli are, to a degree, equivocal - local 
representatives are not connected one-to-one with the entities 
represented. Moreover, the relationshp between behaviour 
objects (or means-objects) in the environment, and the goals of 
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the organism, are similarly equivocal. Thus a given means-
object will assist the attainment of a particular goal only with 
a certain degree of probability. Means objects in the 
environments or organisms have the characteristic, as Heider 
pointed out, of radiating causal trains (e.g. light waves) in 
many directions, quite independently of the organism, some of 
which may lead to its sensory surfaces. 
What is then apprehended by the organism is not the object 
itself, but a cue for the object, which is only coupled to the 
object with a certain degree of reliability. This being so, 
they argue that the psychological 'success' of the organism will 
depend, firstly, on its ability to pick out the 'good' means 
objects for the attainment of particular goals, and, secondly, 
upon its ability to select the reliable cues for this 'good' 
means object. A hungry baby has to know what sorts of objects 
can potentially alleviate hunger, and what sorts of images, 
sounds and smells are reliable cues for such objects. 
Means-objects must, in reality, be conceived as having three 
distinguishable aspects - they can be discriminated, manipulated 
and utilized. Discrimination properties are those whereby the 
object i~ differentiated from other objects - typically such 
properties as shape, colour, size, etc. The manipulation 
characteristics of an object are "the properties which make 
possible and support such and such actual behavioural 
manipulations. They are the object's grasp-ableness, 
pick~up-ableness, chew-ableness •.• and the like" (Tolman & 
Brunswick: 1935:53). Finally, the utilitizable properties of a 
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behaviour object are "the ways in which the object, given the 
[manipulation properties] or the [manipulation and 
discrimination properties] combined, can be useful as a means 
for getting to further objects and goals." (Tolman & Brunswick: 
1935:53). For example, a piece of chocolate within the visual 
field of a baby has the manipulation character of something 
chewable, and by virtue of this, also has the usable character 
of something which will lead toward a full stomach. 
Their concluding remarks point to the ways in which structurally 
different environments may make differing demands on the 
organism's adaptive potential: 
••• we may say in general that in the 
selection both of the means-objects which 
have high probabilities and of the cues 
which have high probabilities the organism 
responds in the form of hypotheses. These 
hypotheses it brings with it -from innate 
endowment and from previous experience. The 
hypotheses tend to be 'correct' for normal, 
average environments. When, however, the 
probabilities in the particular environment 
are not those of a 'normal' or average 
environment, then the organism, if it is not 
to go under, must acquire new hypotheses ••• 
Thus the wholly successful organism would be 
one which brings, innately, normal averagely 
'good' means-ends hypotheses and normally 
averagely 'reliable' perceptual hypotheses; 
but which can immediately modify these 
innate hypotheses to suit the special 
conditions of a special environment; which 
can note and include in its cue system and 
in its means-end system the presence of the 
further identifyng features of these special 
environments. 
(Tolman and Brunswick: 1935:71-2) 
They give us the concept of environment as a causal texture, in 
which cues, means-objects and goals are causally interrelated in 
ways which can be quite independent of the organism. An 
organism's adjustment to its environment is a function of the 
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accuracy of the hypotheses it formulates about the pattern of 
causal couplings and its deg_ree of flexibility in formulating 
new hypotheses and discarding old ones as the causal texture of 
the environment changes. 
The 'Whole Situation' 
One of the main weaknesses, from my point of view, of the 
concept of environment so far developed is that it was treated 
in practice as a specialised, truncated part of the total 
situation, however nruch the full richness and complexity of 
real-life environments was acknowledged in my discussion. The 
work of Lewin and his followers has been very much concerned 
with the problems of systematizing and understanding of the 
relevance of the 'whole situation' to human behaviour. (Lewin: 
1935, 1936). 
Much of Lewin's thinking developed directly out of the work of 
Wertheimer, Kohler and Kaffka, and he was for some time also an 
associate of Reider's, who, together with his wife, was 
responsible for the translation of 'Principles of Topological 
Psychology' into English; he also makes use of Tolman's work. 
For Lewin, behaviour is a function of the individual's 
psychological life space, and the life space is constituted of 
the person and his psychological environment, the world as it is 
to him. The person and the environment are topologically 
distinguished, representing different regions of the life space. 
The life space has both structural and dynamic properties. The 
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basic structural concepts are region and boundary and from these 
more complex concepts to describe structural properties, such as 
degree of differentiation, centrality, path and distance, are 
derived. The dynamic concepts refer to the tendency of the 
life space to change or to resist change, and among the most 
important of them are the concepts of tension, force, field of 
forces, power and equilibrium •. Although the life space refers 
to the total situation at a particular point of time, the 
Lewins' concept of causality is that of a contemporaneous 
relation; the 'time perspective' enters into the life space in 
the form of overlapping temporal gestalts - relevant pasts and 
futures are 'present' insofar as such phenomena as memory and 
expectation actually influence behaviour. In Lewin's work, we 
approach much closer to the idea of a freely variable 
environment in which the behaving individual has constantly to 
seek out those movements and locations, manipulations and 
responses from a complex and dynamic array of possibilities. 
Deutsch writes: 
The emphasis on the interrelatedness of the 
person and the environment was one of 
Lewin's major contributions to psychological 
theorising. Until recently, much of 
psychology has been dominated by what he has 
termed an "Aristotlean' model of thinking. 
In such thinking, psychological events are 
determined by the characteristics of the 
individual-instincts, heredity, 
intelligence, needs, habits, etc., -
relatively independently of the situation. 
Since Lewin, it has become increasingly 
evident that it is meaningless to speak of 
behaviour without reference to both the 
person and his environment. 
(Deutsch: 1968:417) 
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In the context of the line of theoretical development being 
considered here, it is his elucidation of the 'spatial' 
dimensions of behaviour, bound up with the concepts of life 
space, 'field' and region, that adds most significantly to my 
developing concept of the environment. 
The Geo-Behavioural Environment 
I have already noted Chein's criticism of the neglect of the 
environment in theoretical psychology. His discussion of 'the 
environment as a determinant of behaviour', which those remarks 
preface, helps considerably to redress this weakness and is of 
the highest value as a systematic attempt to bring together in a 
comprehensive theoretical model many of the component features 
of environments that had been discussed in the work of Tolman, 
Lewin, Kaffka and others (Chein: 1954). I have also referred to 
his concept of the geo-behavioural environment, which is a 
modification of the distinction drawn by Kaffka between the 
'geographic' and 'behavioural' environments. Whereas the 
behavioural environment refers to the individual's subjective 
interpretation of the world, the geo-behavioural environment is 
the geographic environment (the total objective physical and 
social environment) looked at from the point of view that is 
concerned with understanding behaviour, thus allowing for 
inclusion of elements that are not part of the individual's 
subjectively-interpreted world, but which do, nevertheless, have 
an observable impact on his behaviour. The 'major features' of 
the geo-behavioural environment which he discusses in turn are 
stimuli, goal objects and noxiants, supports and constraints and 
directors. 
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He defines a stimulus as 'whatever is capable of initiating a 
change in the stream of activity ••• a release or trigger 
mechanism'. Stimuli initiate responses, but they do not 
determine a specific response, because any specific response is 
also a function of other environmental features. An 
advertisement for a brand of chocolate may lead to the 
consumption of some of that chocolate, but to say that this 
response is determined by the stimulus overlooks the role of 
other environmental features - the availability of the 
chocolate, possession of the money to purchase it with, etc. -
which are also necessary conditions for that particular 
response. (I note here the direct connection between his 
concept of stimulus and the producer-product relation discussed 
above.) That a stimulus is something which ~ set off a 
response does not, he asserts, preclude the possibility that the 
same object or situation may also function in the role of goal 
object or noxiant, support, constraint or director. However, he 
goes on to make the following important observation: 
It is the sometimes concurrence of these 
various roles in the same object that has 
led to what I believe is the common practice 
of overburdening the stimulus concept with 
the function of determining, as 
distinguished from initiating responses. 
The important point is that those various 
roles are always distinguishable and are 
often carried by distinct objects of 
situations. 
(Chein: 1954:118) 
Given the role of stimuli in initiating responses, the overall 
stimulus properties of an environment have some important 
psychological consequences. Either a dearth or an overabundance 
of stimuli may create quite severe problems of adjustment. 
114 
A relatiyely stimulus-less environment, for 
instance, is, I believe, an important factor 
in neurasthenia: the individual is thrown 
upon his self-stimulating resources which 
may prove insufficient for the initiation of 
activity. Conversely, an over-stimulating 
environment often generates profound 
problems of self-management; one of the 
things we must learn for instance, is not to 
respond to distracting stimuli. 
(Chein: 1954:118) 
It is of interest to note that Toffler.makes exactly the same 
observations and that he obviously sees 'future shock' as the 
counterpart of neurasthenia. 
Goal Objects and Noxiants 
'Goal objects' are objects or situations which can serve as need 
satisfiers and 'noxiants' are objects of situations which can 
produce pain or unpleasantness. Chein suggests that many 
psychologists have taken the existence of goal objects for 
granted and that they have, as a consequence, 'shown little 
interest in examining various environments, as such, from the 
point of view of what they have to of fer by way of goal objects 
and/or noxiants'. (Chein: 1954:120). Environments clearly do 
have important differences in the abundance or scarcity of goal 
objects and noxiants and in the relative abundance of these in 
relation to certain needs as compared to others. 
'Supports' are those features of the environment which make 
particular behaviours feasible, and 'constraints' are 'those 
features of the environment which preclude particular 
behaviours, make their occurrences less likely, or limit their 
variability'. The manipulation and the discrimination 
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properties of objects in situations as they were .defined by 
Tolman and Brunswick are interpreted by Chein as environmental 
properties which set limits on what can and cannot be achieved 
as supports and constraints. He treats 'cues' as a sub-class of 
discrimination - namely those discriminations which exist not in 
or of themselves 'but in systematic relationships to·other 
discriminations, means-end paths, etc.' The colour green, or an 
apple, is discrimination, but insofar as colour is also 
correlated with taste and digestibility, colour is also a cue. 
Consistent with his definition of the geo-behavioural 
environment, Chein's cues are objective features of the 
environment and environments may, therefore, differ in the 
manner and variety of the cues that they present. In this view 
inappropriate or maladaptive behaviour may sometimes be the 
result of the absence of sufficient cues, or the existence of 
misleading or false cues and it is not automatically ascribable. 
to human incapacity or ignorance. The distribution and nature 
of cases in an environment sets limits upon what may be learned 
in that environment. Behaviour is further supported or 
constrained according to the availability or non-availability of 
'means-end paths'. This refers to 'the steps one must take or 
things one must do in order to attain particular goals or. to 
avoid particular noxiants'. Means-end paths vary with respect 
to the characteristics of distance, quickness, freedom from 
barriers and viscosity - they define the conditions for the 
attainment of goals. 
'Directors' are those features of the environment which tend to 
induce specific directions of behaviour'. Most importantly, the 
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particular spatio-temporal patternirtg of stimuli, goals and 
noxiants, supports and constraints, has the effect of 
'channelling' behaviour in certain directions. For example, the 
absence of means-end paths to particular goals may direct 
behaviour towards other goals; being confronted with a new 
unexpected goal object at a particular time may divert behaviour 
in new directions; a means to an end may become an end in 
itself, due to the particular structure of the environment. In 
addition, the prevailing social values or norms of a particular 
culture, or of a particular behaviour setting, may act as 
directors. 
Environments 
Finally, Chein draws attention to some of the global features .of 
the environment, many of which have already been referred to 
here. Thus, some environments are more 'difficult' than others, 
some easier. Environments are more or less organised or 
disorganised, stable or unstable. From another point of view, 
the availability of goal objects, unavoidability or noxiarits, 
and the existing pattern of supports, constraints and directors, 
determine the number of degrees of freedom available to the 
individual in the geo-behavioural environment. 
Emery and Trist's article on 'The causal texture of 
organisational environments' (Emery and Trist: 1965) appears to 
have been the first attempt towards some classification of 
environments which recognises that, like, systems themselves, 
environments may differ systematically in their degree of 
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complexity. This paper has been discussed and extended by 
Terreberry (1968) and McWhinney (1968), and the schema presented 
in it have been amplified by the authors in subsequent 
publications (Emery: 1967; and Emery and Trist: 1972). 
The article presents four ideal-type environments which are 
differentiated by qualitative dissimilarities in their causal 
te~turing. It is premised on 
\ 
the view that the system 
behaviours in which they are interested (in this case the 
behaviours of organisations) can generally be represented as 
moving toward, or straining away from, certain ends, objects or 
situations, which can therefore be considered as either helps or 
hindrances to the system's survival and the performance of its 
functions. 
Such a concept of the behavioural environment is found in a 
number of the writers that have been considered. Tolman, for 
instance, in the glossary to his book~ defines 'purpose' as 'a 
demand to get to or from a given type of goal object. Such a 
purpose is testified to objectively by the fact that behaviour 
tends to persist to or from and to show docility relative to 
getting to or from specific types of goal object or goal 
situation". A 'demand' is "an innate or acquired urge to get to 
or from some given instance or type of environmental presence or 
physiological quiescence or disturbance" (Tolman: 1932). 
Angyal, in discussing the example of an animal hunting food, has 
written: 
••• one may say that the animal is driving 
to obtain food. Viewing the same occurrence 
with the object as the point of reference, 
one may say that the animal is attracted by 
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the sight of food. The whole biosphere of 
reference, appears as a system or attractive 
and repulsive environmental forces acting 
upon the organism ••• One frequently 
describes environmental objects and 
situations as attractive, repulsive, 
pleasing, challenging, seductive, trying, 
provoking, threatening, conducive to one or 
another type of activity. 
(Angyal: 1941:148) 
He has noted, too, that Lewin's psychology is based on a similar 
concept of the role of environmental influences on behaviour. 
Lewin refers to 'negative and positive balances', 'field •forces' 
and 'demand qualities' of environmental-situations. 
Environments are thus considered to be constituted of goals and 
noxiants and environments may be differentiated according to the 
distribution of goals and noxiants (random - clustered), their 
kinetic properties (placid - dynamic) and whether or not a given 
array of these 'environmental relevancies' is shared by more 
than one system. 
1. Placid-random environment 
The simplest of the four types is that in which goals and 
noxiants are 'relatively unchanging in themselves and randomly 
distributed'. Such environments are placid, not in the literal 
sense that they are tranquil or calm, but in the sense that they 
are, from the point of view of the system's activities, 
relatively docile, not offering active challenges or 
resistances. They are placid relative to other, more complexly 
joined environments, which have dynamic properties. They are 
random in the sense that goals and noxiants do not occur in the 
environment in any meaningful or systematic patterns from the 
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system's point of view. It seems to be most useful to think of 
the 'pure' case of a placid-random environment not only as a 
construct, but also as a theoretic! limiting case, or an extreme 
ty~e, analogous for example, to the concepts of 'perfect 
competition' or 'absolute zero'. Such constructs can be used as 
a theoretical 'benchmark' when we are able to develop a 
'comparative' or 'ordering concept'. In this case, a 
comparative concept for specifying degrees of randomness might 
be a valuable development when the concept of 'causal texture of 
the environment' is used in any particular investigation. 
The type I environment corresponds to the idea of a flat surface 
over which an organism can move, which is bare apart from a 
number of widely scattered heaps of food (Simon: 1957,137). It 
corresponds also to the relevant environment of the 
'flea-market' salesman. He is confronted by a market situation 
which is almost totally unstructured, so that the same sales 
approach is appropriate for all comers, and one 'mark' 
(customer) is as good as any other. Attempts to deliberately 
structure environments at this level for human beings have 
occurred in such settings as English madhouses, and in modern 
concentration camps. The environments of some relatively simple 
organisms such as an amoeba or a human foetus, seem to be of the 
placid-random type. 
A further characteristic of the type I environment is that in 
.environments of such relative simplicity it is essentially only 
the properties of the system itself that are critical to the 
effectiveness with which its function is performed. Of the set 
·:· .. -_ 
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is the (L11) relations the internal characteristics of the 
system, that are chiefly determinative of the effectiveness of 
behaviours in such environments. In the case of Simon's 
'organism on a flat surface', for example, given the random 
availability of heaps of food, the survival of the organism is 
very much a function of such properties as its range of vision, 
its storage capacity and its mobility. Knowledge of internal 
properties alone can be predictive of system viability in the 
placid-random environment. 
Clustering is the most important identifying characteristic 
the goals and noxiants are still relatively unchanging in 
themselves. 
The conception of the environment put forward by Tolman and 
Brunswick corresponds to the type II environment. When 
121 
environmental parts are joined in regular and predictable ways, 
some parts can come to act as cues, or 'local representatives', 
for other parts, or can have the character of means-objects for 
behaviour acts - the environment is a causal texture in which 
cues, means-objects and goal-objects are systematically 
interrelated. If the random envir.onment is exemplified in 
Petticoat Lane, then the clustered environment corresponds more 
to the market situation of a country town general store. In 
this case, it pays to differentiate among customers on such 
dimensions as regulars passers-by, debtors creditors, big 
spenders and small spenders. Similarly, if the relevant 
environment for a person searching for shells on the sea-shore 
is a random environment, then the relevant environment for 
prospectors searching for oil or minerals is typically clustered 
- the occurrence of mineral resources is known to be correlated 
with certain topographical and geophysical features. 
The factorie.s spawned by the industrial revolution are the best 
example of environments of this type deliberately engineered for 
human beings. Significant variety in the work environment 
stemmed mainly from fluctuations in the physical demands of 
production processes and the variable desirability of available 
tasks. The environments of plants that are subject to the cycle 
of the seasons, and of human infants, also seem to be of this 
type. 
In order to appreciate the relevance of clustering, one 
typically needs to have knowledge not only concerning the 




but also concerning the capacity of the system to choose and 
implement alternative courses of action in response to 
environmental variations (121 relations). The essential 
requirements for survival in clustered environments are to be 
found in the internal system processes and in the paths of 
influence or causal trains that originate within the system and 
extend out into the environment. 
3. The disturbed-reactive environment 
The type II environment represents a transformation of the 
random environment whereby goals and noxiants become clustered. 
The disturbed-reactive environment is characterised by a second 
qualitative change - it is a clustered environment in which 
there is more than one system of the same kind. ·The essential 
characteristic of the type III environment is the presence of 
more than one system performing the same function, for which, 
therefore, the same elements of the environment have relevance 
as goals and noxiants. This means that from the point of view 
of these systems, the environment can no longer be considered 
placid - it has active elements, and ·it is more appropriat.e to 
think of this and the succeeding type as dynamic environments. 
An example of the type III environment is the state of affairs 
that exists when two or more timber-milling organisations are 
exploiting the same forest for timber, or when two or more 
fleets are fishing the same off-shore waters. The presence of a 
'competitor' makes an important difference in an environment 
that is otherwise only clustered. The disturbed-reactive 
environment corresponds to the typical milieu for mature human 
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behaviour and is described in the economists' theory of 
oligopolistic markets. It is exemplified also in most forms of 
contests and games, in which competitors must act within certain 
defined boundary conditions so as to manipulate a variety of 
objects or situations with the aim of maintaining precedence 
over other. 
The greater complexity of reactive environments is reflected in 
the fact that system viability now becomes dependent upon a 
third class of relations, in addition to the two that are 




). In an 
environment characterised by the existence of independent causal 
agents, knowledge of the (121 ) relationships - causal paths or 
pressures originating within the environment which impact upon 
the system - become essential to comprehension of the system's 
activity. 
4. The turbulent environment 
I have already discussed at some length the phenomena that are 
characteristic of extended social fields in a state of 
turbulence and have given some attention to the concept of 
turbulence. In the conceptual series elaborated by Emery and 
Trist, turbulent environments are, like type II environments, 
dynamic (and clustered); but unlike the reactive environment, 
they are characterised by dynamic processes occurring in the 
field itself, and not simply in the actions of other systems. 
The turbulent environment represents a transformation of the 
third level of causal texturing - it is a disturbed reactive 
environment, from which dynamic field processes have emerged as 
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an unintended result of the interactions of the constituent 
systems. (There are cases in which the field (or the 'ground'} 
becomes dynamic, not as a consequence of the interactions of the 
relevant systems, but due to entirely heteronomous forces. A 
fishing fleet caught in a gale, ora village struck by a 
hurricane would be examples of this. These phenomena are not 
our concern. A useful analogy in understanding how turbulence 
arises is the effect of a company of soldiers marching over a 
suspension bridge. They may set up a resonance that leads to 
the bridge's 'self destruction'. 
I have alrE;!ady used some examples of turbulence relating to 
ecological processes. If the type II environment corresponds to 
the relevant environment of a single milling enterprise 
exploiting a forest for timber, and type III corresponds to the 
new state of·affairs created by other milling enterprises 
beginning operations in the same locality, the turbulent 
environment corresponds to the situation that can arise if the 
competing systems over-exploit the available timber, encouraging 
soil wash and erosion, and making regeneration difficult, if not 
impossible. We are increasingly alerted to the possibility that 
the continuous transformation of energy and the accompanying 
release of wastes into the atmosphere and into water systems may 
result in accumulations of noxious substances up to a 'critical 
mass' point, at which irreversible processes begin to take place 
in ecosystem balances. Instances of the Hegelian thesis that 
quantity can become quality are also found in the work of 
Calhoun and others on the effects of population density on 
animal behaviour. Again, there are critical points at which 
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qualitatively new processes begin to operate which cannot be 
accounted for in the same terms as the processes characteristic 
of interactions of individual systems. 
In the case of social fields, there is a good deal to suggest 
that the dynamics of mob and riot situations correspond to a 
state of turbulence. The mutual excitation of emotionally 
charged individuals can lead to their joint engagement in 
activities that they would "'normally"' never contemplate as 
individuals. Emery and Trist argue that turbulence arises in 
organisational environments as a result of increasing reliance 
on research and development, the deepening interdependence 
between the economic and other facets of society, radical 
increases in the volume and speed of communications and the 
sheer growth of organisations and linked sets of organisations 
to the point that they are so large that "'their actions are both 
persistent and strong enough to induce autochthomous processes 
in the environment"'. (Emery & Trist: 1965:26). 
In turbulent environments, (L11 ), (112), and (121 ) relations are 
still of importance, but now (122 ) relations the area of 
interdependancies that lies within the environment itself become 
of critical significance to the survival of the system and its 
ability to perform its function. As the examples that I have 
given illustrate, when turbulence arises the system's zone of 
free movement is largely dictated by processes which are 
entirely heteronomous with regard to the interactions between it 
and other systems occupying the field. 
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5. The vortical environment 
Since these four levels of environment were first described in 
the literature, the possibility of a.further level has been 
recognised, in which the environment takes on some of the 
properties of a vortex, whirlpool, or black.hole. Such 
environments must be thought of as entirely dynamic and having 
the capacity to swallow up or engross anything that approaches 
them. 6 
Natural events such as the whirlpool and the cyclone provide the 
model for such environments. In the environments of 
individuals, it may be that some mob situations have the same 
characteristics when the atmosphere attains a pitch of frenzy 
and compulsion that erases the individual's will and engrosses 
him 'involuntarily' in the mob behaviour. It has also been 
suggested that some of the rituals and ceremonies associated· 
with conversion and indoctrination and with certain rites of 
passage in preliterate societies, have a similar effect on the 
individual subject, especially when the emotional intensity is 
enhanced by the use of pulsating music and chanting, and 
intoxicants. In this respect, such phenomena as 'Beatlemania', 
Bible Belt conversions in the American south and many primitive 
ceremonials may have a certain amount in common. 
Emery (1971) has suggested that vortical processes may be set up 
within social fields, as in masses of fluid, where the parts of 
field are moving at quite different velocities. Just as in 
rivers, where eddies are set up at the interstices of bodies of 
water moving at different rates, so the frictions engendered by 
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segmentation of the social field and their differential rates of 
change may induce the forces operating in the field to assume a 
vortical dynamic. It is of interest to speculate whether for 
example, the outbreaks .of racial violence at Sharpeville, Watts 
County, and Notting Hill coincide at all with locations and 
points of time in the social field where the differences between . 
blacks and whites were perceived to be greatest. 
In the vortical environment, (122 ) relations alone have any 
significance, for the fate of any object or individual 
implicated in such a field or force is entirely determined by 
the character of the environment. 
With regard to these five types of environment it should be 
emphasised that they are ideal types, and that the real 
environments in which empirical social science is interested are 
invariably 'mixtures' of them. The different facets of business 
activity, for example (purchasing, inventory control, 
production, maintenance, sales, research and development and so 
on), characteristically face environments of differing 
complexities, so that different demands are made on different 
sections of the organisation~ It is, nevertheless, usually 
possible to characterise the overall environment of the 
organisation .with respect to its dominant function. An 
individual's psychological environment at work may be stable and 
simple, while at home or in a love affair it is highly 
turbulent. 
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We can say, in general, that individuals and social systems 
engaged in purposive activity have to devote a good deal of 
time, energy and other resources to acquiring information about 
the structure and dynamics of their environments, and frequently 
also to manipulating and controlling the amount of environmental 
variance they have to confront. As I have suggested, for mature 
humans the normal amount of complexity experienced in their life 
space appears to correspond with the type 3 level. 
Individuals in a simpler environment are likely to introduce 
more complexity if they are able, and to exploit existing 
variances to the full. Alexander Solzhenitsyn's novel "A day in 
the life of Ivan Denisovitch' is an insightful, though 
agonising, account of the efforts of an occupation camp internee 
to make the most of an incredibly monotonous, routine 
existence. 7 
In the more complex environments on the other hand, the typical 
response is to try to reduce the complexity of the environment 
to the familiar, disturbed-reactive level. 
A particular advantage in identifying a number of types of 
environment is that it suggests a.related set of distinctions 
which refer to the problems in purposeful behaviour of 
understanding and learning about the relevant environment and of 
finding ways in which is can be manipulated. These are problems 
of system adaptation • In the next chapter I discuss the 
concept of adaptation, the different strategies of adaptation 
that are appropriate to the five types of environment, and a 
number of characteristic maladaptions to turbulent environments. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER III 
1 The publication by Maurer (1971), already cited, brings 
together a number of articles concerned with organisational 
environments. 
2 See Aguilar (1967) for an analysis of the ways in which 
business firms scan, and obtain information about their 
environments. 
3 There are a number of exceptions to this in recent 
organizational literature, as well as those in psychology 
which are about to be discussed. The pioneering study by 
Selznick (1940) and the important works by Katz and Kahn 
(1966) and Thompson (1967) are good examples. 
4 See, in particular, Kohler (1929) and Kaffka (1935). 
5 The fullest expression of Reider's thinking is found in his 
"Psychology of Interpersonal Relations" (1958). 
6 Some of the properties of a vortical environment are 
described in Edgar Alan Poe's short story "A descent into 
the Maelstrom", in which the narrator describes how he 
survived in the maelstrom, an intense tidal whirlpool off 
the Norwegian coast. 




ADAPTATION OF SYSTEMS TO THEIR ENVIRONMENTS 
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The concept of adaptation is crucial to the development of this 
thesis in that in the chapters on planning discussed later, the 
interaction between individuals, communities and the 
environments in which they live is discussed. Here adaptation 
is developed as a theme from animals to humans, and the 
different influences of vamping environments on adaptation is 
extended as a theme for analysis. 
A CONCEPT OF ADAPTATION 
The concepts of systems and environment have been discussed at 
some length. Open systems, I have shown, are in more or less 
constant commerce with the environments with which they must 
establish appropriate relations in order to be able to survive 
and go on performing their function. In the establishment of 
appropriate relations between the system and the environment, 
both the complexity of the environment and of the system itself 
are determinative factors. The greater the complexity of the 
system, in terms of the number of its parts and the range of 
activities they are capable of performing, the more chance it 
has, in any situation, of finding a response that is 
appropriate. The more uncertain and variable the environment, 
the greater the difficulty for any system to consistently behave 
in an appropriate manner. These are problems of adaptation. 
One of the difficulties in trying to understand the processes 
whereby psychological individuals and social systems become, or 
fail to become, adapted to the environments in which they exist, 
is that while the concept of adaptation has been well developed 
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in the biological sciences, there has been no such development 
in the social sciences. 
Biology has long been concerned with such apparently purpose-
like processes as regulation, co-ordination, intergration and 
adaptation, as they are observed in both plant and animal life. 
Since Darwin's pioneering work we have come to understand a good 
deal about phylogenetic adaptations - those changes in the form 
and functions of an organism that accompany the evolution of its 
species as a whole, resulting from natural selection and genetic 
mutations. The neck of the giraffe, the streamlining of fish 
and the colouration of moths and butterflies that enables them 
to blend with their habitats are examples of phylogenetic 
adaptation. 
A different class of adaptations accompanies the development of 
the single organism, both in its embroynic and maturation 
process, including its ability to learn those responses which 
are appropriate to particular environmental demands. The 
maturation of the human body, represented in sexual development 
and increases in strength and size, and the acclimatisation of 
plants and animals to local variations in climate are examples 
of ontogenetic adaptation. 
Many organisms are capable, in addition, of ex..~ibiting 
end-serving behaviours in response to the continuous flux of 
environmental events, ranging from the most highly sophisticated 
adaptive behaviours of men (which include symbolic responses 
such as. speech and facial expression), through the manipulation 
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of means-objects such as sticks and push-buttons by monkeys and 
pigeons, to the simple approach-avoid tactics available to the 
lowest form of animal life. Instinctive behaviours and reflex 
actions constitute a further category of adaptations. 
Man and Environment 
Men have found it of interest and value to enquire further and 
further into these processes whereby the interdependencies of 
species are established and regulated in the organic world and 
individual organisms accommodate themselves to the vagaries of 
their environments. Yet they have not wanted to see themselves 
as integrally involved in them. Man's unique capacity of 
rational thought and his subsequent creation of technology are 
typically presumed to have liberated him from this organic 
ecology, to the point where it can be imagined that our problem 
is not to adapt to the world, but to adapt the world to our 
requirements. Technology greatly exaggerates this presumed 
discontinuity between man and the rest of nature. It is 
difficult for us to feel closely implicated in the ecosystem 
where we live in highrise downtown apartments, or greatly 
dependent on organic food chains when our meals come tinned and 
synthetic from the supermarket. 
As McHar, has pointed out, this human arr·ogance is compounded by 
the pervasiveness of the philosophy of Genesis, which expounds 
the view that 'man is exclusively divine', that 'man is given 
dominion over all the earth', and that man ought to 'multiply 
and subdue the earth': 
' 
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The implications of this are very clear -
there is one moral arena; that is, that the 
acts of man-to-man are scrutinised by God, 
the Archangels, the Church, the Priests and 
the Court, and if you covet your neighbour's 
wife, or any wife covets her neighbour's 
husband or if you commit adultery, or theft 
or murder, then God, the Archangels, the 
Church, the Priests and the Courts are 
looking for you, and if they catch you they 
will rap your knuckles or do something much 
worse. · But if you want to kill off every 
whale, every ponderosa pine, every sequoia, 
if you want to kill the oceans you may do so 
because the acts of man-to-nature are not 
sacramental. Apparently God, the 
Archangels, the Church the Priests and the 
Courts don't give a damn, and so you may 
destroy all nature without any fear of 
retribution. 
(McHarg: 1971:641) 
While it is, of' course, true (as discussed above) that man has 
achieved a far greater independence from his environment than 
any other organism, it is nevertheless an ecological madness to 
premise our activities on a belief in the invulnerability of the 
human species, and it is fast becoming necessary for us to take 
a humbler view of the place of man in the universe and to 
recognise our complete interdependence with the rest of living 
and non-living things on the surface of the earth. The end of 
'free fall' requires a radical review of the Gospel of Growth 
and the exploitative, competitive and xenophobic attitudes to 
the resources balance of the ecosystem that it nurtures. 1 One 
ingredient of a better appreciation of the symbiotic relations 
between man and his social life on the one hand, and the rest of 
the universe on the other, may be the development of a concept 
of adaptation that is appropriate to the behaviours of 
purposeful systems, and which is entirely consistent with 




An important move in this direction has been made in the work of 
Gerd Sommerhoff and his development of the concept of 'directive 
correlation' (1950, 1969). His starting point is that an 
adequate theoretical biology must have a concept of life and a 
way of distinguishing between living and non-living systems that 
is consistent with a mechanistic interpretation of the world. 
In a sense, therefore, his work parallels in biology the 
~·. 0 • : ••• •• ' •• .... ~ .... ··, ·. ~ . 
He reviews a wide range of phenomena in nature that have the 
'teleological' or end-oriented character of adaptive behaviour, 
and proposes that the common element in all such examples of 
adaptive behaviour is the concept of 'appropriate response', 
which he regards as linking together four spatio-temporally 
distinct elements in any actual example of adaptation: 
1. Environmental circumstances (EC) or 
events which act as stimuli and evoke 
the response (R). 
2. The response itself. 
3. The environmental circumstances which 
the response meets during its execution 
and on which its success depends. 
4. The occurrence of a certain event of 
state of affairs - the 'goal' of the 
response (g) - as an effect of the 
co-occurence and interaction of (2) and 
(3). 
Bearing in mind that the stimulus, the response and the goal are 
individuated by time, the notion of an appropriate response can 




(From Sommerhoff: 1950:p.44) 
The response (Rt1 ) is appropriate insofar as it has the effect, 
in conjunction with the set of environmental circumstances with 
which 
state 
its occurrence coincides, (ECt)
1
, of bringing about the 
t of affairs (G 2 ). 
Sommerhoff uses the example of an automatically sighted 
anti-aircraft gun: 
1. In this case the stimulus st 
(corresponding to ECtO in thg above 
diagram) is the appearance of a target 
within a given region. 
2. The relevant part of the response is the 
line of fire adopted by the gun at time 
t 
tl (R 1). 
3. The relevant environmental circumstances 
coinciding with the firing of the gun 
are all those events and states of 
affairs external to the 
gun-aiming-and-firing system which have 
an effect on the path of the target and 
of the bullet during the time-in-flight 
of the latter (position, velocity, 
direction of target; strength of wind, 
etc.). 
4. The 'goal' or criterion of 
appropriateness can be interpreted in 
two ways. Generally the gun may be 
said to have been aimed appropriately if 
its line of fire at the time of firing 
created the greatest probability 
feasible under the circumstances of the 
bullet hitting the target. This is 
usually a satisfactory criterion in view 
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of the fact that simplifying assumptions 
typically have to be made about the 
actual path of the target. In the more 
restrictive version, the gun is said to 
be aimed appropriately if and only if 
the bullet actually hits the target. 
It is important to note that the significance of the time lapse 
between the environmental conditions or events which initiate 
the given response and those on which its effectiveness is held 
to be contingent is frequently not appreciated, due to the fact 
that the environmental conditions that evoke the response often 
remain constant. The example of the automatic gun takes 
account of the fact that relevant parts of the environment may 
be subject to change during the interval between an action being 
'triggered off' and its completion. This factor is equally 
relevant to the case of a cat pouncing on a mouse or a man 
firing a rifle at a bird in flight. 
To say that a given response is appropriate does not only imply 
that it is effective, but entails, in addition, a comparison of 
the actual response and its corresponding environmental state 
with an extended range of alternative possible responses and 
states of the environment. To return to Sommerhoff's 
anti-aircraft gun example: 
••• the statement that a given line of fire 
is 'appropriate' in relation to a given 
course of the target asserts that the given 
course of the target is a member of a set of 
possible alternative courses and that the 
given line of fire is the corresponding 
member of a correlated set of possible 
alternative lines of fire, each member of 
the latter set being effective in 




In view of the fact that an entirely accidental response could 
conceivably be appropriate under given circumstances (e.g., the 
accidental firing of a rifle might bring down a bird), the 
definition of adaptedness requires the further stipulation that 
it is a form of non-accidental appropriateness. To say that 
the gun is adapted to the path of its target implies not only 
that at a given moment the gun is so trained as to create the 
highest possibility of a hit being scored, but that also, within 
a given range of environmental variation (for example, a target 
moving in a different direction, or at a different velocity),· 
the ~n would have adopted a different line of fire, correlated 
with the changed characteristics of the target. 
Passive Adaptation 
Up to this point, only cases in which the changed initial 
conditions, that set off the adaptive response has been an 
environmental variable, and usually an antecedent value of the 
environmental variable with which the response is correlated, 
have been considered. However, the case of an animate or purely 
mechanical system reponding to a change in its environment 
represents only a limited class of all the events that can 
justifiably be called adaptive. I shall call such cases passive 





The response and the environmental conditions with which it 
coincides are jointly caused by a changed environmental 
t condition (E 0). As a result, the response is directly 
correlated with the state of the environment it meets during its 
execution, and these two variables together produce the goal, or 
focal condition (FC). Passive adaptation corresponds to the 
capabilities of reactive~functional and reactive 
multi-functional systems, which can select actions in response 
to environmental changes, that will maintain the performance of 
their function (e.g. a thermostat). 
Coenetic Variables 
The four essential aspects of this model of adaptedness and the 
relations betwen them generalised by Sommerhoff into his model 
of directive correlation are potentially much wider thart in acts 
of passive adaptation, and are given the general name of 
'coenetic variables' (from the Greek coenos: "beginning"). The 
coenetic variables need not be exclusively environmental 
variables, but may also be changes in the state of the system 
itself, such as the sensation of hunger or discomfort, the need 
for activity or rest, or the apprehension of danger. Neither 
therefore, in an instance of directive correlation, need the 
coenetic variable be an earlier value of the environmental 
circumstances with which the response is correlated. 
Correspondingly, directive correlation is not concerned simply 
with responses or reactions to variations occurring in the 
environment, but also incorporates goal-seeking behaviours. The 
t essential requirement remains that (R 1 ) and (ECt 1) be so 
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related in terms of the objective properties of the physical 
system of which they are part, that they are both caused by, and 







Sommerhof f"s formal definition of directive correlation is as 
follows: 
Any event or state of affairs Rt1 occurring 
at a time t is directively correlated to a 
given simultaneous event or state of affairs 
Et
1 
in respect of the subsequent ~ccurrence 
of an event or state of affairs G 2 if the 
physical system of which these are part is 
objectively so conditioned that there exists 
an event or state of affairs CVt0 prior to · 
t 1 , and a set of possible alternative values 
of CVT0 , such that: 
(a) under the given circumstances any 
variation of CVt0 within this set implies variations in both Rt1 and Et1 ; 
(b) any such pair of varied values of Rt 1 , 
Et1 (as well as the pair of their actual values) is a pair of corresponding . 
members of two correlated sets of 
possible values R"ti, R""t1 , R"""t1 , ••• 
and E"t
1
, E""t1 , E" "t1 , ••• , which are such that under the circumstances all 
pairs of corresponding members, but no 
other pairs, cause the subsequent 
occurrence of Gt • 
(Sommerhoff: 195b:54-5) 
The model of directive correlation, therefore, provides a 
categorically non-teleological definition of goal-directed 
behaviour, as borne out by the fact that it applies equally to 
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the actions of a purely mechanical system - a radar-controlled 
anti-aircraft gun - and the whole range of organic processes 
subsumed under the concepts of regulation, integration, 
co-ordination, organisation and the like, which have been the 
preoccupation of biologists. 
Directive correlation, in short, is the 
fundamental and objective system-property 
which in more or less complex forms 
underlines the phenomena of adaptation in 
nature and their purpose-like character. 
(Sommerhoff: 1950:56) 
Directive correlation refers to a characteristic of a system 
having more than one possible course of action available to it, 
such that within certain limits, it is able to select a course 
of action following a change in one of its own or an 
environmental property, that has the effect of enabling the 
system to go on performing its function. 
Active Adaptation 
In presenting a consistent naturalistic model of adaptation that 
is appropriate to goal-seeking systems which may be either 
mechanical or animate in nature, Sommerhoff further avoids the 
problems of consciousness which are particularly distinctive of 
human behaviours: 
••• directive correlation is a physical 
property which can exist in a closed 
physical system without presupposing the 
presence within that system of a rational 
agent and of conscious mental processes, 
i.e. of processes which are purposive in the 
literal sense of the word and involve 
rational thought, the presence of visualised 
aims, and fixed resolutions in the mind of a 
thinking agent. It is therefore seen that 
conscious mental processes constitute but 
one of several possible mechanisms in nature 
which can cause a system to have the 
objective property of directive correlation. 
(Sommerhoff: 1950:66-7) 
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He does recognise that the rational behaviour of man -
'activities involving rational thought processes and proceeding 
according to a preconceived plan, fixed resolution and conscious 
purpose in the mind of the agent' - involves a type of adaptive 
behaviour that is somewhat distinctive, and yet he comes to the 
conclusion that: 
••• although rational thought is a powerful 
instrument, it is neither a generally 
necessary nor sufficient condition for the 
objective adaptation of Man's behaviour to 
his environment 
(Sommerhoff: 1950:147) 
The special significance of those adaptations which are the 
result of rational behaviour and which, therefore, typify 
behaviours found in social systems, has been clarified by Emery 
in the distinction between active and passive adaptations 
(Emery: 1967; see also Emery and Trist: 1972), and formally 
distinguished by Ackoff and Emery in their definitions of 
goal-directed and purposeful systems (1972). The concept of 
active adaptation goes beyond directive correlations in 
embracing systems of causal relationships in which the focal 
conditions are wilfully induced changes in the state of the 
system or its environment that enhance the range of responses 
that will subsequently be adaptive. In other words, active 
adaptation enta~ls a system of directive correlations, in which 
the circumstances that constitute the focal condition of the 
first are deliberately created in order to become the starting 
condition for subsequent adaptive behaviours. Emery gives the 
example of man lighting a fire: 
••• his wit and action sets off an 
environmental process that enables him by 
appropriate responses to pursue goals of 
warmth, cooking, of visual contact, of 
security, of distillation, etc. Making fire 
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is not only an adaptive response to the sun 
going down but can be a starting condition 




In Sommerhoff's model of directive correlation, the existance of 
some goals in the system's environment is taken for granted. It 
is a function of the eyes and other sense organs to identify and 
locate the need satisfiers and noxiants that come within the 
organism's sphere of influence and to establish the causal 
connections that enable environmental variables to become the 
coenetic variables of adaptive behaviour. The model is 
therefore most appropriate to the kinds of adaptations that 
occur in goal-direct behaviour. 
With active adaptation, immediate actions do not usually :result 
directly in attainment of the outcome sought, for the outcome 
may be extremely distant, having existence only as a mental 
image of the actor. Immediate actions are geared to the creation 
of future conditions which will make further adaptive responses 
possible, some of which have the character that they lead a step 
closer to the attainment of the mentally constructed or distant 
focal condition. The distant focal condition corresponds to the 
system's purpose and the more immediate ones to the various 
goals that are causally connected in the realisation of the 
purpose. The same purpose can be attained by a number of 
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different series of directive correlations; a man, for example, 
can arrive at his destination by any combination of walking, 
running, catching a bus, riding a bicycle and so on. A concept 
of planning as a formalised method of active adaptation is 
elaborated upon later. 
Ecological Adaptation 
In arguing that many of the environments in which the purposeful 
activities of individuals and organisations are carried out are 
becoming increasingly complex and uncertain, I noted that one of 
the consequences is that it becomes more difficult for 
individual systems to adapt by themselves, using only their own 
resources. It becomes increasingly necessary for systems 
commonly confronting a turbulent environment to act in concert 
in order to provide the minimum amount of stability nee-ded for 
them to pursue their individual ends. I envisage, therefore, a 
fourth level of adaptation - ecological adaptation - which 
refers to systems of action in which a number of purposeful 
systems sharing the same environment consistently correlate 
their behaviours to one another for the purpose of rendering the 
effects of their separate activities more predictable, and, 
therefore, more susceptible to control. 
According to the situation, this may mean coming to agreement on 
the general nature of the outcomes (focal conditions) to be 
sought, the means that may legitimately be employed, or the 
nature and range of initial conditions that are to be the basis 
for actions. The most effective way in which the adaptive 
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behaviours of large numbers of purposeful systems can become 
directively correlated amongst themselves appears to be through 
the search for and agreement upon shared values, including 
values which relate specifically to the maintenance of the 
stability of the social field. 
(iii) Ecological 
adaptation 
In terms of my model, this means that the properties and 
behaviours of other systems come to constitute the coenetic 
variables in acts of purposeful behaviour. 
This step in itself does not take me far beyond the notion of 
active adaptation, which already allows for the possibility that 
the sequences of directively correlated responses of the actor 
take into account the parts being played by other systems in the 
same environment. Relating this conceptual series of modes of 
adaptation to the system hierarchy formulated by Ackoff and 
Emery suggests that the significant step beyond the level of 
active adaptation entails an ecologically adapted series of 
directive correlations which envisages no end point; in which 
the correlated systems do not anticipate any final condition 
that would constitute the 'outcome' of their collaborative 
involvement. This implies that the behaviours of the 
ecologically interdependent systems must be appropriate to the 
pursuit of a common ideal or ideals, which pervade the action 
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environment and become salient as field forces when choice 
points arise, disposing the connected systems to choose those 
behaviours which are most conducive to the realisation of the 
shared ideals (See, for example, Willener: 1970). 
Whatever improved kind of understanding of social and 
psychological processes of adaptation the social sciences 
eventually arrive at, it is as well to appreciate, as Sommerhoff 
points out, that: 
adaptability is never unlimited. It may be 
very extensive, as in the higher organisms 
and especially in man, but no living 
organism has the power to cope with all the 
conceivable challenges of its environment. 
On the contrary, the environmental changes 
which are possible in the normal routine of 
events are often so limited that as someone 
has put it, few animals have a chance to 
show how foolishly they would act under 
irregular circumstances. 
(Sommerhoff: 1950:19) 
Clearly both the causal complexity of the environment and the 
variability available to the system in its actions are basic 
parameters of the degree of adaptation that is possible in any 
particular case. The success of an organism, individual or 
organisation in bringing about and maintaining the focal 
conditions that are appropriate to itself is a function of its 
ability to match the range of potential environmental states 
(Et1) with a range of potential responses, such that for each 
(Et1) there is an (Rt1) which would produce the same jointly 
caused, end result. 
The directive correlation model suggests some objective measures 
of the limits of adaptability in particular cases; or, to 
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express it positively, of degree of adaptation. Adaptibility 
can be measured in terms of the amount of variation of a 
coenetic variable over which directive correlation can be 
maintained, and the number of coenetic variables that exist for 
a particular system. The adaptability of the automatic gun is 
limited by the range of target velocities that it can cope with 
and a given range of target elevations. An air-conditioning 
system that controls for humidity as well as temperature is 
adapted to a wider range of environmental circumstances than the 
simple thermostat heating system. 
In the following section I discuss the adaptation of systems in 
environments of differing levels of causal complexity. The 
concepts of adaptation developed here I connect with the five 
levels of environental texturing that I outlined in the previous 
chapter. 
Environmental Complexity and Adaptation 
1. Adaptation to the placid-random environment 
When the environmental relevancies for a particular system are 
"'randomised"' the 'goods"' to be approached and the"'bads"' co be 
avoided have a distribution that is unpredictable to the system 
- any behaviour is as good as any other. No behaviour of the 
system can intentionally be 'better"' than any other, as there 
are no known variations in the distribution of goals and 
noxiants of which advantage can be taken. Actions may be 
selected fortuitously that are conducive to success, but such 
rewards cannot be anticipated in advance. 
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I find it difficult to conceive of any behaviour that could be 
called adaptive taking place in a purely random environment. 
Sommerhoff seems to be of the same opinion: 
The necessity for the existence of one or 
more coenetic variables in every case of 
adaption is also intuitively obvious. It is 
impossible for any machine or living 
organism to adapt a certain action to the 
environment unless it has information about 
the environment, i.e. unless it can be 
influenced by some features of the 
environment. 
(Sommerhoff: 1950:53) 
Sommerhoff's concept of appropriateness has no relevance. The 
system cannot formulate useful hypotheses about the environment 
because its parts do not appear to be joined in any regular way. 
Schutzenburger's interpretation of system objectives in such 
environments is that "the optimal strategy is just the simple 
tactic of attempting to do one's best on a purely local basis' 
(Schutzenburger: 1954:101). If tactics refers to selecting an 
action from one's available repertoire, and strategy to the 
formulation of a 'strategic objective' - the position one wants 
to occupy at a future time - we can say that the discrimination 
between them is not relevant to random environments. 
Further, it does not seem possible for learning to take place in 
such environments. The above quotation from Sommerhoff suggests 
that learning is related not only to the system having available 
to it the faculties of perception and memory and responses that 
would qualify as 'learning behaviour', but also (and 
independently) to the information structure of the environment. 
Chein has made this observation in discussing the role of cues 
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as a determinant of behaviour. Cues are properties of objects 
of situations' which offer relevant information', in the sense 
that they are systematically related .to other characteristics of 
objects or situations: 
a 'cue' is an objective feature of the 
environment, it may not be utilised as such 
by the behaving individual and does not 
depend for its existence (though it may for 
its use) on the learning process or on some 
immediate or direct inference. The 
utilisation of cues may depend on learning 
and/or upon immediate and direct acts of 
inference; but this feature of the 
environment sets limits upon what may be 
learned or inferred, and it makes certain 
learnings or inferences more difficult than 
others. 
(Chein: 1954:121) 
Purely random environments are devoid of the cues that would 
make learning possible and regardless of the response 
capabilities of the system there does not appear to be any 
meaningful sense in which such environments could be learned. 
All four types of systems can survive and perform t.heir. 
functions in this simplest level of environment, but all of 
them, except those which simply perform a function and do not 
pursue any goal, can go on operating in such environments only 
at the expense of forced redundancy in their capabilities. 
Goal-seeking, purposeful, and ideal-seeking systems all have 
capabilities that exceed the minimum requirements of the random 
environment. If we strictly observe the interpretation that no 
adaptation is possible at this level, then only passive 
functional and passive multi-functional systems exist in 
environments at this level without redundant capacity. Reactive 
functional and reactive multi-functional systems (a thermostat; 
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an aircraft's automatic pilot that controls heading and roll) 
are capable of passive adaptation and can, therefore, operate in 
environments which are in some way clustered. Systems occupying 
such environments are generaly instruments of higher order 
systems and it is difficult to think of any systems naturally 
occurring at this level. 
The examples that I have offered of random environments have all 
been the relevant environments of goal-seeking or purposeful 
systems, but we should note, in addition, that the relevant 
environments of parts of complex organisations are frequently 
maintained at this simple level for the same reasons that the 
regimes of lunatic asylums and concentration camps have 
approximated to the random field - control is made a good deal 
easier. 
2. Adaptation to the placid-clustered environment 
The type II environment represents a transformation of the 
random environment whereby the goals and noxiants become 
clustered. A system in an environment in which its 'need 
satisfiers' and those objects or situations which have 
detrimental consequences are regularly interdependent in 
termporal or spatial configurations, thereby giving rise to 
variations in the supportiveness of different parts of the 
environment, cannot expect to survive in the long run by the use 
of purely 'chance' behaviours or 'doing one's best on a purely 
local basis'. Clust.ering offers the possibility of improvement 
upon purely chance behaviours. It is no longer the case, as in 
the random environment, that pursuit of the nearest visible goal 
is as good as any other action: 
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To pursue the goal object that it can see, 
the goal object with which it is immediately 
confronted, may lead the system into parts 
of the field which are fraught with_ 
unforeseen difficulties. Similarly, 
avoiding a present difficulty may lead the 
system away from parts of the environment 
that are potentially rewarding. 
(Emery and Trist: 1972:46) 
Clustering calls for the use of strategy rather than tactics • 
. Actions selected do not need only to satisfy the immediate 
situational demands; they need to belong to some ordered series 
of actions that are calculated to lead towards the strategic 
objective. In clustered environments the strategic objective 
can be appropriately conceptualised in locational terms - it is 
defining and moving towards the optimal location in the 
environment. Thus, for example, mineral prospectors with 
limited resources for surveys and drilling have literally to 
select the best locations they can on the basis of surface and 
strata.variations. Similarly, a wise fisherman knows into which 
part of a river to drop his line. We see, therefore that, by 
contrast with the random environment, adaptation is not only 
possible, but is also necessary, if a system is to survive in a 
clustered environment in the long run. Useful hypotheses can be 
developed about the structure of these environments and they can 
assist the selection of appropriate actions. 
It differs from the random environment also in that learning can 
take place. Some courses of action will now be repeatedly 
better than others for the attainment of particular ends. The 
support for associative, reinforcement or stimulus-response 
theories of learning has come very largely from the use of 
experimental situations which correspond to the clustered 
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environment, in which organisms are rewarded in some way when 
they have made 'correct' hypotheses about the connectedness of 
parts of thei~ environment. 2 
In order to adapt to a clustered environment, a system needs to 
be minimally goal-seeking. In various actual situations, it 
needs to be able to stick to courses of action that are 
determined more by the end that it seeks than by the proximal 
array of goals and noxiants.. This of course is the meaning of 
strategy. 
I mentioned that clustering is relevant also to the behaviour of 
reactive-functional systems. The distinction to be made is that 
for this class of systems, clustering has the effect of 
determining whether or not at any given time the system is 
performing its function, whereas in the case of goal-seeking 
systems the relevance of clustering is its influence over the 
effectiveness with which the system pursues its goal. The. 
relevant environment of a thermostatically controlled heating 
system is fluctuations in the temperature of the air contiguous. 
with its sensor. If, by chance, the room temperature corresponds 
to the level at which the thermostat has been set, the system 
does nothing. Such a system is adaptive because it can react to 
environmental changes in ways that have the effect of 
maintaining an environmental state. Variability in the 
environment is what makes such a system work, but variability 
cannot, in any sense, be exploited or taken advantage of by 
systems belonging to the functional class. 
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I propose, therefore, to reserve the term passive adaptation to 
refer to the capabilities of reactive functional and reactive 
multi-functional systems. These are generally state-maintaining 
systems of some kind. They simply react to fluctuations in an 
environmental condition or conditions in predetermined ways so 
as to go on producing a particular outcome. Goal-seeking 
systems, on the other hand, are capable of directively 
correlating their actions to variations in the state of the 
environment - they are responsive rather than simply reactive, 
in that they can choose their actions. 
3. Adaptation to the disturbed-reactive environment 
The new challenge to adaptation at this level is the presence in 
the same environment of a similar system. When the environment 
contains a 'competitor', adaptive behaviour needs to take into 
account the information that the competitor has of the 
distribution of goals and noxiants (clustering), and what its 
probable courses of action are, as well as the distribution of 
goals and noxiants per se. 
In this environment, each system does not 
simply have t.o take account of the other 
when they meet at random; but it has to 
consider that, what it knows about the 
environment can be known by another. That 
part of the environment to which it wishes 
to move is probably, for the same reason, 
the part to which the other wants to move. 
Knowing this, they will wish to improve 
their own chances by hindering the other, 
and they will know that the other will not 
only wish to do likewise but will know that 
they know this. 
(Emery and Trist: 1972:49) 
The term operation refers to the new requirement for adaptive 
behaviour. An operation is a 'planned series of tactical 
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initiatives' that are calculated not only to be adapted to the 
realisation of the system's goal, but also, in the process, to 
block or elicit certain courses of action that are available to 
the other systems. Although overall location in the field is 
still a relevant consideration for survival and effectiveness, 
the critical factor now tends to be "capacity or power to move 
more or less at will, i.e. to be able to make and meet 
competitive challenge" (Emery and Trist: 1965:26). In clustered 
environments, where the field as a whole is placid - relatively 
stable and predictable - most of the important sources of 
environmental variance may be coped with by the appropriate use 
of approach-avoid tactics, by hiding or hoarding. When the 
major sources of·variance are other systems, then some active 
coming-to-terms between them is demanded. Except when it is 
decided to fight to the death, strategies or bargaining, 
coalition, co-operation, or competition will tend to become 
prevalent. 
I have suggested that the clustered environment offers an 
information structure that allows systems with the requisite 
capacities (perception, memory, etc.) to learn by formulating 
and testing hypotheses concerning the regular connection of 
parts of the environment. The information structure of the 
disturbed-reactive environment is enriched by the fact that the 
cues (or coenetic variables) that can become variables in such 
hypotheses now include the behaviours of independent causal 
agents. The relevant set of causal interrelationships 
11 12 . 21 
encompasses (L ), (L ), and (L ) relations, so that 
distinctions can now be made between cases of system action and 
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environmental response and environmental pressure and system 
response. Given adequate levels of intelligence and memory, 
learning can now include "'theoretical"' knowledge with regard to 
the possible combinations and recombinations of these 
interactive effects. The difference between the Type II and 
Type III environments in this regard is analogous to the 
difference between doing a jigsaw puzzle and playing chess. 
In environments of this degree of causal complexity, adaptive 
behaviour requires that a system be able not only to select 
appropriate courses of action to enable it to move into and to 
exploit the "'richer"' parts of its environment, but also that it 
be able to reconsider its goals. To be adapted in this type of 
environment therefore, a system needs to be at least a 
purposeful system; that is, a system which is capable of 
choosing both its actions and its outcomes under constant or 
varying environmental conditions. 
To speak of a "'similar system' in a clustered environment means 
that a system (or systems) is present in that environment, the 
activity of which has the effect of reducing the effectiveness 
of the original system in the pursuit of its goal. As Thompson 
and McEwen have pointed out, in the case of formal 
organisations, the strategies of competition and co-operation, 
absorption and parasitism that are called for by this state of 
affairs, characteristically entail some surrender of autonomy in 
.goal-setting (Thompson and McEwen: 1958). A good example of 
this is the recurring international fishery disputes over the 
boundaries of territorial waters. For as long as it meets no 
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competition, a fishing fleet operates in an environment that is 
clustered (i.e. fish are more likely to be found in certain 
locations under certain sea conditions than others). When other 
fishing fleets enter the same territory, a need develops to 
divide up the relevant environment if effectiveness in goal 
attainment of the individual fleets is to be maintained. Within 
industry as a whole the development of substitutes, such as 
plastics and synthetic fibres, has forced problems of goal 
re-formulation upon traditional industries, such as steel and 
wool. 
4. Adaptation to the turbulent environment 
Questions concerning the system characteristics and the modes of 
adaption that are required by the causal texture of turbulent 
environments are, in a sense, the basic questions to be 
answered. At this stage only a sketch is presented, and the 
questions raised will be returned to and more thoroughly 
examined later, in Chapters 7 and 8. 
Because my focus is on the behaviours of social systems, ·the 
kind of turbulence that I am chiefly interested in is that which 
is created by the interactions of purposeful systems - human 
individuals, groups and organisations. As I have already 
commented, the emergence of dynamic processes in the field 
itself means for the constituent systems a gross increase in 
their area of relevant uncertainty; the causal complexity of the 
environment is such as to render unpredictable and hence 
uncontrollable the effect of system actions and interactions. 
The national awakening of consumership in the US that followed 
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Ralph Nader's attack on the motor industry and the dramatic 
flare-up of opposition both on and off the campuses that 
followed the anrtouncement of the invasion of Cambodia in 1970 
are indicative of some dimensions of turbulence in American 
society. 
In such environments, it does not seem possible for individual 
systems to formulate courses of action that would have a 
worthwhile probability of enabling th~n to maintain a level of 
efficiency in the performance of their function. Neither 
tactics, strategy, nor operations can be relied upon in a 
situation in which dynamic disturbances originate not only from 
competing systems but from the ground or the medium in which 
they operate. When change and complexity or environmental 
interconnectedness are ubiquitous, there is unlikely to be any 
location in the field that remains benign more than for a 
transient period. The aristocrats had nowhere to hide in .the 
bloody days of the French Revolution. Neither is the 
mobilisation of power, and the capacity to move more or less at 
will, likely to be of much use in the long run when it is not a 
question of subordinating other systems, but of bringing order 
to the ground upon which they interact. It seems unlikely, for 
example, that government decrees and the threat of fines 
represent the solution to the ecological crisis. 
The dominance of heteronomous events at this level suggests that 
a population of purposeful systems can best come to terms with 
turbulence by entering into joint, collaborative searches for 
solutions, premised on the recognition that their most 
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significant problems are common problems. Unlike the disturbed 
reactive environment, which requires some coming to terms 
between similar and dissimilar systems the fates of which are, 
to a degree, negatively correlated, the turbulent environment 
requires some coming to terms between both similar systems the 
fates of which are, to a significant degree, positively 
correlated. This idea has been presaged in my discussion of 
Trist's argument that welfare and development become 
increasingly interdependent as a society moves into 
post-industrialism (See Chapter 1). I am inclined to say, 
therefore, that insofar as adaptation is possible in the 
turbulent environment, it must be ecological adaptation, which 
entails the formulation of some shared principles to guide the 
responses of individual systems in their confrontations with the 
environment, by limiting the possible range of outcomes they can 
seek and the ways in which they seek them. 
It seems for example, that the present state of industrial · 
'lawlessness' in Britain (early 1980's) is the result of a field 
of forces which is turbulent from the point of view of the 
parties centrally involved and which therefore requires measures 
of ecological adaption. Indeterminate relations among the 
goverment, the employers and the unions, manifested in the rash 
of official and unofficial strikes unrelated to wage-bargaining 
and the advocacy of repressive measures by employers and the 
government (even leaders of the Labour Party, the parliamentary 
opposition, have sought to impose fines on dissident unionists), 
have created a situation in which none of the parties involved 
seem able to achieve its aims in the long run. For the parties 
to persist in perceiving this as a conflict situation, and 
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selecting their responses accordingly, is inimical to the 
welfare of the larger systems of which they are all part and in 
the end probably to the parties themselves. What seems to be 
minimally required is a search for some common ground with 
regard to beliefs about the purposes to be served by the 
production system as a whole, and some shared understandings of 
the procedures appropriate to realising those purposes. 
The point is, perhaps, more clearly demonstrated if we consider 
the helplessness of an individual caught up in a mob or riot 
situation who aspires to dampen or to divert the possibly 
violent or destructive direction of the energies engendered. Or 
we may return to the analogy of a company of soldiers marching 
over a suspension bridge; ~ soldier breaking step is unlikely 
to mitigate the effect created by the rest of the company, but 
if a sufficiently large number of them do so, destructive 
resonance can be avoided. 
Emery and Trist have suggested that if there is a mechanism for 
coping with turbulent environments that is comparable to the 
employment of tactics, strategy, arid operations at the simpler 
levels, it is likely to be 'the emergence of values that have 
overriding significance for all members of the field': 
So far as effective values emerge, the 
character of richly joined, turbulent fields 
changes in a most striking fashion. The 
relevance of large classes of events no 
longer has to be sought in an intricate mesh 
of diverging causal strands, but is given 
directly in the ethical code. By this 
transformation a field is created which is 
no longer richly joined and turbulent but 
simplified and relatively static. Such a 
transformation will be regressive, or 
constructively adaptive, according to how 
far the emerging values adequately represent 
the new environmental requirements. 
(Emery and Trist: 1965:28) 
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Values and ideals, unlike goals and purposes, cannot easily be 
written into contractual relationships and other agreements that 
can be used to bring stability to the Type III environment, but 
require, above this, a level of mutual understanding and trust 
among the actors within a given field. It is at this level, 
therefore, that ideal-seeking, as opposed to purposeful 
behaviours, become significant in the adaptive potentials of 
behavioural systems. 
Compared to the problems of identifying strategies of behaviour 
that are adaptive at this level of causal texturing, the task.of 
identifying and describing a number of maladaptive strategies is 
one of relative ease. Accordingly, the next section I address 
to the exploration of a number of characteristic ways of 
behaving which are, in the long run at least, inappropriate in 
such environments. Such an analysis, it is hoped, will be of 
assistance in exploring further the system properties and 
strategies that ~ appropriate to conditions of turbulence. 
Maladaptive Responses to Turbulence 
I have argued that the social fields of advanced industrial 
societies are becoming increasingly turbulent as a concomitant 
of the drift into post-industrialism. I have also expressed the 
view that institutional arrangements for policy-formation, 
planning and decision-making in these technologically advanced 
societies have tended to lag behind the radical increase in the 
complexity of the environments in which plans and decisions have 
to be made. 
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On the one hand, the qualitative novelty of turbulence has 
commonly not been recognized for what it is, and large and 
powerful organisations have continued to behave in a manner 
appropriate to the disturbed-reactive level of complexity. This 
misperception, and its pathological consequences, has been more 
and more recognised and commented upon. In the context of 
societal planning, for example, Ozbekhan has observed: 
At present, our perception is still largely 
governed by the world view of 19th century 
industrialism. Our problem is that the 
reality we are beginning to sense and with 
which we must deal belongs, by our own 
admission, to some other, newer order. It 
is the relationship principles of this newer 
reality that we are now called upon to 
define. 
(Ozbekhan: 1969:52) 
On the other hand, where the ... newer order' has at least been 
recognised, we have characteristically been predisposed to try 
to 'contain' its novel complexities by suppressing them and 
adopting a stance of more selective attention. By limiting our 
consideration to specialised parts, aspects of dimensions of 
turbulently connected fields, we may achieve the effect of 
'downgrading' them to more simple levels for the purposes of our 
immediate responses. In the advanced societies that I am 
talking about, there are widely shared (if often poorly 
articulated) feelings that the real richness and complication of 
social decisions are actually avoided, by being successfully 
dealt with at a more primitive level, using such bureaucratic 
phenomena as routinisation, 'red tape', and impersonalisation. 
These pervasive disenchantments are often conveyed in the 
over-burdened concept of 'alienation'. 
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As I have shown, successful adaptation at any level of 
environmental complexity requires that a system be sensitive to 
the kind of causal texturing with which it is confronted and be 
able to select courses of action and choose behaviours that are 
appropriate to that environment. The choice of behaviours that 
would be appropriate at other levels than that which the system 
confronts is, in general, maladaptive, because they do not 
enable the system to go on performing its function in the long 
run without a reduction in its efficiency. 
The challenges to the adaptive capabilities of individuals and 
social systems with which I have been most concerned are those 
which derive from the over-complexity of their environments; I 
have argued that over-complexity becomes a characteristic 
condition of social fields experiencing the transition to 
post-industrialism. Adaptation becomes prone to breakdown in 
the over-stimulating and unpredictable conditions of 
environmental turbulence. Responses which try to downgrade this 
level of complexity by reacting only to limited facets or 
dimensions of it, and responses which result from a 
misperception of the real level of complexity, may both be 
maladaptive in the long run. I shall refer to the former as 
passive maladaptations and to the latter as active 
maladaptations. 
The active ones are responses which would be appropriate for the 
simpler reactive environments but which do not correspond to the 
demands of a turbulent environment. In such cases, some of the 
quantitative aspects of turbulence may be appreciated, evoking 
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the accumulation and mobilisation of greater and greater amounts 
of power, in an attempt to 'restore order'. It is, however, the 
qualitative novelty of the Type IV environment that has to be 
appreciated, particularly the overriding significance of 
heteronomous forces. To misperceive turbulence as simply a more 
complex form of the reactive environment encourages the 
persistence of Type III strategies of adaptation which are 
likely to be maladaptive in the long run. The passive responses 
are essentially defence mechanisms, which are calculated ,to 
downgrade the causal complexity of the environmental domain with 
which the system is immediately confronted, by artificially 
severing it from its wider context. These responses are passive 
because they are set off by environmental properties to which 
they attempt to conform rather than to manipulate. 
Angyal's identification of three dimensions of living systems -
depth, progression, and breadth - has suggested a second way of 
classifying maladaptive responses. The continuing viability of 
the system as a whole is a function of its ability to achieve a 
satisfactory level of integration of each of these three 
dimensions. Failure to do so results in a pathology of some 
sort. 
1. The depth of vertical dimension refers to the 'system 
principle', or the basic trend of the organism. For individuals 
this basic trend is bipolar, embracing on the one hand a trend 
towards autonomy (independence from the environment) and on the 
other a trend towards homonomy (integration with superindividual 
units such as the group, society the cosmos, etc.) The two 
poles of the vertical dimension are the depth and the surface: 
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In the vertical structure the more 
superficial factor is a part of the 
immediately deeper factor. The relationship 
between part and whole in this dimension is 
that the part is a concretisation of the 
whole in some specific form... The person 
in his development not only acquires more 
effective ways of expression, but may 
acquire also greater depths ••• The depth is 
more essential and represents what one is, 
while the surface is more accidental and 
represents only what one does. 
(Angyal: 1941:266) 
Integration in this dimension, therefore, requires that surface 
behaviours are consistently related to the deeper roots of the 
system - the basic structure in the case of individuals and 
fundamental cultural axioms in the case of social systems. The 
selection of what is to be responded to out of the 'blooming, 
buzzing confusion' of the existential world needs to be guided 
by these root principles. 
2. The dimension of progression (the means-ends dimension) 
refers to the functional 'division of labour' that is 
characteristic of all living systems, whereby the whole 
differentiates into parts that each contribute one or more 
functions to the outcomes of the whole. The outcomes and 
specific behaviours that are shaped by the basic trend of the 
organism through the vertical dimension can usually only be 
achieved through a number of successive stages - a means-ends 
chain that is directed to the outcomes of the. system: 
The position of every single behaviour can 
be defined both with regard to the vertical 
dimension of progression. A given activity 
may be looked upon as an organisation of 
means and ends, but at the same time this 
activity represents the satisfaction of some 
need which in turn is the surf ace 
manifestation of deeper tendencies. 
(Angyal: 1941:268) 
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Integration in this dimension is expressed in the 'economy' of 
the division of labour and the degree of articulation that is 
achieved among the system parts. The trend towards autonomy 
requires both that the system differentiate in order to adapt to 
a wider range of environmental variance (Ashby's 'law of 
\ 
requisite variety'), but also that newly differentiated parts 
are reintegrated into the total structure. 
3. The breadth (or transverse) dimension refers to the lateral 
co-ordination of the various specific behaviours of the system, 
. whereby they become or fail to become mutually consistent, or 
harmonious: 
As we go from the depths to the surf ace the 
tendencies of the organism become not only 
more specific but more numerous. The same 
general tendency may seek expression in a 
number of ways. The various specific 
expressions of the same deeper tendency are 
not subordinated or superordinated to each 
other, but exist side by side ••• The 
organisation of parts into a whole along the 
transverse dimension can be called 
synergesis, or simply co-ordination. 
(Angyai: 1941:269) 
Integration in this dimension has particular reference to the 
trend towards homonomy. There are some dimensions of the total 
system process - the strain towards the fullest realisation of 
the system principle - which require that certain constellations 
of units, processes, actions, etc. achieve consonance, or act in 
concert, with the effect that they individually enter into a 
larger whole, or gestalt. The movements of the various retinal, 
arm and finger muscles that are required by my writing this (but 
not necessarily of the muscles in my feet or back) must be 
co-ordinated and each enter into the total activity of writing. 
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Again the various configurations of units and part processes 
that need to be 'set' and 'shifted' from time to time for the 
carrying through of certain functions have to be in conformity 
to the structural principles of the system in order for 
integration of the lateral dimension to be maintained. Thus, 
the notes that are selected from a piano keyboard have to be 
selected according to some tonic principles if the resulting 
chord is to be 'integrated'. 
Clearly these three dimensions are closely related to one 
another - they have the character of different facets of an act 
of behaving, when behaviours are seen as gestalten. Angyal 
offers the brief example of a person leaving the house and 
reaching for his hat: 
This movement is composed of a number of 
co-ordinated muscle contractions (transverse 
dimension). This activity at the same time 
in a phase in a means-end organisation 
(dimension of progression). Furthermore it 
is a concrete expression of some tendency of 
the organism which can be traced back to 
more and more general tendencies (vertical 
dimension). 
(Angyal: 1941:270) 
A well-integrated personality achieves good integration along 
all three dimensions, and disintegration (or 'segregation') in 
one dimension is usually followed by segregation in other 
dimensions. 
Angyal's concepts were developed primarily to deal with the 
individual or the personality as a unit of study; or, more 
correctly, to interpret the personality-plus-environment system, · 
which he calls the 'biosphere', as an organized whole. The 
biosphere is literally 'the realm of sphere of life': 
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The biosphere includes both the individual 
and the environment, not as interacting 
parts, not as constituents which have 
independent existence, but as aspects of a 
single reality which can be separated only 
by abstraction ••• Instead of studying the 
'organism' and the 'environment' and their 
interaction, we propose to study life as a 
unitary whole and endeavour to describe the 
organisation and dynamics of the biosphere. 
(Angyal: 1941:100-1) 
'Personality' denotes "the total organism when, as in man, the 
latter includes the social self and other factors which bind the 
individual into super-individual relationships" (Angyal: 1941: 
200r). 
His concepts for interpreting the biosphere translate readily 
and in a meaningful way t·o the level of social systems and the 
study of group behaviour because they are systems terms, and his 
study is a thorough and consistent application of the systelllS 
point of view. I conceptualise the realm of sphere in which 
social life takes place as the sociosphere, an organised whole 
which includes social systems and their environments, and 
interpret the degrees of integration within the sociosphere in 
terms of the same dimensions of depth, progression and breadth. 
As the individuality or uniqueness of the individual is 
eh.'Pressed in his personality, so the individuality of the group 
or social system is expressed in its distinctive culture. Each 
of these concepts refers to the characteristic modes of 
organisation and ways of doing things that give rise to the 
important differences among groups and among individuals. The 
individuality of the group and the course of its behaviour can 
be understood in terms of its interdependencies within the 
sociosphere, in the same way that the personality is interpreted 
as a function of biospheric relations in Angyal's work. 
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By bringing together the three dimensions of system integration 
and the distinction between active and passive responses to 
environmental over-complexity, I arrive at a conceptual scheme 
which suggests a number of distinctive forms of maladaptation. 
The drift into post-industrialism that is characterised by 
rapid, accelerating, but uneven, rates of change, and the 
increasing interdependency of the welfare of sub-systems places 
a.strain upon the ability of the parts of the social structure 
to achieve a sufficient degree of integration along the three 
dimensions to which I have referred. The greater scheme of 
novelty, diversity and transience has the effect of creating an 
ever-widening range of conditions that have, somehow, to be 
taken into account, thereby producing pressures towards a 
greater differentiation of structure. Unevenness of change 
creates pressures towards segmentation, while the extension of 
·,organic' interdependence increases the need for the 
co-ordination of past activities. 
Maladaptive Responses to Turbulent Social Fields 
5. DISSOCIATION 
(autonomy) LATERAL 
(hornony) ) EVANGELICISM 6. 
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Pathologies of integration of the depth dimension 
Successful integration is manifested in conformity of surface 
behaviours with the deeper roots of the system, cultural or 
psychic. This has the effect that what is chosen as the basis 
for action, and the courses of action that are selected, are 
shaped by the basic axioms of the system, and are not chosen 
capriciously or according to some principle that is unrelated to 
the essential structure of the system~ When the system responds 
to over-complexity by a breakdown, or segregation, along the 
vertical dimension, I speak of superficiality. The active form 
of maladaptation is when the system responds to over-complexity 
by continuing to try to take everything into account, and I 
shall call this synoptic idealism. 3 
1. Superficiality 
When there is a discontinuity in this dimension, according to 
Angy al: 
•••• tendencies in the depth of personality 
cannot express themselves in concrete 
surface manifestations; they remain 
repressed. Another aspect oE the break or 
impairment of continuity of the vertical 
structure is that the surface manifestations 
no longer express deeper tendencies and thus 
become more or less empty. 
(Angyal: 1941:323) 
The mechanisms that account for discontinuity of this sort on 
the personal level are typically some form of repression that 
amounts to the denial of one's own psyche. On the social level 
.it is the denial through suppression or oppression of the deeper 
cultural bonds that tie people together. 
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Negation of these basic axioms leaves the way open for the 
operation of random or idiosyncratic criteria as the basis for 
actions. This may mean, for example, that one reacts only to 
the familiar, so that behaviour is guided by an exaggerated 
deference to custom and convention, leading to the personal or 
institutional rigidity of conservatism. Conformity is a 
slightly different reaction, resulting in subservience to fads 
and fashions which are, by nature, ephemeral and transient. 
Emery has suggested that trivialisation may be the dominant mode 
at the moment: 
••• if anything might lead to anything, then 
the motive for choice becomes pretty 
irrelevant and one chooses the familiar or 
the efficient. 
(Emery: 1971:663) 
2. Synoptic idealism 
Deviation in the opposite direction seems to entail an effort to 
take everything into account - to ignore no possibility, to 
leave no stone unturned. In this case, the choice of the bases 
of action is not irrelevant or unnecessarily restricted, but is 
quite unrelistically expanded. Remembering that power and the 
ability to move at will are key conditions for adaptation to 
disturbed reactive environments, we may say that the persistence 
of these lower level strategies in the turbulent environment 
represents a quest for the power of omniscience - to be able to 
rationally calculate upon all the values and the facts so as to 
arrive at the 'one best way' in every choice. 
At the personal level, the economists' conceptual mutation 
'rational economic man' has had to be endowed with omniscience. 
. -. ; .. · ;_ .... It may be, that in real situations, the craving for 
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'rationality' in one's behaviour corresponds to emphasising 
analysis and objectivity at the expense of sensations and 
spontaneity as the basis for what one does. Such people are 
typically perceived as 'cold', and perhaps callous, in their 
interpersonal lives. At the institutional level, I am inclined 
to think that a preoccupation with rational decision-making and 
comprehensiveness in planning and policy-formation are often 
indicative of an unrealistic struggle for omniscience. 
The 'Master Planning' ideology (that can still be found in the 
city planning profession), the rather utopian expectations among 
administators concerning the.ultimate utility of integrated data 
systems, mathematical modelling, cost-benefit analysis, PPBS and 
the like, and the tendency for social scientists to search for 
increased understanding by extending the number and variety of 
'variables' handled, are all examples of the quest for a level 
of comprehensiveness that I am saying may be unattainable in the 
turbulent environment. 4 The limits of men's intellectual 
capacities, the multiplicity and fluidity of values, and the 
prohibitive cost of information-gathering are just some of the 
reasons why synoptic idealism is, in practice, impossible to 
sustain for complex situations. It may be that the ideal is 
maladapted even to the third level of environmental complexity, 
for comprehensiveness is really only a feasible aim when the 
system of events, situations, etc., to be acted upon is well 
understood and can be treated more or less as a closed system. 
What we can say is that comprehensiveness is successively less 
well adapted to the higher levels of environmental uncertainty 
and complexity. 
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Pathologies of integration on the means-end dimension 
Integration in this dimension requires the presence and the 
participation of those parts of sub-systems and their activities 
that are necessary for the system as a whole to carry out its 
functions. As I have shown, the development or growth of living 
systems involves a capacity both for differentiation and for the 
reintegration of specialising parts and functions into the total 
system process. When the processes of differentiation and 
integration of functions are well-balanced, there is an 
economical division of labour. When the integrative processes 
lag behind differentiation, segmentation occurs; when 
differentiation is suppressed or ignored and system energies are 
over-concentrated on integration, I shall speak of 
authoritarianism. 
3. Segmentation 
Segmentation refers to a breakdown along the dimension of 
progression - a breakdown in relations among the parts and part 
activities that constitute the successive phases in the 
realisati.on of the wider system outcomes. Angyal refers to two 
aspects of disintegration along the means-end dimension. On the 
one hand a course of action may be left unfinished: ' the 
activity is aborted before it can go to completion. In such a 
case we may speak of frustration', and on the other, parts of 
sub-systems may become segregated: 'Subordinate goals may become 
independent and lose contact with the main goal of activity. 
This may result in a fragmentation and disintegration of the 
total function.' (Angyal: 1941:324). 
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The separation of parts so that they begin to pursue their own 
goals at the expense of the larger systems of which they are 
part is of special concern to the understanding of social 
phenomena. At the individual level the withdrawal of one's 
contribution from a group or communal activity, or placing the 
value of independence and the achievement of one's personal 
goals above the ends pursued by the collectivity result in a 
weakening of the group's potential energies. The organisational 
phenomenon of 'goal-displacement' .;.. the tendency of the 
differentiated parts of the organisation to become preoccupied 
with the attainment of their own limited missions, even when 
this no longer serves or is threatening to the institutional 
mission - is an instance of segmentation that has been much 
discussed by organisation theorists. At the societal level I 
have already referred to the dangers of parts of the structure 
being left behind by the onward rush of technological change and 
mass affluence. It is (curiously) the wealthiest and most 
developed societies that experience the greatest difficulty in 
integrating the poor, the elderly, the beats and drop-outs, and 
other minorities, even though in these societies such problems 
of integration are more and more perceived as critical. 
4. Authoritarianism 
Authoritarianism represents an imbalance in the opposite 
direction - system energies are disproportionately applied to 
integrative processes at ·the expense of differentiation. The 
response to complexity in this case is not the withdrawal by 
part processes of their contribution to the whole activity, but 
an attempt to impose a more rigid structure on the means-end 
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dimension in order to ensure that all part activities are 
directly integrated with the system goal. While the passive 
form of maladaptation on the dimension of progression is the 
interruption of means-end chains, resulting in segmentation, the 
active form is found in the further elaboration and closer 
control of the means-end paths so that they converge upon a 
single pinnacle - the imposed, uniquivocal goal of the system. 
The active responses, I have suggested, result from a 
misperception of the environmental dynamic, and can never be 
successful in the long run. This may be the basis of the feeling 
among many people that the regime in South Africa will not be 
able to subjugate its black and coloured populations 
indefinitely. The fascist states of Hitler and Mussolini had 
legendary success in having the trains and buses running 
according to schedule, but only at the cost of a system of 
control and repression that was a self-def eating component of 
the fuller expression of the aims of the state. In this 
dimension it is not the power of omniscience that is most 
salient, but political power or the power of coercion. Although 
there may be some physiological or psychological states of the 
individual that correspond to a maladaptive subordination of all 
parts to the service of a single over-riding function, 
authoritarianism, in the sense I wish to convey, seems to be 
better understood as a reaction of social system. In the social 
field, power, in the sense of superordination, can also be 
formulated in terms of the various types of authority -
charismatic, traditional and legal-rational. Appeals to bring 




national service, extend censorship and the like, are frequently 
offered as solutions to the complexity and irregularity of 
social life whereby "law and order' might be restored. 
Pathologies of integration on the lateral dimension 
Integration along this dimension requires a certain degree of 
adequacy of the setting and shifting mechanisms available to the 
system as a whole whereby it is able to educe the co-operative 
participation of differing combinations of parts and part 
processes according to the particular demands placed upon the 
system or the particular end that it seeks. The parts of 
purposeful systems are systems themselves, and are subject to 
the dual trends towards autonomy and homonony. To the extent 
that the autonomous tendencies of the parts prevail, the system 
as a whole is less able to employ them in the service of its 
ends and is weakened. Angyal has called this condition 
dissociation. When, on the other hand, the homonomous 
tendencies of the parts dominate, there is a shift towards the 
complete co-ordination and co-operation parts. I shall call 
this evangelicism. 
5. Dissociation 
According to Angyal, dissociation "consists in a lack of 
co-ordination between the parts of the whole and manifests 
itself in a kind of dysplastic behaviour. By lack of 
co-ordination is meant not only motor inco-ordination, but also 
a lack of co-ordination between the various tendencies and 
attitudes of the person." (Angyal: 1941:324). The analogue for 
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social systems is the reluctance or unwillingness of individuals 
to identify themselves with or participate in common social 
activities. Some of the implications of this have been 
discussed by Emery and Trist: 
Dissociation means a reduction in the 
average man's sense of responsibility for 
co-ordinating and regulating his behaviour 
with respect to the potential co-producers 
of his desired ends. For each such 
fractional reduction there is a marked 
multiplier effect. Special and massive 
social regulatory institutions have to be 
created ••• to carry responsibilities 
formerly implicit in the web of mutual 
support that constituted the social field. 
(Emery and Trist: 1972:66) 
As a response to turbulence in the social field it amounts to 
'feathering one's own nest' and 'looking after number one' at 
the expense of any co-operative search for solutions to one's 
own (and others') problems. The domination of autonomous 
tendencies over tendencies towards homonomy among the 
constituent parts of the field increases the freedom of movement 
of the individual parts at the expense of the ability of more 
inclusive, supra-individual systems to mobilise energies for 
collective tasks. 
6. Evangelicism 
The active form of maladaptation in the lateral dimension 
corresponds to the domination of homonomic over autonomous 
tendencies, whereby all the parts of sub-systems become united 
according to some principle, so that they can only be set and 
shifted in unison. Such an arrangement has the effect of 
focussing the energies that are available for doing anything, 
and generally ensures a high level of predictability concerning 
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the behaviour of the whole system. The most important 
detrimental consequence is that it reduces the potential 
responsiveness and flexibility within the system, by reducing 
the number of ways in which the parts are able to combine and 
recombine in the face of variable environmental demands. 
The term evangelicism I use because it is evocative of such 
notions as 'all pulling together' and 'entering into the 
brotherhood', as responses that are appropriate to the solution 
of personal bewilderment or disengagement. Thus, the religious 
evangelicist is inclined to appeal for a world brotherhood of 
man as a panacea for all existing ills, and the reforming zeal 
of urban progress associations and community development 
associations makes a fetish of 'community spirit'.· It is 
intended in no way to disparage the noble sentiments of love and 
brotherhood as such. When, however, the solution to the problem 
of maintaining some order in a turbulent environment is sought 
in appeals to people's better instincts, all the evidence 
suggests that there is little ground for optimism regarding the 
maintenance of order in the long run. The principles whereby 
the parts become regimented need not be moral principles but may 
also be based on power or authority. In the army for example, 
unison of behaviours is based on discipline, which, while 
guaranteeing the performance of tasks, does so at the expense of 
overall responsiveness - 'you're not paid to think'. Such 
cases, however, shade off into the authoritarian responses. 
If evangelicism in the turbulent environment corresponds to a 
vestigial power strategy for bringing order to the field, it 
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seems to be the power of love, or the power of emotional 
sanctions, that is appealed to, in contrast to the power of 
knowledge and coercive power on the other dimensions. It is the 
feeling that 'if only people would all be decent to one another, 
the world would be a far better place. Without disputing the 
worth of this as an ideal, while evangelical responses lack a 
programme for unification they are ultimately maladapted to the 
conditions of turbulence. In this respect, the United Nations 
and Billy Graham confront similar limitations. 
To the extent that the depth, progression and lateral dimensions 
of the personality and of the social system necessarily cohere, 
it is to be expected that a breakdown in any of these dimensions 
will affect the extent of integration on the others. With 
regard to what we have called the passive maladaptations, Angyal 
says: 
In cases of good integration the connections 
of a given biospheric occurrence extend over 
a wide range of systems, while in the case 
of segregation the biospheric occurrence 
becomes a more or less localised affair. We 
make such distinctions frequently in daily 
life, for example when we say that one 
person is doing something half-heartedly and 
that the other is involved 'body and soul'. 
Activities the connection of which with 
other parts of the personality are severed, 
are feeble, unenergetic ••• on the other 
hand, activities well integrated with the 
rest of the personality are more forceful, 
because they are supported, backed up, 
reinforced by many systems of the 
personality. 
(Angyal: 1941:324:25) 
With respect to the active maladaptations, the mutual 
penetration of authoritarian and evangelical dispositions is a 
common phenomenon. Religious systems premised on the 
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fundamental equality of men and dedicated to their universal 
brotherhood have demonstrated surprising capacities for using 
authoritarian structures and teachings in the pursuit of their 
mission, and autocratic regimes have rarely failed to invoke 
some moral, ethical or religious principle to justify their 
tyranny. The craving for omniscience, on the other hand, may be 
reflected in the drive toward the centralised control of 
authoritatarianism, and the elaboration of theologies and 
manifestoes as the underpinnings of evangelicism. 
l_ 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER IV 
1 Such a review is advocated in the forceful polemic by Mishan 
(1967) against the 'ideology of growth'. It is an 
unexpected book from a highly reputed economist, and of the 
highest importance in drawing attention to the alternatives 
to 'growth mania'. 
2 See Toda (1962) for a creative analogue to the clustered 
environment. 
3 This term is adapted from Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963). 
4. Boguslaw (1965) identifies the expanding breed of systems 
engineers as the 'new utopians', striving to eradicate human 
fallability by the design of complex engineering systems. 
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CHAPTER V 
STRATEGIC PLANNING · 
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My preceding work outlines a conceptual framework for the 
investigation of purposeful human and social behaviours, and the 
ways in which social aggregates become, or fail to become, 
adapted to the environmental conditions that they meet. I have 
argued that the nature of the environmental conditions for 
purposeful social activity - the overall properties of the 
social field - are, in many parts of the world, becoming subject 
to important qualitative changes, and that these changes demand 
a new type of response. I have further suggested that for new 
forms of response, or modes of adaptation, to become possible on 
a sufficient scale, some conventional ways of looking at the 
world will have to be replaced by a new appreciative system in 
which a critical element will be the recognition that ecological 
units must become. the basis for achieving regulation. 1 The 
following chapters constitute an exploration of the usefulness 
of systems theory and the contextualist framework in 
apprehending the significance of these qualitative changes and 
suggests directions in which regulation might be sought. 
In rapidly changing and uncertain environments, strategic 
planning becomes the dominant method of which social units at 
all levels attempt to regulate their relations with other parts 
of the field so as to be able to go on functioning effectively. 
Loeks, for example, comments on American experiencer: 
Man's view of himself and the world he 
inhabits has been in the process of change 
since the beginning of time. In recent 
years, however, the rate of this change has 
been accelerating rapidly and in ways that 
have profound implications for planning. 
As emerging national commitment to planning 
and development is being expressed in the 
form of strengthened public institutions for 
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its execution. At the same time the 
private sector is picking up steam in its 
efforts to relate its decisions to public 
policy. This is reflected by increasing 
use of the non-profit development 
corporation and the expanding effort that is 
being put into corporate planning. All of 
the above points up a rapidly enlarging 
consensus concerning the degree and kind of 
social intervention which should be brought 
to bear in the development of the 
environment. Dealing with change is 
becoming a pervasive activity and by ten to 
15 years from now practically everyone will 
be in the act. 
(Loeks: 1967:348,349) 
Planning is therefore to be understood as a generalised way in 
which many kinds of social aggregates endeavour to become better 
adapted to the environmental circumstances with which they are 
confronted. It has generally become a distinctive form of 
activity in societies (or those parts of them in which type III 
environmental characteristics emerge) in which the actions of 
many independent causal agents have to be somehow.regulated, if 
the consequences of their combined, as well as their separate, 
actions are to be subordinated to some concept of the welfare of 
the larger system of which they are a part. At the simpler 
levels, at which uncertainties of this sort are generally 
absent, a satisfactory level of integration may be obtained 
through reacting to disturbances after they have become manifest 
a.nd pursuing present actions almost entirely on the basis of 
·past experiences. This explains why, of all the particular 
expressions of planning, military planning - the formulation· of 
battlefield strategies - has the most extensive history. In 
war, even societies at the very simplest levels of organisation 
have to evolve means for survival in a reactive field, and one 
of the principal means is planning. 
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Strategic Planning and the Social Sciences 
There are I suggest, a number of reasons why it is becoming 
especially important for the social sciences to arrive at a 
bett~r understanding of planning behaviour, the conditions that 
make it necessary, and the characteristic d:ifficulties that it 
has to overcome. Fundamentally, the omnipresence and 
acceleration of change demand more and more that we decide in 
advance of .taking action; that we deliberately survey 
alternative possible o~tcomes and take an active role in 
bringing about those which.are considered preferable. As the 
rate and scale of change increases in indu.strial societies, so, 
too, does the need for planning. With the more ieisurely.scale 
of development of pre-industrial eras; the future generalJiy· 
arrived at an assimilable rate, carrying only occasional threats 
to traditional and established beliefs and ways of doing things. 
The rapid accumulation. and dissemination of scientific knowledge·· 
.and its application in society through technology has steadily 
eroded the validity of an 'extra-relative' view of the future 
(the belief that it would be some sort of continuation of.'Jpast 
trends) and is rendering obsolete the ameliorative approach to 
policy-making, whereby major efforts are mounted only to remove 
existing ills. 
We can no longer assume the continuous development of existing 
patterns of growth and decline and can no longer afford to react 
' , 
after events,. but must struggle to anticipate them. The advent 
of post-industrialism establishes planning as a dominant mode of 
decision-making. Branch comments on this development: 




behind the transformations of the environments om which we plan 
and many of the complex systems for which we plan. 
A third reason for studying planning presents us with a paradox. 
The creation and development of technology gives man an 
instrument for bringing nature more and more under his control, 
and thus liberates him from a rate of progress that is dictated 
by the processes of biological evolution. To be prosaic, we 
have created the capacity to be able, if we wish, to opt for ·· 
unnatural selection and survival of the unfittest when 
technology is added as man's tool in the man-nature nexus. The 
extent of the liberation thus made possible is that we are now 
able, as Gabor has put it, to 'invent the future' (Gabor: 1963). 
The capacities of our existing technology, (let alone that which 
we can safely expect to be developed within the next decade or 
so) are sufficient for us to be able, in principle, to design 
and implement a considerable range of utopias that contain and 
augment only the best, and eliminate the worst of our present 
life situations. How is it, then, that the future presents 
such a chaotic prospect? The paradox becomes thin when we take 
into account that the viability of an invented future depends 
upon it being premised on the existing state of affairs and 
incorporating details of the path to be taken in arriving there. 
Nevertheless, the radical increase in our capacity for inventing 
the future gives us another reason for wanting to better 
understand the process of invention. 
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Fourthly, the new salience of 'the quality of life' in 
conceptions of the public good, and its implicit challenge to 
economic growth as an end in itself and the over-riding aim of 
governments, coincides with a widening conception of the tasks 
of societal planning (Davis & Cherns: 1975). Whereas 
prescriptions for economic growth can be formulated by a 
relatively small coterie of wizards advising governments, the 
problems of improving the quality of life are less amenable to 
expertise, and the search for solutions calls for the 
involvement of larger and larger numbers of people. Past and 
continuing trends towards the urbanisation of larger proportions 
of the populations in industriai nations mean that the critical 
sphere in which these 'quality of life ... problems have to be 
confronted is the urban environment. 
We are already experiencing a growing concern with the quality 
of the urban environment as human habitat, and it seems 
reasonable to expect that in the coming decades the horizons of 
both publ:lc A.nd pr.i.·1ate pLrnni.ng will increasingly extend 
further beyond investment policy and budgetary control, 
encompassing other social goods besides affluence. The nature 
of the alternatives has been eloquently expressed by Galbraith: 
There is little real advantage in a handsome 
income for food, clothing, houseroom, 
furniture, alcohol and private entertainment 
in a city where one cannot move in the 
traffic, venture out safely at night, or 
plough through the accumulated trash. If 
the New York air continues to deteriorate, 
the freedom of those who inveigh against 
public outlays will be mostly available in 
the next world. 
(Galbraith, quoted in Healey: 1971) 
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The fitness of the environment and the quality of their primary 
social worlds are, for the masses of people, far more immediate 
and tangible issues than balance of payments deficits and growth 
rates. To the extent, therefore, that they replace 
'growthmania' as the priority of national and local governments, 
it may be anticipated that involvement in planning will become a 
more common experience. 
Finally, I note that sociology, and the social sciences in 
general, have given relatively little attention to planning as a 
characteristic form of human activity, nor to the future as a 
boundary to social life and a domain that urgently needs to be 
understood. Planners and planning organisations have been the 
subject of some empirical investigations, and the cover blurb to 
"Future Shock" notes that Alvin Toffler gave what must have been 
one of the first courses on 'the sociology of the future' at the 
New School for Social Research. Although there now appear to 
be more and more social scientists joining planning 
organisations, the claims of city planners in particular .that 
they have been rather poorly served by the social sciences seem 
justified. On.reading the city planning literature, I am 
struck by the frequency with which the works of Herbert Gans are 
cited. As one of the few sociologists who have made planning 
their main professional interest, his works are constantly 
appealed to as offering the imprimatur of the sociologist. 
That they are also a valuable contribution does not hide the 
fact that there are few others to which one can appeal. 
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Of the vast amount that has been written on 'social change', 
very little seems to have been designed in any way to influence 
it. In his detailed report on 'the sociologist and the study 
of the fut~re', Winthrop states that: 
Professionally it appears to be permissible 
to examine social change both currently and 
retrospectively. To move on time's arrow 
towards the future however, is to be guilty 
of constructing utopias ••• The irony in 
current developments in studies of the 
future is that some of the natural 
scientists and engineers working in this new 
area are less modest and are assuming the 
role of social philosophers - a role which 
the more cautious sociologist has thus far 
been willing to abdicate. 
(Winthrop: 1968:136) 
Wilbert Moore, who has himself made a considerable contribution 
to the literature of social change, devoted his 1966 
presidential address to the American Sociological Association to 
the topic of 'the utility of utopias', in which he put forward 
some reasons for the demise of the utopian tradition in 
sociology and urged that it again be brought to life. The 
factors militating against utopian thought in sociology and a 
more activist orientation to the future are the tendency t:o 
accept revolutionary models of social systems, in which change 
is a 'chance' phenomenon arising from interconnectedness; the 
adoption of a metaphysic which devalues the role of large-scale 
purposeful behaviour in society in bringing about social change 
through various types of planning; the negativism towards 
utopian thinking induced by Marxist ideology; and preoccupation 
with a closed system methodology for analysing relations among 
variables. On this last point he comments: 
Analysis of the relations among social 
phenomena by treating them as parts of a 
system does not intrinsically require that 
the system remain in a steady state. The 
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analysis is usually easier, however, if that 
assumption is made. Almost all of our 
analytical methods ••• are designed to extract 
more and more information about covariance. 
(Moore: 1966:766) 
Moore responds to his own question 'have we any obligations as 
social scientists to start taking account not only of the 
changeful quality of social life but also of the fact that some 
portion of that change is deliberate?', with the view that 
'sociologists have some scientific stake in forecasting and even 
in implementing the future that is hopefully better than the 
present'. There have been few signs of the profession taking 
him very seriously. While it is beyond dispute that studies of 
how societies ~ changed form an essential part of our 
understanding of the way society is now, it seems important that 
such understandings be geared more often to charting a course 
into the future. 
While it is in organisations that much of the novelty, 
innovation and change to which adjustment is required, and it is 
in organisations that some of the greatest strains are 
experienced in handling the new uncertainties that they foster, 
the 'sociology of organisations' has maintained an empirical and 
nomothetic stance, addressing itself to the 'facts' and sifting 
these for generalisations. This activity, too, has its uses, 
but what seems to be more urgent is for sociologists to engage 
in the burgeoning spheres of O.D., corporate planning, and 
programmes of industrial democracy, as catalysts for the 
processes of change as well as impartial observers of them. 
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The barriers to a greater engagement of the social sciences in 
the processes of societal planning and to enquiry into the shape 
of the future seem to be located in the guiding principles of 
value neutrality, and the veneration of 'data' and objectivity 
to which this principles is conducive. If, as many believe, 
the social sciences have an increasingly important role to play 
in regulating the transition towards post-industrialism, by 
devising strategies of change and accommodation, and by 
identifying and exposing the values that are more likely to 
permit the attainment of at least some of our chosen ends, it 
would seem to be essential that more room is found in their 
professional bodies and academic associations for value 
commitment and speculation, so that passionate beliefs and 
'really crazy ideas' are not lost to the search for solutions. 2 
The best knowledge of how organisations and larger social 
systems have changed up to now may be of limited value in coping 
with the type and scale of change that is to come, and it may 
become more necessary, from time to time, to abandon the 
methodological rigidities of value freedom and sticking to the 
facts if social science is to be of assistance in preparing us 
for the future. 
The Future as the Planner's Environment 
The principal difference between planning and other forms of 
adaptive social behaviour is that planning is specifically 
oriented to coping with uncertainties and opportunities 
affecting large social aggregates which are seen to lie not so 
much in the immediate as in the more distinct future. It is a 
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process of decision-making that is less concerned with finding 
solutions to immediate demands and hazards, than with working 
out before actions are required, what might constitute an 
appropriate response to emerging, or even possible, future 
states of affairs. It is, as Ackoff has said, a form of 
anticipatory decision-making - something done in advance of 
taking action (Ackoff: 1970a). Advance action of this sort 
becomes necessary whenever it is felt that the natural progress 
of events will not l~ad to the kind of future that is considered 
desirable - when it is realised that active intervention will be 
needed if unwanted outcomes are to be avoided and desired ones 
produced. The future thus constitutes a fundamental element of 
the realm in which planning takes place. Over and above the 
particular substantive areas in which they are engaged, all 
planners experience the future as part of the ground in which 
they operate, as a dimension of the environment to which their 
actions must be directively correlated. 
Although the traditional social science disciplines seem to have 
been slow in appreciating the need to address themselves to the 
future, both from the point of view of engaging in social 
forecasting on a scale comparable to that of technological 
forecasting and from the point of view of designing and 
promoting possible societal futures, this tardiness has, in 
part, been compensated for by the remarkable development of 
futurology as a new domain of interest. Largely because of the 
speed with which it has appeared on the scene, but also perhaps, 
on account of its apparent disrespect for some of the 
traditional methodological canons of the empirical sciences, 
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futurology and its practitioners are still regarded with some 
curiosity and suspicion. It is, nevertheless, well into the 
process of becoming institutionalised: 
There is a comprehensive literature dealing 
with the issues of prediction, longe-range 
forecasting, and 'inventing the future'. A 
variety of conferences and publications can 
be enumerated. There are plans for futures 
institutions, lookout institutions, and so 
on. It can be said that in most 
industralial countries the problem discussed 
is no longer the right of existence of 
futures research but rather the problem of 
its usefulness, its limits and its 
organisation. Futures research is not 
primarily a methodologically fashionable 
phenomenon; it is symptomatic of the stage 
of development we have reached today. 
(Lompe: 1968:48) 
A stream of important contributions to the development of future 
studies in the earlier years of the decade culminated in a 
'vintage' year in 1967. Erich Jantsch produced the 'bible' of 
technological forecasting, "Technological forecasting in 
perspective", and Bertrand de Jouvenel, his influential book, 
"The art of conjecture". It was also the year in which Kahn 
and Wiener's massive study, "The year 2000: a framework for 
speculation on the next 33 years" appeared, and the work of the 
Commission on the Year 2000, "Toward the Year 2000" was 
published in Daedalus. 3 
Of the institutions specialising in futures research, 
Washington's Resources for the Future, Inc., established in 1952 
with the co-operation of the Ford Foundation, was one of the 
earliest. Others to appear since then include the World 
Resources Inventory under the guidance and inspiration of 
Buckminster Fuller and John McHale, established in 1963; The 
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Social Sciences Research Council's Committee on the Next Thirtz 
Years in London; de Jouvenel's Futuribles organisation in Paris 
(1967); the Institute for Futures Research in Berlin, headed by 
Robert Jungk.; and the Commission on the Year 2000, already 
referred to, which was chaired by Daniel Bell. Two of the new 
institutions are now producing journals. The World Future 
Society, established in Washington in 1966, publishes "The 
Futurist: A newsletter for tomorrow's world", and the Institute 
for the Future, founded in 1968, with its headquarters in 
Middletown, Connecticut, publishes "Futures". 
My present remarks on the future as an element of the planner's 
environment are not intended to contribute to this body of 
investigation either in the way of further forecasts, 
projections or scenarios, or by examining methodological 
problems of prediction, but they are influenced by the sorts of 
issues that futurology has raised, and more particularly by the 
new perspective on the future that it propounds. 
Webber has suggested that the transition from pre~industrial to 
industrial, and the current transition from indu-strial to 
post-industrial society has been accompanied by a shift in 
societal conceptions of the future from a fatalistic to an 
extrapolative, and now to a 'teleological' attitude. For 
pre-industrial man, the future is likely to be outside his field 
of vision, and even more likely to be out of his control, so 
that there is a general tendency in the direction of fatalism 
with regard to the material future. Under industrialisation, 
the managerial shaping of institutions, forward scheduling of 
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· production, the estimation of budgets and investment, population 
forecasting, and the development of actuarial skills in general, 
contributed to a conception of the future as being more or less 
like the past - a continuation of present trends, such that it 
was, at least, in part accessible to reason through processes of 
projection and extrapolation. Indeed, the entire market and 
credit system was premised on the assumption that the future 
would not depart at all radically from the present. 
Post-industrialism is again revolutionising our concept of the 
future: 
•••.• among the consequences of the knowledge 
explosion is the emergence of a new way of 
thinking about the future. That conception 
is the derivative of our new capacities for 
prediction, our new images of our powers for 
controlling future events and, hence, a new 
outlook suggesting that, to a considerable 
degree, maybe we really can invent the 
future. 
If we can characterise a single 
distinguishing difference between the 
outlooks of the industrial age and of the 
post-industrial age it is this: that 
industry and government in the recent past 
had to respond to change after the fact: in 
the post-industrial age they will be 
intellectually equipped to respond before. 
That is to say, that the coming style for 
contronting the future will be forecasting 
and planning. 
(Webber: 1968:180-181) 
The future is now being seen to depart drastically from the 
present, but we are developing powerful new response 
capabilities that will permit us more directly to seek to design 
the future, rather than accepting it fatalistically, or trying 
to predict and merely accommodate to change as best we can. 
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The widespread internalisation of this 'teleological' concept of 
the future is an enabling condition for the parts of the social 
field to adapt actively to the world they live in on a large 
scale. As I have noted in discussing the concept of 
adaptation, this requires that purposeful systems be able to 
incorporate some image of the future, in the form of desired 
outcomes or focal conditions, into their present state. In 
understanding the causal strands that connect purposeful 
behaviours with future states of the system that they comprise, 
it must be appreciated that the openness of systems refers not 
only to the spatial distribution of their parts, but also to 
their temporal distribution - the 'incompleteness' of an open 
system has a processual as well as a structural dimension. A 
living system is not to be considered simply as a spatial 
conglomeration but also as a temporal spread in which the degree 
of autonomous and heteronomous regulation, and the degree of 
'openness' or 'badness' of the system gestalt may fluctuate over 
time. One of the attributes of consciousness is that it makes 
possible the anticipation of future system states, which is an 
essential preliminary to the prevention of dysfunction and the 
creation of more benign system states and of higher levels of 
adaptation. 
A given social ecology is an existential phenomenon - a 
veridical texture of objects, events and situations with which 
any planning system must interact in the present. The 
'distinctive competence' of an empirical sociology is its 
ability to describe and interpret these complex patterns of 





activity lies in the fact that it is not addressed directly to 
this contemporaneous reality, but to a perceived hiatus between 
the existing state of affairs and an image, or 'wishful 
projection' of a state of affairs that is considered, on certain 
criteria, to be more desirable. More correctly, planning is a 
response to a perceived disparity between a state of affairs 
that is believed will exist if nothing is done, and the desired 
future. Planning is not usually considered necessary if it is 
expected that the forces operating in the present will, of 
themselves, bring about a future that is considered desirable. 
As I have already noted, the gap between socially desirable 
futures, and conditions which can be expected to occur if 
nothing is done, is likely to be greatly enlarged under the 
impact of turbulence. 
It is essentially this future orientation that makes planning 
one of the most difficult intellectual activities in which men 
can engage. The future is an entirely hypothetical realm. 
Certain possibilities and probabilities can be produced by 
forecasters and futurologists, in a similar way that historians 
and archaeologists can offer us probabilistic accounts of the 
past, but there is nothing in the vast edifice of scientific 
knowledge that lends conviction to our anticipations of what is 
to come. This fundamental uncertainty of the future, combined 
with our dismally limited understanding of the dynamics of 
social existence, conspire to.plague the planner's world with 
continuous and immense challenges to his problem-solving 
capabilities, and helps to account for the modesty of much that 
is achieved. 
200 
The future becomes an integral part of the behavioural 
environment to the extent that it is transposed to, and 
incorporated, in the present. In fact, as I have suggested, 
the planner attempts to transpose two future into his present; a 
realistic and a wishful projection of the future state of the 
system. The former corresponds to what can be expected to 
occur 'naturally', and the latter to the desired future. 
Our skills in constructing realistic projections have been 
increasing enormously over the past two decades, and their 
significance is gaining recognition in the establishment of 
specialised institutions, the emergence of expertise and 
professionalism, and the body of literature that is expanding at 
a phenomenal rate. As one would expect, a far greater level of 
competence has been attained in the forecasting of the gross 
quantitative changes that can be expected than in predicting the 
sort of qualitative changes in values, attitudes, beliefs and 
life styles that are likely, and upon which many of the 
quantitative changes are dependent. It is far easier to 
extrapolate from the present rates of car ownership to a figure 
for the year two thousand, than it is to judge whether a society 
will be prepared to ban private vehicles in cities and invest 
instead in large scale mass-transi·t systems. 
A second major difficulty in societal forecasting derives from 
the pervasive uncertainty that adheres to a number of 
meta-problems which have a potential for totally altering the 
basic structural configurations upon which any methodology of 
prediction must be.based. The concept of meta-problem has been 
put forward by Chevalier, who writes: 
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Society has come more and more to perceive 
and articulate a new kind of problem. It 
is not only a matter of putting related 
problems together: new knowledge and 
expectations have caused a fusion, an 
· inter-relation of problems into a class of 
meta-problems. And society, once having 
perceived a meta-problem, begins also to 
perceive that courses of action to relieve 
it are inter-related. In fact some 
comprehensive attack is now the only 
strategy acceptable to society. 
(Chevalier, quoted by Emery and Trist: 
1972: 123) 
For the 'global village', such problems as racial confrontation, 
the population explosion, nuclear diplomacy, and the violation 
of the ecosystem, have this quality, and unexpected developments 
in any such area could entirely vitiate most of our assiduously 
accumulated projections and forecasts in other spheres. 
The basic difficulty in constructing realistic projections lies 
in determining some basis for identifying.those phenomena in the 
present which are likely to have a determining influence over 
the shape of the future. The problems of constructing a 
wishful projection are, perhaps, equally great, but of a quite 
different sort. They relate primarily to the difficulties of 
choosing and designing objectives which will meet a very wide 
diversity of needs and aspirations. Before any wishful 
projection can be translated into programmes of action, some 
mechanism is needed for the reconciliation of multiple 
interests. 
The problems associated with securing a sufficient degree of 
agreement concerning the objectives of action raise fundamental 
questions about the role of the planner and the degree to which 
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he should be involved in the processes of power and influence 
that in democratic societies, ultimately determine the 
implementation or abandonment of plans. The problems of the 
democratisation of planning will be discussed later. My 
immediate interest is in the future as environment, and, 
specifically, in the properties of objectives or desired 
outcomes as 'field forces' acting on the planning system in the 
present. One answer to the problem of how imagined future 
states of affairs, such as the objectives espoused by planners, 
enters into the contemporaneous behavioural environment, has 
been put forward by Lewin. 
I have already had occasion to ref er to his concept of 
'contemporaneous causation' in discussing the meaning of the 
life space. He writes: 
This thesis is a direct consequence of the 
principle that only what exists concretely 
can have effects. Since neither the past 
nor the future exists at the present moment 
it cannot have affects at the present. In 
representing the life space therefore we 
take into account only what is contemporary. 
(Lewin: 1936:34-5) 
How then are we to explain the evidence of our senses that the 
possible outcomes of the things that we and others are doing now 
lie in the future, and yet that they do exert a constraint on 
the way we behave in the present? 
The following consideration offers a 
solution to this dilemma. The goal as a 
psychological fact undoubtedly lies in the 
present. It really exists at the moment 
and makes up an essential part of the 
momentary life space. On the other hand 
the 'content' of the goal ••• lies as a 
physical or social fact in the future. 
Indeed it may not occur at all. The nature 
of the expectation and the character of what 
is expected, in so far as they act as 
---- --------- ---------------------------------~ 
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psychological conditions at the moment, 
naturally do not depend upon whether or not 
the event comes to pass. In either case 
the person strives toward a goal which 
exists psychologically in the present life 
space ••• 
••• Nevertheless, the content is in no way 
irrelevant, but is of greatest importance 
for psychological dynamics. Whether, for 
instance, an actual goal refers to a present 
or a future event, whether this event is 
thought of as something that definitely 
exists, or is something that is only 
possible or highly probable - all this forms 
an essential characteristic of a goal. 
(Lewin: 1936:37-8) 
A great deal of confusion and misdirected effort has occured, 
both in psychology, and sociology from the inability to see 
goals as relations between systems and certain parts of their 
environments, and the tendency instead to reify them, conceiving 
them as 'things' which can be striven ~or and attained once and 
for all. The goal-seeking behaviours of rats have been taken 
as the paradigm of rational behaviour. Studies of motivation 
and of organisational behaviour, in particular, have been 
handicapped by the concept of the 'purpose-ridden' system, that 
has had to be invented to do justice to the notion of goals as 
things: 
The purpose-ridden man's only 'rational' 
activity is to seek goals: but since each 
goal is attained once for all, it disappears 
on attainment, leaving him 'purposeless' and 
incapable of rational activity unless and 
until he finds another. 'Satisfaction' is 
impossible to purpose-ridden man or at least 
forms no part of his rational activity. He 
is allowed only a momentary 'relief from 
tension'. 
(Vickers: 1965:32-3) 
In contrast to this concept, Vickers proposes that the main 
energies in purposeful behaviour are, in fact, taken up with 
establishing and maintaining relationships, which he calls 
'norm-holding', with various parts of the environment. 
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The goals we seek are changes in our 
relations or in our opportunities for 
relating; but the bulk of our activity 
consists in the 'relating' itself. To 
explain all human behaviour in terms of 
'goal-seeking', though good enough for the 
behaviour of hungry rats in mazes, raises 
insoluble pseudo-conflicts between means and 
ends ••• and leave the most important aspects 
of our activities, the ongoing maintenance 
of our ongoing activities and their 
satisfactions, hanging in the air as a 
psychological anomaly called 'action done 
for its own sake'. 
(Vickers: 1965:33) 
Conceptualising planning as a process of anticipatory 
decision-making which includes the setting of objectives 
requires that the relevant environment for planning includes 
various aspects or dimensions of the future. Their 
psychological potency (not their actual 'content') is brought 
into the present as temporal gestalten which overlap the 'real' 
present and which enter into the contemporaneous determination 
of behaviours. The special significance of the future in the 
environment of planners cannot be appreciated, therefore, if the 
future is simply regarded as the focus .of planning goals, which 
like battlefield targets can be defined in various ways and 
'fired at' from various angles and distances. Planning's 
concern is with acting in the present so as to ensure that our 
social systems will be able to relate to future environments so 
as to enhance (or at least to maintain) the present 
effectiveness of our purposive behaviours. The planner's task 
is conceiving and designing alternative possible relationships 
among the parts of the social field and the non--social 
environment, based on an understanding of the dangers and the 
opportunities in the future that can, with foresight, be avoided 
or exploited. 
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The difficulties of working out in advance the ways in which 
present organisational arrangements (which are themselves 
constantly changing) can effectively relate themselves to future 
states of the environment (which can rarely be adequately known) 
are subject to some variation, according to the velocity at 
which the future is seen to be approaching, and to the degrees 
of certainty or uncertainty that attach to the anticipations and 
conjectures constructed. In the first place, when .it is 
believed that the future is, ·to a degree, 'knowable', variances 
believed to be latent in the future which are relevant to the 
effectiveness of the system may be perceived as more or less 
immediate or distant - as urgent, or as no cause for any 
immediate concern or action. The perceived distance of 
relevant aspects of the future is, of course, closely bound up 
with the speed with which the future is seen to be approaching. 
I am aware of the dangers of 'misplaced concreteness', but there 
does seem to be some phenomenological basis for ascribing to the 
future certain heteronomous properties, and particularly its own 
dynamic. The uneven development of societies means that 
futures are being created in relatively limited and isolated 
spaces, at the vanguard of technological and social innovation. 
Some aspects of the life styles into which we can expect to be 
moving are already present in our midst, or, as Jungk has put 
it, "Tomorrow is already here." (Jungk: 1954). This is 
reflected in the now widespread appreciation that the 
discontinuity between science fiction and 'science fact' has 
been steadily eroded, to the point that we can often no longer 
be sure that even the more incredible postulates of science 
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fiction are not the objects of systematic laboratory exploration 
somewhere in the world. For large parts of the social field, 
out of touch with the cutting edge of technical innovation, the 
'discovery' of many of the advances that have already been 
achieved has the effect of telescoping their expectations and 
delivering the future into the present. 
It is equally true, of course, that in the same sense pockets of 
the past survive in the present, and it is a characteristic of 
our times to want to slow down the rate at which the past 
recedes by diligently preserving and amplifying its material 
manifestations and our powers of recollection. Planning's 
concern must be with the rate of arrival of the future, and the 
creation of roles and institutions that are sufficiently 
responsive and adaptable to cope with the scale of change ·that 
is coming. The titles of a number of recent publications are 
indicative of a growing awareness that we now stand in .some 
danger of being overtaken by the future: "The unprepared 
society: planning for a precarious future", (Michael: 1968), 
"Future Shock", (Tofler: 1970), "The Urgent Future", (Mayer: 
1967), "The Temporary Society", (Bennis and Slater: 1968), "The 
Age of Discontinuity", (Drucker: 1968). 
very considerably extendeq .• 
Such a list could be 
The scope for a more positive approach to the unfolding of the 
future seems to lie in the extent to which we are able to 
impress our own fame upon it, in planning and programming our 
activities at a pace that takes account of men's finite adaptive 
capabilities, and corresponds to a rate of learning attainable 
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over an extended social field. In this regard, some 
distinctions, such as those proposed by Vickers (1965) and 
Ackoff (1970a) between goals, objectives and ideals, may be 
indispensible: 
Goals are objectives whose attainment is 
desired by a specified time within the 
period covered by the plan ••• Objectives may 
be unattainable within the planning period, 
but they must be approachable within it ••• 
Goals must be attainable within the planning 
period, but need not necessarily be 
attained. An objective which can never be 
attained but which can be approached without 
limit is called an ideal. 
(Ackoff: 1970a:23-4) 
Ordering the aspirations of an individual or a social system 
into categories of this sort has the effect of imposing a 
morphology on the future which offers a system of reference 
points for the mounting of·effort and a criterion for 
discriminating the order in which different courses of action 
need to be undertaken. 
The frequently-made distinction between tactical and strategic 
planning can perform a similar function as an ordering device 
for partitioning the relevant future to make possible some 
separation of planning tasks and appropriate· allocation of 
resources. Ackoff has pointed out that the distinction between 
tactical and strategic planning is relative rather than 
absolute, and is, in fact, three-dimensional. In any particular 
planning operation, these dimensions are the time span over 
which it has effects and the difficulty of reversal; the scope 
of the plan, or the number of functions and activities affected 
by it; and the extent to which it is concerned with the 
selection of means as opposed to the selection of objectives 
(Ackoff: 1970a:4-5). 
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A related aspect of developments and events that are thought to 
lie in the future is the degree to which they are foreseeable. 4 
Because a behavioural system and its field correspond to a 
dimensional domain in space and time, one consequence of 
anticipation and expectation is to extend the system's relevant 
environment into the future. It is then possible for the 
overall structure of probabilities associated with the emergence 
of favourable and unfavourable sets of circumstances in the 
future to be interpreted in the classification of environmental 
causal textures that are used to describe the geo-behavioural 
environment: 
1. As a theoretical limiting case, we can envisage situations 
in which the future is regarded as entirely irrelevant, when 
it is felt for example, that 'nothing could happen which 
would make any difference'. For individuals, this 
corresponds to the condition of living entirely for the 
present, a state that may be associated either with pure 
despair (as sometimes with reaction to a bereavement), or 
with pure hedonism. The locus of significance with regard 
to what might happen in the future is felt to lie entirely 
within the individual (111 ). 
The sense in which this constitutes a limiting case is quite 
evident. There is usually bound to be some event of 
potential significance to the individual, with a probability 
of occurrence that injects at least a minimal degree of 
relevance into the future prospect, and of course there is 
no meaning to a concept of 'life' that restricts its 
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significance entirely to the present. Perhaps the closest 
we mortals may approach to a future without relevance is in 
the apprehension of imminent death. On one interpretation, 
at least, it is profound human distaste for such a 
contemplation that has inspired doctrines of immortality. 
In real life, social collectivities and organisations are 
even less likely to see their futures in such terms. One of 
the well-known synergistic effects of group experience is to 
make confrontations with the unknown tolerable, in a way· 
that an individual cannot usually achieve by his resources 
alone. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that groups and organisations, 
as well as individuals, find no relevance to themselves in 
the future, it is improbable that any planning or other 
purposeful activity will be undertaken. 
2. At the next level, some significant variability is believed 
to lie in the future, but significance is ascribed only to 
those variations which it is believed will emanate from the 
system itself. (111 and 1 12 relations are relevant). When 
this is the case, knowledge of the future is likely to be 
characterised by a feeling of certainty - all the 
significant things that are going to happen will be the 
result of what the system itself does, or the development of 
processes already latent in the system or its environment. 
In an environment which is clustered but still placid, the 
clustering itself offers no threats or promises for the 
210 
future which cannot be apprehended in the present. If this 
were not so, we would be considering a higher level of 
causal texturing. 
Certainty about the nature and the location of environmental 
relevancies which are yet to happen, can, of course, be only 
relative and never an absolute quality. In this context I 
am referring to certainty relative to the degrees of 
uncertainty and ignorance that are descriptive of the more 
complex levels, and in contrast to the limiting case of 
irrelevance, when all possible relevancies are randomised. 
This level seems to correspond to the environments that are 
relevant in the medical prognosis of some of the simpler 
diseases. Diagnosis of the symptoms allows an accurate 
prediction of the career of the illness to be made and 
enables the physician to act with a degree of commitment in 
the application of a remedy. In organised social systems 
routinisation is the pervasive mechanism whereby a degree of 
certainty is imposed on the future, the classic case being 
that of bureaucracy, as described by Weber. The essence of 
bureaucracy is predictability, and the safeguard of 
predictability is routinisation - the reduction of behaviour 
to repetitive cycles of action, carefully programmed and 
controlled. Thus the Director of Education in Napoleon's 
France could look at his watch and tell what subject every 
child in every French school was studying. For children at 
school and workers in factories the shape of the future 
tends to a high degree to be mapped out, artd to justify 
feelings of certainty with respect to its unfolding. 
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With regard to those aspects of the future about which we 
can be certain, we can carry out col)lillitment planning, of 
which routinisation itself is one of the commonest tools. 
When activities are continuously programmed and repetitive, 
forward scheduling of production and estimates of budgets 
can be carried out with a high degree of exactitude. 
Clearly it is not environments of this type that pose the 
re~l problems for planning. If community planners have any 
opportunity to operate in such favourable circumstances, it 
is in the planning of new towns and new communities where 
they have extensive control from the beginning, and not the 
more typical circumstances under which they operate in the 
established city and the metropolis. It is in environments 
of this amount of predictability that an 'optimising' 
philosophy of planning is most likely to be successful. 
3. The next step brings me to futures whose dominant 
characteristic is uncertainty. These are futures in which 
it is understood that important variances may occur, which 
originate in changes happening in other parts of the field 
with which the system is linked in some way. In other 
words, the planner has to confront the probability of 
relevant changes occurring in the future as a result of the 
behaviours of others. The possible future behaviours of 
parts of the field to which the system is directly linked, 
and with which it has some established relations can usually 
be inferred or intuited from a knowledge of their past 
behaviours and an understanding of their structural and 
other relevant properties. This means that futures, 
:.·· 
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although they cannot be approached with certainty, can be 
approached probabilistically or 'stochastically'. The 
important difference from the previous levels is that (1
21
) 
relations nbw enter into future determination, in addition 
Environments of which our knowledge is uncertain provide an 
essential part of the settings for such institutionalised 
activities as insurance, gambling, and competitive sport. 
The provision of insurance and the rates of premium attached 
to it is directly related to the discernable probabilities 
of certain events happening in the future, and is only 
required insofar as some threats to system maintenance or 
development can be anticipated. Similarly with gambling. 
When outcomes in a game of chance are certain, everyone 
could be expected to gamble, but there would be no-one 
willing to take their bets; in situations in which we are 
quite ignorant about outcomes, it is unlikely that anyone 
would want to gamble. Competitive sport loses much of its 
appeal when one side has such an overwhelming superiority 
that the result is a foregone conclusion, or when we can 
have no expectations about the achievement of a result. 5 
The kind of planning required in environments of this sort 
is contingency planning. Of this sort of planning Ackoff 
writes: 
Contingency planning is old hat in the 
military but is relatively rare in business. 
In planning for a military invasion, for 
example, consideration is always given to 
each possible outcome of an operation and 
plans are made for each. Military planners 
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do not wait to see what happens before 
planning what to do about it. They try to 
cover every possibility in advance, because 
time is 'of the-essence' once a possibility 
has become a reality. 
(Ackoff: 1970a:17) 
Contingency planning involves the maintenance of a level of 
preparedness with respect to developments thought possible 
or likely and a readiness to shift resources or change 
direction so as to be able to avoid or exploit new 
situations as they occur. Uncertainty of this order is 
descriptive of the typical planning environments of business 
enterprises in industrial society and of battlefield 
planning in warfare restricted to what are now known as 
'conventional' weapons. It corresponds also to the sorts of 
environment confronting planners in established communities, 
in which significant uncertainty is created by the existence 
of other formal organisations and interest groups charting 
their own preferred courses into the future. 
4. The fourth level corresponds with the dynamics of the 
turbulent field. In relation to the predictability of the 
future, the essential novelty for planning at this level is 
having to face the fact that sources of relevant variability 
can be expected to lie outside the set of relations about 
which the system has at least 'probabilistic' knowledge and 
an adequate set of prognostic skills. In other words, the 
relation of the system to its future is, in critical 
respects, one of ignorance - there is no apparent way of 
telling what might happen. As I have argued earlier, this 
corresponds to the state of affairs in which the 'ground' or 
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the field within which the connected systems· are acting 
itself takes on dynamic properties. Systems of relations 
that lie entirely within the environment become 
determinative of the survival of individual systems and the 
character of the interactions that take place. Ignorance is 
thus equated with the high salience of (L
22
) relations in 
determining the shape of the future. 
Ignorance of the future has quite different implications to 
a conception of the future as irrelevant, because it 
suggests that what ought to be known is not, and possibly 
cannot be known. I have argued throughout (adducing support 
from a number of different sources) that this level of 
unpredictability is becoming more typical in the rapidly 
changing social fields of those societies which are moving 
towards post-industrialism. For the city planner, this 
order of unpredictability has become pervasive with the 
onset over the past few decades of the 'metropolitan 
crisis'. The present distresses and disorders in many of 
the largest urban conglomerations deserve the name crisis 
partly because planners have not been able to cope with such 
a degree of unpredictability within the system as a wh-0le. · 
It is in conjunction with such fields that Ackoff recognised 
the need for an 'adaptivising' philosophy of planning, and 
has advocated responsiveness planning for corporations: 
Such planning is directed toward designing 
an organization and a system for managing it 
that can quickly detect deviations from the 
expected and respond to them effectively. 
Hence, responsiveness planning consists of 




.5. For the sake of completeness, but at some risk of 
'over-intuiting' I suggest that insofar as the future takes 
on a vortical appearance then it again becomes irrelevant to 
the system. The feeling that one is entirely at the mercy 
of what is to come, tends to make any concern for its actual 
content and course of development superfluous. The 
ascription of irrelevance in this case, however, derives 
from the sensation that the forces shaping the relevant 
future are entirely heteronomous, and beyond any possible 
intervention by the system itself that would make any 
difference. The (122 ) relations are perceived as entirely 
determinative of the future states that will affect the 
system. At the first level I considered, the future states 
of the system are felt to be subject only to autonomous 
determination - everything outside the system itself being 
irrelevant to its future (i.e. only (111 ) relations are 
relevant). 
Naturally the 'real' futures that we confront as individuals 
and those that are faced by institutions and organisations 
are complicated mixtures of these abstracted models. Much 
of the future will continue to lie beyond our capacities to 
influence it; other parts of it we can expect to be able to 
invent and plan. Some of its aspects we shall always have 
to approach with the attitude of the gambler. In his 
illuminating conjectures on 'planning beyond the industrial 
age', Webber writes: 
Our continuing intellectual problem will be 
to know when it is more useful to view the 
future deterministically, when it is best to 
view it stochastically (and hence as 
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indeterminate), and when we can profitably 
view it teleologically. That question is 
likely to take on the character of an 
intellectual dilemma. In a setting of rapid 
technological and social change, the 
possibilities for 'accurate' prediction 
would seem to decline. But with improving 
predictive theory, we should also be able 
more sensitively to anticipate coming 
changes. And with increasing organisational 
capacities for large-scale decision and 
action, we should be able deliberately to 
shape more of the future than was once 
possible. No formula is available for 
resolving these competing views. It may be 
that the conceptual, methodological and 
governmental issues that surround these 
images will continue to occupy us as we are 
carried along into the coming decades. 
(Webber: 1968:182-3) 
Planning: The.Active Adaptations of Purposeful Systems 
Planning has been described as a means whereby aggregates can 
adapt themselves to changing environmental circumstances when 
these become characterised by certain degrees of uncertainty and 
unpredictability. It is a process of anticipatory 
decision-making which is directed to the production of future 
states of affairs that are considered to be desirable, but which 
could not be expected to occur naturally, without active 
intervention. In environments that are relatively unchanging, 
or when it is felt that existing states of affairs could not be 
improved upon, it is unlikely that planning activity will become 
prevalent. 
In order to test the usefulness of the systems concepts 
developed in the first part for gaining a better understanding 
of planning, it is now necessary to consider more closely what 
is to be understood by that term. In conformity with the 
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contextualist thought-mode this will be done by amplifying the 
connotations of planning rather than trying to specify its 
meaning definitionally. Planning is to be understood initially 
as a particular form of human and social activity - a purposive 
human activity that is directed towards influencing the future 
state of some system of ideas, actions, events, objects. It 
becomes necessary to show in what ways it is a distinctive form 
of activity - how planning behaviour differs from other forms of 
behaviour, and what kinds of effects it has in society. 
In its most general sense, planning is a ubiquitous activity, in 
that all deliberate actions, to some.extent, take account of the 
value implications of choice, consider the opportunity cost of 
alternatives foregone and attempt to relate means to ends 
according to some criterion of 'efficiency'. These steps are 
not necessarily taken self-consciously, and it is possible, of 
course, for plans to be conceived which have no possibility of 
ever beirig translated into action. The prisoner's deliberations 
over the perfect escape, day-dreamers spinning images of their 
paradise on earth, and the gambler optimistically planning his 
orgy of consumption would be examples. When I speak of the 
planning that is carried out by armies, corporations, town 
planners and the like, I mean to imply more than idle 
conjecture. Planning in this context implies the design not 
ouly of a desired future but also of effective ways of bringing 
it about. These 'realistic' or feasible plans differ from those 
of the day-dreamer to the extent that they attempt not only to. 
define the objectives of planning, but also to enumerate the 
appropriate means - resources and courses of action which are 
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both available and which are calculated to be effective in 
bringing about the desired objectives. The differences between 
effective planning and day-dreaming seem to be diferences of 
degree rather than differences of kind. When the best laid 
plans of men do not fulfil expectations, it is often because the 
required means prove to be unobtainable (funds, information, 
expertise, public support) or because they prove to be less 
effective than the plan had anticipated. (The advertising 
campaign for Ford's Edsel would be a classic example). 
A further distinguishing characteristic is that planning is 
required only when the decision-maker is confronted with a set 
of decisions that are too large to handle all at once and that 
cannot be !livided into independent subsets. This is one of the 
central elements of the definition of planning put forward by 
Ackoff: 
Planning is required when the future state 
that we desire involves a set of 
interdependent decisions; that is, a system 
of decisions. A set of decisions forms a 
system if the effect of each decision in the 
set on the relevant outcome depends on at 
least one other decision in the set. Some of 
the decisions in the set may be complex, 
others simple. But the principal complexity 
in planning derives from the 
inter-relatedness of the decisions rather 
than from the decisions themselves. 
(Ackoff: 1970a:2-3) 
To the extent that a set of decisions can be handled all at 
once, or can be broken down into subsets that can be handled 
separately, it constitutes a decision-making or programming 
situation, and not a planning situation. When the set is too 
large to handle all at once, it must be divided into a series of 
stages which are dealt with sequentially, or partitioned among a 
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number of decision-making bodies that can work 'in parallel'. 
The difference between planning and simple decision-making is, 
therefore, a difference of degree. Planning embraces a more or 
less complex system of decisions, in which present decisions are 
made in the light of those already taken and earlier decisions 
are constantly reviewed in the light of new requirements. 
Planning is purposeful, involving the choice of appropriate 
means as well as the choice of goals and objectives. For a 
system to be able to choose a desired future and to be able to 
modify it when circumstances change it must have the properties 
of a purposeful system. It must be able to reconsider and 
modify its objectives under constant environmental conditions, 
and to go on pursuing a particular end within certain limits of 
environmental variation. Functional and goal-directed systems, 
lacking these capabilities, are unable to.use planning as an 
adaptive mechanism. Machines may help human planners, but they 
cannot replace them. 
Individuals and the institutional structures which they comprise 
do have the capacity to plan. At a societal level, one can 
usually identify a collection of government departments, 
statutory authorities, and other large formal organisations that 
have responsibility for the development of particular regions or 
development of limited facets of societal resources such as 
manpower, technology, transportation, trade, agriculture, 
health, and the like. Similarly, within cities responsibiity 
(_ 
for the provision and the enhancement of resources, amenities 
and opportunities for the citizens is usually functionally 
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divided among a considerable number of specialised agencies. 
The extent to which the planning responsibilities of these 
various agencies are subordinated to one overall planning 
authority naturally varies immensely from society to society, 
and from city to city. 
Purposefulness, as opposed to merely goal-directed behaviour, is 
a critical capability of such agencies because of their need to 
adapt to an uncertain and changing environment. This may mean 
sustaining a particular organisational effort in spite of a 
radically altered situation, or reformulating the organisational 
mission at a time when the social context is relatively 
unchanging. It is, however, perhaps more typical to observe 
organisations reconsidering their goals only in response to some 
manifest dysfunction or crisis. 6 
The significance of purposiveness to planning activity may be 
made more evident by considering a nonpurposeful mode of 
'planning', which, as one might expect, is typically better 
known for its failures than its successes. We can think of it 
as 'target planning' and it is essentially a goal-directed 
activity. 
It begins with the formulation of a comprehensive and systematic 
specification of the state of affairs that is to be aimed at -
the target - and prescribing the time schedule for attaining 
this goal. Thus in many of the five-year or ten-year development 
plans for under-developed societies, the goals are set once and 
for all at the commencement of the planning period. Similarly 
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with the galaxies of Master Plans that have been drawn up to 
guide the progress of communities. Civic authorities in many 
parts of the world have optimistically sought to improve the 
common good through the construction of comprehensive land-use 
and transportation maps which purport to describe the state of 
the community at the end of a 15 or 20 year period of 'planned 
development'. 
The reasons for the failure of such development plans and Master 
Plans to reach fruition are not, of course, always simple, but 
in many respects they seem to derive principally from the 
adoption of inflexible objectives which cannot take account of 
events and situations emerging during the planning period which 
challenge the feasiblity of the original targets. It may often 
be the case in practice that 'plans' of this sort are not 
intended to be realistic in their promises, but are d_esigned to 
serve shorter run political ends. 
To describe planning as a process of active adaptation is a 
corollary to the proposition that a planner must be at least a 
purposeful system. Planning is more than simply reacting to 
changes in the environment (passive adaptation), or responding 
to changed circumstances in either the system itself or in the 
environment (directive correlation); it involves active 
interventions that will create the starting conditions for 
further adaptive behaviours. As I have shown, the process of 
active adaptation embraces a connected series of directive 
correlations in which the earlier system actions and the 
outcomes that they produce constitute successive steps towards 
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the realisation of objectives. We tend to speak of planning 
when such sequences of directively correlated behaviours are 
deliberately structured at the outset in order to increase the 
probability that the desired outcome(s) will be produced (i.e. 
things are not left to chance); and the effectiveness with which 
it is produced. 
In such planned sequences it is usuqlly possible to identify a 
number of constituent parts of the planning process itself. 
Ackoff, for example, has identified five such parts: the 
setting of objectives, the determination of means (courses of 
action, practices, procedures, programmes and policies), the 
acquisition of resources, the design of implementation 
procedures, and of a feedback or control system for evaluating 
performance. (Ackoff: 1970a:6). Thus, to take an Australian 
example, the National Capital Development Commission upon 
assuming responsibility for the planning of Canberra, the 
Australian capital, in 1958, announced as its immediate tasks: 
"1. To survey problems and needs and fix 
both short term and long term 
objectives. 
2. To produce a revised town plan. 
3. To establish the resources available, 
both government and private enterprise, 
and the roles for each. 
4 •. To prepare a programme which relates 
what needs to be done to the 
instruments, physical resources and 
funds available. 
5. To make the programme work." 
(NCDC Annual Report: 1958) 
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Such parts of the planning process are not to be thought of as 
essential or invariant stages in a linear causal train, 
commencing with the unambiguous specification of goals and 
concluding with the selection and implementation of the 'best' 
course of action for achieving them, but are better understood 
as constituting a system in themselves. As such they are in 
interaction with one another throughout the planning activity, 
each subject to variations in the impact they have at each stage 
on the total process. As the relations between those parts 
themselves may be quite complex and unstable, it is usually 
necessary for planning itself to be planned. 
A man lighting a fire in order to be able to cook is an instance 
of purposefulness and active adaptation. The present area of 
interest, however, is limited to those deliberate actions which 
are directed towards the state of large-scale social systems 
society and its major sub-systems - and is not particularly 
concerned with the active adaptations of individuals. 
Friedman, in referring to this kind of activity as 'social 
action', directs attention to planning as a socio-cultural 
force, as well as an activity that needs to be understood on the 
bio-psychological level (Friedman: 1969). Societal action is 
inevitably tied up with the distribution of such field forces as 
power, knowledge, values and material resources within the 
social field as a whole, and is therefore unavoidably concerned 
with its operative political and ideological systems. It 
therefore tends to reflect and to perpetuate the prevailing 
zeitgeist even though this may seldom be a conscious aim. 
224 
The importance of this link tends to be revealed only at those 
times when the zeitgeist is abandoned in favour of expediency or 
efficiency, and the needs stemming from peoples' cultural roots 
are overlooked. Much of the criticism of modern functionalist 
architecture, for example, draws attention to its cultural 
s uperf iciali ty. The mountains of glass-covered steel boxes 
taking root in central business districts all over the world and 
the global uniformity of airport lounges and cafeteria 
contribute to the emergence of a universal style and form at the 
expense of cultural distinctiveness. More generally, the 
cultural specificity of the planned achievements of society are 
threatened by the emergence of a 'positivistic' approach in 
planning that aims to reduce it to a form of programming. 
Techniques in business planning developed in the United States, 
for example, are commonly packaged into a marketable form and 
exported to the rest of the world. Similar homogenising 
tendencies are apparent in metropolitan planning. The earlier 
experiences of the US with mass car ownership and the vast 
amounts of money spent there on traffic and transportation 
research give a special appeal to the solutions arrived at-in 
the design of traffic systems, and they have consequently been 
imitated in other places. Inner city freeways continue to 
devour houses, and cloverleaf junctions hectares of valuable 
land, more in response to what. are regarded as the universal 
requirements of the motor car than to more basic cultural values 
which are less readily apprehended and given expression. 
With the great debate over planning versus individual freedom 
now generally resolved in favour of planning, it may be 
l __ 
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necessary to caution that the success of planning has to be 
measured in terms of its capability to respond to, and elaborate 
the expression of, the spiritual values and cultural axioms of 
its historial period, as well as its ability to produce good 
'technical' solutions to engineering problems (the 
'technological fix'). 
To the extent that it takes account of cultural values and 
uncertain futures, planning is resistant to claims of special 
expertise in its practice and to the professionalisation of 
planning into an esoteric craft beyond the comprehension of its 
supposed beneficiaries. To the extent that the legitimation 
for societal action is sought in societal choice, planning has 
become, in part,. a political activity, and the planner, lika the 
social scientist, is under pressure to define and to defend his 
concept of the role he plays. 
Difficulties of this sort are common to the whole range of 
occupations the resources of which necessarily include an 
element of applied behavioural science. Educationalists, 
penologists, management scientists, welfare officers and city 
planners share the difficulties that arise from the permeation 
of this subject-matter with social values, and in each case, the 
questions of what the basic aim of their activity is, and how it 
may best be served, represent significant and enduring problems. 
I suspect that where such aims as 'serving the public interest', 
'rehabilitation-, and -increasing job satisfaction'~ be 
agreed upon, this is precisely because they are too vague to 
allow the deduction of particular courses of action. Current 
\ 
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planning literature reveals widespread disagreement over whether 
the planner should be advocate or dictator, adviser or 
policy-maker, technical expert or involved humanist. 
A further delimitation is that we are interested in those types 
of planning or societal action, which are dependent upon and 
make maximum use of scientific-technical intelligence. 
Interventions in society that are premised upon religious 
conviction or traditional beliefs, or that are dependent upon 
the charismatic propositions of an individual, are of direct 
concern to the social scientist, but they fall outside the scope 
of the concept of planrting to be considered here. Formally 
institutionalised planning is characteristically information-
dependent to a very high degree, and could always use more 
information than is available at any particular time. 
Planning that is based on scientific knowledge has the further 
characteristic that it espouses rational thought, discussion, 
and argument to the exclusion of extra-rational thought-modes 
such as intuition, wisdom, and tradition. More particularly, 
as Friedman has argued, planning's typical medium of exchange is 
a form of 'bounded rationality': 7 
This refers to the fact that thought and 
consequent action intended to be rational 
are contingent on environmental conditions -
the social context of planning which 
represents the medium in and through which 
planning decisions are made. 
(Friedman: 1967:234) 
In Friedman's schema, bounded rationality is contrasted with 
ideological and utopian thought, which he calls 'non-bounded 
rationality'. Ideological and utopian thought is at least 
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potentially rational in that its constructions can be logical 
and coherent, and they may be concrete representations of 
abstract social values such as equality, freedom and justice. 
There is clearly a place in planning for the productive use of 
utopian thinking, or the exercise of creative imagination. 
Martin Meyerson, for example, has called for a revival of 
utopian thinking to test new possibilities for city growth, and 
advocates the bringing together of the social utopianism of More 
and Owen and the physical utopianism of Lloyd Wright and 
Corbusier: (Meyerson: 1961). 
Bounded rational thought is, in turn, dichotomised into · 
functionally rational and substantially rational thought -
thought which is rational with respect to the means only, and 
thought that is rational with respect to both the. ends and the 
means of action. Both types of rationality can usually be found 
in the activities of planning systems·. In the first case the 
' 'ends' of the planning activity are assumed to be given, while 
substantially rational thought " ••• implies the possibility of 
altering the ends during the action as a result of changing 
circumstances or new information." (Friedman: 1967:236). 
It is of interest to note the degFee of correspondence between 
this classification of types of thinking and the Ackoff-Emery 
systems taxonomy discussed above. 8 Functional rationality and 
substantial rationality express the action potentials of 
goal-seeking and purposeful systems respectively; the former 
have choice only with respect to course of action or means, 
while the latter are able, in addition, to choose and to change 
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their goals. Further, Friedman's concept of non-bounded 
rationality corresponds fairly closely with the characterising 
properties of ideal-seeking systems: 
THOUGHT 
In such thinking there is a picture of an 
ideal social order ••• The images of perfect 
communism and perfect capitalism are such 
utopias, as are the corporate state, 










































(derived from Fried_man (1967))~ 
In trying to describe some of the general characteristics of 
planning, planning activity has been contrasted with 
day-dreaming, 'wishful-thinking' and the like, on the grounds 
tht the former must be deferent to feasibility while the latter 
recognises no such boundaries. In many actual situations, 
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however, there is pressure towards improving upon mere 
feasibility as a criterion for action, and searching instead for 
the optimal solution, or at least the best among the courses of 
action that are deemed feasible. The potentiality of the system 
being planned for and the relevant environment to change over 
time promotes a third criterion for the actual formulation of 
planning decisions - adaptability. Insofar as the phenomena to 
which planning is related are subject to unpredictable and 
uncontrollable variations during the course of the 
implementation of the plan, the plan must incorporate some 
sensitivity to changes of this sort, and must be modifiable when 
the situation so demands. Here I follow Ackoff who has 
identif.ied three 'philosophies of planning' that are related to 
the degree of emphasis given to each of these important criteria 
- feasibility, optimality and adaptability. These three planning 
philosophies are satisficing, optimising and adaptivising 
(Ackoff: 1970:6ff). 
Satisficing planning simply aims to do 'well enough' in any 
situation, and reflects the 'art of.the possible'• Limited aims 
are adopted which make no novel demands on the structure and 
capabilities of the planning system. The satisficer tends to 
use only that information which is readily available or can be 
acquired easily. The great attraction of satisf~cing is that is 
makes very moderate intellectual demands, and requires 
comparably limited resources. Aims are chosen which tend to 
exclude the need for subsequent revision (adaptability), and 
there is no attempt to optimise. 
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Optimising, on the other hand, searches for the best possible 
course of action in any situation, and for this reason is 
intellectually more challenging, and more likely to recognise 
the need for fairly constant review and correction during the 
implementation period. The optimiser needs far more information 
and spends considerable amounts of time and other resources 
searching for the information that is needed but which is not 
readily available. In fact, optimising planning tends to become 
dependent on information of a particular sort - that which 
yields to quantification and is therefore amenable to the 
mathematical techniques of optimisation. 
Adaptivising (or 'innovative') planning is a relatively new 
concept, the development of which has been largely due to 
Ackoff. It is presented as the 'richest' of the three 
philosophies in the sense at least that it addresses itself not 
to a limited set of feasible aims, or to optimising the 
performance of those parts of the system which can be qualified, 
but to improving the adaptibility of the whole system. It is 
the richest, too, in that it includes the possibility of moving 
towards the most feasible set of decisions, without necessarily 
placing a premium on optimality or pre-judging what is to be 
considered feasible. The most important single ingredient of 
the adaptivising philosophy is its premise that the actual 
process of planning is more important than the product'; the way 
in which planning is organised and carried out, and the people 
who are involved in it, is more important than the plans that 
are produced: 
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••• the process of planning is its most 
important product. The benefits of planning 
are derived more from participation in the 
process than from consuming its product. 
(Ackoff: 1970b:22) 
Although it seems to be the case historically that planning has 
emerged as a prevalent mode of decision-making in connection 
with the shift from agricultural to industrial society and in 
those parts of social fields in which actors have had to meet 
disturbed-reactive types of environmental conditions, there is 
nothing about these new conditions which makes planning 
obligatory, or guarantees that it will be carried out 
effectively. In the first case, this is only to say that 
practically all of the problems in society that may be perceived 
in some sense as 'planning problems' can be expected, if 
ignored, to regulate themselves at some level of activity. 
Vickers, in his discussion of the Buchanan report on traffic in 
towns, considers the consequences of doing nothing about the 
traffic problem: 
Traffic, outstripping road capacity, will 
generate self-magnifying traffic blocks in 
which no vehicle can move and through which 
it is impossible even to walk. This 
self-defeating situation will both prevent 
and deter flow of traffic; and when the 
blocks have been cleared, a reduced volume 
will move for a time in relative freedom, 
which will soon attract enough traffic to 
generate another jam. The volume of traffic 
will stabilise, oscillating about a mean at 
which it is just sufficient to deter what 
the roads cannot handle. 
(Vickers: 1965:2809) 
The purpose of human intervention, as he points out, is to 
regulate such relationships at a level which is more acceptable 
to those concerned than that at which the inherent logic of the 
situation would otherwise provide. 
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In past historical periods (and today among some political 
conservatives) it has been widely believed that these tolerance 
limits are most effectively and fairly established by the 
operations of a market system in which each is equally free to 
buy and to sell, and a political system in which each is free to 
record his vote. In 19th century England, the organised 
restraint of laissez-faire was held to produce institutional 
structures that were robust and durable, representing the 'fit' 
elements that were able to survive the competitive machinations 
of the laws of supply and demand - the scarcely concealed 
'hidden hand'. The steady and continuous increase in the amount 
of resources allocated to societal planning in both the 
developed and the developing countries has gone on alongside 
accumulating signs, some mundane and some spectacular, that the 
hidden hand is, in fact, highly fallible, and a growing 
awareness that the alternative to planning, at least in such 
contexts as the metropolis, may be no longer laissez-faire but 
'laissez-mourir'. 
Notwithstanding the judgement that the use of planning is very 
much on the increase, it is already a very widespread form of 
activity, and has developed its own professional bodies and 
'invisible colleges', a substantial body of literature which 
includes a large number of journals, and a respectable standing 
iu a very wide range of public and private institutional 
contexts. Moreover, it is ·not at all restricted to the 
developed societies in its impact, but has been one of the most 
significant 'social exports' to the Third World. Today's 
missionaries preach planning as one of the roads to national 
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salvation. Naturally, in circumstances where a regular daily 
meal for all has yet to be achieved, economic planning of one 
sort and another has taken precedence. Yet there are grounds 
(though these may be diminishing) for hoping that an earlier 
start on broader societal planning may permit the emerging 
African, Asian and Latin American societies to avoid at least 
some of the worst consequences of the relatively undisciplined 
industrialisation of the west. 
Spectacular and compelling support for a larger scale of 
intervention in the functioning of society was forced upon those 
who, in this century, experienced the unexpected and unwanted 
turmoil and convulsions of the two world wars and the depression 
that intervened. The apparent heteronomy of the processes 
behind such massive breakdowns in social life created a climate 
that at least was not resistant to greater intervention and 
control, while the actual mobilisation of resources on a 
societal scale, both to fight the wars and to "'reconstruct"' 
after the fighting and after the great depression, offered a 
powerful demonstration effect of what could be achieved by a 
mobilised society. 
As the pace and scale of change have boomed over the last few 
decades, the belief appears to have grown that the avoidance of 
similar catastrophes is, in an important way, contingent upon 
our ability to anticipate, regulate, and, where possible to 
create, the changes that are going on. The media (and 
television in particular), have made global issues of race 
conflict, over-population, the ecological crisis, and so on, and 
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we appear to have no 'guiding fiction', equivalent to the 19th 
century belief in 'progress', which offers us even a pretended 
immunity from the traps 'that lie ahead. It would be facile for 
me to suggest that such immunity might now be found in planning. 
It would appear, however, that the application of scientific and 
technical intelligence to problems of the future and our means 
of arriving there is now commonly regarded as a more hopeful 
approach to the preservation and enhancement of our social 
worlds than the attitude of old-fashioned liberalism and a 
purely therapeutic approach to societal malfunctioning. The 
limited starts on preventive maintenance in industry and 
preventive medicine in the field of public health have to be 
generalised to society itself. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER V 
1 The concept of appreciation comes from Vickers: 
"Appreciation manifests itself in the exercise through time 
of mutually related judgments of fact and value ••• such 
judgments disclose what can best be described as a set of 
readinesses to distinguish some aspects of the situation 
rather than others and to classify and value these in this 
way rather than in that. I will describe these readinesses 
as an appreciative· system." (Vickers: 1965:67; see also 
Vickers: 1968). 
2 See Jungk (1969) on the distinctions between logical, 
critical and creative imagination, and the special need for 
the latter. 
3 See Winthrop (1968) for a more comprehensive review. 
4 The discussions by Ackoff (1970a) and Webster (1968) of 
different types of knowledge of the future provide most of 
the concepts used in this section. 
5 This has become the bane of cricket Test Matches for 
example! 
6 Crozier (1964) has argued that in the traditional French 
bureaucratic structure, change occurs only with the crises 
that punctuate periods of routine. 
7 This concept was, of course, introduced by March and Simon 
(1958). It has obvious correspondences with the viewpoint 
that open, behavioural systems can only be adequately 
understood if the properties of the environment and the 
nature of system-environment interdependancies ar~ also 
understood. 
8 Its value as a basis for further conceptualisations, 
however, is limited, due to the fact that the basic category 
of 'thought' or types of thinking is rather nebulous. 
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CHAPT}!;R VI 
STRATEGIES FOR THE "SOCIOSPHERE" 
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PLANNING'S EXPANDING HORIZONS: THE SOCIOSPHERE 
In the developed societies we are accustomed to the fact that 
planning enters into a vast range of purposeful social 
activities, routine and innovatory. The waging of wars, the 
exploration of space, business activity, environmental control, 
the preparation of National Budgets, the administration of 
social welfare - for all such activities,. planning - making 
decisions now that will affect the future state of affairs - has 
become indispensable. In refining the concept of planning I 
make here some prelimiary distinctions according to the 
different substantive areas in which planning is habitually 
applied. That is to say, that I distinguish a number of broad 
types of system that are planned for: 
Technological systems: human enterprises such as space 
exploration and the development of supersonic transport, the 
design and construction of huge dams and hydro-electric schemes. 
Sometimes the label of project planning is attached to planning 
of this sort, in which the critical problems are the piecing 
together of men, material and machinery to make a successful 
working system. 1 The intellectual resources for such activity 
are characteristically from mathematics and the natural 
sciences, engineering, etc. but are likely to include operations 
research, systems analysis and so on when the end product is a 
complex man-machine system requiring the integration of the 
technology with human capacities. 
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Natural systems: man's interventions in nature, intended to 
Flood exploit, preserve, and augment the natural environment. 
control, reclamation, conservation, resource planning, 
policy-making for minerals, agriculture, fisheries and the like 
all fall into this category. (With 'Departments of the 
Environment' springing from the ground like mushrooms after a 
thunderstorm it could be that our planning for natural systems 
will become far more systematic). The main intelligence called 
upon derives predominantly from the biological and geographical 
sciences - botony, ecology, oceanography, geology, meteorology, 
and the like. Planting deserts, ocean farming and weather 
control are some of the prospects for natural system planning. 
Institutional systems: the institutional arrangements in 
society for serving men's physiological, psychological, 
spiritual and social needs, encompassing institutions for 
welfare, production, recreation, education, communication, 
health, etc. - organisational mechanisms deliberately structured 
for the creation, allocation and control of relatively scarce 
material and non-material resources. The critical tasks of 
institution building, maintenance and change involve organising 
the capabilities of an aggregate of individuals into a 
functioning whole, and the key resources for planning for 
institutional systems derive from the behavioural sciences 
psychology, social psychology, sociology and their 'applied 
wings of industrial psychology, sensitivity training, 
psycho-therapy, corporate planning, management science, 
administrative science, etc. 2 
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Economic systems: economic systems are referred to separately 
because of the special interest and expertise that has developed 
in civilised societies in relation to problems of the creation 
and allocation of those resources that are given a monetary 
value for the purposes of their exchange and distribution. 
In planning for economic systems the concept of resources 
typically has a rather limited connotation which relates to 
man's material requirements to the relative exclusion of his 
appetites for beauty, peace, freedom and the like, or even clear 
air and water. 
The 'routine preoccupations' of natio.nal economic planning - the 
maintenance of a high level of employment, the stabilisation of 
price levels, and the promotion of a favourable balance of 
payments, and of business economics - profits or profitability, 
·abstract one dimension of the systems that they are applied to, 
and i,t is a dimension that has come to assume an overriding 
significance in the management of industrial society. · Planning 
for economic systems draws its expertise from the various 
branches of economics - welfare economics, econometrics, 
accounting, etc. and the professional experience of banking, 
finance, trade and the like. 
Conflict systems: it is seemingly inherent in the nature of the 
social world that particular forms of competition, fights and 
struggles are recurrent, so that both their occurrence and the · 
way in which they unfold can be to some degree anticipated and 
thus prepared for. Planning for conflict systems, whether the 
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aim be to avoid, contain or achieve ascendance in the conflict 
has a characteristic expression at a number of different levels 
of social behaviour, but its formalisation has perhaps proceeded 
furthest in military planning and some aspects of business 
planning. Preventive planning for international conflicts 
incorporates defence strategy, diplomacy (including its 
expressions through foreign aid, trade and cultural 
arrangements), and the study of international relations. Among 
institutional systems, business and political conflict are the 
most salient and have their own characteristic ground rules and 
procedures, which are the planning intelligence of political 
parties and corporations. 
The development of Game Theory is an attempt to generalise the 
dynamics of competitive situations through the investigation of 
conflicts in microcosm, although its real value for planning for 
conflict systems is not yet evident, conflicts at thes~ 
differing levels naturally require for their negotiation 
expertise that is based upon knowledge and understanding of the 
possible and probable behaviours of the aggressor or competitor. 
Expertise of the first sort is generally consolidated into 
bodies of law, constitutions, and sets of rules. 
Social systems: planning for large-scale social systems has 
been widely aspired to and discussed, but infrequently carried 
out. Much more has been achieved in the context of 'middle 
range' social systems - organisations and institutions, and 
limited aspects of them - economics and conflicts for example. 
However, planning for social systems per se, at the national, 
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regional and community levels is becoming more feasible, and 
more essential for societies moving into post industrialism. 
Along with the rapid expansion of other forms of technology, the 
technology of the social sciences, and its resources in 
scientists, methods, understandings and institutional 
arrangements for teaching arid research has also been subject to 
escalation. To date, social planning has generally proceeded 
on limited fronts - demographic (birth control), health and 
welfare, educational, leisure and recreation - with relatively 
little co-ordination of these facets and often a low level of 
understanding of the relations among them. 
Little can be claimed for a list such.as this, and certainly it 
cannot be said that such categories are likely to be exhaustive 
of planning's concerns, or that they are mutually exclusive. 
It does imply that the future stages towards which planning 
activity has been geared have been thought of in systems terms, 
such that planning is understood as a process of improving the 
existing state of a system by guiding its change towards a more 
desirable state, as a process of making more systemic, or 
improving the coherence among an existing set of elements, or as 
a process of designing and bringing into being a completely new 
system. Thus improving the performance of a racing car entails 
successive adjustments to each of the engine's parts and the 
relations between them, in a search for a combination that will 
optimise speed without sacrificing endurance; the more adequate 
provision of adult or continuing education facilities may 
involve bringing into conscious and conherent relations a number 
of_ existing and fragmentary providers; planning for such 
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projects as the giant Aswan dam and the Apollo mission involves 
the creation of substantially new systems. 
The complex institutional arrangements and systems of action 
that have become reliant on some sort of planning activity are 
not represented by any one of these types of systems, but rather 
represent the overlap and points of intersection of many of 
them. In the past even though the operation may have been 
thought of fundamentally as an economic system - one whose 
functions were defined in terms of profits or profitability it 
had to be viewed also as a technological and a social system, 
and planning had to try to reconcile the competing constraints 
of economics, engineering and psychology. The city is another 
example of a complete socio-environmental system within which a 
bewildering heterogeneity of functions have to be performed, 
aims have to be satisfied, and relations established and 
maintained. If corporations and communities are managed and 
planned for as if they have systematic properties, then it is 
necessary in spite of the complexity and variety of structures 
and actions that they encompass, that there be some image of 
them in systems terms. The origins and phases of city planning 
as a special form of activity can be related to changes in the 
image of the city as a distinctive entity in the minds firstly 
of reformers, and later of politicians and professional groups. 
While planning has in its origins been divided according to its 
subject matters, giving rise to separate fields of planning and 
separate experts within them, there are now increasing signs 
that the best thinking about planning today is become oblivious 
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to disciplinary boundaries and special subject matters. This 
may be reflected in the decision of the American Institute of 
Planners to identify themselves primarily as planners, and to 
extend membership to those not specifically trained in 
traditional 'city planning', as the OECD's 'Bellagio Symposium' 
on long-range forecasting and planning, in which the dimensions 
of the coming style of planning are charted. The 'Bellagio 
Declaration' issued by the participants in this symposium begins 
with the following observation: 
Social institutions face growing 
difficulties as a result of an ever-
increasing complexity which arises directly 
and indirectly from the development and 
assimilation of technology. Many of the 
most serious conflicts facing mankind result 
from the interaction of social, economic, 
technological, political and psychological 
forces and can no longer be solved by 
fractional approaches from individual 
disciplines. The time is passed when· 
economic growth can be prompted without 
consideration of social consequences and 
when technology can be allowed to develop 
without consideration of the social 
prerequisites of change or the social 
consequences of such change. 
(Jantsch: 1969:7) 
At the forefront of the planning literature there is an 
increasing concern for large-scale societal planning, or 
'integrative' planning, which would have the effect of bringing 
into closer relations the segments into which planning 
endeavours are currently separated, both by conceptualising them 
individually as facets of a large scale system for which 
interventions in any one part has effects for all of the others, 
and by focussing on the activity of planning as such, as a 
generalised means for attaining a satisfactory level of societal 
regulation. Wentworth Eldredge, in outlining the need for 
-- - - --- ----- - --------- -----------------------------------
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'total environmental planning' is a characteristic apostle of 
this concern: 
The conservation, rehabilitation and 
development of both natural and man-made 
environment is a massive task, clearly 
calling for the up-grading of our planning 
technology, or resource allocation for 
agreed-on goals, from a micro- to a 
macro-scale level in three specific ways to 
match the ever-growing increase in the 
socio-economic complexity and extent of the 
rapidly expanding American scene. 
Specifically, considerations of (1) area, 
(2) function and (3) time are all to limited 
in our planning ~apabilities. 
(Eldredge: 1967:1158) 
It seems most likely that such identified areas as corporate, 
defence, regional, city, economic and social planning will 
retain their identity but most probable that they will also 
become increasingly salient as parts of each other's planning 
environments in a wider definition of the realm in which 
planning takes place. Some of the groundwork in preparing the 
necessary intelligence for this more comprehensive scale of 
societal intervention has been undertaken in the studies on 
'social intelligence' by Raymond Bauer, Bertram Gross and others 
(Bauer: 1966, Gross: 1969). 
The need for such development is one that is being forced upon 
us by the changing pace and scale in the environment that we 
inhabit: 
Our present revolutionary waves differ not 
only in their quantitative aspects from 
those of the recent past, but also in their 
qualitative characteristics. Whereas in 
the 19th century we might have dealt 
conventionally with relatively separate 
revolutionary strands within their local 
geographical context, our present 
revolutions are now global in their spatial 
and quantitative aspects. Their quality is 
no longer that of isolable sequences of 
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events whose interrelations were more 
separated in time, in numbers of people, and 
in the social and physical processes 
affected. 
Our present series of revolutionary trans-
itions are more specifically characterised 
by their simultaneity - the swift inter-
penetration, increased feedback, and the 
interdependence of one group of changes upon 
another. 
Global in scale, potentially affecting the 
physical balance of all life on the plant 
itself, and reaching into every aspect of 
individual human life and society, our 
ongoing change patterns now constitute an 
ecological revolution. 
(McHale: 1969:63) 
McHale advocates a conceptual extension towards a 'planetary 
ecology' which assumes that 'its prior concern is with the 
maintenance of the planetary society'. 
One of the consequences of the drift towards post-industrialism 
is that many of the terms and tools of planners have become 
obsolete and inadequate to the dimensions of the task. The 
thoughtways of industrial society are no longer helpful in 
confronting the planning problems of extended social fields in 
which turbulent systems of interaction and interdependency mean 
that the basic units are ecological in character. 
This, as I have noted earlier, becomes a prevailing condition in 
social fields undergoing transformation form Type III to Type IV 
environments. Planning for social fields requires that they be 
treated as fields, and not simply as collections of systems 
performing different functions, with different structures and 
sizes, such that each system can be planned for in isolation 
from the others and the overall context that they share. It 
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therefore requires ecological concepts and understandings that 
will encompass populations of systems and their environments, 
and show ways in which these can be modified and governed as 
ecological units. 
To re-conceptualise the relevant domain of planning on this 
planetary scale raises more forcibly than has previously been so 
those kinds of problems which Churchman has identified as 
problems of the 'ethics of large-scale systems'. The central 
difficulty is that of finding criteria of 'rational conduct' 
with regard to intervention in one part of the whole system when 
its effects upon the state of the whole system can never be 
adequately grasped. As Churchman himself puts it: 
" •••• there is no such thing as improving a 
part of the system without taking into 
account what happens to the whole system as 
a consequence". 
(Churchman: 1968b:70) 
Before exploring possibilities for a 'science of the ethics of 
the whole system', we need some concept of the dimensions of the 
'whole system' that we are to concern ourselves with, and it is 
towards such a concept that the following discussion is 
directed. 
If systems theory is to be of real value in comprehending the 
expanded ecological realm of planning, then what is needed in 
systems theory is a set of concepts that go beyond the 
system-environment dichotomisation, which emphasises their 
structural differentiation, to describe the ~system plus 
environment' as a unit, emphasising their essential continuity 
in terms of process. Lewin's concept of life-space, and his 
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equation b = f (p • e) - behaviour is a function of the person 
plus his environment, accomplishes this for the psychological 
individual, but the problem has been more systematically treated 
by Angyal in his discussion of life, not as an intra-organismic 
happening, but as a process which takes place between organism 
and environment. I referred in the last chapter to his concept 
of the biosphere. In introducing this concept he writes: 
••• The life process does not take place only 
within the body surface, but involves a much 
broader realm of events. Such a broad 
definition of biological happenings is 
unconventional but necessary in order that 
justice be done to the problems of the total 
personality. The broadened concept of life 
does not refer to an intra-organismic 
happening, but to a process which covers a 
much broader field than the body. Life 
involves both intrasomatic and extrasomatic 
happenings. The limits of life extend as 
far as the organism is able to exert an 
influence on the events in the world •.• 
Accordingly I propose to call the realm in 
which the biological total process takes 
place the 'biosphere' that is, the realm or 
sphere of life. 
(Angy al: 19111: 99-100) 
He rejects attempts to distinguish between the organism and the 
environment in structural or morphological terms as 
un-productive, if not impossible, and argues that the subject 
matter of the sciences of life is primarily processes and not 
structures. This being so, it is more appropriate to 
distinguish between organism and environment in dynamic terms 
and to examine the processes of life in terms of the extent to 
which they are determined by the system or organism itself or by 
heteronomous, environmental forces. 
We cannot tell whether a structure belongs 
to the organism or to the environment, but 
we can determine to what extent a process is 
respectively organismically or environ-
mentally governed. 
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Those factors which are prevalently under 
autonomous government constitute the 
organism or self or subject, while the 
factors which are prevalently under 
heteronomous government form the objectives 
of the environment. 
(Angyal: 1941:95;102) 
The biosphere therefore is not an amorphous domain but is 
differentiated in the dimension of automous versus heteronomous 
determination between the subject and the object poles. No 
biological process is determined entirely organismically or 
entirely environmentally, but is a resultant of both kinds of 
forces. These may be expressed in the ratio (a;h), the ratio of 
autonomous and heteronomous government. The limits of the 
opposing poles of the biosphere thus correspond to pure organism 
(processes governed entirely autonomously - the subject pole) 
and pure environment (processes governed entirely heteronomously 
- the object pole) neither of which refer to real phenomena, but 
which have the status of theoretical limiting cases. 
The relative values of a and h ••• are very 
different in the various biological 
manifestations. For example, the processes 
going on in the gastrointestinal tract are, 
on the one hand, heteronomous, 
environmentally determined through the 
physical chemical properties of the food, 
but on the other hand, they are also 
autonomous, organismically determined: 
mechanical work of the stomach and 
intestines, secretion of the digestive 
glands. In the biological process taking 
place in the blood, the external 
determinations play a smaller role and 
internal determinations a larger role than 
in the processes of digestion. 
(Angyal: 1941:94-5) 
An analogous term for describing and interpreting the realm or 
sphere in which social life takes place has been suggested by 
Boulding - the 'sociosphere'. He writes: 
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The social system consists of all human 
beings on the planet and all their 
interrelationships, such as kinship, 
friendship,_hostility, status, exchange, 
money flows, conversation, information 
outputs and inputs, and so on. It includes 
likewise the contents of every person's mind 
and the physical surroundings, both natural 
and artificial, to which he relates. This 
social system clings to the surface of the 
earth so that it may appropriately be called 
the sociosphere, even though small fragments 
of it are now going out into space. 
(Boulding: 1966:3) 
As Angyal uses the concept of the biosphere to overstep the 
structural dichotomization of the organism and the environment, 
so the concept of the sociosphere points beyond the separate 
consideration of the structures and properties of social 
aggregates, and of their environments, to a way of understanding 
social activities entirely as processes which take pl~ce between 
such aggregates and their environments in which the shape and 
direction of the activity is jointly governed by the properties 
of the behaving systems and by the properties of the 
environment. 
For the biologists, the image of the existential form of the 
organism as a dynamic one, expressed in the precept 'the 
organism is a process' occasioned a fairly radical 
re-orientation of the focus of their investigations but also a 
certain amount of confusion and disagreement. In sociology, 
the analogous point of view states that 'a social system is a 
structuring of events or happenings rather than of physical 
parts and it therefore has no structure apart from its 
functioning' (Katz and Kahn: 1966:31). This image too demands 




conceptions of the social structure, towards a new conception of 
it as a system of action, interaction, exchange, process, and so 
on a dynamic complex in which structure is 'immanent' rather 
than transcendental, being constantly_ refashioned, destroyed and 
elaborated in every sequence of social interaction. 
To view the ~ubject matter of the sciences of behaviour as 
processes rather than structures is a necessary consequence of 
conceptualising the entities with which they deal as open 
systems whose capacity for survival, for performing their 
functions, and for growth is a direct function of their ability 
to incorporate free energy from the environment in a constant 
exchange process. The processes of exchange themself and not 
the particular morphological characteristics or substantive 
appearance of the system are the phenomena to be. understood. I 
am inclined to say therefore that discussions concerning where 
we should draw the boundaries of an organisation for example, 
are no more fruitful than arguments over where one might locate 
the boundaries of the organism. 
In this regard Etzioni has suggested that we distinguish between 
participants and non".'"participants according to whether the 
individual achieves a high rating on at least one of the 
following criteria: the nature and intensity of the actor's 
involvement in the organisation; the degree to which he is 
subordinated to organisational powers, and the amount of 
performance required of him by the organisation. "Thus 
students, inmates, soldiers, workers and many others are 
included. Customers and clients on the other hand, who score 
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low on all three criteria, are considered "'outsiders"'" 
(Etzioni: 1961:21). March and Simon have taken a broader view: 
"When we describe the chief participants of most business 
organisations, we generally limit out attention to the following 
five major classes: Employees, investors, suppliers, 
distributors and consumers." (March and Simon: 1958: 89). Of 
themselves, such deliberations are relatively sterile, and need 
to be geared to the investigation of specific systems of action 
before they are of any practical significance. 
The consequences of adapting Boulding"'s concept of the 
sociosphere to my conceptual scheme become clear. The 
sociosphere is the region, or "'dimensional domain' (Angyal) in 
which social activity goes on. Like the biosphere, it can be 
roughly differentiated into two fields, corresponding to the 
ratio of autonomous and heteronomous determination of the events 
it encloses. Towards the subject pole, events in the 
sociosphere are predominantly under autonomous government, or 
system-determined; towards the object pole they are 
predominantly under heteronomous government, or environmentally 
determined. 
This derivation may be clarified in the following quotation from 
Angyal in which terms appropriated to the sociosphere replace 
the specifically biospheric terms: 
The differentiation of the (sociosphere) 
into subject and object is the basic 
organisation of the (sociosphere) and forms 
the foundation for further 
structuralisations. The single factors 
hav~ no fixed position in the (sociosphere). 
Processes which, at a given moment, stand 
prevalently under environmental government 
~--------------------------------------------------------
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may at the next moment come under 
prevalently (system) government. Strictly 
speaking, one cannot generalise and state to 
what extent a given type of (social 
activity) is (systematically) or 
environmentally governed. The exact value 
of this ratio can be determined only in 
specific instances. There is, in other 
words, a continuous flux between the two 
poles of the (sociosphere). 
(Angyal: 1941:102) 
In making this conceptual transposition, full account must of 
course be taken of the qualitative differences between the 
organism or the individual, and the social group or social 
aggregates as centres of autonomous government and of the 
related differences between the substantive forms of 
environmental determination in the biosphere and the 
sociosphere. Nevertheless there are substantial continuities 
between the two concepts which have some important 
methodological consequences. Primarily, they are contextual 
categories, and in emphasising the dominance of process over 
structure they refer back directly to the root metaphor of the 
historical event or act. In investigating and interpreting the 
relevant parts of the universe, this implies that understanding 
is sought in terms of field determination rather than the 
discovery of linear casusal trains and functional relationships 
- in fact that understanding and not explanation becomes the aim 
of research itself. This is discussed by Angyal in terms of 
the difference between relations and systems: 
Dealing with relations and dealing with 
systems involve two different logical 
manipulations to which two psychologically 
quite different processes may 
correspond ••• Relational thinking aims at the 
establishment of the direct connection 
between two objects. For instance, in the 
study of casusation one has to find for 
member A (effect) a second member B (cause) 
with which it is necessarily connected. In 
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causal research the task is_ to single out 
from a multiplicity of data, pairs of facts 
between which there is a necessary 
connection. In system thinking the task is 
not to find direct relations between two 
members but to find the superordinate system 
in which they are connected or to define the 
positional value of members relative to the 
superordinate system. 
(Angyal: 1941:254) 
The directions and the outcomes of social actions are shaped 
both by the properties of the social actors, and the properties 
of the relevant environments - psychological, technological, 
natural - in which social life is carried on. This basis 
differentiation of the sociosphere into subject and object poles 
- the regions of autonomous and heteronomous government of 
social behaviours - leads to further structuralisations. The 
subject pole corresponds to the loci of purposeful social 
behaviours in the social field - the modal points in the mesh of 
field forces and interdependencies at which social relations are 
sufficiently organised and enduring to give them an identifiable 
form or structure. The sociosphere as a whole incorporates not 
only articulated social aggregates and their interrelations, but 
also the natural physical environment of the surface of the 
earth (the biosphere in conventional terminology), the 
technological environment that man has created on this same 
surface, and the symbolic-cultural environment that derives from 
the properties of man as psychological individual. This object 
pole of the sociosphere, the domain of the heteronomous 
determination, has not been subject to the same systematic 
attention as has the subject pole. 
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The-subject Role of-the Sociosphere 
In a sense the subject pole of the sociosphere may be thought of 
as the social field itself, because it is the existence and the 
properties of the field as a whole that makes possible the 
degrees of system government over sociosphere occurrences. We 
are more accustomed however to thinking of the various types of 
social aggregates within the field as the actual source of 
goverment - the family and the kinship organisation, the 
informal group, community organisation, nation and so on, the 
varieties of social units that are frequently presented as the 
'elements of the social structure' in beginning courses of 
sociology. 
Distinctions are drawn among these units according to such 
criteria as their size, duration, cohesion, complexity, and the 
activity they carry out. 
• 
I am not concerned here with 
elaborating such distinctions, but only with exemplifying the 
'subjects' of the sociosphere. Social aggregates belong to the 
region of autonomous government in the sociosphere. Their 
characteristic 'cultures', the internal structuring-of their 
parts into a division of labour, structures of authority and 
control, their characteristic climates, and so on- create ways 
in which occurrences in the sociosphere can be regulated and 
controlled, and sometimes designed through systemic functioning. 
From this point of view of carrying out planned interventions in 
the social field, some of the differences among the various 
forms of social organisation that are maintained within it are 
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far more important than others. One set of distinctions which 
is fruitful in this regard, and which is particularly consonant 
with the systems approach is based on the concepts of geneity 
and nodality (Ackoff and Emery: 1972:13.35ff). The distinction 
between homogeneous and heterogeneous organisation that derives 
from the concept of geneity has already been alluded to. 
Geneity refers to the relations between a system and its parts. 
The homogeneous organisation is one which has greater control 
over its members than they have over it - the members function 
so as to serve the organisation's objectives. The 
heterogeneous organisation is one whose members have greater 
control over it than it has over them - the organisation exists 
to further the objectives of its members. 
I have argued that the individual psychological system, ~, is 
a purposeful system. Man can exhibit different behaviours and 
produce different outcomes under constant environmental 
conditions, and he can exhibit identical behaviours and produce 
the same outcome under varying environmental conditions. In a 
homogeneous organisation a large number of men are required to 
limit their possible behaviours to those which are calculated to 
co-produce the objectives of the organisation. Their possible 
range of responses must therefore be constrained in some way. 
In various circumstances this may be achieved by coercion, 
persuasion, the manipulation of incentives, the voluntary 
compliance of individuals in support of the organisational 
'ideology', and so on. The essential point is that for a 
group of men to effectively pursue the objectives of the larger 
system of which they are part, the potential variance in their 
l 
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purposeful behaviours has to be reduced. Organisational 
control refers to the characteristic ways in which human 
behaviour in organisations is limited and rendered sufficiently 
predictable for their separate functions to be consistently 
connected within a functional division of labour. With respect 
to the behaviours of their members therefore, homogeneous 
organisations are variety decreasing. 
While homogeneous organisations use their members as 
instruments, heterogeneous organisations are used by their 
members as instruments (A definition and discussion of the 
concept of 'instrument' is given in Chapter II). For an 
organisation to function so as to increase the possible courses 
of action and expand the range of outcomes available to its 
individual members (the function of instrumentality), it must be 
responsive to their will, and not impose its own objectives upon 
them. 
In order to serve the ends of its individual members such 
organisations have to be aware at every stage of what these ends 
are. This type of awareness has typically been sought through 
such mechanisms as the market place, the ballot-box, censuses 
and surveys, the actual participation of members in 
decision-making, and the like. When an organisation functions 
as the instrument of individuals, enabling them to do things 
through belonging to the organisation that they would not 
otherwise be able to do, the organisation is variety increasing 
with respect to members behaviours. A community is usually 
thought of as an organisation of this type. 
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The relationship of instrumentality entails a difference in 
system level between the actor and the instrument. For an 
individual or a social group to use an object, a person, or a 
group as an instrument in the production of desired outcomes 
necessitates that the 'used' entity function at a lower level of 
system behaviour than the user. Because individuals and social 
systems have. the property of purposiveness, for them to be used 
as instruments implies either that their response patterns are 
downgraded to the level of goalseeking behaviours (or possible 
even functional behaviours), or that their 'user' functions as 
an ideal-seeker. In the latter case the purposiveness of 
individuals and groups need not be inhibited. Thus in the case 
of homogeneous organisations variety reduction generally 
corresponds to the restriction of members' behaviours to the 
goal seeking level. A social system is variety increasing when 
it allows its members to function at the level of purposeful or 
ideal-seeking behaviour. Examples of .organised systems which 
tend to be predominantly homogeneous in character are 
corporations, prisons, army units and ships. On the other hand 
political parties, universities, clubs, cities, and communities 
are predominantly heteroge~eous. 
Nodality refers to the way in which authority is distributed. 
A uninodal organisation has a hierarchically structured 
authority pyramid capped by a system part which functions as an 
ultimate decision-maker, which also, as a consequence, carries 
the final responsibility for what the organisation does. This 
part is able to resolve disputes among decision-makers at any 
lower level. A multinodal organisation has no such ultimate 
l 
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decision-maker, and therefore in making decisions about the 
system as a whole requires a certain level of agreement between 
two or more relatively autonomous decision-makers. 















employers and trade 
union associations; 
city and community ............................................................... 
An Empirical Classification of Organisational Types 
Homogeneous organisations: a number of critical problems focus 
on the organisational requisite for obtaining and maintaining 
the participation of members and a sufficient level of 
involvement by them for the organisation to achieve its 
objectives. Either the members must be coerced in some way, or 
there rrrust be a favourable balance of rewards to induce them to 
stay. The use of coercive means for obtaining participation is 
generally unstable in the long run, and with the progress of 
industralism has given way to the manipulation of monetary and 
psychological rewards, as advocated for example by the 
Scientific Management and the Human Relations Schools 
respectively. 
Etzioni has classified organisations according to the dominant 
mode of 'compliance', where compliance refers to 'a relationship 
consisting of the power employed by superiors to control 
subordinates and the orientation of the subordinates to this 
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power' (Etzioni: 1961:xv). The three kinds of power are 
coercive, remunerative and normative, and the three kinds of 
involvement are alienative, calculative and moral. 
Cross-classification gives nine cells, of which three 
corresponds to the conforming types: coercive-alienative 
(Coercive organisations); remunerative-calculative (Utilitarian 
organisations); and normative-moral (Normative organisations). 
He suggests that each of the non-conforming types will 
experience a strain towards one of those in which power and 
involvement are commensurate. In homogeneous organisations 
other than those based on coercion, members have to be 
compensated for the reduction of variety in their behaviour. 
Etzioni's typology is useful in drawing attention to a number of 
the issues involved for organisations in managing compliance. 
Planning for a homogeneous system involves identifying a set of 
goals for the system which are compatable with the state of its 
environment, and with which the goals of the individual members 
can be reconciled. 
Heterogeneous organisations: a number of critical problems for 
heterogeneous organisations relate to the mechanisms by means of 
which the members can make their goals known, and to the 
adequacy of organisational resources for helping them to achieve 
these goals once they are known. Demands for the 
'democratization' of universities, workplaces, professional 
associations, schools and a host of other institutional domains 
have become more pervasive and more persistent during the last 
two decades or so, and there is currently a great deal of 
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·experimentation going on in all kinds of institutional 
mechanisms such as the ballot-box and the laws of supply and 
demand. Various strategies for consultation, participation, 
and 'power to the people' has emerged. 
A related difficulty that is also characteristic of 
heterogeneous organisations concerns the tendency of those 
responsible for the day-to-day running of the organisation to 
subvert its actual raison d'etre by formulating and defending 
goals for the organisation itself which conflict with its 
ability to serve its members interests (Blau and Scott: 
1963:45-67). In this regard the conception of the organisation 
as a resource (or instrument) is quite critical. So long as the 
organisation remains a resource for the benefit of its members 
it can be variety increasing. As soon as it attempts to use 
its members as resources for its own ends it become variety 
reducing. 
Planning for a hetergeneous system involves firstly that the 
needs and goals of the individual members be known. These 
goals must be reconciled amongst themselves, and with the 
constraint of being part of a system in a particular 
environment. 
Uninodal organisations: The problematic consequences of 
uninodality for the organisation relate on the one hand to the 
quality of the ultimate decision-maker, and on the other hand to 
the ability of the membership in some respects to keep this 
decision-maker under control. This latter problem is of course 
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especially relevant to heterogeneous uninodal organisations. 
The key consequence for planning is that the institutional 
leader in general has to be in agreement with planning decisions 
that affect the state of the organisation as a whole. 
Multinodal organisations: In organisations that are 
characterised by a multi-centred allocation of authority many of 
the key problems are to do with the reconciliation of the 
judgements and the aspirations of the various relatively 
autonomous decision-makers. In order for things to get done 
and for the organisation as a whole to fulfil its mission some 
mechanisms for resolving disputes have to be developed. There 
has to be some agreement both concerning the relevant 'courts of 
appeal' (precedent, constitution, seniority, etc.) and the 
appropriate means for working towards solutions (bargaining, 
compromise, arbitration, etc.). Planning for a heterogeneous 
\. 
system requires a minimal level of shared understanding of, and 
commitment to the plan amongst the independent decision-makers. 
The Object Role of the Sociosphere 
As I have indicated in commenting upon the neglect of the 
environment in the behavioural sciences, as a region deserving 
study in its own right, the object pole of the sociosphere - the 
region of environmental determination, is less well understood 
and we are conceptually less well equipped to describe it. 3 
One path towards further structural separations in this domain 
is suggested in the identification and analysis of Jantsch of 
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what he has called the nature-man-society-technology system 
(Jantsch: 1969). The manner adopted here of conceptualising 
these dimensions and of interpreting the relations among them 
differs, however, from that pursued by Jantsch. 
We may think of purposeful social activities, which are to 
social scientists the most significant types of occurrences in 
the sociosphere, as being shaped and directed by the properties 
of four main structural elements - the social field (social 
aggregates), the natural universe, technology, and psychological 
individuals. From these we have identified social aggregates 
with the subject poles of the sociosphere, which means that for 
courses of action originating within the social field the 
psychological properties of man, and the properties of nature 
and technology represent the principal sources of heteronomous 
government and environmental influence. 
SOCIAL AGGREGATES 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* PSYCHOLOGICAL * 
NATURE ******* INDIVIDUALS ********* TECHNOLOGY 
In this context 'nature' is intended to connote the natural 
material universe in constrast to the man-made, 'artificial' 
environment. It embraces such phenomena as climate and 
topography, flora and fauna - geographic and biological 
phenomena in general. It may be thought of as incorporating 
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the other major 'spheres' that men have identified in the 
universe - the atmosphere, the lithosphere, the hydrosphere, and 
in its conventional meaning, the biosphere. Man is thus 
inherently part of nature as the species homosapiens. 
Technology is conceived as a dimension that has been 
progressively added to the sociosphere since the dawn of 
civilisation, referring therefore to the man-made environment of 
artifacts, machinery, buildings and so on. Its status is 
ambiguous, because while it appears fundamentally as a tool of 
man for controlling and reshaping the natural universe - in a 
sense an extension of man, it has also achieved a certain 
independence, and presents itself in some respects as an 
autonomous realm of development. From the point of view of 
many actions in the social field at least, it has achieved 
independence from both man and nature, with which in a sense, it 
has come to compete (Ellul: 1964). 
While the psychological properties of man enter into the texture 
of the social field and the determination of its global 
properties, the individual nevertheless remains in an important 
way distinct from the field, as a part of it which is free to 
locomote and choose its own lines of action. Social aggregates 
have to confront and adapt to the unique characteristics of men 
as psychological individuals, in much the same way that they 
have to adapt to certain phenomena of nature and the 
technological environment. Man as individual is the primary 
locus of psychological activity which is based on the ability to 
symbolise. It is in particular the psychlogical properties of 
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man, but also of course his biochemical properties, that exist 
as constraints or supports for social activities, and can 
therefore be thought of as belonging to the realm of 
heteronomous government of social behaviour. 
The sche~ implies that the persistence of a social aggregate 
entails that it become connected in certain ways with each of 
Social these other elementary dimensions of the sociosphere. 
activity occurs in a realm that may be differentiated 
conceptually into three major spheres - a natural 'physical-
organic' environment, a technological or man-made environment, 
and a psychological or symbolic-cultural environment. 
Characteristics of nature, technology and man may equally 
influence the nature of occurrences in the sociosphere, and thus 
constitute sources of heteronomous government from the point of 
view of the purposes pursued in social aggregates. At a 
mundane level, climate and topography limit and dispose the 
types of social activity that are engaged in as surely as ,the· 
pattern of roads and buildings. The psychological constraints 
and demands that characterise the individual, his needs for 
support, achievement, and so on give rise to structural 
prerequisites for modes of social organisation. 
In the present context the connections between social aggregates 
and these three other spheres are of the most significance, but 
these connections themselves are bound to be affected by the 
three other types of relations that this schema draws attention 
to: man-nature, man-technology, and nature technology. I have 
shown that while individual human beings belong to the subject 
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pole of the sociosphere in terms of their inclusion in the 
social ag~regates which are the locus of social activities, 
there is also a sense in which some of the properties of man as 
an individual can constitute boundary conditions for social 
activities. We may note in particular, that in his relations 
with the other dimensions of the sociosphere man has the 
capacity both to become estranged from them or to idealise them. 
Insofar as the feelings an individual has and the ideas he 
propagates reflect his enstrangement or alienation from the 
world, or his idealisation of certain components of it, he may 
come to affect the quality of the aggregate experience in which 
he shares. 
Mans alienation from society - the loss of social identity and 
of a sense of purpose - is a common theme amongst writers and 
philosophers, as well as social scientists, and has been 
captured in the concept of anomie. The idealisation o~ society 
on the one hand is expressed in social utopianism, and 
Jesuitical notions of the relative values of nature and nurture. 
Alienation from nature is held by some to be the typical state 
of the city-dweller (despite his attempts periodically to remedy 
this by 'going bush'!), and consists in an estrangement from the 
land and the organic world in general. The idealisation of 
nature on the other hand is perhaps most commonly associated 
with the ideas of Rousseau, agrarianism, and such images as the 
'noble savage'. Finally, alienation from technology has been a 
very pervasive theme from Marx to Marcuse, and is associated 
with such ideas as the separation of man from the means of 
production, the 'disenchantment of the universe', and the 
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crushing of the human spirit. The idealisation of technology 
appears just now to have a limited life expectation, but it 
seems to have been an essential ingredient in the 19th century 
adulation of 'progress', and is perpetuated by a breed of people 
whom it is currently conventional to denigrate as 'technocrats'. 
The significance of the nature-technology relation I discuss 
below. 
Returning now to the interdependencies between social aggregates 
and the three major spheres of heteronomous determination, it is 
apparent that these relations may or may not be subject to 
conscious deliberation and purposeful structuring in the course 
of social activities. On the one hand, many of the purposeful 
activities which are necessary to maintain and elaborate the 
social field require that certain sociospheric relations be 
consciously organised and carefully controlled, while on the 
other many aspects of these relations remain unorganised and 
diffuse. 
There are for example, systems of action in which the social 
field and the individual are deliberately brought into 
systematic relations. The ancient institution of the school is 
perhaps the exemplary case, insofar as education is concerned 
with the deliberative transmission of culture, but family 
socialisation and the various institutions for 
,,. . l" . ' 4 h re-socia isation have the same c aracter. On the other hand 
it is perhaps more common for the individual and the social 
structure to come into contact and impinge upon one another 
without self-consciousness. The bulk of behaviour and its 
267 
consequences belong to the area of non-specific, casual, or 
spontaneous occurrences being guided possibly by some deep-lying 
assumptions~ but not consciously organised. 5 
Again, with regard to the relations between social aggregates 
and nature there is a considerable variation in the degree of 
specificity and purposiveness with which the natural world is 
taken into account. In many circumstances, dimensions of the 
natural world such as time and space, diurnal and seasonal 
variations, topography, sexuality and territoriality, exist 
principally as the setting or context of social life and are not 
themselves subject to purposeful manipulation or exploitation. 
Other social actions on the other hand involve organised and 
controlled relations with nature to a far greater degree. The 
archetype here seems to be agriculture, standing in contrast 
between a nomadic life and the permanent occupation and 
development of a natural site in the form of a settlement. As I 
will argue later, the progress.ion of technology has had the 
effect of successively reducing the salience of the 
nature-society nexus. 
Finally the interdependence of the social field and technology 
present a rather different case, because technology is entirely 
an 'artifical' creation of man,·and we tend to assume at least, 
that its very existence is a reflection of deliberation and 
purposiveness. There is nevertheless a significant area of 
social life in which technology has the character of context, or 
an extension of the natural setting rather than an integrated 
part of an organised social-technoogical complex. Thus for 
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example the city can be considered as man's technological 
habitat - a human ant-hill in which nature has been very 
extensively subordinated by the artificial environment. 
Everyday pursuit of social activities entails contacts with 
technical constructions and experiences with technology in such 
activities as communication and transportation, that correspond 
to the 'non-specific' confrontations of men and the social 
structure. These relatively haphazard meeting places of 
technoogy and society stand in considerable contrast to the 
various types of deliberately organised and controlled 
interactions of men with machinery and instruments that are 
typically known as production organisations. 
Those relations between social systems and the other elementary 
dimensions of the sociosphere which are deliberately structured 
and controlled for the purposes of attaining particular social 
ends may be conceptualised in terms of three pure types of 
socio-environmental system: Socio-physical systems, socio-
technical systems, and socio-psychological systems. These are 
'pure' types in the obvious sense that the real environments of 
social systems are invariably a mixture of them. The typology 
is therefore based on the existence in any system of social 
action of a set of relations - with nature, technology, or man -
that are dominant in terms of the functions of the system, and 





































NATURE **************** MAN *************** TECHNOLOGY 
Socio-technical and socio-psychological systems have been 
identified and discussed in the literature. They are to be 
thought of here in rather broader terms as corresponding to the 
social system-technology, and social system-individual 
interfaces. The socio-technical system concept was developed 
initially from a series of investigations of coal-mining 
conducted by the Tavistock Institute in London, to draw 
attention to the fundamental interdependence of the social and 
the technological systems in production systems (Trist and 
Bamforth: 1951; 6 Trist et al: 1963). In the process of 
systematically applying the concept of open system in the 
investigation of enterprises, Emery and Trist write as follows: 
The technological component has been found 
to play a key mediating role and hence it 
follows that the open system concept must be 
referred to the socio-technical system, not 
simply to the social system of an 
enterprise. It might be justifiable to 
exclude the technological component from the 
system concept if it were true, as many 
writers imply, that it plays only a passive 
and intermittent role. However, it cannot 
be dismissed as simply a set of limits that 
exert an influence at the initial stage of 
building an enterprise and only at such 
subsequent times as these limits are 
over-stepped. There is, on the contrary, an 
almost constant accommodation of stresses 
arising from changes in the external 
environment; the technological component not 
only sets limits upon what can be done, but 
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also in the process of accommodation creates 
demand that must be reflected in the 
internal organisation and ends of an 
enterprise. Study of a productive system 
therefore requires detailed attention to 
both the technological and the social 
components. 
(Emery and Trist: 1960:86-7) 
Subsequent application of essentially the same conceptual 
framework in the investigation of institutions whose main 
purpose is the processing of people rather than things, 
suggested that it is not primarily the nature of the techology, 
or the physical apparatus of such institutions that constitutes 
the critical boundary condition, but the unique and the common 
characteristics of the individuals that are to be acted upon. 
Thus in describing his research in a prison, Emery writes: 
The key to the difference would seem to be 
in the obvious and indisputable fact that 
one is primarily concerned with things, the 
other with human beings. The prison 
achieves its institutional ends only by 
doing certain things with and to its 
inmates. It roust therefore give primary 
considration to the psychological properties 
of the inmates, because these make some 
measures effective and others non-effective. 
These common psychological properties 
constitute the key boundary conditions of 
the prison - they are an essential part of 
the prison and yet they must, in large 
measure, be treated as a 'given' i.e., as 
existing and obeying laws and influences 
that are independent of the wishes or prison 
administrations ••• Basically, the prison is 
one of the class of socio-psychological 
institutions. It differs from hospitals -
medical and mental - and from religious, 
educational and political institutions in 
that it is based on the premise of doing 
something against the wishes of its inmates, 
and usually against their interests. 
(Emery: 1970:2) 
The third type of socio-environmental system, the socio-physical 
system, corresponds to organised interrelations between social 
systems and the natural organic environment - institutional 
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settings in which neither technology nor the psychological 
properties of individuals, but the objects and events in the 
natural universe constitute the chief boundary conditions. The 
.. 
fact that this third class of system has not been identified in 
the literature, and that it is difficult to think of any good 
examples of such systems, seems to be due to the fact that the 
direct mutual interaction between social and natural systems has 
been progressively effaced by the rise of technology. 
In much of the earlier part of this work I have been concerned 
with the particular, very powerful effects of technology upon 
the sociosphere, and I have repeatedly suggested that technology 
is responsible for a number of important ecological imbalances. 
The thesis of the drift into post-industralism promotes a 
different version of the diagrammatic representation of the 
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The process of industralisation is characterised by technology 
becoming the 'leading part' and tending to dominate the system 
of relations in the sociosphere as a whole. The 'reification' 
of technology and the ascription to it of an autonomous status 
may be a human mistake, but there is no doubt of the tremendous 
power of technology to refashion the shape of the world, and of 
our present relative ignorance of its impact upon sociospheric 
relations. A corollary to this is that socio-technical systems 
come to assume the dominant position in industrial societies. 
One of the most critical consequences of the relative ascendancy 
of technology as has been suggested, is the attenuation of the 
direct link between society and nature, the social field and the 
organic environment, that has a far more prominent place in 
pre-industrial societies. The mechanisation of agriculture for 
example has the effect that the set of relations between society 
and the organic world that are designed to satisfy the food 
requirements of a population are increasingly mediated through 
technology, such that we become more inclined to think of 
agriculture as simply another industry. 
The other central consequence of this imbalance is that 
technology and nature, which have previously had a relatively 
indirect relation to one another, mediated through man and 
society, are now brought into a direct relation - one which we 
have come to know as the ecological crisis. The significance of 
this has come to be appreciated by a number of ecologists who 
are urging and attempting to create a new social consciousness 
of the fundamental importance of the way in which society 
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relates to its natural environment, with the goal of 
re-establishing a direct link between society and technology. 
Some Implications for Societal Planning 
This interpretation points to the usefulness of the concept of 
the sociosphere for thinking about planning. If planning is 
viewed as a form of human activity designed to enhance the 
adaptive capabilities and possibilities of individuals and the 
institutions they comprise, then the concept of the sociosphere 
embraces comprehensively the realm in which planning takes 
place. 
First of all, to think of the sociosphere as the realm in which 
planning takes place, suggests that planning itself has to do 
with activities and processes, rather than objects and 
structures. As we shall see, many of the more recent and more 
useful concepts of planning now stress its significance as 
process rather than a product - as a process furthermore that 
aims to enlarge and improve .the range of activities and outcomes 
available to purposeful individuals and groups. 
It suggests also that the deliberate interventions of men in the 
universe ought to be guided by some image of the balance in 
which its main components stand to one another - an image of the 
overall system of interdependencies between man, nature, 
technology, and society (Bateson: 1973). The inference to be 
made from this is that from the point of view of the fitness of 
the sociosphere as a whole, the development of any one of these 
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four sub-systems must be directly correlated with the states of 
the other sub-systems. Insofar as planning is directed towards 
altering existing relations or effecting changes in the 
sociosphere, it needs to be highly sensitive to the possible 
consequences of intervention in any particular domain for the 
interdependencies among the main components and the state of the 
whole system. It does not seem possible in any actual instances 
of large-scale change that the existing social structure, the 
psychological state of an individual, the technological system, 
or the natural environment can be acted upon and 'improved' in 
isolation from changes in some of the other elements. 
Experimentation in the social sciences which has tried to 
isolate the effects of these different sorts of elements, both 
in natural and laboratory settings, has been more distinguished 
by its failures than by its success. To the extent that they 
jointly enter into the systems of activity to which planning is 
directed, planning must seek their joint optimisation. 
While it is possible for the choice of immediate courses of 
action to be guided by an image of some necessary balance in the 
sociosphere, practical constraints to do with the amounts of 
time, money and other resources available, and the sheer 
limitations of human cognitive abilities, dictate that actual 
courses of action tend to be limited to highly circumscribed 
facets of the totality, such as those I identified at the 
beginning of this chapter. In terms of the structural 
differentiation between the subject and the object poles it is 
apparent and to be expected that greater attention has been 
directed to the subject pole, in the design, transformation and 
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control of social systems, than to the object pole - the 
environment sphere. While principles and understandings to do 
with the 'engineering' and management of the dimensions of 
social environments - such phenomena as the ecosystem, man's 
technological habitat, and group and organisation 'climates' are 
becoming better understood, methods of directly influencing the 
structures and performances of social systems themselves attract 
more attention and have been far more extensively utilised. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER VI 
1 See for example, Jungk's account of the World War II 
'Manhatten Project' (Jungk: 1960). 
2 Dror sets out a compelling case for a more systematically 
organised area of 'policy science' (Dror: 1968). 
3 See Duncan (1964) for one exploration of the relations 
between social organisation and ecosystem. 
4. See McKorkel and Korn (1962) and Brim and Wheeler (1966) on 
the concept of re-socialisation. 
5. The 'ethnographic' approach of Goffman and others has 
encroached into this neglected area of 'taken-for-granted' 
behaviours. See especially Goffman's study of "Behaviour in 
public places" (Goffman: 1963). 




URBAN STRATEGIES, SOME PROBLEMS 
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Having now considered strategic activity in the abstract, as a 
mechanism within social fields for adapting actively in the face 
of a complex and uncertain future, and having spread this 
appreciation outwards in exploring the sociosphere as the realm 
in which strategists of ·all kinds are now being required to 
integrate and co-ordinate their efforts, I now turn to the 
substantive field of urban planning as an example of an area 
where the notion of appreciative management may be applied. The 
rationale for this is two-fold. Firstly this can be expected to 
enrich the understanding of the activity of planning by adding 
to the abstract investigation of planning as an adaptive 
mechanism for integrating and regulating the forces within, and 
impinging upon, social fields. This may be thought of as part 
of a contextualist mode of exposition (See Chapter 2), in which 
understanding of a particular kind of behaviour or process is 
sought both by 'shearing outwards' into its wider contexts, and 
by focussing inwards on particular expressions of it. This 
stands in contrast to definitional, classificatory, and 
typographical approaches, without however, denying their 
potential value. 
Secondly, as has already been indicated, the quality of urban· 
planning becomes an increasingly critical concern as a 
consequence of the world urbanization process, which means that 
for greater and greater proportions of people, the urban 
environment determines the quality of the lives that they lead. 
This is not to forget or to ignore the fundamental importance of 
the workplace in this regard, and thus to devalue the importance 
of corporate and institutional planning in general. 
---- --- -------------------------------
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Nevertheless the continuing abbreviation of the working week, 
and the tendencies now to seek greater connections between the 
workplace and the community (and to make workplaces more like 
communities), accentuate the importance of creating 
'communities' in the full traditional meaning of the term, and 
enhance the significance of the urban realm as a determinant of 
the 'quality of life' (Davis and Cherns: 1975). 
Further than this, it is in the giant urban, industrialised 
regions of the sociosphere that the basic psychological, social, 
natural and technological forces are most imbalanced and 
vulnerable to quantum changes in their effects. As a machine 
for maintaining human life the city represents the most 
extensive and complete domination of the universe by structures 
that men have made themselves - an attenuation of the 
society-nature interdependence that is inadequately compensated 
by annual rushes to coast or mountains. 
For the rest of this chapter then, I will develop a history of 
urban planning in order to contrast the definitional, 
classificatory and typographical approaches with that which may 
be possible, taking a more contextualist and appreciative 
approach. 
Urban Planning and Urban Planners - The Background1 
It is only in the last 100 years or so that communities on the 
city and metropolitan scale have become predominant in 
industrial society, and it is only within this time that the 
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city as a whole has come to be taken as a unit for policy-
making, reform, and planning. Even within this period it has 
nevertheless been more common for problems of urban living to be 
treated separately - housing conditions, poverty, open space 
provision, traffic and transportation, and so on, have typically 
been isolated under the administrative rubric of a special 
organisation or department, and treated as though solutions may 
be found to each of them independently of one another. Since 
the middle of the last century however, active intervention to 
improve urban conditions has been guided by a more and more 
comprehensive concept of the city. 
It is within this period also that the combined effects of the 
industrial revolution and the greatly accelerated increase of 
population that it nurtured, began to seriously outstrip the 
capacity of the urban centres to sustain and enhance existing 
standards of living for the majority of the population. 
Giedion has commented: 
From 1870 onward, the great cities developed 
continuously toward what they are today -
unserviceable instruments. No one knows 
when this tremendous waste of time and 
health will be stopped, when this pointless 
assault on human nerves will end, when this 
failure to achieve a dignified standard of 
life will be remedied. 
(Giedion: 1967:778) 
It is within this time therefore that city planning (as distinct 
from city design which can be credited with a much more ancient 
lineage) was recognised as a distinctive field of activity, in 
response to the gradual emergence of the kinds and scale of 
problems that have become characteristic of the modern 
metropolis. 
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The metropolis is a system much described 
and little understood. We know that it has 
emerged and this phenomenon appears as a 
phoenix-like birth from the ashes of the old 
city, which was a manageable and easily 
recognised political and social unit with 
fixed boundaries. 
(Dyckman: 1964:220) 
In fact as Benevolo has recognised, a distinctive professional 
interest and competence in urban planning did not appear until 
some decades after this new pace and scale of urban development 
began to transform the fact of industrial society and 
'metropolitanise' the city landscape: 
The birth of modern town-panning did not 
coincide with the technical and economic 
movements which created and transformed the 
industrial town; it emerged later, when 
these changes began to be felt to this full 
extent and when they began to conflict, 
making some kind of corrective intervention 
inevitable. 
(Benevolo: xi:l967) 
Many historical forces have shaped city planning from its 
earliest days - political, ideological, economic, social. 
Cherry suggests that the emergence of a comprehensive planning 
philosophy can be related in particular. to two 'universal 
streams' - "The search for the ideal city in architectural 
terms, and the social idealism of utopia." {Cherry: 1969:12). 
The first stream can be traced back to antiquity, and the first 
'urban revolution' in the fertile crescent of the lands 
bordering the Nile, Euphrates, and Indus, where there is 
evidence of designed layouts. Five centuries B.C., the Greeks 
were building cities on a chequer-board layout, and a good deal 
of evidence of civic design from Roma? times has been unearthed 
,._' 
in England and other European countries. In the modern era the 
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tradition is kept alive by such endeavours as William Penn's 
plan for Philadelphia, the work of Nash and Wren in London, 
L'Enfant's Washington, and Burley Griffin's plan for Canberra, 
the Australian National Capital. This civic design tradition 
corresponds more readily with popular conceptions of the nature 
of city planning than the social reformist tradition, and is 
usually evaluated according to artistic and aesthetic criteria 
with which architects and landscape designers are more familiar. 
The roots of the second stream - social utopianism - may if 
anything stretch even further back. Certainly the works of 
Plato. and Aristotle have been an inspiration and model for much 
subsequent speculation on the perfectibility of man and the 
possibilities of social harmony, a tradition maintained by men 
such as Francis Bacon in his "New Atlantis' (1623), and James 
Harrington's "Ocean~" (1656), and translated into practice in 
industrial societies in the design of model towns and villages. 
Of a number of community experiments in Britain in the 18th 
century, Robert Owen's New Lanark is perhaps the best known, 
while many other ideal factory-communities such as Titus Salt's 
Saltaire at Bradford, opened in 1853, George Cadbury's model 
community of Bournville (1895), and William Lever's 
profit-sharing industrial community of Port Sunlight (1890) were 
established during the 19th century. 
In some respects it is in these model communities of the later 
part of the 19th century that the convergence of the two streams 
becomes most appa,rent. The big reformist movement in England 
during the 1830's and 1840's was largely concerned with the 
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deplorable conditions of urban living and the human inequalities 
in the towns and villages that had grown through industrial-
isation. The immense overcrowding and lack of sanitation that 
so seriously jeopardised health in the large towns, and the 
general deficiences in housing and public utilities made it 
apparent that the true happiness of man was not to be found 
simply or directly in the transformation of his social 
institutions and organisations, but depended also on the radical 
improvement of his physical environment. 
Self-consciousness about the city as a qualitatively novel 
living environment, an~ a conception of it as closely connected 
system of buildings, roads, activities, communications, begins 
with the reform movements in England and America in the middle 
of the 19th century, which. had to address themselves to the 
hopeless interferences and confusions amongst these elements. 
While the aim~ of these movements are in general limited and 
remedial, they reveal embryonic conceptions of the city as a 
total environment and attempts to understand the inequities and 
pathologies within their populations in terms of the properties 
of this environment as a whole. Thus in Britain parliament 
initiated enquiries that lead to reports such as those of the 
Select Committee on the Health of Towns (1840) and the Royal 
Commission on the state of Large Towns (1840-45) which became 
the basis for reform legislation such as the Public Health Act 
of 1844 (Ashworth:l954). Gans comments that the Civic Reform 
movement got under way in America during the 1850's in response 
to a similar rapid and unregulated growth of urban areas which 
has resulted in the inadequate provision of utilities and 
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services, the accumulation of slums, and the diminution of 
municipal open space (Gans:l968). The first large-scale 
interventions designed to influence the course of urban 
developments therefore, were largely motivated by humanitarian, 
and often socialistic ideals, and where the product of groups of 
dedicated reformers. In England, the housing conditions of the 
urban poor was a major problem. It was attacked by the sanitary 
reformers - men such as Farr, Chadwick and Shaftesbury (who 
sponsored the first housing acts in 1851); by the establishment 
of philanthropic building societies; and through the 
construction of new model estates. 
This reformist movement dominated attempts to improve the urban 
areas up to the end of the century. In England, further health, 
housing and employment acts continued to attack the inner urban 
blight, and investigation into conditions of urban living 
developed on a new scale under the guidance of men such as 
Seebhom Rowntree, who was responsible for the Report of the 
Royal Commission on the Housing·. of the Working Classes (1884-5),. 
and Charles Booth, whose monumental 'Life and Labour of the 
People of London' was published in 1889. 
A new kind of more positive outlook gained prominence during the 
1880's with the launching of the 'garden city' movement in 
England and the tremendous interest created by the Columbian 
Exposition at Chicago which epitomized the 'City Beautiful' 
movement in America. The Chicago Fair of 1893, celebrating the 
quadricentennial of Columbus' landing in the New World, 
comprised a 600-acre demonstration landscape known as 'White 
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City' on the shores of Lake Michigan. More than 20 million 
Americans visited this 'temporary wonderland': 
Here was an enthralling amalgam of classic 
Greece, Imperial Rome, Renaissance Italy, 
and Bourbon Paris, as improbable in the 
Midwest as a gleaming iceberg would be in 
the Gulf of Mexico, yet somehow expressive 
of the boastfulness, the pretensions, the 
cultural dependence, the explosive energy, 
and the ingenious optimism of industrial 
America ••• the millions gaped and admired 
and almost disbelieved that so.much beauty 
had sprung up in Chicago, city of grain and 
lumber and meat, city of railroads and smoke 
and grime. The entire enchanting spectacle 
was a thrilling revelation of the power of 
architects, landscape architects, sculptors 
and painters to evoke rapture and delight. 
(Scott: 1969: 33) 
The role of this 'plaster fantasy' as a symbol of what was 
possible, and as an inspiration to other city fathers and young 
professionals far surpassed its intrinsic significance. The 
park landscape of White City, largely the work of Frederick 
Olmsted, set standards for the beautification of the city 
through the development of fine parks integrated with an 
upgraded civic architecture. 
The publication of Ebenezer Howard's 'Tomorrow - a Peaceful Path 
to Real Reform' in 1898, the subsequent foundation of the Garden 
City Association, and the establishment of the first garden city 
at Letchworth in 1903, had a similar catalytic effect on ideas 
for town development and improvement in England. Few of his 
proposals were entirely novel, but he was able to pull together 
many existing strands of critical and innovative thought and 
present them as a cogent and comprehensive scheme for the 
construction of new towns. The garden city was to grow to a 
maximum population of around 30,000, organised into a series of 
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concentric circles demarcating the civic centre, residential, 
industrial and recreation areas, with the outer fringes devoted 
to agriculture. Growth would be by the establishment of another 
garden city beyond this zone of country, until gradually a 
cluster of such cities would come into existence. 
The idea of the garden city was advanced as 
a panacea for the many dwelling problems of 
the late 19th century. The essence of the 
plan was that the community should control 
the ground, and that all prof its through 
increases in the value of the land should be 
returned to the community in order to 
discourage speculation of any sort ••• it was 
no mean achievement at which Howard aimed. 
He aspired to nothing less than the 
abolition of the evils of the industrial 
revolution, the elimination of slums and 
overcrowded industrial districts. 
(Giedion: 1967:782) 
His actual achievements on the ground were relatively modest,. 
being plagued chiefly by financial difficulties, but his. work 
crystallized new insights into the possibilities of bridging the 
gulf between town and country and taking control of town growth 
out of the hands of speculators. 
The permanent legacy of the apostles of the city beautiful and 
the garden city is not found in the bricks and mortar of White 
City of Letchworth, but in the powerful idea, backed by 
demonstration, that cities could be transformed and built anew, 
along quite different principles to those that had guided the 
initial urbanising frerizy. 2 In the garden city in particular 
the utopian vision of the social reformer and the determinism of 
the civic design tradition meet in a new conception of the city 
that is sensible and practicable. Even though resources were 
scarce for such innovations, conceptual barriers to a more 
active orientation towards the problems confronting urban 
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populations were removed by such vision, and it became more 
possible to think in terms of creating urban habitat more 
responsive to human nature, as well as coping with the existing 
conditions. 
At the turn of the century, housing and the social malaises of 
crime, poverty and disease were still the critical problems that 
aspirant planners had to face in England, though the Royal 
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Commission on London Traffic in 1905 marked the recognition of a 
powerful new debilitating force. Progressively, the 
opportunistic interventions of reformers were supported by the 
introduction of legislation giving positive powers and 
responsibilities to city and municipal authorities, and by the 
development of a professional interest and concern in planning 
as well as simply building cities, among architects and 
engineers. England's first Town Planning Act of 1909 was in 
some regards simply an extension of provisions previously 
enacted, but was of critical importance as a symbol of change in 
orientation of policy towards recognizing the need for a more 
comprehensive form of attack. 
This act showed evidence that many of the arguments of the town 
planning movement were understood. That the scope of town 
planning should be wider than that found in the older sanitary 
and housing legislation. The next act stated that the general 
object of town planning schemes was to secure 'proper sanitary 
conditions, amenity and convenience in connection with the 
laying out and use of land (covered by the scheme), and of any 
neighbouring lands' (as quoted in Ashworth: 1954:184). 
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In that same year the opening of the School of Civic Design at 
Liverpool University under Patrick Abercrombie symbolized the 
growth of a specialised interest in the problems of city 
development, and it was only a few years later, in 1913, that 
the British Town Planning Institute was founded, drawing its 
membership principally from the Royal Institute of British 
Architects, The Institution of Civil Engineers, and the 
Surveyors Inst.itution. The American Institute of Planners was 
founded shortly afterwards in 1917. 
The emergence of the planning profession in America belongs to 
the period 1907-1919, America's progressive era. The full 
building up of the urban areas exhausted the adaptability of the 
stark grid pattern, and the increasing density and conflicts of 
users drew more attention to the welfare dimensions of planning. 
Although there were a few piecemeal reports before 1906, there 
were no surveys, general planning, or professional planners as 
such. Between 1907 and 1917, over a hundred towns undertook 
'comprehensive planning', half of the 50 largest cities, 13 
percent of all with populations over 10,000. By 1917 there were 
dozens of municipal information clearing houses, a range of 
technical literature, and three planning orientated magazines 
whose aim was to record knowledge of planned cities and the 
history of 'municipal science in the making' (Hancock: 
1967:294). 
As in England, 1909 was a pivotal year, being in this case the 
date of the first National Conference on City planning and the 
problems of Congestion, convened at Washington, with 
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representatives from 'health, housing, law, social work, 
engineering, architecture, landscape architecture'. The 
N.C.C.P., as it became in the following year, developed into the 
chief forum for the discussion of urban reform and technical 
means for achieving it. 
In the early decades of this century therefore, planning became 
institutionalised, and set about the formulation of legislative 
instruments and planning techniques that would make the 
conscious and deliberate control of city expansion a normal 
policy concern of local and central governments. Then as today, 
the planners were part of a relatively small intellectual elite 
who saw more clearly than the masses of city dwellers the traps 
of congestion, spiralling land costs, neighbourhood decay and 
ghettoization, the loss of open space and other amenity, but as 
the servants of less far-sighted political masters, their 
advances had to be piecemeal and not revolutionary. Generally, 
to extend the existing city was easier than to conceive and 
implement new forms for urban areas, and try to win acceptance 
for them, and the development of housing estates and garden 
suburbs on the urban fringes, often influenced by Perry's 
'neighbourhood unit' concept, absorbed far more of the young 
profession's attention than new town ventures. 
Planning became identified with the spatial problems of land 
use, and identified as its chief instruments the master or 
Statutory Plan, which combined zoning regulations with a variety 
of codes establishing standards for the construction of housing, 
roads, utilities and so on. Gans records that the early decades 
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of 20th century planning in America were characterised by the 
emergence of semi-independent commissions staffed prodominantly 
by architects and engineers, whose bias towards physical 
determinism was consolidated in a Master Planning ideology 
The typical Master Plan, which has changed 
relatively little since the first one was 
drafted in 1914, portrays a future ideal: a 
city without slums, divided into zones for 
each major land use, with efficient highway 
and mass transit systems, vastly increased 
amounts of open and recreational space and 
other public cultural facilities, and served 
by a system of neighbourhood, district and 
downtown retail and civic centres. The 
proposals for new facilities and re-arranged 
land-use and transportation patterns are 
synthesized into a master plan map, with 
proposals for implementing this map through 
a zoning ordinance to order land use as 
prescribed by the plan, building codes to 
discourage slums, subdivision regulations to 
guide the development of vacant land, and 
governmental re-organisation schemes to 
implement the proposed changes. 
(Gans: 1968:130) 
Scott notes that the foundation membership of the American 
Institute of Planners numbered 52, and included "fourteen 
landscape architects, thirteen engineers, six attorneys, five 
architects, four realtors, two publishers, two 'housers', and an 
assorted group of writers, tax specialists, land economists, 
educators, and public officials" (Scott:l969). In comparison to 
England however, the prospects for extending physical planning 
into the socio-economic realm were already advantaged by the 
establishment of sociology as a respectable discipline, and the 
interest of men such as Park and Burgess in the specific 
problems of 'urban social ecology'. There was also in America 
an earlier recognition of the need for extending the concern for 
metropolitan planning beyond the city boundaries to embrace 
regional planning, a need formally recognised in the New Deal 
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programme of the 30's, and given its model expression in the 
Tennessee Valley Authority. The inter-war period was also marked 
by growing recognition of the importance of national economic 
planning, and the need to integrate urban development with 
planning at this level. The Roosevelt administration championed 
national planning, and in its first year approved a National 
Industrial Recovery Act from which the National Planning Board 
was created in 1933. 
A number of new ideas in community development were put forward 
and experimented upon: Perry's concept of the neighbourhood unit 
of between 3,000 and 10,000 people, centred on their own schools 
and shops; the Radburn housing and estate development in New 
Jersey (1929); Tugwell's ambitious programme for Greenbelt towns 
- satellite communities on the perimeters of existing cities to 
house in garden city conditions the inhabitants of inner city 
slums, which were to be torn down and replaced with parks; Frank 
Lloyd Wright's concept of Broadacre City - a self-sufficient, 
low density, rtiral community; the.'parkway' system, precursor of 
present urban freeways, largely the inspiration of Olmsted.· 
The early years of town planning in England aiso boasted some 
far-sighted and creative individuals, in men such as Raymond 
Unwin, Patrick Geddes, and Patrick Abercrombie. As in America 
however, the need for a radical redirection of urban development 
patterns was not sufficiently obvious or sufficiently pressing 
at that time for any comprehensive policy to replace the 
practice of coping with the expanding population and their 
increasing mobility through the accretion of suburban housing 
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schemes, and from the 1930's, the construction of city tower 
blocks, many of which became slums on a vertical plane, 
replacing their horizontal predecessors. The garden city idea 
was 'corrupted' by translation to the 'garden suburb', and 
raised objections due to the amount of agricultural land thereby 
consumed, and the commuting problems that it enormously 
amplified. 
Nevertheless, just as the basis of intervention had previously 
been enlarged from health and welfare concerns to the regulation 
of land use and building structures, the horizons of town 
planning continued to enlarge. There were signs that among a 
few people a changing concept of the scope and nature of town 
planning was becoming acceptable, where the emphasis was moving 
from the design of residential estates to. the more general 
problem of the allocation of land among various uses (Ashworth: 
1954:202). Planning was beginning to be viewed then, less in 
terms of mere visual appearance, health and amenity, and more in 
terms of economic function. But as stressed above, by 1930 
these changed views were those only of a minority and their 
subsequent spread through the town planning profession and their 
achievement of some influence on public opinion was of major 
significance in the development of a recognisable national town 
planning policy. 
Many of the strengths of the British town planning tradition 
(and perhaps some of its weaknesses) derive from its national 
statutory basis, and the strong links which this has forged with 
the local government organisation. Since the first revision of 
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this statutory basis in 1919, which obliged every borough and 
urban district with a population of more than 20,000 to prepare 
a town-planning scheme, to the town planning act of 1968, which 
includes a statutory guarantee for the citizen that he must be 
given the pertinent information about intended schemes and the 
opportunity to comment, town planners and town planning have had 
a recognised role in local government administration, and urban 
development has been ari agenda item of local politics. While 
practice has seldom matched provision, there is as a result a 
well established tradition of public involvement at least of the 
negative sort - undesirable or unwanted schemes being blocked by 
public protest. 
The Current Urban Crisis: Cities in Turbulence 
The first 40 years or so of professional town planning in 
Britain and America was naturally a period of trial and error, 
in which the young but rapidly expanding body of professional 
planners strove for legitimation in the eyes of public and 
politicians by originally cautious and usually poorly-funded 
attacks on the worst problems of the city, brought about by the 
rapid industrialisation of society during the preceding century. 
Experience in such problem-solving accumulated, and together 
with the expansion of planning education in the universities, 
contributed to an ever-enlarging base in information and 
relevant skills. The two World Wars and the intervening 
Depression were perhaps in the long run a boon to planners, 
helping to establish a climate of opinion more favourable to 
active large-scale interventions, while the widespread 
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destruction during the second war in many industrial centres in 
Europe, provided a unique opportunity for extensive rebuilding. 
Although all this occurred many decades after the industrial age 
city had arrived, there were signs that its novel dimensions and 
their implications for an industrial way of life were being 
recognised and attracting the special attention and larger 
resources that they deserved. 
From the vantage point of the present~ it appears that the 
emergence of town planning as a separate specialised function of 
government was in itself no more than the orthodox reaction in 
society to Type III conditions of complexity. Under such 
conditions, as in the oligopolic market, the identification and 
conceptualisation of a new problem area or of new opportunities 
arising in the field is met by the creation of a new functioning 
body with a mission explicitly directed at exploiting or 
neutralising the changed circumstances. There thus arises a 
rough one-to-one correspondence between organisational elements 
and publicly identified areas or jurisdiction, with some 
elements disappearing as they pass from the public policy agenda 
and fall to the bottom in budget priorities, and other being 
added as new causes are won or new contingencies arise. At the 
national level the titles of government portfolios and public 
service departments not only allocate responsibility, but 
condition and reflect the way in which societal problems are 
perceived. The establishment of separate organisations, 
.sections and positions with responsibility for city planning has 
generally reflected the felt need for some co-ordination and 
guidance of the processes of the growth and regeneration of 
··--·-- ... ·-
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urban structure, that cannot be adequately met within the 
framework of existing administrative responsibilities. In the 
government of cities, city planning therefore took its place 
alongside departments of housing, health, employment, education, 
social welfare, water, sewerage and electricity authorities, and 
so on, with prime responsibility for the physical structure of 
the city. 
Although it is obvious that the separation of domains of concern 
such as housing, education, and employment inevitably imposes a 
somewhat artificial division upon often very complex individuals 
and social circumstances, it is a system that can work at quite 
a complex level of needs and demands, providing that there is an 
adequate level of co-ordination among the many providers and 
regulators, so that their governmental roles. are not only to a 
degree mutually exclusive of one another (avoiding duplication) 
and collectively exhaustive of the reasonable demands of the 
community they serve, but that they are sufficiently in touch 
and in agreement on objectives to be able to re-allocate 
resources and responsibilities among themselves when the need 
arises. 
There now seems to be general agreement that in the years since 
the end of the last world war a whole new order of problems has 
arisen in the city, and the metropolis the theatre of war in 
which some of the most divisive and pervasive problems of 
societal regulation are currently having to be faced. The rapid 
growth of the metropolitan areas, their coalescence into 
connurbations and 'megalopolis', caused by rural-urban migration 
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and natural·increases in population~ is itself an element of the 
drift into post-industrialism; the pathologies of the 
metropolis, which have been so.thoroughly described over the 
last three decades, are symptoms of the turbulent society 
discussed in earlier chapters - the unregulable residue of 
disorder and distress beyong the powers or capacities of 
existing institutional arrangements (Fischer: 1976). 
As the city planners were winning for themselves a recognised 
and respected role in urban government, and working out the 
manifold ways in which their responsibilities for planning the 
physical environment related to the responsibilities of other 
bodies concerned with local government, health, public transport 
and so on, the environment to which their activities were 
adapted was itself in the embryonic stages of a revolutionary 
change which may now be summed up as 'metropolitanization'. 
The Metropolis 
The preconditions for the present crisis are to be found largely 
in the phenomenal rates of growth of urban areas during this 
century. In the period 1900 - 1950 in the United States for 
example, when the total population increased from 76 million to 
150 million, the number of cities with populations in excess of 
lG0,000 increased from 82 to 147, and their total population 
from 24.1 million to 84.3 million, representing a percentage. 
change in the metropolitan population from 31.9 per cent to 56 
per cent of the nation's population. In 1960 approximately 63 
per cent of the tota1. population were living in 212 Standard 
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Metropolitan Statistical Areas, whereas the proportion of the 
population living in urban areas corresponding to these 
S.M.S.A.'s in 1940 was only about 40 per cent of the total. 
Behind these rates of population increase lies a qualitative 
change in the nature of the urban areas and the nature of urban 
living (Statistics from Glaab and Brown: 1967). 
The 20th century has seen the growth of the metropolises in the 
United States reach a stage which represents a dramatic 
demographic development going beyond the mere statistics of 
population. Involved in the concept of the modern metropolis 
are complex changes of function and structure within the city 
and its suburban areas - decentralisation of numerous 
activities, separation of areas of residence and work, and a 
high mobility over greatly extended spatial areas, together with 
involved relationships with other cities and urban areas outside 
the immediate limits of the urban region. 
Whereas the term 'metropolis' has been used to refer to the 
extension of the influence of the large city over enormous 
metropolitan peripheries, the term 'megalopolis' has had to be 
invented to describe vast urban regions such as the eastern USA 
seaboard that contain several linked metropolitan centres. We 
have then the notion of the United States as consisting 
essentially of three or four loose, sprawling megalopolises 
separated by small stretches of largely empty countryside. It 
may be said that the city is destroyed by its own success 
(Boulding: 1963). The paradox is that by the time 90 per cent 
of the population are urban, the city has really ceased to have 
any meaning in itself. 
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As an Australian, I find it still occasions surprise that 
Australia, with a fraction of the population of the United 
States occupying an area not a great deal smaller, is in fact 
more highly urbanized. Not only is the population as a whole 
highly urbanised, .but it is concentrated in the six state 
capitals, which contained 57 per cent of the national population 
in 1966 (a figure which has more or less stabilised), though 
this concentration has increased progressively throughout this 
century as the following table indicates. 
percentage of metropolitan 
state's population area population 
STATE CAPITALS 1911 1966 1966 
Sydney 42 58 2,447,219 
Melbourne 45 65 2,110,336 
Brisbane 23 43 719 ,2 78 
Adelaide 45 66 720,279 
Perth 38 59 500,246 
Hobart 32 119 ,469 
Degree of Urbanisation in Australian Capitals 
Whereas only 30 per cent of the national population lived in the 
capital cities in 1901, it is expected that 70 per cent will do 
so by the end of the century. The current planning for the 
Sydney region envisages a growth in Sydney's population from 2.7 
million in 1968 to about 5.5 million by the year 2000, by which 
time the annual growth rate may be approaching 100,000 people a 
year. Rural.New South Wales, of which Sydney is the capital, 
represents something of a mirror image, with 85 of its 130 
shires having negative growth rates in the period since 1961 
(Census Statistics. Australian Bureau of Statistics: 1966). 
I 
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Although the scale of urbanisation and its consequences are of a 
different order of magnitude for Australia, compared to North 
America and most of the European countries, the planning 
problems of the large metropolitan regions, in terms of this 
thesis, are equally those of regulating turbulence. The failure 
so far to meet the requirement of such highly uncertain and 
volatile planning environments is acknowledged in the major 
resolution of the 'Canberra Forum' in 1970, a novel alliance of 
planners and Cities of the 21st Century: 
We, the Canberra FORUM of Australia's 
Architects, Planners, Landscape Architects 
and Architectural Students, having met in 
serious discussion and considered expert 
analyses of the future of our urban areas, 






Australia is facing an urban crisis 
Our sordid, sprawling cities are the 
result of past indifference and lack of 
co-ordination and forethought 
Our environment has not been planned, -
it has just happened 
In part, the cause has been that the 
responsibility for our cities is divided 
amongst dozens of authorities 
In part, it has been that we have not 
considered carefully enough the long term 
consequences of economic, political and ' 
social polities. 
We voice our alarm to all levels of 
government and offer a National Alliance for 
immediate action in order that our urban 
society is not overwhelmed by this crisis. 
The abilities and the resources to deal with 
these issues already exist. What is 
required is mobilisation of these resources 
and the opportunity to get on with the job. 
(Canberra Forum 1970, Proceedings: xi) 
The American authors of 'Metropolis in crisis' caution against 
the exaggeration of the difficulties to be faced: 
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The widespread use of the concept crisis 
calls for a sober appraisal of the very term 
and the reasons why we use it so freely ••• 
it should be recognised that excessive use 
. or misuse of a concept may result in a 
weakening of its impact. The work crisis 
calls for a response and if it becomes 
commonplace it may no longer convey a sense 
of urgency. Our use of the word crisis in 
the title of this volume is not without some 
misgivings. But if crisis is an appropriate 
word to use at all, it seems to us 
appropriate to apply it to the city. 
(Hadden et al: 1967:vi-vii) 
The prevailing image, even in the early years of this century of 
the city as 'urbs' in an agricultural surround, determined in 
its form and function by physical considerations such as the 
need for defence, access to production and topographical 
characteristics, and maintained by fixed and established 
networks of transportation, communications and service 
facilities, has guided the management of urban systems even 
while such considerations became osbolete or irrelevant. 
While the more obvious obstacles to the wholesale replanning of 
cities have been those of financial and real estate interests 
(McHale: 1969:289), much of the present failure to conceive of 
new city forms lies with the traditional ideal form model. This 
has become restricted to the 19th century version of the 
multi-purpose city as a static agglomeration of commercial/ 
industrial production and distributing points related to 
materials, transportation and warehousing. Urban living was 
tucked into the interstices of a system for earning a living or 
controlling the production and flow of material goods and 
wealth. 
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In contrast to this conception, the city has become during the 
last three decades a chronically self-exciting system, initially 
primed by its dramatic increase in size and scale. Radical 
increases in urban population due to the focussing of economic 
activities in the city areas places an intolerable strain on 
both housing capacities and the capacity of original core areas. 
The multiplication of users chokes the central business 
district, where commercial and office enterprises expand upwards 
in high rise buildings to meet new demands for space. Inner 
city dwellers, unable to face new levels of inconvenience and 
soaring land prices retreat to the suburbs. The suburbs, 
already expanding into the countryside to· cope with migration to 
the city and the rehousing of slum dwellers, aggravate the 
greater costs of utility provision in outlying districts. The 
expansion of suburbia defeats its own benefits when employment 
is left behind in the city and the 'journey to work.' problem 
adds psychic costs and volumes of exhaust fumes to the balance 
sheet of city living. The industrial and manufacturing 
enterprises required to produce the consumer goods of the 
swelling population and the wages to guarantee their 
consumption, further destroy the natural amenities of clear air 
and water, and freedom from noise. The construction of city 
freeways and requirements for on-site parking in city offices 
bring more vehicles into the centre faster than before, at an 
enormous cost in land acquisition and rehousing schemes, and at 
the same time reduces the appeal of public transport systems. 
The forced relocation of industry, and the voluntary relocation 
of retailers away from the centre, enhance its environmental 
possibilities and help solve suburban shopping problems, but at 
302 
the same time remove the tax base from which comprehensive 
improvement schemes might be financed. 
The Problem of Growth: the Turbulent Environment 
While a village may grow into a town through increases in the 
scale and capacity of its retail, residential, production, 
recreation, transport and utility systems and continue to 
function without undue interference between the requirements of 
these different elements, the passage to metropolitan scale has 
resulted in their mutual invasion and excitation with the 
increasing competition for space, freedom of movement, and other 
scarce resources. The traditional jurisdictional boundaries of 
government and administration are overtaken by the appearance of 
meta-problems, and the probabilities of the effective 
co-ordination of agencies successively reduced by their 
increasing numbers and specialisation. 
Traffic is just one example of such a meta~problem. As the 
Buchanan report has clearly demonstrated, the problem of city 
traffic can no longer be thought of as a problem that has to do 
simply with vehicles, roads and journeys, if we are to have any 
chance of working out a tolerable solution, but has to be 
approached conceptually and operationally as a problem of the 
whole system (Buchanan: 1963). 
Contemporary literature on the city as a human habitat is 
characterised by its pathos, reflected in many of the titles 
that have been chosen: "The death and life of great American 
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Cities" (Jacobs: 1962), "Cities in trouble" (Glazer: 1970), 
"Cities in a race with time" (Lowe: 1967), "Metropolis in 
crisis" (Hadden et al: 1967), "The exploding metropolis" 
(Fortune: 1957), "Sick Ci ties" (Gordon: 1963), "Taming 
megalopolis" (Eldredge: 1967). Their chapter headings catalogue 
the meta-problems that the metropolis has to confront. Crime 
and juvenile delinquency, racial conflict poverty and urban 
blight, traffic congestion, pollution, psychological distress 
and mental breakdown. In the heightened density of interaction 
and interdependence of metropolitan living each of these assumes 
the character of a systemic malfunctioning, its occurrence and 
perpetuation being intimately bound up with the conditions that 
constitute urbanism as a way of life, such that their 
improvement or eradication is a problem of effecting change in 
the whole system. 
Although Duncan and his colleagues were not primarily concerned 
in their study of "Metropolis and region" with exploring the 
dimensions of this urban crisis, they comment informatively on 
the underlying structural conditions with which they are 
connected. 
The maladies on this familiar roster -
traffic congestion, housing obsolescence, 
frictions among shifting population groups, 
financial quandaries, governmental 
fragmentation, and the like - are most 
likely not fundamental problems in 
themselves. Rather they symptomatically 
reflect an accumulat-ion of lags in the 
mutual adjustment of units and functions of 
the metropolitan community-lags which are 
perhaps inevitable in a period of sporadic 
and unco-ordinated, though not unrelated, 
changes in community structure. 
(Duncan et al: 1960:1) 
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These lags or failures of adjustment are reflected especially in 
the multiplication of governmental and other agencies and the 
lack of c.o-ordination among them. Such organisational 
maladjustments are typically exacerbated by the continuous 
shortage of funds in view of what needs to be done, and by the 
characteristic difficulties of sharing out planning functions 
betwen state, city and local governments in a fashion that 
preserves strategic control while making the best use of 
initiatives and resources at the local level. More 
fundamentally, the global characteristics of the field within 
which these meta-problems become manifest include conditions 
which are inimical to their solution. The concepts of private 
property developed during the agricultural and industrializing 
eras, and in particular the concept of private property in land, 
constitute a formidable field resistance to the guidance of 
change in the form and functions of the city. The concept.is 
supported by other notions of individual rights that have failed 
to take· account of the increasing vulnerability of the public 
good, and the need for responsibilities as well as rights to 
achieve social recognition. 
Interdependence of Systems 
As internally the metropolis brings a new order of complication 
to public policy-making, so externally it is more and more 
deeply implicated in national and international systems of 
interdependence. The extension and filling in of the 
communications net at these levels put geographically distinct 
urban regions more closely in touch so that formerly isolated 
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occurrences can become national topics of interest within hours. 
The race riots and the campus rebellions of the late 60's in 
America 'went off' like a string of firecrackers, with similar 
armouries and tactics being used from east to west. At the same 
time the desperate need for Federal financial assistance links 
the fates of the metrpolitan areas even more tightly within the 
ambit of national economic strategy and success. Even though 
the costs of completely rebuilding the decaying city centres 
will be enormous, comparisons with the costs of the Indo-China 
war are invidious, and outspoken leaders such as John Lindsay 
made an issue of reconstruction at home versus destruction 
overseas. 
Recapitulation: The Need for New Strategies 
As outlined in earlier chapters, the dimensions along which 
social fields are becoming transformed - the acceleration but 
uneveness of change, increasing overall size and complexity 
together with greater interdependence of the constituent parts, 
and such symptoms of this transformation as future shock, 
fragmentation of the social fabric, alienation, and increasing 
vulnerability to becoming ecologically trapped, are especially 
descriptive of those regions of the sociosphere in which the 
metropolitan way of life has become established. The rapidly 
altering city skyline - new buildings going up and the old 
coming down, and new road configurations requiring adjustment to 
mental maps of the city; the powerlessness and insignificance of 
the individual voice and the diminution of the individual's 
private world (Slater: 1975); the immense vulnerability of the 
-------------------------------------
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life of the city to power, garbage, and transport strikes; the 
great stumbling blocks of personal motor transport and private 
ownership of land, threatening and adaptive capabilities of the 
public body by upholding its democratic traditions. 
Both those formally engaged in the maintenance, management and 
planning of the urban habitat, and those for whom it is the 
milieu of their social existence, experience an expanding range 
and variability of conditions that have to be taken into 
account, an increasing differentiation and specialisation of the 
component parts and functions, and an overall volume of change 
and variety that challenges institutional and cultural 
capacities of absorption. 
For example, the growth of cultural pluralism and the 
variegation of values across the social field, that are the 
reflection of cosmopolitanism, present both puzzles and threats 
to the culturally orthodox, and further complications to the 
managers and planners obliged to respona to community value 
preferences. While the segregation of ethnic groups in the 
cities of Australia, England and America enhances their 
prospects of cultural survival and self-control, this increases 
the heterogeneity of the whole system and may be at the expense 
of its control when the relations of the life of such 
sub-systems to the goals of the total systems are not well 
appreciated. The individualism and cultural permissiveness of 
districts such as San Francisco's Haight Ashbury, Chelsea's 
Kingsroad and Soho's Carnaby Street in London and Sydney's Kings 
Cross, evoke reactions as varied as the individuals they 
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attract, but as enclaves of individual and social experiment-
ation they compound the 'surfeit of subcultures' (Toffler), 
adding to the bewildering variety of alternative life styles. 
The crisis for city planners engendered by the urban population 
explosion and the 'metropolitanization' of the city is that of 
reconciling the gap between present planning capabilities and 
the kinds of response that are demanded by an environment that 
is beginning to assume its own dynamic. The problem of 
( 
regulation for the formal metropolitan planning organisation is 
one that can no longer be met through its 'organisational set' -
the network of reciprocal relations with other powerful 
organisations. Greater co-:-ordination here is a holding action, 
but no solution in the long run when the ground underneath all 
of these systems is itself shifting. Toynbee introduces an 
extremely apt metaphor for comprehending the transformation that 
is occurring, when he refers to 'cities on the move': 
Some people in technologically 
'advanced' countries have become aware that 
our cities are now on the move, and have 
become alive to the consequent menace to the 
well-being of mankind and perhaps even to 
its survival. We have awoken late in the 
day, and we cannot yet tell whether we shall 
have been too late to save ourselves from 
being overwhelmed by the onrush of our 
mobile cities. Present-day cities are 
moving at the speed of an avalanche rather 




Looking at these problems in terms of the previously presented 
framework, my earlier analysis of system adaptations to their 
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environment identified two forms of maladaptive response to 
turbulence, the active and the passive, the former corresponding 
to the persistence of strategies appropriate at the disturbed-
reactive level of environment, and the latter to attempts to 
downgrade the inherent complexity of the situation by 
artifically segregating it into segments that can be coped with 
by already understood behaviours. The dynamics of the passive 
maladaptations were suggested by Angyal, and have been 
elaborated by Emery: 
It seems only natural that men will seek 
ways of reducing the turbulence to the point 
where their learnt responses to disturbed 
reactive environments are again adaptive. 
Any generally effective way of doing so 
implies segregation (Dis-integration) of the 
social field so that men have to cope with 
only a part or an aspect of that field. All 
such responses are forms of passive 
adaptation. They are triggered off by the 
environment. They are also essentially 
defence mechanisms. in that they seek to 
negate, downgrade, the environmental 
texturing with which they are confronted. 
(Emery and Trist: 1972:58) 
Purposeful systems have choices in the ways in which they can 
segregate turbulent environments and counter their 
over-complexity and over-stimulation, yielding the three 
previously discussed patterns of superficiality, segmentation 
and dissociation. They can sacrifice their psychic and the 
deeper cultural bonds, or zeitgeist, as axioms for determining 
the basis of what is to be responded to; they may concentrate on 
the pursuit of their separate and selfish ends in disregard of 
the integrative needs of the wider systems of which they are 
part; and they may dissociate themselves from the collaboration 
with others on the co-production of social ends. These 
defensive strategies are more likely to be pursued by those 
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parts of the field constituting the ground upon which the 
figural matrix of powerful organisational elements imposes 
structure under disturbed-reactive conditions (See especially 
Chapters 1 and 3 and Emery and Trist: 1972:57ff). 
The three corresponding active maladaptations, which have ~ 
been previously identified - synoptic idealism, authorit-
arianism, and evangelicism, are mechanisms of 'attack' rather 
than defence, and seem more likely to be adopted by those units 
which represented the loci of power and field determination 
under the simpler environmental conditions. Responses of this 
sort are based on a.misrepresentation of the new field forces 
coming into operation, and treat the over-complexity of 
turbulence as though it were a purely quantitative modification 
of the existing level, requiring greater organisational capacity 
to mobilise resources and the refinement of existing regulative 
procedures. 
Passive responses to the bewildering transformation of personal 
and organisational environments in the zones of concentrated 
urbanisation are manifest in withdrawal and reduction of 
commitment - a greater indifference to incomprehension, both 
personal and institutional, to the fate of the wider systems and 
the quality of the whole environment. Attempts to define a new 
and more constructive role for the corporation in the 
post-industrial urban realm offer hopes of a more positive 
engagement between corporate and community requirements, but 
still lack significant practical expression. 3 
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At the personal level, apathy towards local government 
organisations as potential vehicles for action, and limitation 
of involvement in the planning process to obstructive protests 
when self-interests are threatened, simplify personal worlds, 
the worlds of individuality, at the cost of energies available 
to the community as a whole. The physical withdrawal to 
suburbia, and thence behind family walls and fences, has similar 
effects in severing possible lines of action. 
After reviewing some of the commoner criticisms of suburbia -
the psychological consequences of scattered low density living, 
the increased cost of utilities, the use of valuable farm land, 
and so on, Gans comments: 
A much more valid criticism of 
suburbanization is its effect on class and 
racial segregation, for the fact that the 
suburbs have effectively zoned out the poor 
and the non-whites is resulting in an 
ever-increasing class and r~cial 
polarization of city and suburb. 
(Gans: 1970:44-5) 
C.Wright Mills exercises a popular theme of his, the contrasts 
between 'private troubles' and 'public troubles' in discussing 
the comparable strategy of the rich: 
For many upper-class people, the personal 
solution to 'the problem of the city' is to 
have an apartment (with private garage under 
it) in the heart of the city and 100 miles 
out, a house and garden by notable 
architects, on a 100 acres of private land. 
In these two controlled environments - with 
a small staff at each end and a private 
heiicopter connection - most people could 
solve many of the personal problems caused 
them by the fact of the city. But all this, 
however splendid, does not solve the public 




By such means as these social and psychological distances can be 
maintained and personal worlds can remain relatively inviolate 
in the midst of revolutionary changes. The power of such 
defence mechanisms become manifest when 'undesirable elements' 
intrude into homogenized suburbs and educe communal rejection 
symptoms, and in the staggering dissociation of passers-by from 
violent personal assaults on city streets (The Argus: 29.7.83). 
Superficial Responses 
Insofar as superficiality of responses becomes a dominant 
characteristic in social aggregates, and conform.ism, 
fashiortability, conventionality and the like come to guide the 
selection of objectives and activities, eccentricity and 
non-conforming behaviour are likely to be viewed as subversive. 
Thus, members of society are thrust aside or move aside, not 
because they constitute a viable social sub-system with goals in 
conflict with the larger system, but because as individuals they 
are non-confoiming. They refuse to be indifferent to the costs 
of their individual behaviour and are outcast as alcoholics, 
perverts, beatnicks, eggheads, or punks. This maladaptive mode 
cari become such an unquestioned part of social life that 
integrated communities of schools and families can tear 
themselves apart, for example, on the length of boys hair, 
·without laughing as they do so.· Thus, insofar as the 
non-conformists are an identified source of social variance, 
then their exclusion seems to reduce the total amount· of. 
relevant variance in the envi rortmerit ·(See Chapters 2, 3 and 4). 
312 
Dissociation on the other hand is primarily a psychological 
copying mechanism that does not require or create social 
consensus (Emery and Trist: 1972) The pay-off, the apparent 
adaptiveness of the mode, is some sort of positive function of 
the extent to which the individual lives his daily life, 
travelling, earning, working, entertaining is a mass condition. 
Little wonder that dissociation (Durkheim's anomie) has always 
been a charge laid by traditional societies at the gates of the 
cities. In turbulent environments it is not the mass character 
and anomie per se that encourages this mode of passive 
adaptation but the increasingly unpredictable nature of what 
might follow from even seemingly trivial involvement with 
others. 
Similar strategies are available to planners and others with 
responsibilities for the guidance of change within the whole 
system, when this becomes dynamic and unstable to a degree that 
makes attempts at overall regulation appear futile. Such 
segregation is likely to appear conceptually as well as in the 
performance of tasks, in the way in which the system to be 
planned is conceived, and the way in which planning roles are 
defined and defended. Thus even while the tides of urban-rural 
migration were ;flooding the cities and laying bare the 
countryside traditional master planning with its basic tool of 
the zoning ordinap.ce stopped at the city limits, drawing a 
political boundary around its area of concern when the decisive 
phenomena were socio-economic. While it is now almost de rigeur 
for metropolitan plans to be conceived iri regional t~rms, 
including the area within which the metropolis exerts a decisive 
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influence, and within which its growth may be contained, the 
major change thereby effected is of ten greater control over 
peripheral subdivision and the inter-metropolitan communication 
net, and not the needed reconceptualization of the metropolis as 
an organic part of the wider state and national networks of 
resources and activities. 
Just as areas of concern can be physically circumscribed in a 
way that places some limits on the problems to be faced, so can 
the planners role be defined in a way that demarcates his 
responsibilities. The lengthy preoccupation of city planners 
with physical land-use planning has thus had the effect of 
insulating them from many of the problems and pathologies of 
city life that appear to be extraneous to the system of 
relationships operating between the built environment and the 
behaviours of people. Davidoff quotes from Farbman on the 
consequences of the 'physical bias': 
The physically biased planner plans on the 
assumption (conviction) that the physical 
problems of a city can be solved within the 
framework of physical desiderata; in other 
words that physical problems can be 
adequately stated, solved and remedied 
according to physical criteria and 
expertise. The physical bias produces both 
an iriability and an unwillingness on the 
part of the planner to 'get behind' the 
physical recommendations of the plan, to 
isolate, examine, or discuss more basic 
criteria ••• 
(Davidoff: 1965:338) 
When city planning is reduced to physical planning it tends to 
be seen as a set of design and engineering problems and not of 
socio-economic and political problems. In these terms the city 
may be viewed as a functional system, or instrument, for 
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satisfying the needs, or at least some of the needs of its 
inhabitants. The task of planning centres on the ordered 
provision of all the ingredients that are deemed necessary for 
city life - such elements as housing, industry and commerce, 
education, transport systems, health, sporting and cultural 
facilities have to be provided and functionally related to one 
another. For these purposes people may be regarded simply as 
house-holders, members of the labour force, consumers or power, 
goods and services, car drivers, and so forth. If behavioural 
assumptions are added, they tend to be assumptions about 
tendencies of individuals to maximise or optimise certain 
behaviours. Thus for example the model of rational economic man 
may be adopted and employed in planning decisions concerned with 
the provision of public transport or retail facilities, and 
together with other simplifying assumptions, issues in planning 
techniques such as gravity modelling and central place theory. 
Other assumptions may be made - for example that vehicle drivers 
w~ll always take the most direct or the fastest route between 
two points, that people want to maximise their standards of 
living, that people prefer clean and modern buildings to ;ancient 
and decayed ones. 
This may be something of a caricature, but not necessarily too 
exaggerated. Physical planners must be concerned to optimise. 
the physical environment of the city to build a system for 
living in that is functional, economic and efficient. The 
important things to know about people are what they need and 
what they want in the way of facilities, and whether they like 
or do not like various aspects of the built environment, so that 
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when the opportunity occurs for building it again, their needs 
may be better satisfied. For the physical planner the relevance 
of the social sciences, if any such thing is acceded to, is 
thought to lie in their ability to explain and predict the 
relations between particular physical structures and 
environmental settings, and the kind of social behaviours that 
they give rise to. 
A further consequence of viewing the city primarily as a 
physical system from the point of view of planning, is that it 
becomes easier for the planners to seek legitimation in terms of 
expertise and professional qualifications, and correspondingly 
more difficult for the layman to penetrate to the planner as a 
human being and to discuss planning issues with him from a 
position of equality. Computerised 'retail market potential' 
and 'travel demand and traffic assignment~ models for example, 
and most problems that are defined in 'engineering' terms, tend 
to have optimal solutions. In locating these, the planners can 
acquire a good deal of useful information, and may be able over 
time, to improve their performance through learning. On the 
other hand the citizen is effectively excluded as a partner in 
the exercise, never having enough understanding of the 
principles involved to be able to differ with confidence. This 
would seem to be as much a problem for the planner as the 
citizen. 
The negative regulatory mechanism of zoning ordinances and 
municipal standards have in the past accentuated the segmental 
tendencies inherent in a style of planning that maintains a 
.. 
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simplistic physical determinism. The absurdities of this style 
are irrefutably demonstrated in the contrasts between physically 
decayed slums which are the home of vigorous communal life, and 
physically superb planned neighbourhoods in which individual 
isolation and loneliness reflect the lack of any communal life. 4 
The planning profession can seek to defend itself from over-
complexity by defining the planner's role as one of limited and 
specialised responsibility in urban management, by fracturing 
planning into isolated 'projects' of renewal, residential 
development, road construction, redevelopment schemes and so on, 
or by 'dampening' or ignoring the unwanted 'noise' of the 
socio-political repercussions of physical planning. Such 
strategies are pursued at the cost of the increasing irrelevance 
of the planner and greatly enhanced prospects of a massive 
structural breakdown. 
Of the three passive responses Erner/ has concluded that: 
a. they are mutually faciitating defences, 
not mutually exclusive; 
b. they all tend to fragment the spatial 
and temporal connectedness of the larger 
/ social fields and focus further adaptive 
efforts on the localised here and how; 
c. they all tend to sap the energies that 
are available to and can be mobilised by 
the larger systems and otherwise to 
reduce their adaptiveness, 
(Emery and Trist: 1972: 66) 
It may help to place the active maladaptive responses in 
perspective by attempting at the outset a similar summary 
statement of their impact. Because they too correspond to the 
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set of system dimensions - the dimensions of depth, progress, 
and breadth - they also tend to be nrutually faciitating and 
supportive, rather than exclusive. In the second place however, 
they are each intended to impose a greater coherence and 
integration on the field rather than to fragment it, and attempt 
to do this by focussing adaptive efforts in the field as a whole 
towards defined objectives lying in the future. Finally, they 
also tend to reduce the total adaptiveness of the larger system, 
but in this case through attempts to impose limits on the 
potential vaiability of the constituent sub-system. 
As with dissociation, evangelicism seems to differ from the 
other two types of response in that it is essentially an 
individual response rather than a symptom of socially induced 
forces. It differs from dissociation in seeking to make the 
anonymity and uncertainties of mass living manageable not by the 
erection of barriers to involvement with, and concern for other, 
but by seeking to unite people under some common cause, or 
within a common ethical system. Simplistically, the contrast is 
between the controlled ' management of self' learned by regular 
travellers on the subway or underground and the curiously 
regarded inter-personal enthusiasms of the commune and the 
Salvation Army singers. 
ln some re·spects the evangelical response may be more potent for 
the individual as a tactic of withdrawal, allowing him to escape 
from the stresses of his situation in 'folk' or communal 
settings. It becomes an active response in the context of field 
problems through proselytization and the promotion of solutions 
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which rely on consensus of beliefs and values. While the belief 
that the world's problems would dissolve if everyone was willing 
to subordinate themselves to the same ethical system is clearly 
a persuasive one, any programme for bringing this state of 
affairs about must be hopelessly idealistic. 
Authoritarianism is more commonly institutionalised as a 
response to turbulent conditions. In the unconventionally wide 
sense in which authoritarianism is thought of here, it refers to 
the tendency of existing powerholders and decision-makers to try 
to maintain their control in more dynamic fields by curtailing 
the freedom of movement of other parts so as to limit the 
variability of their possible behaviours. The strategies of 
absorption, parasitism, co-optation, competition and so on which 
are found to be appropriate in fields characterized by the 
dominance of a number of powerful organisations are 'stepped up' 
in an effort to cope with the new dimensions of instability. 
Gouldner's analysis of the problems faced by the new manager of 
a gypsum plant, that had been rather loosely and benevolently 
governed by his predecessor~ and the way in which he reacted to 
these problems is an instructive example of the conditions which 
may generate an authoritarian response and of the difficulties 
that its implementation encounters. The efficiency of the 
plant, a subsidiary of a larger organisation, had been suffering 
from a system of management that Gouldner characterizes an an 
'indulgency pattern' in which workers enjoyed considerable 
freedom of movement, took home raw materials, and showed a high 
rate of absenteeism. The young new manager from head office 
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perceived this as a situation which demanded much closer 
control: 
••• There were other, less dramatic 
indications that Peele's actions were 
uprooting the indulgency pattern. One of 
these hinged on the increasing amount of 
paper work which he introduced. Whereas in 
the past this work was held to a mere 
minimum, Peele's new directives called for 
weekly and daily reports from foremen and 
building supervisors. In this manner he 
secured a more careful check on production 
results and on accidents and breakdowns. The 
new reports required that greater care and 
effort be expended for the front office 
could now detect failures more quickly. In 
its return, this constant check on the 
foremen necessarily constrained foremen to 
check up on the workers ••• Along with the 
new reports came increased restrictions that 
slowed down job shifting and curtailed 
conversation groups and loitering. 
(Gouldner: 1954:66) 
The successor reflected the main office's emphasis on rational 
administration, and was oriented to 'rational, efficiency -
enhancing values'. His efforts to achieve a higher degree of 
integration and control by imposing these values was not 
entirely successful: 
Workers viewed close superv1s1on as a kind 
of 'strictness' and punishment. In· 
consequence, the more a supervisor watched 
his subordinates, the more hostile they 
become to him. Workers shared standardized 
conceptions of what a 'good' or legitimate 
foreman should be like, and almost 
universally these insisted that the good 
foreman was one who 'doesn't look over your 
shoulders'. From the worker's standpoint a 
'driving' foreman was 'bad', and they would 
retaliate by withholding work effort... In 
other words close supervision enmeshed 
management in a vicious circle. 
(Gouldner: 1954:160) 
In the cities in recent years it has been the political and 
moral confrontations of the sit-in and protest demonstrations 
that have evoked the authoritarian response in its clearest 
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form. Some ten years ago, the declaration of a state of 
emergency in the Australian State of Queensland, entailing an 
increase in police powers and the suspension of civil rights, to 
contain the skirmishes anticipated with the visit of the South 
African Rugby team has been paralleled by legislation in Western 
Australia which prevents people the right of assembly without 
prior police permission (Section 54B of the Police Act). Such 
legislation has been reflected in the over-reaction of the 
authorities to apparent race confrontations in both London and· 
Liverpool in the late seventies and early eighties. Such moves 
fail in not making possible further steps towards more positive 
solutions even though short run goals may be achieved. The 
rising tide of public protest movements, for which the city is 
in some respects an incidental though obvious stage, may itself 
sometimes take the form of an authoritarian response to 
intolerable circumstances, but if further battles for the mind 
.are to issue in battles for the streets, it seems important that 
some non~authoritarian coping mechanism be devised that creates 
opportunities for mass demonstrations within the city without. 
prejudging them as conflict situations. Australian moratorium 
march organisers have understandably complained when city 
streets effortlessly closed to traffic for Anzac Day marches are 
closed to them to protest a later war. 
Usually denied the exercise of any such direct power in the 
control of their environments, planners are nevertheless able to 
seek the simplification of the problems they have to confront by · 
acting with respect to value frames that fail to reflect the 
real pluralism of community values, thus tending to constrict 
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the choice of outcomes that are preferred by the 'deviant' 
groups. Charges of middle-class bias have been laid against 
most of the professions at some time, including city plannerso 
The concept of a slum which equates high density and physical 
deterioration with the genesis of social pathologies has been 
repeatedly attacked on this score, and so too have some concepts 
of recreational open space which regard its provision in 
isolated islands as inherently healthy and beneficial. Stretton . 
has attacked the bias in suburban planning in Australia towards 
meeting the requirements of male bread-winners at the expenseof 
the needs of the young, the aged, and the housewife (Stretton: 
1970). 
It is in general far easier for planners to interact with other 
middle class business and professional groups, and to adopt some 
variant of the power elite model of the structure of community 
influence that it is for them to adopt a more pluralistic-model 
and try to interact equally with the poorly organised and less 
articulate segments of the community. In a study of the way in 
which two different planning directors approached the same 
Boston South End Urban Renewal Project, Hyman has analysed the 
way in planner's conceptions of the community distribution of 
power influence the planning process - the way in which 
influence is exerted and the kinds of groups that the planner 
works with. 
Hunter's model of how power is organised and 
how social changes occur in a community 
appears to best describe how PT I's (the 
first planning team) director modelled his 
work; his team served as an agent of the 
community power elite ••• 
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In contrast PT 2 director studied city 
planning at a university where the 
pluralistic model of power as developed by 
Banfield, Dahl and Polshy was emphasised. 
These authors contend that power is 
fragmented in a community, so to achieve a 
goal it becomes necessary to concert 
relevant power centres through influence and 
bargaining. 
(Hyman: 1969:106) 
While the first planner proceeded deductively to the production 
of a technically and architecturally fine solution, the second 
worked with neighbourhood groups 'to produce several discrete 
plans for various sub-areas, then co-ordinate them into a 
coherent whole through community wide citizen planning bodies' 
(Hyman: 1969:106). In drawing the conclusions from his study, 
Hyman comments: 
The issue revolves around planning style, 
what Donald Foley has termed a 'unitary' 
versus an 'adaptive' approach ••• the 
planners own professional.orientation will 
strongly influence which segments of the 
popuiation he will identify with; 
community-wide elite or neighbourhood 
groups. Working with community-wide leaders 
will require a greater emphasis on 
conceptualizing holistic plans in which 
relationships of various parts are 
identified and analysed, as in PT l's plan. 
Planners who emphasise working with 
neighbourhood bodies should be prepared to 
work out specific substantive programs which 
may or may not be related to each other but 
which meet the resident's immediate needs. 
(Hyman: 1969:112) 
'Inductive' planning which pieces together part solutions from 
the grass roots level is more likely to result in solutions to 
the whole problem which are sub-optimal in terms of professional 
standards, and to be more costly in terms of time and the effort 
needed to engage with previously unorganised groupings. 
Planning responses which avoid these difficulties in sea~ching 
for optimal solutions agreeable to the community elite are 
323 
authoritarian in so far as they de-value or ignore the needs of 
under-privileged and less articulate groups. The need to 
rectify such approaches from the 'consumer' end has been urged 
by Davidoff's concept of 'advocacy planning' (Davidoff:l965) and 
the energetic and creative work of Saul Alinsky in organising 
the ghetto and the poor in self-help programmes.5. 
The final form of maladaptive response, synoptic idealism, 
corresponds with efforts to maintain a level of control across 
the field by the more neutral means of comprehensiveness in 
analysis and rationality in policy and decision-making. Of the. 
considerable amount of critical comment on the possibilities of 
such comprehensiveness in the management of large and complex 
systems, the attack by Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) is one of 
the most penetrating. 
The classical decision-making model, which they call the 
'rational-deductive ideal', represents 'an ideal of science 
transferred to the world of values'. It begins with the 
unambiguous expression and ranking of 'ultimate values'·, from 
which intermediate principles to cover actual situations are 
derived. Thence, actual policies may be selected deductively 
according to the sum of values that they would promote. Thus 
ethics has been concerned with constructing a total deductive 
system for the derivation of moral principles to cover all human 
choice situations. The welfare function is a variant of this 
which substitutes rules for manipulating numerical variables for 
the more general techniques of deduction that are envisaged in 
the rational-deductive ideal, such that all the costs and all 
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the benefits of all possible alternatives can be assessed, and 
that one which maximised 'welfare' selected. 
There are a number of criticisms of these received ideals, 
beginning with the fact that they are actually impossible to 
implement. When one of the chief virtues of the rational 
deductive ideal is claimed to be its comprehensiveness, the 
benefits of only partial attainment are dubious. The 
multiplicity of values affected in complex policy choices is 
such that they can never all be taken into account, and it is in 
fact often those values which are 'used up' in achieving others 
which are ignored. Further, the instability and fluidity of 
values over time, and the difficulties encountered in totally 
novel situations for which no relevant value priorities are 
available, together with the pervasive conflicts among values 
and combinations of them, challenge the worth of attempting to 
sum values at a particular point of time. In fact value costs 
are typically incommensurable, as when decisions have to ,be made 
as to what level of unemployment is tolerable for the 
maintenance of a certain standard of living. 
The rational deductive and welfare function ideals imply a model 
of 'synoptic decision-making' in which fact and value are 
radically separated, and policy-making is comprehensive in all 
aspects. In such a model the goals are first established, and 
then a review of all the possible alternatives and their effects 
is undertaken. From such a review the 'best' solution can be 
identified in the light of the previously established goals. 
This synoptic ideal fails in practice because it is not adapted 
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to the real complexities of the decision-making environment and 
problem-solving situations that are encountered in social 
policy-making. Braybrooke and Linblom identify a number of 
specific 'failures of adaptation' of the synoptic ideal: 
(i) It is not adapted to man's limited problem-solving 
capabilities - it offers no strategy for achieving 
'cognitive economy', but insists on omnipotence. 
(ii) It is not adapted to the inadequacy of available 
information. 
(iii) It is not adapted to the costliness of analysis - "the 
value of the solved problem imposing some limits on the 
energies worth ehi>ending to achieve the solution; and a 
problem-solving method patterned •.• after analytical 
methods in pure research, where the research activity is 
valued for its own sake, is irrational by any ordinary 
standards of rationality" (ibid: 50-51). 
(iv) It is not adapted to failures in constructing a 
satisfactory evaluative method - i.e •. it offers no guide 
to action when a deductive scheme of values cannot be 
worked out. 
(v) It is not adapted to the closeness of observed 
relationships between fact and value· in policy-making~ 
The consideration of values cannot be realistically 'cut 
off' at some point, and attention devoted to means. In 
....... ' .... 
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particular, consideration of available means frequently 
generates new value questions. 
(vi) It is not adapted to the openness of the system of 
variables with which it contends - "for synoptic problem-
solving it is difficult or impossible to define 
rationality except in relation to a closed system of 
variables ••• the would-be synoptic problem-solver aspires 
to comprehend all interacting variables" (ibid: 53). The 
ideal however gives no account of how 'closure' might be 
achieved, nor as to how the conclusions reached at any 
time should be handled pending closure. 
(vii) It is not adapted to the analysts need for strategic 
consequences of analytical moves - the ideal describes 
what analysts should have done by the time a problem is 
solved 1 but contains no road maps for getting there. 
(viii) It is not adapted to the diverse forms in which policy 
problems actually arise. In complex social situations, 
problems are not simply 'something which blocks an 
organism's attempts to reach a goal', but are typically 
synthetic and fluid - complex adjustment-of-interests 
which require continuous attention. "The synoptic ideal 
is too rigid in its prescription that a 'solution' be 
found for a problem, where all that is actually required 
and all that can at best be defended as a right 
'solution ... is that a series of reconciliatory moves be 
made" (ibid: 55). 
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Bolan, drawing attention to weaknesses of this sort, and the 
immense variability irt the decision-making environments in which 
planning is carried out, comments as follows: 
Most planners, in accounting for these 
differences, have not thought through 
alternative planning strategies or 'styles'. 
Instead they have tried to develop alter-
native ways of selling comprehensive or 
'master' planning. Planning method has not 
adjusted and adapted to circumstances; 
instead the ways of imposing the classical 
ideal have been altered. Accompanying this 
is the usual wishful thinking that some day, 
given enough time and education, circum-
stances will change and the classical ideal 
will come into its own - even though more 
careful examination could reveal that the 
classical ideal might never be appropriate 
to present or future circumstances. 
(Bolan: 1967:235) 
Planners deferent to the synoptic ideal are likely to see 
themselves as the guardians of the public good, which they 
attempt to realise not so much by the coercion of other parts 
and their relations, but by an omniscient appreciation of the 
state of the whole system under consideration that will allow 
them to calculate optimal solutions. This typically entails a 
heavy emphasis on capacities fo'r gathering, storing centralised 
data - the development of powerful centralised data systems, 
macroscopic cost-benefit analyses, intensive forward 
programming, and so forth. Another emergent manifestation of 
the ideal is the design of all-embracing schemes ror living in 
the year 2000 (or some other equally arbitrary date) which lack 
the self-honesty of utopian visions by appearing in the spurious 
garb of scientific statement. 
We may say of the active maladaptations in general that they are 
capable of bolstering existing organisational patterns and 
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processes and fending off the emerging turbulence in the sh~rt 
run. There is usually some slack to be taken up in the degree 
of effective co-ordination among major organisational elements, 
so that for a while tightening the links that tie them together 
may enhance survival prospects. Similarly, big impressions can 
be made and ultimate confrontations postponed by large-scale and 
conspicuous efforts, such as the Anti-poverty campaign, 
addressed to the more tangible and visible societal problems. 
When organised planning persists with such strategies however, 
it is likely to be appreciated too late when the surrounding 
' 6 
world has become transformed. I have indicated the direction 
of transformation is towards a world requiring greater 
sensitivity to far more complicated environments, much speedier 
reaction times, and the ability to collaborate successively with 
changing configurations of other elements of the field. 
Institutions which have concentrated on self-aggrandisement, 
monopolistic practices, centralised, bureaucratic and 
mechanistic forms of management, and the preservation of the 
status quo by the accumulation of power, are likely to find 
themselves outflanked by the heteronomous processes of the 
turbulent environment. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER VII 
1 This necessarily perfunctory exposition concentrates upon 
the main ideas and events that have shaped city planning in 






See Rodwin (1956) for a good historical appraisal of the 
garden city idea and its impact on the British New Towns 
policy. 
For an exception, see Hill's (1971) study of the company 
development programme and new management philosophy of Shell 
U .K. Ltd. 
Jane Jacobs (1962) is particularly insightful on the myths 
of environmental determinism and the relative independence 
of social structure from physical conditions. 
Alinsky's 'Reveille for radicals' (1946) is a timeless 
statement of the values and purposes of communal 
organisation - 'Peoples Organisations' - for promoting 
community welfare and development. 
See the examples of the British Canning Company and the 
National Farmers Union discussed in Emery and Trist (1965). 
Also, recent discussions of similar problems by Blackler and 
Brown (1980) of Shell's "New Philosophy of Management". 
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· CHAPTER VIII . 
STRATEGIC PLANNING: A NEW PARADIGM 
331 
The problems of the metropolis are enormous and pressing, and 
with the phenomenal rates of urban growth reliably expected, 
become more critical with each year that passes. Already, vast 
amounts of money are being expended on urban renewal, housing 
programmes, urban freeways, transportation studies, anti-poverty 
programmes, new towns and cities, and so forth. Many planners 
and others who have identified the symptoms of turbulence are 
already engaged in search and debate directed towards finding 
strategies for coming to terms with rapid and uneven change and 
its unpredictable consequences. The intention here is not to 
review the lines of search that are currently being pursued 
(although a number of them are referred to), or to advance a set 
of solutions for planning in a turbulent environment. It is to 
propose a new paradigm for planning that better comprehends the 
emergent over-complexity of the planner's world, and in so doing 
suggest some new perspectives on the nature of the problems to 
be overcome. 
Susanne Langer begins her exploration of philosophy's 'new key' 
with the observation that "the technique, or treatment, of a 
problem begins with its first expression as a question. The way 
a question is asked limits and disposes the way in which an 
answer to it - right or wrong - may. be given" (Langer: 1963:3). 
Insofar as the concepts that have been developed to talk about 
cities and city planning are the product of the industrial age, 
they are likely to be in need of revision when the phenomena 
that they describe are becoming part of a post-industrial world. 
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It becomes necessary therefore, to spell out some newly emerging 
concepts of the city, of planning, and of the role of the city 
planner. The retention in thought of concepts rendered obsolete 
by the changes that have taken place in society constitutes a 
substantial barrier to the right questions being asked, and 
retards progress towards appropriate responses. 
This has been very nruch the case, as I have suggested, with city 
planning. For decision-makers employing the conceptual 
apparatus of industrial society, the appearance of greater and 
greater amounts of novelty and unpredictability in the social · 
environment is likely to be perceived as a problem which demands 
the augmentation of existing capacities and the mobilisation of 
further resources. Planners ask how they can become better, 
more expert at their tasks - with what tools can they enhance 
their existing capabilities? How can they plan? And once 
these objectives are known, how can the best means for attaining 
them be found? 
When it is believed that the relevant uncertainties are such as 
may be overcome by increased organisational efforts, solutions 
will be sought through acquiring more powerful systems for 
information gathering, data storage and analysis, model-building 
and simulation. For others, the significant uncertainties may 
be thought to stem not from shortages of information or 
inadequate calculative capacity, but from the inappropriate 
distribution of land uses - the haphazard interrelations of 
industry, commerce, residence and recreation, and the physical 
deterioration of parts of this urban plant. Such people would 
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seek to regain control at the wheel of the bulldozer and the 
replacement of the entire urban plant over the next 30 years. 
Others, again, see the extension of uncertainties as a 
reflection of the multiplication and fragmentation of 
authorities, and the answer to the problem thus conceived is a 
drive for greater agency co-ordination. 
All the indications are that coping with turbulence will require 
a substantial conceptual leap, and that this constitutes a far 
more decisive condition than the application of special 
mechanisms of control. It is not simply new concepts that are 
needed, however, for there is ample evidence that individually, 
promising new concepts can be assimilated into existing 
thought-ways and emasculated of their power to reorder 
perceptions. Empiricist writings have managed to make the 
Marxian concept of class a dogsbody concept. If new concepts 
are to survive and to effectively promote new frames of 
reference, they must draw their strength from a network of 
concepts, and from conceptual rather than simply empirical 
definition. What I am concerned with then is a new paradigm 
(Kuhn) - the contextualist frame of reference - which offers not 
simply an alternative language, but also a fresh vision, a ne\1 
appreciative system. 
Many of the elements of this new paradigm I have already 
referred to, but they must now be drawn together. The direction 
of the shift is from closed to open systems, and from open 
systems to the fields in which aggregates of open systems 
interact; from a strictly physical to a geo-behavioural concept 
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of space, which is more fluid and subjectively determined. It 
represents the transition from a vertical to a horizontal 
cosmology, and a surrendering of the belief that with enough 
power and patience, one Iliight always push analysis to the bottom 
of things, so that a more pragmatic world view, from which it is 
understood that solutions may be approached, but not achieved. 
Thus it should be possible to seek to understand problems and 
difficulties and to connect them in terms of more inclusive 
contexts. The accompanying movement in the aim and techniques 
of enquiry is from the making of explanations which derive from 
the analytical decomposition of linear causal.trains (the 
'normal' approach of science) to the developing of understanding 
which is derived from the exploration of field determinations. 
This amounts to an epistemological shift from a pronounced 
objectivity to a more subjective understanding. 
The new paradigm breaks away from the presumption of an 
inherently orderly universe, in which individuals pursue goals 
within an essentially stable framework of objects and 
structures, and substitutes instead a universe in which change 
and novelty are central features, and behaviour is a continuous, 
interactive process, the directions and outcomes of which are 
shaped equally by the properties of the individual and of 
his/her environment. Such degrees of structure and stability as 
exist are properties of the field itself, and not of its parts 
or elements. 
The implications of this contextualist frame of reference for 
the way in which planning is understood and carried out, and the 
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contrasts with existing modes, I consider in the following 
sections, but I will summarise them at this point. The 
underlying grid, and the key reference points for urban planners 
have been goegraphical and territorial - producing cognitive 
maps in which physical spaces and movements represent the 
essential parameters. Within this game, planning has become a 
process of 'tooling up' for the construction of large living 
machines - 'urban capsules', with efficient and economic 
environmental controls, in which urban man can do his educating, 
working, playing and resting; "tooling up", because it has 
characteristically stopped short of designing and facilitating 
the process of living itself. The social structure and social 
pathologies or u':banism have invariably been a lagged function 
of the built environment. 
The planner has operated outwards in space and forward in time 
from the existing conditions of the physical, territorial city, 
modifying his practices as attention shifts from the dense core 
of the business district to the scattered peripheral suburbs and 
back again to redevelop the core, and as the shape of the future 
with which his planning has to be correlated becomes more and 
more uncertain. The formal planning commission has become the 
major instrument, deploying its expert technicians and policy 
advisers to control growth and development on behalf of the 
whole. Rising uncertainty and unpredictability have evoked an 
emphasis on rational, legal, and bureaucratic means of control -
on the importance of planning ordinances and formally enunciated 
contracts and constitutions in restricting the activities of 
powerful organisations, legally defining their fixed reciprocal 
obligations. 
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The new paradigm proposes a new set of non~territorial units for 
the fundamental mapping of the planning realm, built of 
behavioural complexes incorporating concepts of social and 
psychological, (in addition to physical) space. This makes it 
possible to overstep the rather clumsy proposal to ameliorate 
the consequences of physical planning by supplementing it with 
'social planning'. This distinction is lost when attention 
shifts to the social field, behaviour settings and the life 
space, and the units of analysis become occurrences in the 
s oci os phere. 
The synthetic and dispersive bias of the contextualist world 
hypothesis makes it possible to think in terms of a reversal of 
the planning process - to plan inwards from the field, and 
backwards from a vision of the future. To begin planning in 
other words, not from the extant city, but from the region of 
which it is a part, not from the immediately given goals and 
noxiants, but from a conception of a position in the future from 
which actions may be decided upon by 'backward determine'. In 
such a context planners may have to be identified in terms of 
what t~ey are and what they do, rather than by their membership 
of a particular organisation or the possession of certain 
qualifications. Their personal qualities come to rank with the 
power and status of the planning commission when the environment 
for action calls for the creation of visions, and the regulation 
of complexity through the formation and negotiation of shared 
values. 
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From 'City' to 'Urban field' 
In the framework of the politics and planning of the industrial 
era, the city has been regarded as a geographic, economic and 
political entity, standing out as an island of concentrated 
population and economic activities in the pristine rural-
agricultural realm. The geographic frame of reference is 
concerned with topographical situation and the different ways in 
which land may be used, leading to a concept of the city as a 
spatial distribution of land uses and prompting investigations, 
of the relations between such area patterns and other geographic 
features such as drainage systems, geomorphology, soils and so 
on. This merges with the economic image of the city, as a 
centre of production and distribution of goods and services, 
with a regional sphere of influence determined by such factors 
as the availability of raw materials and labour and the quality 
of the communication linkages with the other centres. 
Politically, the city has emerged as a separate area of 
government and administrative responsibility, demarcated from 
its surrounding hinterland by precise, legally constituted 
boundaries which delimit (and therefore constrain) in an 
important way the carrying out of governmental and admin-
istrative functions, including planning. 
The rather rigid 'town and country', 'rural-urban' dichotomies 
in terms of which problems have been identified and policies 
worked out have been placed under an accumulating strain; to the 
point that their retention can now seriously inhibit progress 
towards improving the quality of life of both urban and 
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non-urban dwellers. It may be said that within America at 
least, a revolution is occurring which is unhitching the social 
processes of urbanisation from the locationally fixed city and 
region. Reflecting the current explosion in science and 
technology, employment is further shifting from the production 
of goods to services; increasing ease of transportation and 
communication is dissolving spatial barriers to social 
intercourse. A new kind of large-scale urban society is 
emerging that is increasingly independent of the city (Webber: 
1970). In turn, the problems of the city generated by early 
industrialisation are being supplanted by a new array different 
in kind. 
The traditional idea of the city fails to apprehend the new 
dimensions of urban aggregations, the reality of which is now 
· generally recognised. Vickers comments, in typically succinct 
style: 
•.• the conception of the city itself, as an 
entity bounded and supported by the basic 
rural world, seems to be dissolving, giving 
place to the concept of urban space, 
extending indefinitely, within which social 
and political divisions may have no more 
natural validity than the frontiers which 
colonial powers left behind in Africa. 
(Vickers: 1970:40) 
Recognising the poor 'fit~ of an existing concept is an 
important first step, preparing the way for the more difficult 
task of formulating a new concept that better articulates the 
phenomena to be understood. In this thesis I have developed 
the skeleton of a new frame of·reference in adopting the 
concepts of the social field and the sociosphere, and I have 
attempted to trace strands of meaning from planning to them, 
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rather than to the concepts of society and social structure. I 
will extend this framework further by thinking of cities as 
regions in which the sociosphere is relatively concentrated, 
standing in contrast to regions in which it is thinly spread or 
diffused. The basic considerations then become the degree of 
concentration of purposeful social activities and the 
extensiveness of their influences. The concept of Urban field 
(Friedmann and Miller: 1965) expresses very well this conception 
of urban phenomenon. Within this, the inherited form of the 
city no longer corresponds to reality. The spatial structure of 
contemporary civilizations consists of metropolitan core regions 
and the intermetropolitan peripheries. The former have achieved 
very high levels of economic and cultural development at the 
expense of the latter, leaving the periphery in a decadent 
state. Current and projected trends in technology and tastes 
suggest that the urban field, a new element of spatial order, is 
coming into being which will unify both core and periphery with 
a single matrix. 
The older established centres, together with 
the intermetropolitan peripheries that 
envelop them, will constitute the new 
ecological unit of America's post-industrial 
society that will replace traditional 
concepts of the city and the metropolis. 
This basic element of the emerging spatial 
order we shall call the urban field. 
(Friedmann and Miller: 1965:312,313) 
The two major forces underlying the emergence of 'urban fields' 
in Ame,f-ica are continued demographic concentration in the 
established metropolitan core areas, and a number of centrifugal 
forces pressuring towards the reintegration of the peripheral 
areas as resource bases ~nd aciivity centres. Its space, 
scenery, relative ease of travel and cheapness of land, 
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historical assets and so forth, make the intermetropolitan 
periphery increasingly popular for such activities as 
recreation, the location of high-land-use institutions, the 
establishment of new towns and specialised communities catering 
for retirement, vacations and cultural activities, and economic 
activities which are either space-extensive or which do not 
depend upon intimate contact with large population 
concentrations (airports, agrobusiness, mail-order houses, 
insurance companies and warehouses). 
Friedmann and Miller identify 70 potential urban fields in the 
United States, constituted of a core area of at least 300.000 
inhabitants and having a radius of approximately 160 km. A 
population of around 300,000 is held to be the point at which 
distinctively metropolitan characteristics emerge, while the 
distance of 160 km from the centre represents the approximate 
geographic limit for commuting to a job and the limit for 
intensive weekend and seasonal 1.1se of the periphery for 
recreation. The urban field thus transcends the town and 
country, urban and rural dichotomy, suggesting that any sharp 
distinctions of this sort have become relatively meaningless 
from an economic or sociological standpoint in the urbanised 
society. Thus, the corresponding view of the city is no longer 
of a physical entity, but of a pattern of point locations and 
connecting flows of people, information, money and commodities. 
The ideas of the urban field is based on the criterion of 
interdependency: "To define this region on a map, the main 
criterion should be that exchange relations within each field 
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are more intensive than among them" (Friedmann and Miller: 
1965:315). 
The concept of urban field, together with the social field and 
the sociosphere, belongs to the field-theoretic, contextualist 
framework. The resultant notion of ... field planning"' directs 
attention beyond concern with the physical urban plant and the 
social structure of the city, and the way in which these 
separate systems interact, by incorporating concepts of 
perceptual and behavioural space as well as the more readily 
understandable physical time-space co-ordinates. Further, the 
field notion points to the continuity of planning as a system of 
decision-making that extends in time both backward (existing 
possibilities are conditioned by all past decisions) and forward 
(present decisions influence future decisions both by changing 
the shape of the world and by establishing new precedents). 
We thus come to a new appreciation of the metropolitan crisis -
as a crisis over flnding ways in which to cope adaptively with 
turbulent urban fields. The crisis, in other words, is one 
brought about by a qualitative change in the character of urban 
areas, which, in order to be met effectively, requires 
qualitatively different responses. The turbulence lies in the 
ecologically-connected patterns of activity, and needs to be 
approached in ecological terms • 
. The concept of urban field by itself provides a valuable new 
perspective. By itself however, it is a fragile innovation, and 
could easily become fashion.able in the literature without 
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challenging established perceptions of the phenomena to which it 
alludes. Planning activities below the level of overall 
strategic planning for metropolitan regions must typically focus 
on parts and not the whole of the field, and an analogous shift 
is needed from concepts that have been used to distinguish 
spatially the different parts of the city to concepts referring 
to component zones of activity. It is now quite widely 
appreciated that the neighbourhood concept no longer 
corresponds, (if it ever did), with patterns of family and 
friendship interaction and the uses that are made of urban 
amenities and resources. The primary referent of other notions, 
such as the suburb, district, and 'territorial unit', is 
similarly locational and spatial, and they are more suited to 
describing the divisions of ,cities than the purposeful groupings 
within urban fields. 
The Community 
It seems far more appropriate to consider communities as :the 
units of the urban field to which planning should be oriented, 
and abandon the administrative, areal, and pseudo-sociological 
distinctions to which planners have deferred. Community is not, 
therefore, to be thought of as necessarily a territorial unit, 
although of course it may be. 
A community may be defined then as a social organisation that is 
territorially localised and within which people satisfy most of 
their daily needs and deal with most of their common problems. 
Members cooperate to provide, use and maintain the resources 
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that enable them to pursue the satisfaction of these needs and 
resolution of these problems. Thus, associations and interest 
groups, clubs, unions and professional bodies, as well as the 
residential locality, may be, or can become, communities. To 
regard communities in this sense as units for planning may 
. further liberate traditional notions of the processes of 
planning and politics from preoccupation with fixed geographical 
areas, and encourage in its place a 'multi-faceted' conception 
of planning with numerous overlapping communities, and a 
non-territorial conception of democracy. 
Conventional frameworks for the management and planning of 
cities move from metropolitan area to city area, district, 
suburb and neighbourhood, and thence to families and individuals 
as the units of administration. The emphasis is then on 
providing homes and amenities for families and understanding 
patterns of 'household activities', and providing jobs, school 
places, buses, and so on, for individuals. The unit at this 
level in the new paradigm is the behaviour setting. 
In the course of their intensive investigation of the socio-
physical dynamics of behaviour in the real world community 
context of 'Midwest', Barker and Wright made a 'discovery' that 
was obvious to native Midwesterners ....; "that behaviour comes not 
only in particle form, but in extra-individual wave patterns 
that are as visible and invariant as the pools and rapids in 
Slough Creek west of town. The Presbyterian worship services,. 
the high school basketball games, and the post office, for 
example, persist year after year with their unique configur-
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ations of behaviour, despite constant changes in the persons 
involved" (Barker and Wright: 1955:7). They noted that these 
'standard behaviour patterns' were attached to particular 
place-thing-time constellations, the non-psychological context 
or milieu, and that there was a 'perceived fittingness' 
, (synomorphism) between the patterns of behaviour and this 
milieu. They further observed that these behaviour-milieu 
. units, which they came to call behaviour settings, were quite 
ubiquitous, in that very little behaviour in Midwest occurred 
outside their limits, and that there were often abrupt and 
usually noticeable changes in the behaviour of a person as he 
left one behaviour setting and entered another. 
The discovery of these standard behaviour patterns they saw as 
crucial in identifying a community unit suitable to their 
purposes. While the general characteristics of the dividing 
conditions and behaviour of a community may be described by 
adding together the behaviour characteristics of the dividing 
conditions and behaviour of community may.be described by adding 
together the behaviour characteristics and situations of 
representative individuals, it seemed clear to Barker & Wright 
that these patterned features of behaviour.which can be seen 
directly should not be ignored. 
In considering the value of taking behaviour settings as the 
units for understanding community behaviours I shall summarise 
them as follows: 
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Visibility: behaviour settings are prominent features of 
extra-individual behaviour identified with a h.lgh degree of 
agreement by observers. 
Phenomenal character: they are features of the phenomenal 
worlds of both laymen and scientists> and a description of the 
community in terms of behaviour corresponds to common 
experience. 
Internal dynamics: behaviour settings involve persons, 
non-psychological milieu, and behaviours in an interacting field 
of forces. Behaviour settings coerce behaviour and vice versa. 
Variety of attributes: behaviour settings have many · 
discriminable behavioural and non-behavioural characteristics. 
As such, they are rich material for analysis. 
External dynamics: behaviour settings are not independent 
community units, and the pattern of one setting is often 
radically changed by the behaviour occurring in another 
behaviour setting. 
Theoretical position: behaviour settings are empirical facts. 
They can be demonstrated, and their internal s.tructure and 
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dynamics and their external relations suggest that they can be 
profitably conceptualised and incorporated into productive 
theory. 
They will be incorporated into my conceptual schemes. The 
evidence is that the quality of a person's primary social world 
is very much. a function of the availability and the quality of 
the behaviour settings. While planners and architects have 
talked a good deal about 'activity systems', most attempts to 
translate such notions into planning actions have lacked 
theoretical insight. In particular, the 'non-psychological 
milieu' has been treated as an independent variable, assumed 
somehow to give rise to the desired social liveliness and 
interaction, while Barker and Wright state quite clearly that 
standing behaviour patterns are shaped equally by the properties 
of the actors and the milieu (See above). 
To orient planning in the community towards the needs of the 
household as the basic unit may be conducive to the functional 
and efficient provision of the structures and amenities 
necessary for family life. To visualise the community as an 
overlapping net of behaviour settings, actual and potential, 
makes possible a new perspective on the tasks of planning, in 
which the meaning and value of the community life is not sought 
in a behaviourally - random geographical area and the facilities 
it contains, but consciously located in the opportunities and 
variety provided in such supra-individual settings, in which 
people may experience the involvements and identity that tie 
them into the wider field. When, for example, the citizens of 
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Canberra, Australia, bemoan as they have done for years, the 
city's lack of a 'soul'~ the lacuna that they identify, more 
particularly in the outlying suburbs, is the poverty of 
behaviour settings in which Canberrites might come to know one 
another and with which they might achieve some stabilising 
identity. Each neighbourhood has carefully calculated areas of 
open space and playing fields, and square metres of retail 
space, and the inevitable primary school and filling station 
(budgeted for as the normal basic community requirements). What 
such neighbourhoods lack are the behaviour settings of a local 
tavern or milk bar, through which the neighbourhood might become 
a community. If the electronic age is tending to destroy the 
neighbourhood, effective planning could do much to restore it. 
In the conceptual series of the conventional framework, the more 
basic unit, (the atom from which the family neighbourhood and 
city are compounded), is the individual; in the new paradigm it 
is the life-space. The person moves through a succession of 
behaviour settings in a continuous stream of behaviour that 
changes both himself and the settings in which he engages. The 
behaviour settings in a community should be such as to 
collectively provide each unique member of the community with 
the opportunities to learn more about himself and the community, 
opportunities for self-expression, and a certain level of 
support and recognition. There is, of course, no formula for 
bringing such a state of affairs into existence, but a start may 
be made by abandoning (or at least suppressing) the physical-
territorial segmentation of the city as a basis for improving 
the quality of life, and organising efforts around a better 
348 
understanding of the dynamics of the life-space and the 
behaviour setting. 
I arrive, therefore, at a suggestive alternative to the 
conceptual grid of the traditional city planners. In the new 
framework, dynamic processes and behaviours move to the 
foreground - processes take precedence over spaces and 
structures. 
To summarise to this point, I shall draw up a table for the 
comparison of conventional approaches and the new approach 
suggested by my paradigm. 










On the one hand, the elements considered by conventional 
planners discussed to this point are the metropolis, the suburb, 
the household and the individual. Such elements have been 
useful, but as I have elaborated in the earlier chapters, they 
do not take us for enough; they are epistemologically limiting. 
On the other hand, the urban field, the community, the behaviour 
setting and the life space, give us the notion of process of a 
dynamic interaction among the elements in an ever evolving 
contextualism. 
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As has been stressed earlier, the new concepts are not simply 
definitional equivalents, but belong to a new frame of reference 
in which the basic data are not elements or factors that are 
part of an inherently determinate cosmos, but contexts of 
complexes which continuously cohere and disperse. 
Feibleman and Friend (1945) maintain that for the purposes of 
the structural analysis of wholes, three system levels are 
required - the whole from which analysis starts and the two 
levels below this. While there is an intuitive appeal in the 
idea that three levels are needed, there also seems to be a case 
for arguing that one of these be the level above the focal 
system. Thus, for example, the community is to be understood in 
terms of its 'location' in the urban field, and the behaviour 
settings that it comprises. If the urban field itself is to be 
taken as the unit whole, it may be that the sociosphere can be 
taken as the next higher level. The implication for planning is 
that intervention at any of these levels must be sensitive to, 
and take into account, the adjacent levels. 
From Mobilisation of Power to the Institutionalisation of Values 
To see the problem of city planning not as solving the 'urban 
crisis' but of finding ways in which social aggregates may adapt 
to the conditions of a turbulent urban field, suggests search in 
the direction that I have previously indicated - towards modes 
of ecological adaptation and the identification and 
institutionalisation of common values. In discussing the active 
and passive maladaptations to turbulence, it has become clear 
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that appropriate responses must take as their starting condition 
the full complexity and uncertainty of the environment, and that 
appropriate strategies do not include courses of action designed 
to strengthen systems of power and control when the field as a 
whole is in motion, long run stability is not to be attained by 
segregating the field into presently 'manageable' parts or by 
amplifying the power of its elements. 
In terms of my value system, the answer is to be sought in the 
emergence and spread of shared values which embody the most 
important meanings and aspirations of all the actors and become 
part of the boundary conditions of their individual actions. In 
explaining this I shall refer to other writers who have 
profounded the same idea. A good example is to be found in 
Elting Morison's (1966) study of coping with technological 
innovation, in which he confronts the question: 'How then can we 
find the means to accept with less pain to ourselves and less 
damage to our social organisation the dislocations in our 
society that are produced by innovation?' 
Morison suggests that in studying innovation we look info the 
possibility that any group exists for any purpose, for example, 
the family, the factory, the educational institution, and that 
this group might define for itself its grand object and see to 
it that the grand object is communicated to every member of the 
group. Thus defined and communicated, it might serve as a 
unifying agent against the disruptive local allegiances of'the 
inevitable smaller elements that compose any group. It may also 
serve to increase the acceptability of any change that would 
assist in the more efficient achievement of the grand object. 
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Many of the processes studied by sociologists, such as group 
formation, institutionalisation; professionalisation, and so on, 
are concerned with the subordination of individual differences· 
to the norms, values, and shared definitions of the situation 
that constitute the sub-culture of the collectivity and 
facilitate predictability of behaviour. 
The reasons for re-emphasising and exploring further the role of 
values as a response to the present metropolitan turmoil are to 
be found in the ominously-widening gap between the trans-
formation of the material environment through technological 
innovation and the rate at which this novelty is being absorbed 
in the cultural or appreciative systems of the social field. 
Our cultural-symbolic interpretations of the universe have 
lagged behind its material transformation, to the point that the 
natural distillation and change of meanings requires to be 
supplemented by the a.ctive search for, and dissemination of, new 
belief and value systems. The most fundamental difficulties 
seem to be the sheer scale of the field over which new values 
need to be communicated and absorbed; the considerable 
resistance of many social scientists and other professionals and 
practitioners to identifying themselves with and committing 
themselves to particular values, and of course, the resistance 
offered by existing values. 
Values have the nature not of regulators and sanctioners, 
imposing specific demands and coercing particular courses of 
action, but of field forces which have the capacity of inducing 
coherence and co-ordination by providing parameters for the 
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adaptive behaviours of the numerous discrete parts of the field. 
Value formation does not, therefore, reduce the turbulent 
environment to a simple disturbed-reactive environment in which 
institutional capabilities are determinative of field 
regulation, but to a modified form of this, in which scattered 
and unpredictable behaviours become organised behind commonly 
acknowledged and professed sets of beliefs and values. The 
central requirements for particular values to assume this 
organising role seem to be, firstly, that the chosen values 
accurately reflect the psychic dispositions and basic cultural 
bonds operative in the given field, and that they are diffused 
by processes of exemplification, mutual explorations and 
democratic agre~ments, rather than by authoritarian injunctions 
and covert propaganda. 
In searching for the sorts of values that might serve to bring a 
degree of coherence and predictability to the environments of 
present urban communities, the choice is not so hopelessly 
open-ended as it might first appear. Emery has drawn attention 
to a basic choice of 'design principle' that states the broad 
alternatives for organised social groupings facing changing and 
uncertain environments: "the choice is between whether a 
population seeks to enhance its chances of survival by 
strengthening and elaborating special social mechanisms of 
control or by increasing the adaptiveness of its individual 
members" (Emery and Trist: 1972:71). To cope with a changing 
environment, any adaptive, self-regulating system must have a 
degree of redundancy built into it - it must have parts or 
functions that are not called upon all the time, but which can 
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be brought into action when changes in the environment so 
demand. In human systems, to opt for the redundancy of parts 
means treating individual members as substitutable and 
replaceable, and requires a hierarchy of controlling parts 
within the system to make decisions concerning the parts at 
lower levels that are to be active or redundant for the purposes 
of a particular response. The fact.ories of the industrial 
revolution and the armies of the First World War were systems of 
this kind. For a social system to seek the necessary variety by 
having redundancy of functions on the other hand, entails having 
individual members who have multiple skills and requires some 
mechanism for setting and shifting the configurations of these 
functions that constitute appropriate responses to changing 
environmental demands. 
This choice of basic principle is equivalent to that between 
structuring communities as homogeneous or heterogeneous systems, 
as systems which decrease or increase the variety of the 
behaviour of parts. I have argued already that the former 
alternatives, of tightening control and co-ordination, are not 
likely to be adaptive under turbulent conditions for the field 
as.a whole, while the latter alternatives tend better to reflect 
western democratic ideals. It would seem, therefore, that 
planning within the urban field ought to be premised on 
acknowledging that the constituent units of the field are 
heterogenous systems and the recognition that large and complex 
social aggregates can achieve a higher degree of overall 
adaptivity, by loosening up all the connections among their 
parts and fitting them, as far as possible, to cope·separately 
with the turbulence in their immediate environments. 
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Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence to support 
such an assertion. Nevertheless, within systems theory, which 
continues to have some force within the European industrial 
setting, a number of job redesign experiments have been set up 
with some success under this assumption. 
The loosening of interconnections within the aggregate and the 
placing of the emphasis on the adaptability of individual parts 
are of themselves preconditions for centrifugal movement and 
disintegration. The most obvious and effective counter to such 
tendencies is the inculcation and dissemination of values and 
ideals, self-consciously arrived at and agreed upon by the main 
actors. 
The meaning of this strategy of individuation of parts, and 
maintenance of the adaptivity of the whole through shared 
values, may be better appreciated by considering an extreme 
example - the engagement of opposing infantry forces in the 
battlefield. While the initial long-distance manoeuverings and 
preparations are best governed by the normal authority apparatus 
of military organisations, there comes a point in closing with 
the enemy when 'every man for himself' is a far more adaptive 
strategy. The environment of hand-to-hand fighting is a radical 
transformation in the direction of greater uncertainty and 
unpredictability, which can best be met by the abandoning of the 
normal command pyramid and increasing each individual's area of 
discretion in choosing his actions. When individuals are thus 
loosened from the authority structure to which they normally 
respond, the effectiveness of their joint actions becomes, to 
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some extent, a measure of the degree to which they share common 
values and understandings and the strength with which they are 
committed to them. This combination of the physical 
independence and value consonance of parts has long been 
appreciated by the strategists of underground organisations and 
guerrilla forces concerned with survival in highly uncertain and 
hostile environments. It seems reasonable to suggest that city 
planners may have more to learn from them than from the 'new 
utopians'. 
The suggestion is that the planning and development of adaptive 
communities within the context of a turbulent urban field may be 
.furthered by·defining the community itself as an organisation 
with the function of serving the ends and needs of its members, 
and working towards enhancing the adaptive capabilities of these 
members rather than building up and consolidating the 
'fire-power' of the whole. This means that all the resources 
within the community, including the resources available for 
planning, should be regarded as instruments for the pursuit of 
individual purposes and ideals to which all members have equal 
rights of access. To the extent that the community as a whole 
needs to anticipate .and take decisions in advance of changing 
external circumstances, its individual members need to learn the 
meaning of planning. To the extent that the purposeful parts of 
the community are enabled to adapt individually and to pursue 
~heir own purposes and ideals, there must be contemporaneous and 
collaborative search for values and unifying ideals that will 
provide a skeletal structure for the whole field of directively 
correlated behaviours. 
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This is not to advocate anarchy over control. The control in 
this instance will come from the ideals and values of the people 
involved in some kind of decision making. An underlying 
assumption of this thesis has been that members of communities 
are too of ten directed in every aspect of their lives, through 
monotonous work, authoritarian schooling, and dubious quality 
television and radio programmes. To involve people again in a 
proactive manner, requires that communities be involved with 
their members and that the community be involved in those 
decisions (such as urban planning) which reflect so markedly on 
their lives. 
A conventional criticism (and source of despair) of the 
office-holders of traditional, professional planning commissions 
concerns the ignorance and indifference of the populations for 
which planning is undertaken. 
Elaborately-prepared planning documents and diligently-organised 
public hearings fail to generate the expected responses and lead 
to charges of public apathy. Such charges may then be used to 
legitimise resorting mainly to professional standards and 
judgments in designing futures and policies for implementation. 
Such criticisms are naive, ignoring as they do the fact that 
planning activity involves a special sort of interest in, 
awareness of, and concern for larger systems and broader future 
horizons than the individual usually has to concern himself 
with, and which can only be acquired by doing planning. Only 
individuals who are given responsibility for planning can become 
imaginatively involved in planning's concerns; for those who are 
denied any such responsibility their involvement in the planning 
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process is likely to be restricted to some form of tokenism. 
The point has been provocatively argued by Churchman, who 
invites us to imagine a manager of the future reflecting upon 
the 'obvious' axioms of planning in 1968: 
••• This manager sees what no manager of 
today even suspects, that the whole 1968 
planning process is predicated on the false 
and untenable position of serving the 
public's interest by means of expert 
representation. This old-fashioned 
assumption of 1968 is false because in 
reality the public's 'interest' is to plan, 
to mean something in the planning process, 
to become a master, not a servant, in 
planning the system. 
(Churchman: 1968c:76) 
If communities are to reflect the needs and aspirations of the 
people they contain, then planning must be responsive to the 
purposes and ideals espoused by individuals and to the more 
general field values that are needed to regulate actions and 
interactions across the larger system, but planners have no 
special expertise in, or privileged access to, community values. 
In less troubled environments of past eras, when speed and 
appropriateness of responses, and accuracy and richness in the 
feedback of results, may have been less critical, the 
paternalistic gauging of the public good, the fairness but 
pedantry of the ballot box, the cumbersomeness of systems of 
'representation', and the dubious scientism of surveys and 
questionnaires, may have provided sufficient articulation 
b~tween planners and planned to avoid the gross accumulation of 
lags and the creation of ecological.traps. The emergence of 
turbulence requires drastically shortened reaction times, 
multi-centred sensitivity to the environment and capabilities 
for continuous learning and adaptation. Such capabilities 
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cannot be monopolised by experts and special institutions, but 
by their nature need to be spread out across the field. This 
again has been Churchman's concern, in his attempt to 
demonstrate that the wisdom required for the regulation of 
society cannot be monopolised by any of its special parts. He · 
suggests that we cannot assign the matter of judging a society 
and formulating policies for it to any kind of elite (Churchman: 
1968b:65) be it scientific or managerial. The best answer that 
mankind has developed to the question "Who shall decide?" is not 
to be found either within political power or intellectual 
prowess. It lies in the concept of a well informed public. To 
take up Churchman's argument: 
There are simply no 'experts' in the 
planning of human societies. The so-called 
experts know less about the planning of 
human society than does the public, because 
in each case the expert brings in a 
thoroughly biased viewpoint; on account of 
his expertise he is forced to concentrate on 
only one aspect of the living system. There 
seems to be no successful way in which the 
expert of large-scale systems can become a 
'generalist'. There is no such thing as the 
'universal man' in the area of the ethics of 
large scale systems. Therefore the need for 
a well-informed public is a true need. The 
underlying ethical principle here is that 
every man ought to feel that by his nature 
he can acquire knowledge about how society 
should be designed. 
(Churchman: 1968b:65,83-84) 
It may be that society cannot be planned but this has not 
stopped the elites to whom Churchman refers from trying. His 
point is that an informed public can prevent an undesirable 
alternative which reduces their quality of life from being 
imposed on them. 
The direction of the change required is from planning for to 
planning with and planning by. More and more planners and 
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greater amounts of planning will be needed, but in environments 
in which stability is a function of value-sharing, planners will 
be less 2ble to separate themselves from others and make 
decisions for them. If, as is argued in the following section, 
the process of planning is of more importance than the plan 
produced, the value of planning is heavily dependent upon the 
number of people who are engaged in the act. The degree of 
responsiveness that will be needed in future urban fields calls 
for the development of planning capabilities within communities 
and the capacity to co-operate as equal partners (co-planners) 
with 'outside' planning organisations. Preoccupation in recent 
planning literature with participation, choice, advocacy, and 
social planning seem to reflect a widening appreciation that 
some of planning's traditional concerns and modes of 
organisation have to be sacrificed if a meaningful engagement is 
to be achieved with the clients of the planning process. 
The foregoing provides the barest framework within which the 
more particular interpretations and evaluations needed for the 
coming decades may be located. Numerous prophets and 
speculators, futurologists and social scientists have been 
bolder than this in offering their insights into the sorts of 
values that are already becoming (or may be expected to become) 
more salient as the cultural surround of post-industrial society 
responds to the structural transformations that have taken place 
and are continuing. It may be argued that whatever new values 
emerge they must be values which enhance our ability to cope 
with the increased levels of complexity, interdependence and 
uncertainty that characterise the turbulent comtemporary 
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environment. The individual by himself, or indeed the 
organisation and even "the policy" by itself, cannot meet the 
demands of those more complex environments. A greater pooling 
of resources is required, more sharing, more trust, more 
cooperation. The inference may be drawn that appropriate 
emergent values will tend to be communal rather than 
individualistic. Their direction will be opposite to that which 
value-formation has taken in industrial societies, moulded as 
these have been by the Protestant Ethic. 
In the following table, the key cultural values, organisational 
philosophies and government strategies persisting from 
industrialism with the emergent cultural patterns of 
post-industrialism are contrasted: 
Cultural values achievement self-control 
independence endurance 
of distress 
Organisational Mechanistic forms 





regarded as owned 
absolutely 










































Planning: From Product to Process 
If I may caricature the 'old' style of planning in order to 
contrast it with that which is emerging and needed, I may say 
that it tends to be reactive and remedial, that it is oriented 
to producing a plan rather than to the process of planning, that 
it venerates impartiality and rationality and maintains the 
separation of planning and action. The need for planning becomes 
o.bvious only with the appearance of crises and serious 
malfunctions, and responses are oriented to regaining the 
pre-existing state, or finding a new steady state, comparable to 
that which existed before the crisis. The main means for 
achieving this is to define the new steady state on a plan or 
series of plans which can be handed over to the decision-maker 
who decides if, when, and how they are to be 'implemented'. In 
the city, the classical expression of this form of planning is 
found in the powerful, quasi-independent planning commission, 
with its professional, qualified staff of planners, engineers, 
architects and so on, which functions as an advisory body, 
assisting government in policy-formation. Its view is 
comprehensive in that no aspect of community development is 
assumed to be beyond its responsibility. It is also 
comprehensive in the sense that the planning commission is the 
guardian of the whole public interest (Bolan: 1967). From this 
it is assumed that the planning commission is both capable and 
responsible for establishing long-term development goals which 
provide a broad perspective and give substance to short-term 
particularistic community decisions. 
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This sort of planning is more likely to be deferent to the 
synoptic ideal in policy-formulation and decision-making, and to 
seek its own improvement in becoming more 'rational' and more 
comprehensive. 
In contrast to this, numerous emergent strands of planning 
thought are currently coalescing into an alternative image of 
the nature of planning activity which emphasises its 
future-oriented, prospective concern, stresses the importance of 
the process itself above the plans produced, acknowledges the 
permeation of the planner's world with values, and attempts to 
understand their dynamics, and seeks to break down the 
distinction between plans and their implementation. This new 
'dynamic' image can be traced back to many roots, in business 
and city planning, in philosophical, economic and political 
writing, and is discussed under a variety of names -
'innovative', 'process', 'action', and 'adaptive planning'. Its 
flavour may best be appreciated by sampling the thought of some 
of its proponents. 
Ackoff (1965, 1970a, 1970b) developed a concept of adaptive 
planning for organisations premised on the view that 
'' •.• planning is not an act but a process, a process that has no 
natural conclusion or end point (1970a:3). A 'solution' can be 
approached but never fully accomplished, because there is no 
necessary limit to the amount of reviewing of previous 
decisions, and because both the system planned for and its 
environment undergo change during the planning, and it is never 
possible to take all such changes into account. Hence "a plan 
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is not the final product of the planning process; it is an 
interim report. It is a record of a complex set of interacting 
decisions which may be partitioned in many different ways" 
(Ackoff: 1970a:5) Planning is defined as a process that 
involves making and evaluating each of a set of inter-related 
decisions before action is required, in a situation in which it 
is believed that unless action is taken a desired future state 
is not likely to occur, and that, if appropriate action is 
taken, the likelihood of a favourable outcome can be increased. 
Adaptive planning entails taking into account the stylistic as 
well as the performance objectives of the organisation, and the 
value preferences of the participants, and seeks to reconcile 
these by "motivating participants in the system to act in a way 
that is compatible with the interests of the system as a whole 
••• by providing incentives that make individual and 
organisational objectives more compatible" (Ackoff: 1970a:20). 
Adaptive planning for communities rather than corporations may 
have to take account of the purposes of the members in a 
different way, which appreciates that the parts of such systems 
are at a higher level than the system itself, but the conclusion 
- that the benefits of planning derive more from participation 
in the planning process than from the consumption of its product 
- remains valid. 
Friedmann (1959, 1966, 1967, 1969) comments that "until a few 
years ago, discussions of planning were restricted to 
consideration of an abstract model of perfect rationality in 
social decision-making" (Friedmann: 1967:225). He interprets 
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planning as societal action, concerned with 'the guidance of 
change in a social system', and oversteps the disjunction 
between plan formation and plan implementation in drawing 
attention to the characteristics of 'action' and 'innovative' 
planning, and the changed environmental circumstances that are 
making these new modes obligatory. The new modes are dynamic 
and continuous. Any plan, given the contextualist approach of 
this thesis, is only a working paper, not a set number of fixed 
objectives. Thus it is of but momentary importance; by the time 
it is published in print it may already be out-of-date. The 
making of the plan, the exercise of plan related thinking is 
infinitely more important than a neatly published book entitled: 
six-year plan. 
The widespread notion that planning and implementation are 
separable activities dies hard, while the belief that adequately 
communicated plans ought to get accepted and implemented rests, 
"on the technocratic fallacy that planner's proposals are 
inherently superior to actions that result from the unaided 
decisions of non-planners" (Friedmann: 1969:311). 
Most forms of societal action are system-maintaining rather than 
system-transforming (revolution and counter-planning), and 
embrace two forms of planning - allocative and innovative 
planning. The former concerns the 'assignment of resource 
increments among competing uses' and exhibits strains towards 
comprehensiveness, system-wide balances, synthesis, and 
functional rationality. Innovative planning, on the other hand, 
is concerned with the mobilisation and organisation of resources 
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for new uses: " ••• the task of innovative planning is the 
institutionalisation of functions, roles, frameworks, and 
performance programs that were not previously part of an 
organisation's repertory" (Friedmann: 1969:312). Elsewhere he 
has put forward four defining characteristics. Innovative 
planning may be defined in terms of four characteristics: 
1. It seeks to legitimise new social objectives or to 
accomplish a major realignment of those already existing; 
2. is concerned with the translation of general value 
propositions into new institutional arrangements and 
concrete action programs; 
3. has greater interest in the mobilisation of resources than 
in their optimal allocation among competing uses; 
4. proposes to guide the process of innovation and the 
consequent adjustments within the system through information 
feedback of the actual consequences of innovation. 
This description makes it abundantly clear that innovative 
planning eschews the comprehensive plan in favour of strategic 
action. For communities living through a succession of 
continuing crises, innovative should be more prevalent than 
allocative planning. Indeed the need for innovation is among 
the imperative needs of an age which structural changes are the 
normal pattern and social equilibria may be considered fragile 
and short-lived. 
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Very similar conceptions have evolved among the leading thinkers 
in the domain of corporate planning, many of whom make explicit 
recognition of the fact that, just as for the metropolis, the 
transformation of corporate environments in the direction of 
greater complexity and.unpredictability urgently demands new 
forms of planning behaviour. A brief review of just four such 
waters will .make the point. According to Branch, for example, 
changes in the structure and organisation of finance, sales and 
distribution, industrial relations and research and development 
require an enhanced sensitivity to the environment and reduction 
of reaction times of business operations. The type of planning 
needed has the characteristic that 'the continuous application 
of the process is more important than any particular plan': 
An understanding of the inherent 
open-endedness of planning, a coming to 
terms with the scientifically indeterminate 
environment within which it must operate, 
and the establishment of an effective modus 
operandi are required for successful 
planning in general and corporate planning 
in particular. 
(Branch: 1962:40) 
Beer attacks the tacit assumptions of the 'old' model of 
planning in the following terms: 
There is no 'day of judgement', even 
notionally, against which to measure overall 
performance. This means that the pay-off 
for any set of plans is no criterion of 
optimality ••• the proposal is then, that 
managerial decisions implicit in any plan 
ought to be taken over and over again while 
the plan is unfolding; and that it is not 
enough to say (as managers do) that the plan 
'ought to be flexible'. It sounds like a 
truism that planning must be a continuous 
process; and yet it is not in practice, and 
this is why plans - notoriously - 'do not 
work'. 
(Beer: 1970:32) 
In discussing the challenges to management science of long-range 
planning, Drucker has defined business planning as: 
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a continuous process of making present 
entrepreneurial decisions systematically and 
with best possible knowledge of their 
futurity, organising systematically the 
effort needed to carry out these decisions, 
and measuring the results of these decisions 
against expectations through organised 
systematic feedback. 
(Drucker: 1959:240) 
With regard to city planning in particular, Mitchell concludes. 
from his inspection of the "'new frontier in metropolitan 
planning' that the professionals will have to grow out of their 
"'static, handicraft, and largely intuitive methods"': 
Most planning today is static. It portrays 
a desired urban pattern at some future date. 
I believe the plans of the future will be 
plans for the nature, rate, quantity, and 
quality of urban change - for a process of 
development. They will be expressed in 
dynamic rather than static terms. They will 
start with present conditions and point the 
direction and rate of change. 
(Mitchell: 1961:171) 
For planners who are having to operate in environments of 
extended size and complexity, and rapid and uneven change, 
solutions are not to be found in attempts to improve upon the 
weaknesses of the synoptic ideal or striving harder for 
optimisation in policy making, nor in the more obvious 
pathologies of artificially fragmenting the decision field. The 
direction of response required is from utopian to piece-meal 
social engineering (Pepper: 1945); from synoptic idealism to 
'disjointed incrementalism"' (Braybrooks and Lindblom: 1963), 
and, more generally perhaps, from optimising to adaptivising. A 
world view compatible with such a shift has to acknowledge that 
our systems for living can never be complete and in balance, but 
will always be unfinished and will experience strains and 
stresses. It requires the further appreciation that an extended 
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field confronted with turbulent conditions is able to improve 
upon its total development and adaptive potential by loosening 
the connections among the parts and enabling them by process of 
'partisan mutual adjustment''to meet the uncertainties in each 
of their relevant environments. 
Within the strategy of 'incrementalism', it appears that through 
various specific types of partisan mutual adjustment among the 
large number of individuals which comprise groups, there seems 
to be a diffuseness. Further, that among such groups analysis 
and policy-making may be fragmented. What is ignored, however, 
is that one point in policy-making becomes central at another 
point. Hence, it will often be possible to find a tolerable 
level of ratlonality in decision making when the process is 
viewed as a whole in its social or political context, even if at 
each individual policy making centre, analysis remains 
iricomplete. 
Of adaptive planning, we may say, therefore, that it is 
continuous, participative, value-laden, and future-oriented. 
Engaging constructively with the future and doing planning takes 
precedence over the creation of plans, which has ~ natural 
consequence that the more people who can be involved, the better 
planning can be expected to be. It is inherently concerned with 
values as facts and seeks to understand the way in which they 
change and interact with needs and means, rather than trying to 
separate values and facts into different phases of planning 
activity. 
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Adaptive planning responds to the difficulties of constructing a 
comprehensive evaluative method and the limitations of human 
problem-solving capabilities.by rejecting the centralisation of 
power, control and decision-making, in favour of the devolution 
of initiative and the decomposition of problems into separate 
facets and successive stages. It aspires to a level of 
rationality in the achievements of the whole system that is 
consistent with the decentralisation of decision-making among 
the numerous purposeful sub-systems and the processes of mutual 
adjustment by which stable ecological patterns are evolved and 
maintained. 
Adaptive planning seeks to inspire and to shape societal change, 
not by the construction of complete and final designs of the 
future or by bringing into existence special and massive 
problem-solving agencies to remedy particular dysfunctions, but 
through connected series of opportunistic interventions by the 
communities described here, or individuals concerned with 
improving their "life-space", in which the purposes accomplished 
have the character that they each contribute to progress towards 
a guiding ideal which supplies their rationale. The techniques 
for accomplishing change in this manner are resistant to 
categorisation, because they are more likely to issue from 
expediency than from rational calculation. They include a 
special sensitivity to the use of 'leverage points' - those 
parts of the field which are susceptible to change and from 
which the greatest rates of diffusion can be expected; the 
manipulation of incentives and inducements in the reconciliation 
of competing ends; the practice of generating resources, 
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(including, especially, human and organisational resources) as a 
worthy end in itself; and the use of experimental methods in 
searching for solutions, in which the extra costs incurred and 
risks involved have to be justified in terms of the guarantee of 
~ result, positive or negative, that contributes to overall 
progress. 
A Methodology 
Adaptive planning aims to overcome inadequacies of information 
and to improve upon its own performance by devising and 
employing techniques of action that generate information, and 
which make the maximum amount of learning possible. When it is 
successful it is continuously self-correcting, and provides a 
continuing education for those who are involved. In community 
planning, this means that some members must be involved from the 
beginning and throughout a phase of planning activity, so they 
may learn at least what the official planners learn, while both 
may learn more as a result of their interaction. Attempts to 
involve citizens at the blueprint stage, when a plan has been 
prepared and polished, must be expected to generate more 
antipathy than learning. Insofar as learning comes from 
self-help and practical experiences, it ·may be furthered in the 
community by making citizens responsible for conducting surveys, 
organising planning exhibitions and so on, and more importantly, 
for actually planning their own neighbourhoods. To the extent 
that more can be learnt from meeting conflicts and trying to 
resolve them than from suppressing or avoiding them, there are 
benefits to be gained from working out such conflicts in a 
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public forum. To go. a step further, some elements of conflict 
may be deliberately introdu.ced by the creation and formal 
sanctioning of a counter-planning system, to provide continuous 
criticism and promote alternativese To the extent that learning 
rarely suffers from the making of mistakes, the community's own 
~lanners should be expected (and allowed) to make them, the 
benefits of the experience thus gained compensating for 
sub-optimal solutions in terms of professional design and 
implementation standards. 
The long-run aim or ideal of the adaptive planner becomes, as 
Ackoff enigmatically suggests, his own obsolescence. The family 
succeeds in its historical and cultural mission not by providing 
its dependent members with all that they need and want, but by 
liberating them from itself through providing them with the 
adaptive capabilities to survive in other environments. 
Adaptive planning succeeds when its children become planners 
themselves, and parents are able to retire. 
Because ours is an age dominated by technology in a time of 
prodigious technological change, we need to become, by one means 
or another, an 'adaptive society', able to extract the fullest 
possible returns from the opportunities at hand and to build 
into the social field "the kind of resilience that will enable 
us to accept fully and easily the best promises of changing 
circumstances without losing our sense of continuity or our 
essential integrity" (Morison: 1966:42). 
We are not, as yet, an emotionally adaptive society, though I 
think we try systematically to develop forces that tend to make 
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up one. We encourage the search for new inventions; and keep 
the mind stimulated, bright, and free to seek out fresh means of 
transport, communication, and energy; yet we remain, in part, 
appalled by the consequences of our ingenuity, and, too 
frequently, try to find security through the shoring up of 
ancient and irrelevant conventions, the extension of purely 
physical safeguards, or the delivery of decisions we ourselves 
should make into the keeping of superior authority like the 
state. 
We should then, give some attention to the construction of a new 
view of ourselves as a society which in time of great change 
identified with the obtained security and satisfaction from the 
wise and creative accommodation to change itself. Such a view 
rests, I think, upon a relatively greater reverence for the mere 
process of living in a society than we possess today, and a 
relatively smaller respect for and attachment to any special 
product of a society, a product either as finite as a bathroom 
fixture or as conceptual as a fixed and final definition of our 
democracy. 
The Planner's Role: From Master to Midwife 
When the task of city planning is broadened from its. 
preoccuption with the physical environment to encompass the 
ecological problems of the regulation of change in extended 
urban fields, and the strategic objectives for regulation is 
defined in terms of value-formation and institutionalisation, 
some important changes are implied for the role of the planne~. 
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The concept of adaptive planning described in the preceding 
section invites one to think of the planner and organisations 
for planning as resources to be used by communities in their 
efforts to improve the quality of the community life. As the 
critical environmental processes in the action environment of 
the planner are the purposeful behaviours of people who are 
capable of directly correlating their own behaviours with what 
is done by planners, ·there can be no utility in trying to define 
or to prescribe the particular sorts of relations that should 
exist between planners and planned. Their interactions should 
be II1Ultiple, varied and changing, and always open to new 
possibilities. 
The role of midwife suggests, however, that the respective 
contributions of planners and citizens to the planning process 
ought to be more a matter for joint determination, and not 
something that is decided unilaterally by the planners. 
Reflecting the climate of self-examination of the city planning 
profession, Rein (1969) suggests that the advent of 'social' 
planning to respectable status makes it necessary for the 
planner to search for new sources of legitimation. Their 
authority has been legitimised in the past in terms of: 
expertise: planners are considered as scientific experts 
operating independently of the political process 
bureaucratic position: the planners operate as the agents of 
elected political representatives 
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consumer preferences: the planners operate as the translators 
and advocates of user-group preferences 
professional values: planners operate in terms of a 
preconceived notion of what planners consider relevant. 
In terms of the framework discussed here, however, there would 
be an accumulating, almost world-wide pressure away from such 
legitimation towards participative democracy which places an 
added importance on defining planners' roles not only in terms 
of formal qualifications and bureaucratic position, but in terms 
of leadership, and visible ability to assist in the pursuit of 
community objectives and ideals. 
It is suggested that planners might learn from (for example) 
successful ghetto leaders (Ackoff: 1970c) who survive not 
through the operation of the "Peter Principle", but by 
effectively serving their constituents and.the larger community 
that contains them: 
Without support of the larger community, 
ghetto leaders cannot get the resources and 
programs that they require to serve their 
constituents. Without serving their 
constituents they cannot retain any 
followers. Hence only effective leaders 
survive •••• The ghett9 leader has neither 
rank nor authority vested in him from above. 
Therefore, he cannot use these to get others 
to do what they do not want to do. He tnust 
know what his followers want, what they can 
be persuaded to do, and how he can persuade 
them to do it. 
(Ackoff: 1970c:l8) 
To retain his position, the ghetto leader has to 'deliver the 
goods', and to do this he has to rely on personal qualities and 
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a close and continuous sensitivity to the needs and moods of 
those whom he serves. 
Obviously, professional planners need to acquire political and 
inter-personal skills if they are to play any significant part 
in urban development. If metropolitan problems are to be dealt 
with, it is up to the planner and his professional cohorts to 
develop strategies which will include not only physical and 
social change but also the building of coalitions among the 
holders of influence in urban areas." (Robinovitz: 1967:19). 
The skills required for discovering and formulating coalitions 
and maintaining alliances are, to varying degrees, the skills of 
the politician. 
Friedmann (1966) has discussed the 'behaviour traits' of 
innovative planners and the ways in which these differ from the 
received image of the professional planner's role. Innovative 
planners become committed to their ideas, and are more concerned 
with justifying proposed solutions than with predicting their 
consequences. They become engaged, but not involved, in the 
political process, retaining a marginal, boundary position 
between planning and political systems that gives them influence 
in each, and treat information and co-operation as tactical 
ingredients in getting towards solutions rather than as ends in 
themselves. Finally, they show strong preference for 
experimental methods and pilot schemes in tackling difficult 
problems - a predisposition to learn by practical results 
rather than abstract 'trial-by-stimulation- which is so much in 
vogue. What stands out in this personality profile of 
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innovative planners is their commitment to ideas, their 
single-minded pursuit of a task, their political engagement, and 
their relative indifference to values other than those which 
bear specifically on their problems. 
This recalls the observation of Wolfgang 
Mommsen that 'only a spiritual state that is 
basically attached to certain values by 
which the individual feels personally 
compelled, can supply the measure of energy 
requisite to break out from the confines of 
the everyday world and impart a new 
direction to its sluggish flow: 
(Friedmann: 1966:201) 
The concern of this 'new breed' of action planners whose 
concerns are really 'trans-technical', and whose training ought 
to include the development of those personal skills that enable 
technical and analytical competencies to be put to the best use 
has not yet manifested itself. Yet, the action planner needs 
heightened self-knowledge, greater powers of empathy, and an 
in~re~sed capacity for learning (' ••• his effectiveness will 
often depend on his ability to learn from others and from the 
situation itself, and to rapidly integrate this learning with 
the knowledge he already possesses. This implies ••• a 
willingness to learn, a htnnbleness when faced with new and 
possible disconcerting facts ••• ') He needs to be capable of the 
skilful use of symbolic materials and to have an understanding 
of the dynamics of power and political processes. Finally, his 
word must be responsible. He is advocating points of view that 
will affect the lives and well-being of others. In 
action-planning then, the planner moves to the foreground as a 
person and autonomous agent. His success will in large measure 
depend on his skill in managing interpersonal relations. The 
----- ----------------------------------~ 
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typical action environment is tense and charged with conflict. 
Consequently, the planner has to learn to live with conflict, to 
accept conflict as in·evi table, and to exploit conflicting forces 
for constructive action. Only rarely will the planner have his 
way; he will have to bargain, compromise, and .learn to accept 
defeat without being crushed.by it. 
Planners must become advocates acting on behalf of every kind of 
organised interest group (political parties, chambers of 
commerce, real estate boards, labour organisations, ad hoc 
protest associations, and, in particular, neighbourhood groups). 
This appeal is based on the view that planners need to become 
involved. The planner should do more than explicate the values 
underlying his prescriptions for courses of action (Davidoff: 
1965). He should affirm them; he should be an advocate for what 
he deems proper. 
We may note that as a major drawback to effective democratic 
planning 'the continuation of that non-responsible vestigal 
institution, the planning commission' (Davidoff: 1965:331), and 
proposes to substitute for its unitary planning a process of 
plural planning in which many groups create and defend plans 
with the help of advocate planners. 
The advocate planner is responsible to his client group, on 
behalf of whom he engages in the planning process, and whose 
views he seeks to express - he pleads for his own and his 
client's view of the good society. He therefore devotes much 
time to assisting the client organisation in clarifying its 
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ideas and giving expression to them, but he is also occupied in 
informing other groups of the conditions, problems and outlook 
of the group he represents, and is responsible for the critical 
appraisal of the planning carried out by other groups. 
These are some of the facets of any emerging image of the kind 
of planner who is needed to create and galvanise the resources 
required to tame the metropolis. It goes without saying that 
all existing technical and theoretical skills that enter into 
the planning process will continue to be fundamental, although 
they have not been considered here. Beyond this, the horizon is 
one of increasing diversity in the roles that planners will be 
playing. 
The new conceptual mapping of the urban field I propose here 
suggests that the organisation of planning itself might benefit 
from becoming ordered to the structural levels of the urban 
field, instead of the functional and territorial divisions that 
are commonly used. The problem of the whole urban field is one 
of overall strategic planning, requiring co-ordination with 
developments in contiguous (and more distant) fields. 
Alternative field structures and their implications as 
boundaries for the finer texture have to be spelt out. The 
involvement of the public here should come in the evolution of 
the philosophical basis of the structure, which could be argued 
out in many venues from a realistic (i.e. limited) number of 
genuine alternatives. Inevitably, some of the major forces 
shaping the structural alternatives are the dispositions and 
objectives of the dominant institutional complexes of 
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government, public and private enterprise; and planners 
operating at this level need to be able to relate themselves 
effectively to the institutional leaders from these domains and 
to negotiate a degree of congruence between the values 
represented in the planning process and those held by other 
institutions. 
At the community level, the roles of leader and advocate become 
more salient, and more activities can be directed to giving 
expression to the preferred values. The community seems to be 
the critical level for efforts to reduce turbulence as it 
impacts upon family groups and individual lives. Organising 
community members behind values such as those built into 
Alinsky's "People's Organisations", or conservation, or 
anti-poverty, gives a structure to the field against which other 
choices and actions can be measured. Community planners should 
be in contact with the individuals and families, local 
organisations and interest groups, shopkeepers, lawyers, law 
enforcement officers and other functionaries in the community, 
and devote time to deliberately cultivating organisation with 
and amongst them, so that the planners' success may eventually 
be measured not by the amount and quality of the planning that 
they do, but the amount that they enable others to do. 
It is doubtful whether there is much value in trying to 
rationally plan and create behaviour settings, as their quality 
and viability are as much the product of individual free 
expression and spontaneous interaction as of a definable milieu. 
They need to be nurtured permissively in the same way the 
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intelligent planners of institutional environs do not 'fix' and 
concretise footpaths until people have shown where they want to 
walk. If, at the level of the whole field, the planner's 
autonomy and responsibility are greatest, at the community level 
he becomes a collaborator and co-planner, in the 'creation' and 
maintenance of behaviour settings he plays his least obtrusive 
role - that of facilitator. 
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CHAPTER IX 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
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In Chapter VIII, I attempted to draw together the threads of the 
thesis and from this I wish to develop a number of 
recommendations for future action. Finally to add a cautionary 
note, and some thoughts on implementation. 
·From the outset, this thesis has been premised on the notion 
that a new paradigm using a contextualist frame of reference 
which offers a new appreciative system is necessary if we are to 
make headway in _dealing with environmental turbulence. Further, 
I have argued that the flight to increased organisational 
efforts to find solutions through acquiring more powerful 
systems for information gathering, data storage and analysis, 
model-building and simulation and so on, will not provide 
adequate outcomes. 
Adaptability, at all levels of human affairs, is positively 
evaluated almost without exception. This gives to "'adaptive 
planning"' and the notion of the "'adaptive society"' a rather 
seductive appeal that must be guarded against. The point~to be 
emphasized is that the adaptations urgently required are of the 
active and not the passive type. The indulgency of 'free fall' 
has taken us so close to the portals of a global trap that 
reacting to changed circumstances when they have become manifest 
is a luxury that cannot really be afforded. Active inter-
ventions are needed to overcome inertia in the massive system of 
technologically-dominated machinery, energy, institutions, and 
ideas of post-industrialising societies, in order to provide a 
widening array of meaningful alternatives in ways of living. 
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As has been argued consistently here this requires: 
1. active involvement of individuals in order to regulate 
actions and interactions across the systems so that we do 
not allow society to be judged and have policies formulated 
for it by elites. This requires planning with and planning 
by the people themselves. 
2. That planning be regarded as a process, in which the plan is 
seen as an initial step in the formulation of succeeding 
plans to bring about appropriate actions thereby increasing 
the likelihood of a favourable outcome. We move then, from 
a "comprehensive plan" to strategic planning. This I call 
adaptive planning. 
3. The role of the planner must be changed from director to 
facilitator. The planner must be 'involved'. 
How may such recommendations be implemented? 
One readily available (but presently under-utilised) means from 
which a start may be made is the method of experimentation. 
Ways need to be found of building into society closer control 
over its own .nature and direction, of giving its members more 
responsibility for participating and greater powers of choice, 
better evidence for judging alternatives, and more inspiring 
purposes and ideals by which to live. We might approach such 
tasks experimentally through the introduction of a massive 
expansion of the process of experimental demonstration 
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throughout all parts of the society to create the mood and means 
that will enable the members of the society to explore new 
instruments and new procedures by designed experiments while 
pondering alternatives and reserving judgement until the results 
, are in. 
The conditions governing such experiments, whether conducted 
with new machinery, new building designs, new manufacturing 
systems, new ideas for community organisation, are relatively 
simple and much the same in each case (Morison: 1966). In 
addition, in each area of interest there should be not one, but 
a good many different experiments of differing design so that a 
suitable array of alternative s6lutions could be offered. There 
should also be enough of them in all parts of our life to 
demonstrate that the society is proceeding, as a whole, in the 
mood of ex,,eriment. 
Social experimentation needs to be operational rather than 
'pure', requiring some measures of protection, but not those 
which would make experimentation artificial and abstracted from 
the realities of the social world. The relevance and value of 
social experimentation if small, is critically dependent upon 
its ability to encompass, in some manner, those real exingencies 
that have to be confronted in the post-experimental stage. It 
is, therefore, of the first importance that experimental sites 
be judiciously selected. They must be sites which offer 
conditions for conceptual protection in the design stage, 
experimental protection during the period in which changes are 
introduced and modified, and operational protection during the 
( 
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transitional phase from experimental to normal operations (Trist 
et.al: 1963:225-6) Yet at the same time if the experiences are 
to be transferable they must not be protected to the point of 
unreality. From what basis then might experimentation in 
planning proceed - what would it be designed to accomplish? 
The suggestion here is that such experimentation is more 
productively grounded on a conception of the 'solution' of end 
state to be aimed at than on the nature of the immediate 
threats, difficulties and disturbances that constitute the 
problem-solving situation. In terms of the normal thresholds of 
human and organisational adaptivity, the turbulent environment 
represents an 'overshoot' - a behaviour milieu characterised by 
degrees of complexity, uncertainty, connectivity and dynamism 
that make irrelevant the experiences gained in other 
environments, and make dangerous attempts to survive passively. 
Yet the forces that operate within the manageable, disturbed-
reactive environment to produce turbulent conditions are so 
pervasive and so powerful that there can be no question of 
throwing them into reverse, thereby creating a path back from 
the Type IV to the Type III environment. 
Massive and powerful institutions, government complexes and 
multinational corporate systems cannot now be dismantled into 
independent firms and bureaus, and there are no obvious gains 
from now reducing the speeds and capacities of the global 
communications net, or placing a moratorium on scientific 
research. Attempts to begin reducing the interdependence of the 
economic and other facets of society are, at least, equally 
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unfeasible. These are the forces behind the uneven acceleration 
of change, the growth in size, complexity, and inter-
connectedness of social fields, and they are forces that we 
should not deceive ourselves could be turned around, 
nothwithstanding the convictions of the evangelist, the 
authoritarian, and the synoptic idealist to the contrary. 
The solution from which we might backwardly (See Chapters 7 
and 8) determine the content and design of the experiments that 
ought to be undertaken is not found, therefore, in the structure 
of the disturbed-reactive environment, to which there can be no 
return. We are concerned, rather, with a dialectical process, in 
which the disturbed-reactive environment represents the thesis, 
and the turbulent environment the antithesis. The synthesis, 
(and my solution) is not the disturbed-reactive environment 
again, but a modified form of it, which I have tentatively 
called a disturbed-creative environment. It is a modulated form 
of the turbulent environment, in which some of the character of 
the disturbed-reactive environment is reproduced. 
Turbulence is generated by the pounding accumulation of 
competitive energies and forces which are predominantly 
divergent - single, self-seeking power centres each seeking to 
refashion the world in its own image, and deciding amongst 
competition, co-operation or coalition on the basis of power 
added. When these same forces become convergent, it is often 
unpredictable there having been no symptoms discernible with the 
aid of any existing instruments. The consequences of actions 
lead off everywhere and anywhere, with unexpected (and 
387 
unprepared-for) windfalls and traumas equally possible. What 
becomes necessary is to have greater potentialities for 
convergence built into the.field - a rewiring of the loose ends 
of action consequences, to enhance the probabilities that they 
will converge and cohere into recognisable patterns, rather than 
working themselves out through attrition, or converging randomly 
to create contingencies that can neither be readily taken 
advantage of nor easily avoided. 
To identify, plot and engender convergence out of such blooming, 
buzzing confusion is a task demanding creativity, and it is for 
this reason that we are inclined to refer to the modulated 
turbulent environment as disturbed-creative. It is still 
disturbed because the generating forces of turbulence cannot be 
eradicated. The creativity especially required, as previously 
suggested, is creativity in value-formation and dissemination -
in other words, leadership. The potentialities for the 
deliberate creation of convergence and coherence out of the 
turbulently-connected field are a function of the quality of 
leadership in all the regions and at each level in the field, 
of the ability of some human beings to relate the unconnected, 
unite the dissident, and all the time imaginatively embrace the 
more and more inclusive systems of which they are part. The 
necessary rewiring is not something that may be accomplished 
technically or politically or educationally, or by any other 
system of power. It is something that has to be accomplished by 
the fragile instruments of men's minds, and their capacities to 
present and adhere to ideals to which the behaviours of multiple 
and diverse actors in the field may be directively correlated. 
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Having identified the disturbed-creative environment as the 
'solution', the question arises whether, in specific cases, it 
may be approached 'from below', from the simpler environments, 
through interventions in the evolutionary processes at the 
Type II and Type III levels. The appeal of this strategy is 
that it may, in some respects, be easier to guide the 
developmental forces in clustered and reactive environments so 
as to produce a demonstration case of the disturbed-creative 
field than to discover the kinds of interventions appropriate in 
the turbulent field to reduce its complexity. In the case of 
urban planning, the concrete terms of this possibility have to 
do with the kind of planning that is done in new communities. 
New communities (estates, villages, towns, cities) embodying 
modernity in conception and design, and reflecting current or 
somewhat advanced notions of appropriate standards of living 
have become a salient feature of contemporary society and are 
much discussed in the planning literat~re. It is generally (but 
not always) appreciated that new communities in themselves can 
never provide an answer to the real problems of the large city. 
They syphon away minute and often privileged fractions of 
metropolitan populations, and in their novelty and physical 
attractiveness distract attention from the dominant urban 
sprawls. They have, however, been referred to, and appealed to, 
as sites in which experiments in planning might take place. 
New ·urban growth comes in many different _forms - garden cities 
and garden suburbs, model estates and villages, corridor 
expansion and new satellites for the metropolis. In such 
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contexts, planning may begin from a virgin, "'green fields"' 
environment, or, as in town expansion schemes, from a more 
disurbed, though still relatively simple, environment. In cases 
where new towns are built on publicly owned land in particular, 
planning organisations occupy highly favourable positions 
vis-a -vis those in the large established cities. If the 
judgment is correct that a requirement for coming to terms with 
t.urbulent planning environments is new forms of more positive 
engagement between planners and other parts of the field, then 
the conclusion seems justified that the experience of creating 
new communities to date has been nowhere near as successful as 
it might have been. 
These benign environments seem to have attracted some of the 
best planners with the promise of relatively early and very 
tangible results. Characteristically, however, they have used 
their protected positions to perfect the traditional modes of 
planning, and to develop new techniques, rather than 
experimenting with the planning process itself. Planners 
continue to differentiate hierarchically among their own 
capabilities, organising themselves into bureaucratic structures 
when these are demonstrably less responsive .than organic and 
matrix forms of organisation. While there is much talk in new 
communities of "'social"' planning, in fact planning usually 
continues to be organised around physical and spatial concepts, 
and reputations made on architectural not social achievements. 
The "Master Plan"' is "'out' and "'participation"' is "'in"', but 
seldom with significant consequences. The 'strategic outline 
plan"' is less dogmatic and more palatable to the planned, while 
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participation, as it is normally conceived, absorbs protest but 
fails to unleash new energies and enthusiasms. The community 
development officer often seems to be the product of the same 
type of thinking, which produces 'innovations' that will better 
maintain the status quo. 
Canberra, the Australian national capital, provides a classic 
example of this kind of 'lost opportunity'. Constituted in 
1957, the National Capital Development Commission has become a 
near perfect model of the traditional style of city planning. 
The organisation is powerful, efficient and impersonal, and its 
planning long range, comprehensive and authoritarian. With the 
land owned by the Commonwealth, and its use controlled by the 
planners through a leasehold system, Canberra's planners oscupy 
a position that is the envy of their colleagues in the state 
capitals. They have used their powers to create a physically 
superb, but socially and politically dormant habitat, manifested 
in the pervasive 'we-them' mental set of Canberrites towards the 
Commission. 
On the practically total lack of citizen involvement in the 
planning process, the Commission has, at least, been quite 
frank: 
Although all avenues of disseminating 
information are pursued, there is no direct 
involvement of the public in the planning 
process. There has been little evidence of 
a desire for such involvement so far but it 
can be anticipated that a more educated 
public (sic) will seek more opportunities 
for dialogue before decisions are made. The 
Commission can see nruch value in dialogue on 
matters of 'municipal' concern. It has 
already conducted a number of surveys of 
attitudes and behaviour of people and is 
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proceeding with a programme of seminars on 
topics which lend themselves to public 
comment. 
(NCDC: 1970:134) 
Elsewhere in the same publication, (a high quality and expensive 
book on "Tomorrow's Canberra'), the planners' priorities are 
further revealed. The key to the com'mission' s success in the 
planning and development of Canberra is attributed to five 
factors: 
The public ownership of land and the 
leasehold system of tenure; the availability 
of reasonable funds for development, the 
absence of fragmentation in responsibilities 
for the planning, development, and 
construction of the city; mutual 
understanding of objectives between the 
leasing and administration authority (the 
Commonwealth Department of the Interior) and 
the planning, development, and construction 
authority; and effective partnership with 
private enterprise. 
(NCDC: 1970:233) 
The 150,000 human beings who struggle to breathe life into the 
monumentality and vistas, the district centres and neighbourhood 
units, are not accorded the privilege of partnership granted to 
private enterprise. They are privileged strangers in their own 
community. 
In general, the new communities seem to have deferred to the old 
paradigm of planning, and their planners occasionally even to 
have struggled to retard the evolution from a clustered to a 
reactive environment. There are, however, other possibilities 
for experimenting with open-ended and adaptive styles of 
planning that might eventually render the new community 
experiences relevant to the metropolitan crisis, by moving 
closer to the disturbed-creative· environment. This would 
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involve planners not in supplementing their physical planning by 
reacting to community organisations and protests as they appear 
(and running the risk of entering a conflict situation), but in 
creating organisation as an ingredient just as essential as 
roads and shops, and creating it not around particularised 
interests or territorial units, but around ideals that express 
the direction in which the community sees itself moving. 
Community engagement with planners ought not to be organised 
around 'participation', which, as in universities, invariably 
means lower echelons participating upwards in a manner that 
reinforces status barriers and isolates the 'participators', but 
around citizen control, delegated power, and partnership. This 
would mean planners foresaking the shelter and impersonality of 
the Commission offices and seeking legitimation in terms of 
·' 
human qualities that can be seen to fit them, in some respects, 
to act on behalf of, and to lead, the community. 
Fundamentally, if new communities are to be regarded as more 
than beautiful set pieces, as ends in themselves, and used by 
societies to experimentally generate new forms of societal 
development and regulation that are mor~ promising for the 
future than those now existing, the conventional industrial 
techniques of controlling and structuring developments 
comprehensively from the centre, avoiding or dampening 
conflicts, and visualising growth only as a quantitative affair, 
have to be surrendered. The living medium of the coming world 
is unlikely to be 'cool' and strongly structured by its figural 
elements, and contemporary designs for creating such worlds are 
393 
segmental and irrelevant in the broader picture. It will be 
'hot' and fast-reactive, evincing structure only at the field 
level, phenomenal worlds at lower levels being dominated by 
diversity, transience and novelty. 
To prepare for this world the captains of the new communities 
ought not to wait upon publics becoming 'more educated', but 
should vigorously go out and educate and create opportunities 
for education~ Planners who really believe in it, too, might 
devote resources to running their own continuing education 
programmes and spread their planning knowledge as far as 
possible. They might abandon the publication of 'cool' 
coffee-table books and reports in favour of 'turning on' 
planning awareness and interest through the local electronic 
media, seeking the maximum exposure of issues and conflicts. 
They might even begin weighing the personal satisfactions of 
advocacy against the bureaucratic security of the planning 
authority. 
Notwithstanding such possibilities in the planning of new 
communities, there are considerable forces militating against 
the development of the creative-convergent field out of the 
clustered and reactive environments of new community settings, 
and some grounds for suspecting that even if this could be 
al.!hieved it might not be a convincing demonstration for those 
who would have to approach this new state from its opposite 
side, looking back. In particular, generally high levels of 
content must, with the living environments of new communities 
compared to those previously experienced, dispose inhabitants 
against permanent active involvements. 
394 
It seems, therefore, that the experiments that have to be 
undertaken are those directed to producing a disturbed~creative 
field from states of affairs that have already, in some senses, 
moved beyond this, into turbulence. This means taking 
open-ended, adaptive planning principles into the worst 
communities of the big cities and demonstrating there that 
people can do their own planning, and through this continuously 
learn more about planning, their community, and each other. It 
has to be demonstrated, too, that in this process the comnrunity 
can nurture latent creativity and leadership, and discover the 
ideals that can focus forces of dissension and distress as well 
as initiative and enthusiasm. 
To push (gratuitously, perhaps), just one step further, we might 
suggest that any realiy effective transformation of the 
turbulent urban field may be brought about by a pincer movement, 
in which grass-roots transformation of social settings in a 
number of scattered community laboratories is carried out in 
connection with (and in direct relation to) the working-out at 
the level of the leadership of the whole field, of a guiding 
philosophy or vision of future life in the city. City Hall and 
ghetto leaders, city councils and ratepayers' associations, city 
planning authorities and local progress associations might, 
thus, devote time and effort to negotiating a positive fusion of 
energies and collaborating in the production of a vision and 
philosophy for the development of the field as a whole; a vision 
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